Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. June 30, 1853.

CONFIDENTIAL.

F.O.
424

PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

8

From May 1850 to July 1853.

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. June 30, 1853.

CONFIDENTIAL.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES

OF THE

LATIN AND GREEK CHURCHES

IN

TURKEY.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.			Subject.	Page
1. Sir Stratford Canning ..	No. 161	May 20, 1850	Question which has arisen between the Greek and Latin Churches respecting holy buildings at Jerusalem	1
2. To Sir Stratford Canning	170	June 7,	To take no part in the discussion respecting the holy buildings ..	1
3. Sir Stratford Canning ..	176	5,	Note verbale of French Minister. Resistance to be looked for on part of Greek Church	2
4. To Sir Stratford Canning	177	24,	Approving answer to French Minister respecting note verbale	2
5. Sir Stratford Canning ..	221	July 5,	Conduct of Roman Catholic representatives, and of the Greeks. Sir Stratford Canning takes no part	3
6. To Sir Stratford Canning	210	Aug. 3,	Approving his non-interference ..	4
7. Sir Stratford Canning ..	225	July 19,	Copies of notes from representatives of Roman Catholic Powers. French demands and Articles of French Capitulations	4
8. „ „	269	Sept. 4,	Communication made by General Aupick to the Porte, requesting an answer to his demands of May 28	9
9. „ „	361	Dec. 4,	Firman of Selim I unfavourable to Latin claims	10
10. „ „	393	27,	Embarrassment of the Porte; it intends to appoint a Mixed Commission	10
11. „ „	4	Jan. 4,	Note from Porte to General Aupick announcing intention to appoint a Mixed Commission ..	11
12. „ „	9	6,	French Minister protests against documents subsequent to 1740 being referred to Mixed Commission	12
13. „ „	14	7,	Copy of French Minister's Protest	13
14. „ „	57	Feb. 25.	The French Government supports General Aupick's Protest. M. de Titoff's language	14
15. „ „	62	Mar. 6,	M. de Titoff's instructions; he has not written to the Porte. Austrian claims to protection of Latins	15
16. „ „	91	18,	Has abstained from taking part. Incloses letter from Guardian of Holy Sepulchre and reply ..	16
17. To Sir Stratford Canning	96	7,	Approving answer to the Guardian	17
18. Sir Stratford Canning ..	112	5,	Copies of Firmans respecting holy places granted in 1666 and 1688 to British Ambassador	17
19. „ „	167	May 19, 1851	M. Lavalette takes up negotiation respecting the holy places ..	19
20. „ „	206	June 19,	Course which the Porte proposes to pursue in regard to French demands	19

No.			Subject.	Page
21. Sir Stratford Canning ..	No. 218	July 4, 1851	Answer of the Porte to French Ambassador. Mixed Commission to be appointed	19
22. „ „	282	Sept. 17,	Interest shown by Russia in Greek pretensions. M. Lavalette's language	20
23. Sir G. H Seymour ..	52	Oct. 21,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting discussions at Constantinople	21
24. Sir Stratford Canning ..	308	17,	Language of M. de Titoff to the Sultan, and His Highness' reply	21
25. „ „	309	17,	Letter from the Emperor of Russia to the Sultan	22
26. „ „	Private	25,	M. Lavalette's language respecting hesitation of the Porte to comply with his demands	23
27. „ „	Private	25,	Threats of Russia to prevent concession to French demands ..	23
28. „ „	No. 323	Nov. 4.	M. de Lavalette's language and reference to his Government. Course taken by the Porte and Russian Envoy. Documents bearing on matters in discussion	24
29. „ „	328	5,	Conversation with Aali Pasha on French demand. Intentions of the Porte, and Russian pretensions	29
30. Lord Normanby ..	337	20,	Views of French Government respecting M. Lavalette's proceedings	30
31. To Lord Normanby ..	568	21,	Approving his language to M. Turgot	30
32. Sir Stratford Canning ..	334	5,	Conversation between M. Titoff and Aali Pasha	31
33. „ „	336	8,	Question to be referred to a Special Council of State for investigation	31
34. To Sir Stratford Canning	291	27,	For information as to the relative numbers of members of Greek and Latin Churches ..	32
35. Sir Stratford Canning ..	343	19,	M. Lavalette's language, and correspondence with the Porte ..	32
36. „ „	362	27,	Procès-verbaux of the Mixed Commission, and correspondence between M. Lavalette and the Porte	33
37. „ „	364	28,	Porte not alarmed by M. Lavalette's threats. Slow progress of inquiry	42
38. Lord Normanby ..	413	Dec. 17,	Prince Callimachi anxious that Reshid Pasha should be supported	42
39. Sir Stratford Canning ..	370	4,	M. de Lavalette's language to the Porte. Sir Stratford Canning tries to calm him ..	43
40. To Sir Stratford Canning	307	24,	M. de Lavalette to have leave of absence	43
41. To Lord Normanby ..	641	24,	Sir Stratford Canning will give all proper support to Reshid Pasha.	43
42. Sir Stratford Canning ..	383	18,	Urgency of M. Lavalette. Aali Pasha's account of Latin claims .	44
43. „ „ ..	387	30,	M. Lavalette has not yet obtained an answer. Course taken by M. Titoff	45
44. „ „ ..	Private & Confidential	31,	Report of Turkish Commission. Answers to questions of Porte. Emperor of Russia's feelings ..	45
45. „ „ ..	Private	Jan. 5, 1852	The Russian Envoy insists on the *status quo*	47
46. „ „ ..	1	7.	Compromise which the Porte wishes to make not likely to be acceptable to either party	47
47. „ „ ..	10	17,	Probable decision of the Porte in the nature of a compromise ..	47
48. „ „ ..	13	25,	Porte has decided to settle the question by a compromise ..	48
49. „ „ ..	18	Feb. 4,	Opposition of Russian Envoy ..	48
50. „ „ ..	30	18,	Conduct of Russian Envoy, and its probable motives	48

No.			Subject.	Page
51. Sir Stratford Canning ..	No. 31	Feb. 18, 1852	Note from Porte to French Minister and proposed communication to Russian Envoy. Opinion on Porte's decision	49
52. „ „ ..	52	Mar. 5,	Moderated tone of Russian Envoy	52
53. Lord Cowley ..	27	8,	M. de Turgot's satisfaction at settlement of question of holy places .	52
54. Sir Stratford Canning ..	58	19,	Firman of February to be delivered to the Greeks. Terms of settlement	53
55. „ „ ..	59	19,	Letter from the Sultan to the Emperor of Russia	55
56. Lord Cowley ..	380	July 1,	M. de Turgot denies having applied for co-operation of Austria ..	56
57. „ „ ..	401	8,	Porte's answer to French complaints in regard to firman of February	56
58. Colonel Rose ..	33	Aug. 3,	M. Lavalette does not wish to reopen the question of holy places	57
59. „ „ ..	50	14,	Objections urged by M. Lavalette against firman of February ..	57
60. „ „ ..	55	18,	Language of French and Russian Ministers respecting the holy places	57
61. Lord Cowley ..	519	Sep. 6,	Conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting M Lavalette's language	58
62. „ „ ..	532	13,	Conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys; his anxiety for settlement	59
63. „ „ ..	541	16,	Anxiety of French Government respecting reported armaments of Russia in Black Sea	59
64. Colonel Rose ..	70	Aug. 30,	France determined to insist on explanation of the firman ..	59
65. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	267	Sep. 17,	Serious consequences may result from modification of firman of February	60
66. „ „ ..	274	23,	Repeating apprehensions of consequences of alteration in firman.	60
67. Colonel Rose ..	76	7,	Observations on the firman of February	60
68. Lord Cowley ..	582	Oct. 3,	M. Drouyn de Lhuys considers question of holy places to be settled	61
69. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	289	1,	Danger of reopening question respecting holy places	61
70. Colonel Rose ..	89	Sep. 27,	France disclaims protectorate of Turkish Christians . ..	62
71. „ „ ..	92	Oct. 1,	Firman sent to Jerusalem by Afif Bey. M. Lavalette satisfied about firman	63
72. „ „ ..	113	19,	Importance of question respecting key of the great door at Bethlehem	64
73. Mr. Consul Finn ..	11	27,	Account of Afif Bey's proceedings at Jerusalem. He evades reading the firman	64
74. Colonel Rose ..	139	Nov. 20,	Embarrassing position of the questions relating to the holy places .	66
75. „ „ ..	140	20,	Pretensions and acts of French and Russian Ministers, who each menace the Porte. Colonel Rose at request of Porte communicates with those Ministers	67
76. „ „ ..	145	23,	Recommending that England should press the Powers to settle the question of the holy places ..	69
77. To Colonel Rose ..	97	Dec. 14,	Approving his conduct; but he must abstain from official interference	71
78. Colonel Rose ..	153	4,	Modified tone of French and Russian Ministers. Threats formerly used by them	71
79. „ „ ..	154	5,	Russia rests her claims on Treaty of Kainardji, 1774	72
80. „ „ ..	155	5,	Communication with Fuad Effendi and Grand Vizier. Further examination of documents ..	73

No.			Subject.	Page
81. To Colonel Rose ..	No. 106	Dec. 21, 1852	Approving his endeavours to moderate vehemence of rival claimants	74
82. Lord Cowley ..	739	19,	Anxiety of M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting question of holy places	74
83. Memorandum by Baron Brunnow	..	22,	State of question under discussion at Constantinople	75
84. Mr. Consul Finn ..	15	9,	Firman of February publicly read at Jerusalem	76
85. Lord Cowley ..	9	30,	Conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys	76
86. Colonel Rose ..	160	16,	Review of proceedings in the question of holy places	77
87. „ „ ..	164	18,	Animosity of Russians against Fuad Effendi	80
88. Lord Cowley ..	17	Jan. 6, 1853	M. Drouyn de Lhuys expresses to M. Kisseleff a desire for settlement of question	81
89. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	455	Dec. 31, 1852	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on state of the question at Constantinople	81
90. Mr. Consul Finn ..	16	28,	Silver star replaced at Bethlehem and keys of church delivered to the Latins	82
91. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	1	Jan. 6, 1853	Military preparations of Russia ..	83
92. „ „ ..	2	6,	Suggestion for settlement of matters in dispute	83
93. „ „ .	5	7,	Increased military preparations of Russia	84
94. „ „ ..	6	7,	Irritation of Emperor as regards Turkey	85
95. „ „ ..	7	8,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode; requirements of Russia from the Porte	86
96. Lord Cowley ..	42	20,	France anxious for a settlement. M. Brennier to replace M. Lavalette	86
97. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	10	9,	Memorandum on state of affairs and Russian armaments read to Count Nesselrode	87
98. „ „ ..	13	11,	First conversation with the Emperor on Turkish affairs	89
99. „ „ ..	15	11,	Further as to his conversation with Count Nesselrode	91
100. „ „ ..	17	13,	Summary of Russian despatch to Baron Brunnow	91
101. „ „ ..	18	13,	As to military preparations. Conversation with Count Nesselrode	92
102. „ „ ..	19	13,	State of military preparations ..	93
103. Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow	..	14,	Course which the Emperor proposes with reference to the question of the holy places . ..	93
104. To Sir G. H. Seymour	18	25,	Impolicy of a military demonstration on the part of Russia ..	95
105. Lord Cowley ..	51	24,	French overture at St. Petersburgh. Desire for a settlement. . ..	96
106. „ „ ..	54	25,	Conversation with French Emperor	96
107. „ „ ..	55	26,	General Castelbajac's communications with Emperor of Russia. Course which France proposes to pursue	97
108. To Colonel Rose ..	16	28,	Urgency for the settlement of the question respecting holy places .	99
109. To Lord Cowley ..	51	28,	Views taken of the question by Her Majesty's Government ..	99
110. „ „ ..	57	29,	Answer to No. 61. Perils of the Ottoman Empire from mutual jealousies of France and Russia. Montenegro	100
111. Lord Cowley ..	61	28,	Anxiety of the French Government respecting course to be taken by Austria in regard to Montenegro	101
112. Colonel Rose ..	2	1,	Advantage to the Porte from having itself decided the question of the holy places	102
113. „ „ ..	4	4,	There was only one firman. Moderated tone of the French and their demands	103

No.			Subject.	Page
114. Lord Cowley ..	No. 63	Jan. 31, 1853	Course that he has taken with the French Government	104
115. „ „ ..	66	31,	Altered tone of M. Drouyn de Lhuys	105
116. „ „ ..	68	31,	Explanation of his conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys reported in No. 61. Montenegro.	105
117. To Lord Cowley ..	71	Feb. 3,	Approving his course respecting the holy buildings	106
118. Lord Cowley ..	79	4,	Views attributed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Russia	106
119. Sir G. H. Seymour .	23	Jan. 21,	Count Nesselrode denies accuracy of report respecting assembling of a Russian naval force in the Adriatic..	107
120. „ „ ..	24	22,	Second conversation with the Emperor	108
121. „ „ ..	26	22,	Has communicated to Count Nesselrode the Emperor's language. Opinion of Russian statesmen on Eastern Question	111
122. „ „ ..	28	25,	Conversation with General de Berg	112
123. „ „ ..	36	27,	Fresh difficulties respecting holy places. Montenegro. Fuad Effendi. Emperor's policy	112
124. Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff	..	Feb. 7,	Count Nesselrode to M. Kisseleff. Recapitulation of transactions respecting holy places, and course to be pursued for a settlement..	113
125. To Sir G. H. Seymour	38	9,	Answer to his report of his conversation with the Emperor ..	116
126. „ „ ..	39	9,	Orders sent for equipment of Sevastopol fleet..	118
127. To Colonel Rose ..	22	10,	In consequence of Baron Brennier's detention he will abstain from offering any advice respecting holy places	118
128. Lord Cowley	93	11,	Language of M. Drouyn de Lhuys less satisfactory ..	118
129. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	44	3,	Rumoured mission of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople ..	119
130. „ „ ..	51	4,	Course to be pursued under present circumstances	120
131. „ „ ..	52	4,	As to Russian vessels reported to be sent to Albanian coast ..	120
132. „ „ ..	56	5,	Count Nesselrode's statements as to Prince Menchikoff's mission..	121
133. „ „ ..	57	5,	Baron Brunnow's desire to promote good understanding with England	122
134. Mr. Jerningham ..	12	17,	French Government have news of Prince Menchikoff's mission..	122
135. „ „ ..	13	17,	Desire of M. Drouyn de Lhuys for understanding with England ..	123
136. To Colonel Rose ..	27	19,	Language he is to hold as to holy places; and course to be pursued with reference to Prince Menchikoff's mission	123
137. Colonel Rose	19	Jan. 21,	As to the delivery of the key of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins	124
138. „ „ ..	30	28,	Communication with M. Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff	126
139. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	62	Feb. 10,	Conversation with Greek Minister	127
140. „ „ ..	69	10,	Sensation produced by Prince Menchikoff's mission: his character	127
141. „ „ ..	70	10,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on Prince Menchikoff's mission: and Austrian views of Holy Places Question	128
142. „ „ ..	73	10,	Substance of despatch to M. Kisseleff of February 7	129
143. Mr. Jerningham ..	24	21,	As to Prince Menchikoff's mission	129
144. Colonel Rose	36	4,	Influence of Russian feeling on Russian policy in the East ..	130
145. Mr. Jerningham ..	25	23,	M. Drouyn de Lhuys anxious about Eastern question	130
146. To Lord Stratford ..	1	25,	General Instructions on proceeding to Constantinople	131

No.			Subject.	Page
147. Mr. Jerningham ..	No. 29	Feb. 24, 1853	M. Drouyn de Lhuys disquieted by military movements of Austria and Russia	134
148. „ „ ..	31	24,	M. de la Cour sent to Constantinople: M. de Bourqueney to Vienna	134
149. Lord Cowley	108	26,	Favourable character of the above appointments	135
150. Colonel Rose	42	6,	Rumoured naval and military preparations in Black Sea	135
151. „ „ ..	43	6,	Ditto	135
152. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	80	17,	Has communicated Lord John Russell's despatch No. 38 to Count Nesselrode	136
153. „ „ ..	81	17,	Conversation with General Castelbajac: his reports to his Government	136
154. „ „ ..	83	18,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode; his evasive answers respecting military preparations ..	137
155. „ „ ..	87	21,	Conversation with the Emperor ..	138
156. „ „ ..	88	22,	Further conversation with the Emperor on communicating to him Lord John Russell's No. 38 ..	139
157. Lord Cowley	131	Mar. 10,	M. Drouyn de Lhuys' account of his reports from St. Petersburgh and Vienna	143
158. Colonel Rose	48	Feb. 15,	Satisfactory assurances from Russian Chargé d'Affaires	143
159. „ „ ..	59	22,	Communication to the Porte respecting holy places, according to instructions in No. 16 ..	144
160. „ „ ..	62	25,	Intelligence of Prince Menchikoff's approaching embassy	145
161. „ „ ..	64	26,	Supposed objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission	146
162. „ „ ..	65	26,	Vindication of the Sultan's conduct in regard to the holy places. M. Titoff previously acquainted with Porte's intentions	146
163. „ „ ..	66	26,	Prince Menchikoff's approach officially announced to the Porte ..	148
164. „ „ ..	67	26,	M. Lavalette announces his approaching departure	148
165. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	101	Mar. 1,	The Emperor approves the course taken by Austria towards the Porte	149
166. Lord Cowley	141	13,	M. Lavalette's opinion of state of Turkey	149
167. Colonel Rose	69	3,	Slight put on Fuad Effendi by Prince Menchikoff	150
168. „ „ ..	70	5,	Conversation with M. Ozeroff. Supposed objects of Prince Menchikoff's Mission .. .	150
169. „ „ ..	71	6,	Duplicity of M. Ozeroff as to object of Prince Menchikoff's mission	151
170. „ „ ..	72	6,	General observations. Protest of the Latins. French capitulations	151
171. „ „ ..	76	7,	Particulars of Prince Menchikoff's conduct to Fuad Effendi ..	155
172. „ „ .	73	7,	Conversation with M. Ozeroff respecting Fuad Effendi. Explanation given to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff. Colonel Rose requests Admiral Dundas to bring the squadron to Vourla ..	157
173. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	103	3,	Fourth Corps d'Armée to fill up its reserves	160
174. „ „ ..	105	5,	Despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting holy places ..	160
175. „ „ ..	106	6,	Russian armaments; and French communication respecting them and the holy places	160
176. „ „ ..	115	9,	Baron Meyendorff's explanation of position of Austria towards Russia in Turkish question.. ..	161

No.			Subject.	Page
177. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	No. 116	Mar.. 9, 1853	Conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting military preparations and holy places	161
178. „ „ ..	Secret and Confidential A.	9,	Emperor's memorandum on Lord John Russell's despatch No. 38.	163
179. „ „ ..	B.	9,	Letter to Count Nesselrode respecting a passage in the memorandum	166
180. „ „ ..	C.	10,	Explanations with Count Nesselrode	167
181. Colonel Rose	77	8,	Private information respecting objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission	168
182. „ „ ..	80	8,	Précis of French despatches in 1833 respecting Count Orloff's proceedings	168
183. „ „ ..	..	8,	Prince Menchikoff's audience with the Sultan	169
184. Lord Cowley	161	19,	Conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuy's on reports from Constantinople of Prince Menchikoff's proceedings. French fleet sent to Greek waters	170
185. Colonel Rose	75	7,	Alarming aspect of affairs. Rifaat Pasha succeeds Fuad Effendi ..	172
186. To Lord Cowley ..	52	22,	Conversation with Count Walewski on intelligence from Constantinople. Assurances from Baron Brunnow	174
187. To Colonel Rose ..	17	23,	The British fleet ordered to remain at Malta	175
188. To Sir G. H. Seymour	23	23,	Reply to the Emperor's overture .	175
189. „ „ ..	25	23,	View taken by Her Majesty's Government of news from Constantinople. Baron Brunnow's assurances. Explanation of course taken by France	177
190. Lord Cowley ..	172	24,	Vain endeavours to prevent the sailing of the French fleet ..	179
191. „ „ ..	175	24,	Satisfactory assurances received from St. Petersburgh by the French Government	181
192. „ „ ..	176	24,	French report of Prince Menchikoff's audience with the Sultan..	182
193. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	127	16,	Opinions at St. Petersburgh respecting Turkey	182
194. Lord Cowley ..	180	25,	Augmentation of French naval forces in commission .. .	183
195. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	Secret and Confidential D.	12,	Further explanation respecting passage in Emperor's memorandum of February 21	184
196. To Lord Cowley ..	60	29,	Conversation with Count Walewski respecting French fleet and English policy	184
197. Colonel Rose ..	83	10,	Improved aspect of affairs ..	185
198. „ „ ..	86	10,	Conversation with M. Ozeroff respecting the holy places, and with the Grand Vizier .. .	185
199. „ „ ..	88	10,	Conversation with Prince Menchikoff respecting Russian armament	187
200. „ „ ..	89	10,	Conversation with Prince Menchikoff and M. Benedetti respecting the holy places	187
201. „ „ ..	93	11,	Prince Menchikoff requires Servian Government to dismiss M. Garaschanin	188
201a. Lord Cowley ..	190	30,	Conversation with the Emperor ..	189
202. „ „ ..	194	31,	Accounts received at Paris from Constantinople	190
203. To Lord Cowley ..	81	April 1,	Further conversation with Count Walewski respecting the fleet ..	191
204. Colonel Rose ..	95	Mar. 15,	Language of Prince Menchikoff. Request for British fleet withdrawn	192
205. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	Secret and Confidential E.	16,	Note from Count Nesselrode explaining passage in Memorandum of February 21	193

No.			Subject.	Page
206. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	No. 129	Mar. 20, 1853	General Castelbajac's communications with Count Nesselrode respecting holy places	193
207. „ „ ..	134	24,	Prince Menchikoff's proceedings. Assurances from Count Nesselrode as to limited nature of his demands	194
208. „ „ ..	137	24,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting maintenance of Turkish Empire	195
209. „ „ ..	145	26,	On the sinister reports received from France and Germany respecting events at Constantinople	196
210. To Sir G. H. Seymour	35	April 5,	Conversation with Baron Brunnow. Explanation to be asked respecting Russian armaments and Admiral Korniloff's visit to Athens.	196
211. „ „ ..	36	5,	Observations in reply to the Emperor's memorandum of February 21	197
212. Lord Cowley ..	219	8,	Assurances given to France by Austria respecting Turkey ..	199
213. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	148	Mar. 27.	M. Kisseleff's report of intelligence of Colonel Rose having summoned the British fleet	199
214. „ „ ..	150	29,	General observations ..	200
215. „ „ ..	151	29,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting Colonel Rose's proceedings and pending questions	201
216. „ „ ..	153	30.	Dissuades French Minister from communicating his last instructions to Russian Government ..	202
217. „ „ ..	154	31,	Baron Brunnow's report of his communications with Her Majesty's Government .	203
218. „ „ ..	155	31,	Russian military preparations	204
219. Colonel Rose ..	99	17,	Inconsistency between Russian acts and assertions	205
220. „ „ ..	101	18,	Excitement of Greek population ..	206
221. „ „ ..	102	19,	Execution of instructions contained in Lord John Russell's No. 27. Manner in which they were received by the several parties ..	207
222. „ „ ..	108	21,	Question of the cupola	208
223. „ „ ..	109	21,	Probable views of Russia ..	209
224. „ „ ..	113	23,	Respecting the silver star and keys. Errors in Mr. Finn's despatch No. 16 of 1852	209
225. „ „ ..	116	24,	Information respecting Prince Menchikoff's communications with the Porte	210
226. „ „ ..	118	24,	Revelations of M. Kleal .. .	212
227. „ „ ..	119	25,	Information respecting the communications made by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte	213
228. „ „ ..	125	28,	Russian policy and intrigues in Turkey	215
229. „ „ ..	126	28,	Military as well as diplomatic character borne by Prince Menchikoff	217
230. „ „ .	129	31,	Further proceedings of Prince Menchikoff. Statement of Turkish Ministers to Colonel Rose ..	217
231. „ „ .	130	April 1.	Result of Colonel Rose's communications with various Turkish Ministers	219
232. „ „ ..	132	1,	As to union between Austria and Russia	222
233. „ „ ..	135	2,	Military preparations of Russia ..	223
234. Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow	..	7,	Assurances as to the intention of Russia. Satisfaction at British fleet not having joined in the French demonstration	224
235. Lord Cowley ..	238	14,	French reports from Constantinople	225
236. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	160	5,	Renewed assurances of Count Nesselrode. Communication of No. 25	226
237. „ „ ..	161	5,	Satisfaction of Emperor with conduct of England	227

No.			Subject.	Page
238. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	No. 162	April 5, 1853	Has given to Count Nesselrode a copy of No. 23	227
239. „ „ ..	163	6,	General observations	228
240. „ „ ..	164	7,	Substance of despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow of April 7	230
241. „ „ ..	165	7,	Count Nesselrode admits that the differences with France about the holy places are slight	231
242. „ „ ..	166	7,	Baron Brunnow's prudent reserve.	231
243. „ „ ..	169	7,	Conversation with General Castelbajac. Questions put by him to the Russian Government ..	231
244. To Lord Stratford ..	14	18,	Respecting dismissal of M. Garaschanin	233
245. To Lord Cowley ..	114	18,	Conversation with Count Walewski respecting report of secret Treaty, and demand proposed to be made on Russia	233
246. Colonel Rose ..	136	3,	Language held to Prince Menchikoff respecting Russian armaments	234
247. „ „ ..	138	4,	Rumoured relaxation of Russian armaments. State of affairs ..	235
248. Lord Stratford ..	6	5,	Arrival at Constantinople. Nothing yet settled. Appearances favourable	236
249. Lord Cowley ..	253	21,	Conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Intelligence received by French Government	236
250. „ „ ..	254	21,	French Government pleased with the British fleet being kept at Malta	237
251. „ „ .	255	21,	Disquieting telegraphic accounts from Constantinople. Reported alarm of Austrian Government .	237
252. „ „ ..	259	22,	Substance of communications made by M. Kisseleff to the French Government	238
253. „ „ ..	260	22,	Telegraphic despatch from Berlin respecting disturbances at Constantinople	239
254. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	174	13,	Substance of a despatch received by General Castelbajac from his Government	239
255. „ „ .	177	14,	Referring to his correspondence of 1852 respecting holy places ..	240
256. Lord Stratford ..	8	6,	Interview with Turkish Ministers. Their account of Prince Menchikoff's proceedings. Advice given to them	240
257. „ „ ..	9	7,	Report of his audience of the Sultan	242
258. „ „ ..	10	9,	State of the question as to the holy places. Other demands made by Prince Menchikoff. Advice given to the Porte	244
259. „ „ ..	12	11,	Porte will reject secret Treaty. Draft of that Treaty. Lord Stratford's communications with Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia	248
260. Lord Cowley ..	269	25,	Note verbale respecting holy places delivered by General Castelbajac to Count Nesselrode	251
261. Colonel Rose ..	..	11,	Admiral Korniloff's proceedings at Athens. Observations on the attitude and conduct of Russia ..	251
262. Lord Stratford ..	17	16,	Prince Menchikoff's language to Lord Stratford respecting holy places and other demands of Russia	253
263. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	179	19,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode respecting Admiral Korniloff's visit to Athens, and Russian armaments. Montenegro, the chief object of Prince Menchikoff's mission	254

No.			Subject.	Page
264. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	No. 185	April 20, 1853	Count Nesselrode denies report of an offensive and defensive alliance having been proposed to Turkey, but admits offer of assistance against France	254
265. „ „ ..	187	20,	Gossip about military preparations of Russia	255
266. „ „ ..	189	20,	Conversation with the Emperor on Lord Clarendon's No. 23 ..	256
267. „ „ ..	190	21,	Memorandum from the Emperor in reply to No. 23. Communication of No. 36, to which no answer will be returned.. .	257
268. „ „ ..	191	21,	Prince Menchikoff's note verbale of $\frac{1}{13}$ March. Count Nesselrode's explanation of the term "acte de confiance"	258
269. „ „ ..	193	25,	Reported disturbances at Constantinople	259
270. Lord Cowley ..	280	29,	Report of M. de la Cour respecting the arrangement proposed in regard to the holy places ..	260
271. „ „ ..	289	May 2,	Porte more reserved in its communications to France than to England. Arrangement respecting holy places	262
272. Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow	..	April 21,	Note verbale presented by Prince Menchikoff, March $\frac{4}{16}$	262
273. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	196	28,	Reports of disturbances at Constantinople unfounded	266
274. Lord Stratford ..	13	12,	Reserve observed by Count Nesselrode and Prince Menchikoff respecting ulterior demands ..	266
275. „ „ ..	15	15,	Communications with French, Prussian, and Austrian Representatives, respecting Russian demands..	266
276. „ „ ..	Secret	15,	Communications from the Porte asking advice and giving details of a conference between Prince Menchikoff and Rifaat Pasha ..	268
277. „ „ ..	Private	15,	Military preparations of Russia ..	270
278. „ „ ..	16	16,	Conciliatory course recommended to the French Ambassador .	272
279. „ „ ..	19	20,	Favourable aspect of Holy Places Question. Communication with Prince Menchikoff respecting his ulterior demands. Course pursued by Lord Stratford.. ..	272
280. „ „ ..	21	22,	Successful efforts to effect an understanding between Russian and French Ministers	274
281. „ „ ..	25	25,	Communications with Turkish Ministers	275
282. „ „ ..	28	23,	Report from M. E. Pisani. Holy Places. Prince Menchikoff's note verbale of April 19 ..	276
283. Lord Cowley ..	299	May 8,	French reports of settlement of Holy Places Question	278
284. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	198	April 27,	Despatches received by French Ambassador. Austrian and Prussian opinions of Russian demands..	279
285. „ „ ..	200	26,	Letter to Count Nesselrode respecting reported disturbances at Constantinople	280
286. „ „ ..	207	30,	Count Nesselrode's renewed assurances respecting objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission	281
287. „ „ ..	209	30,	Military preparations .. .	282
288. To Lord Stratford ..	33	May 10,	Approving his views as stated in No. 19	282
289. „ „ ..	34	10,	Approving advice respecting holy places	283
290. „ „ ..	35	10,	Approving advice respecting Prince Menchikoff's ulterior demands..	283
291. Lord Cowley ..	315	12,	French reports from Constantinople respecting Holy Places Question	283

No.			Subject.	Page
292. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	No. 211	May 5, 1853	General Castelbajac sanguine as to satisfactory settlement	283
293. „ „ ..	215	5.	Count Nesselrode's anxiety to come to an understanding with France respecting holy places	284
294. „ „ .	217	5,	Probable motives of present Russian policy towards Turkey ..	284
295. To Sir G. H Seymour	69	16,	Conversation with Baron Brunnow respecting Prince Menchikoff's demands..	285
296. Lord Cowley ..	328	16,	Russian communication respecting holy places. Serious state of affairs at Constantinople ..	286
297. „ „ ..	331	17,	Observations of M. Drouyn de Lhuys on Prince Menchikoff's note of May 5	287
298. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	219	7,	Amount of Russian force on Turkish frontier	287
299. „ „ ..	221	8,	Settlement of Holy Places Question	288
300. Lord Stratford ..	41	6,	Prince Menchikoff's note to the Porte of May 5, and draft of Sened	288
301. „ „ ..	34	3,	Drafts of firmans respecting holy places	293
302. „ „ ..	39	5,	Determination of Russia to insist on a Treaty guarantee	295
303. „ „ ..	38	5,	Firmans sent to Russian Embassy	296
304. Lord Cowley ..	334	19,	Publication in the "Moniteur" respecting holy places, and ulterior demands of Russia.. ..	297
305. „ „ ..	339	19,	French despatches from St. Petersburgh on settlement of Holy Places Question	298
306. „ „ ..	340	19,	French Government satisfied as to holy places. Instruction to M. de la Cour respecting ulterior demands..	298
307. Lord Stratford ..	42	9,	Communications with Porte, French Ambassador, and Prince Menchikoff. Letter to the latter ..	299
308. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	223	13,	Count Nesselrode's note of May 8 announcing favourable aspect of affairs	302
309. „ „ ..	224	13,	Favourable news from Constantinople up to May 6	303
310. „ „ ..	226	14,	Conversation with M. Zographo on supposed result of Russian negotiations; also with General Castelbajac	303
311. „ „ ..	230	14,	Count Nesselrode's statements as to favourable accounts from Constantinople	304
312. Lord Cowley ..	347	23,	Statement by Turkish Ambassador respecting Prince Menchikoff's demands and intentions of Sultan	305
313. To Lord Cowley ..	176	24,	Conversation with Count Walewski on English and French co-operation	306
314. Lord Cowley ..	350	24,	M. de Bourqueney's report of a conversation with Count Buol ..	306
315. To Lord Stratford ..	49	26,	Answer to his report of Prince Menchikoff's demands	307
316. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	239	18,	Expectations of Russia from negotiations at St. Petersburgh ..	308
317. „ „ ..	240	18,	Count Nesselrode considers Holy Places Question settled.. ..	308
318. „ „ ..	244	19,	Count Nesselrode in expectation of receiving Treaty respecting holy places	309
319. Baron Brunnow ..	..	26	Memorandum of his communications with British Ministers ..	309
320. Lord Cowley ..	368	29,	Communications between the French and Austrian Governments	315
321. Lord Stratford ..	46	14,	Partial change of Ministry, and manner in which it was brought about	315

No.			Subject.	Page
322. Lord Stratford ..	No. 51	May 15, 1853	Prince Menchikoff presses for an answer. Lord Stratford's suggestions to the Porte	316
323. To Lord Stratford ..	55	31,	Empowering him to send for the fleet, and discretion left as to its employment	317
324. To Sir G. H. Seymour	81	31,	Assurances of Russia contrasted with Prince Menchikoff's proceedings..	318
325. Lord Stratford ..	53	19,	Prince Menchikoff's note of May 18. Meeting and measures of four Representatives	323
326. Lord Cowley	374	31,	Prince Stourdza's opinion of feelings of Greek clergy and population	325
327. „ „	376	31,	French disclaim protection of Turkish Roman Catholics ..	326
328. „ „	383	June 1,	M. de Hübner's opinion as to latitude left to Prince Menchikoff..	326
329. To Admiralty.. ..	..	2,	British fleet to proceed to neighbourhood of Dardanelles ..	327
330. To Lord Stratford ..	59	2,	Copy of letter to Admiralty ..	327
331. Lord Cowley	387	2,	French Government will write to General Castelbajac in the sense of No. 81 to Sir G. H. Seymour	327
332. „ „	388	2,	French telegraphic accounts from St. Petersburgh and Warsaw ..	328
333. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	261	May 7,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode, who denies his assurances .	328
334. Lord Stratford ..	43	10,	Interview with the Sultan ..	330
335. „ „ ..	44	14,	Note of May 10 from the Porte, and Prince Menchikoff's reply..	331
336. „ „ ..	45	14,	Letter from Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha. Questions proposed to Lord Stratford. Prince Menchikoff's proposal of offensive and defensive Treaty	334
337. „ „ ..	47A	14,	Interview with Reshid Pasha, who applies to Prince Menchikoff for time	336
338. „ „ ..	47B	14,	Prince Menchikoff's answer to Lord Stratford's letter of May 8.	337
339. „ „ .	48	15,	Rifaat Pasha's communication with Greek Patriarch	339
340. „ „	49	15,	Porte's thanks for Lord Stratford's assistance in Holy Places Question	339
341. „ „ ..	50	15,	Secret information respecting late change of Ministry	340
342. „ „ ..	52	16,	Prince Menchikoff's note of May 15	340
343. „ „ ..	54	20,	M. Klezl's interview with Prince Menchikoff on the part of the Representatives. Communication between Prince Menchikoff and Reshid Pasha	341
344. „ „ ..	55	22,	Draft of note which Prince Menchikoff requires the Porte to address to him. Prince Menchikoff's departure	342
345. To Lord Cowley ..	199	June 3,	Satisfaction at instruction to be sent to General Castelbajac in matter of Russian assurances ..	344
346. „ „ ..	200	3,	That French Government should communicate to Russia its disclaimer of protection of Turkish Roman Catholics	344
347. Lord Bloomfield ..	207	May 30,	Conversation with Baron Manteuffel on Prince Menchikoff's proceedings. M. Budberg's language	345
348. Lord Westmorland ..	219	30,	Conversation with M. Buol respecting news from Constantinople	347
349. To Lord Stratford ..	60	June 4,	Approving proceedings in No. 44.	347
350. „ „ ..	61	4,	Approving advice to the Sultan ..	347
351. „ „ ..	62	4,	Approving answers to Reshid Pasha's questions	348
352. „ „ ..	63	4,	Approving advice given to Reshid Pasha in No. 47	348

No.			Subject.	Page
353. To Lord Stratford ..	No. 64	June 4, 1853	Concurring in observations on Prince Menchikoff's letter of May 8	348
354. „ „ ..	65	4,	Approving mission of M. Klezl to Prince Menchikoff	348
355. Lord Cowley ..	397	5,	Conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. French fleet to proceed to Besika Bay. French instructions	349
356. „ „ ..	398	5,	Assurances which the French Government had received from Russia	350
357. „ „ ..	399	5,	French disclaimer as regards religious protection communicated to Russia	350
358. „ „ ..	400	5,	Communications between France and Austria	350
359. Lord Bloomfield ..	211	3,	Conversation with Russian Minister	351
360. „ „ ..	212	3,	Report of Austrian mediation ..	352
361. „ „ ..	214	3,	Russian military movements ..	353
362. „ „ ..	215	3,	Instruction sent to Russian Minister at St. Petersburgh ..	353
363. M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski	..	5,	Course to be observed in regard to the Turkish question. Instructions to French Admiral and Ambassador at Constantinople..	354
364. To Lord Bloomfield ..	96	7,	Satisfaction at views of Prussia ..	355
365. To Lord Westmorland	141	7,	Satisfaction at views of Austria ..	355
366. To Sir G. H. Seymour	93	7,	Surprise at Count Nesselrode's language. Defence of Lord Stratford	356
367. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	262	May 31,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on events at Constantinople	357
368. „ „ ..	263	31,	Conversation with the Emperor on events at Constantinople ..	358
369. „ „ ..	264	31,	Orders for advance of reserves ..	361
370. To Sir G. H. Seymour	95	June 8,	Telegraphic communications ..	361
371. „ „ ..	96	8,	As to Russian assurances. Lord Stratford's conduct	362
372. Lord Bloomfield ..	216	5,	Telegraphic despatch from Sir G. H. Seymour of May 30	362
373. „ „ ..	217	5,	Respecting Prussian instruction to Count Henckel at St. Petersburgh	364
374. Lord Westmorland ..	228	4,	Count Buol's opinion of Lord Stratford's proceedings.. ..	364
375. To Lord Cowley ..	211	8,	M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch respecting French views at the present crisis. Their identity with those of England	365
376. Lord Stratford ..	57	May 22,	Observations on the present state of the Turkish question ..	366
377. „ „ .	58	25,	Russian military preparations ..	370
378. Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow	..	June 1,	Announcing the intentions of the Emperor of Russia in consequence of the failure of Prince Menchikoff's mission	372
379. Lord Stratford ..	60	May 25,	Firmans respecting the holy places	376
380. „ „ ..	61	25,	Circular from Prince Menchikoff announcing his departure ..	379
381. „ „ ..	62	25,	Final communications between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte	379
382. „ „ ..	63	25,	Letter to Sir Hamilton Seymour .	381
383. „ „ ..	64	25,	Porte's circular to provincial authorities	383
384. „ „ ..	65	26,	Intelligence respecting military preparations	384
385. To Lord Stratford ..	72	June 10,	Approving his letter to Sir Hamilton Seymour	385
386. „ „ ..	73	10,	Approving advice to the Porte respecting circular to provincial authorities	385
387. „ „ ..	74	10,	Instructions to French Ambassador and Admiral	386
388. Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus	..	May 26,	Circular communication respecting Prince Menchikoff's departure and intentions of the Porte ..	388
389. Lord Westmorland ..	228	June 4,	Justification to Count Buol of Lord Stratford's conduct ..	390

No.			Subject.	Page
390. Lord Cowley ..	No. 416	June 9, 1853	Exception taken by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Prussian communication	391
391. „ „ ..	417	10,	Has communicated to M. Drouyn De Lhuys instructions to British Ambassador and Admiral ..	391
392. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	265	4,	General Castelbajac's report. Assurances which had been received by Austria and Prussia ..	391
393. „ „ ..	266	4,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode	393
394. „ „ ..	267	4,	Count Nesselrode communicates instruction to Baron Brunnow and his note to Reshid Pasha ..	393
395. Lord Stratford ..	66	May 27,	Note from Porte explanatory of state of affairs	394
396. „ „ ..	67	27,	Prince Menchikoffs note verbale of 1/13 March never communicated to the Embassy	396
397. Lord Bloomfield ..	220	June 8,	Prussian circular to their Ministers abroad	397
398. „ „ ..	223	10,	Despatch from Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg	398
399. „ „ ..	224	10,	Prussian Government had no previous knowledge of Prince Menchikoff's note of 1/13 March ..	399
400. „ „ ..	225	10,	Prussian communication to St. Petersburgh	399
401. „ „ ..	226	10,	Prussian accounts from Vienna ..	400
402. „ „ ..	227	10,	Prussian accounts of military preparations	400
403. „ „ ..	228	10,	Has communicated No. 96 to Baron Manteuffel	401
404. Lord Cowley ..	423	12,	Communication made to M. Drouyn de Lhuys by M. Kisseleff ..	401
405. To Her Majesty's Ministers abroad	..	13,	As to the present state of the Turkish question	402
406. Lord Cowley ..	427	13,	M. Drouyn's account of his communications with M. Kisseleff ..	403
407. To Lord Westmorland	150	14,	Conversation with Count Colloredo as to course to be pursued ..	403
408. To Lord Bloomfield ..	106	14,	Conversation with M. Bunsen as to course to be pursued	404
409. Baron Manteuffel to the Chevalier Bunsen	..	10,	As to course to be pursued ..	405
410. Count Buol to Count Colloredo	..	May 31,	Views of Austria on Turkish question	406
411. M. de Wildenbruch to to the King of Prussia	..	19,	Progress of Prince Menchikoff's negotiation	407
412. „ „ ..	..	19,	Ditto	409
413. „ „ ..	..	22,	Ditto	410
414. Baron Manteuffel to the Chevalier Bunsen ..	..	June 3,	Instructions to M. de Wildenbruch	412
415. Prussian Memorandum	..	3,	Prussian views as to Eastern Question	413
416. To Lord Bloomfield ..	107	15,	Hope that Prussia will speak freely to Russia, and state her opinions to Austria	414
417. „ „ ..	108	15,	To rebut calumnies against Lord Stratford	415
418. „ „ ..	109	15,	Satisfaction at Baron Manteuffel's language to Russian Minister ..	415
419. „ „ ..	110	15,	No desire to exclude Russia from conference on Turkish affairs ..	415
420. To Sir G. H. Seymour	105	15,	Approving language to Count Nesselrode	416
421. „ „ ..	108	15,	To question Count Nesselrode respecting bearing of old Treaties. Defence of Lord Stratford ..	416
422. Lord Stratford ..	73	May 30,	Military preparations of the Porte	417
423. „ „ ..	74	30,	Draft of proposed firman respecting Greek Church and clergy ..	418
424. „ „ ..	75	30,	The Porte applies to Egypt for military assistance	419
425. „ „ ..	Private	30,	Intelligence of Prince Menchikoff's arrival at Odessa	420
426. Lord Westmorland ..	237	June 11,	Conversation with Count Buol. His opinion on conduct of Russia	420

No.			Subject.	Page
427. Lord Cowley ..	No. 430	June 15, 1853	Communications between French and Russian Governments ..	421
428. „ „ ..	439	16,	Language of Bavarian Minister respecting Russia	422
429. „ „ ..	440	16,	Despatches to French Ministers at Berlin and St. Petersburgh, and Vienna	423
430. To Lord Cowley ..	239	17,	As to the position of Austria and Prussia. Language held to their Representatives	424
431. Lord Stratford ..	Telegraph	10,	Arrival of Count Nesselrode's note to Reshid Pasha	424
432. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	270	7,	Emperor does not consider occupation of Principalities as cause of war	425
433. „ „ ..	281	10,	Prince Gortchakoff to command armies in the south. Naval intelligence	425
434. „ „ ..	283	11,	Naval preparations in the Baltic ..	426
435. To Lord Stratford ..	81	18,	Course which the Porte should take in the event of the entrance of the Russians into the Principalities ..	426
436. Lord Cowley ..	444	19,	French reports respecting Austrian views	427
437. Lord Stratford ..	82	3,	As to point at which resistance should be offered to the advance of Russians	428
438. Lord Bloomfield ..	230	13,	Prussian draft Convention ..	428
439. „ „ ..	231	13,	As to supposed understanding between Emperors of Austria and Russia	429
440. „ „ ..	233	17,	Prussian draft Convention ..	429
441. „ „ ..	234	17,	Conversation with Baron Manteuffel respecting a conference in London	429
442. „ „ ..	235	17,	Conversation with Baron Manteuffel respecting news from St. Petersburgh and Austrian and Prussian policy	430
443. „ „ ..	236	17,	Instructions to Austrian Internuncio	431
444. „ „ ..	238	17,	Baron Budberg's opinion as to view which the Emperor of Russia would take of a conference ..	432
445. „ „ ..	240	17,	Baron Manteuffel approves of English policy	432
446. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	268	5,	Emperor's observation on language held in Parliament. Military preparations	433
447. „ „ ..	269	6,	Emperor's language to General Castelbajac. The latter's opinion	433
448. „ „ ..	272	9,	Observations on Baron Brunnow's memorandum of May 25 ..	435
449. „ „ ..	273	9,	As to the deceptive conduct of Emperor and his Government ..	436
450. „ „ ..	279	10,	Russian memorandum respecting French claims to protect Christians in Turkey	437
451. „ „ ..	280	10,	Further account of Emperor's language to General Castelbajac ..	437
452. „ „ ..	282	10,	Discussion with Count Nesselrode on communicating Lord Clarendon's No. 81	438
453. „ „ ..	284	11,	Note to Count Nesselrode sending Lord Stratford's letter of May 23	440
454. „ „ ..	285	12,	Circular instruction to Russian missions published in Petersburgh paper	441
455. „ „ ..	286	14,	Reference to be made to St. Petersburgh before the Russian armies enter into the Principalities ..	447
456. To Lord Stratford ..	87	21,	That specific instructions should be given to Omar Pasha	447
457. To Sir G. H. Seymour	111	21,	As to communications with Baron Brunnow	447
458. „ „ ..	112	21,	Austrian and Prussian Cabinets have not approved of Russian proceedings	448

No.			Subject.	Page
459. To Sir G. H. Seymour	No. 113	June 21, 1853	No blame attaches to him for the discrepancy between his reports and the conduct of the Russian Government	448
460. To Lord Bloomfield	131	21,	As to the opinion of Prussian and Austrian Cabinets	448
461. „ „	134	21,	Satisfaction expressed by Prussia at conduct of England	449
462. To Lord Westmorland	176	21,	Communication to Count Colloredo of despatch from Vienna ..	449
463. Lord Cowley ..	452	20,	Austrian communication to French Government	450
464. Lord Westmorland ..	241	17,	Conversation with Count Buol, who disapproves of Russian proceedings. Policy of Austria ..	451
465. Sir G. H. Seymour .	287	14,	Observations on Russian circular .	452
466. „ „ .	289	14,	Communication to Count Nesselrode respecting telegraphic despatch of June 5	454
467. „ „ ..	290	16,	Russian army not to enter Principalities without reference to St. Petersburgh	454
468. Lord Cowley ..	458	22,	M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion on Count Nesselrode's circular ..	455
469. „ „ ..	460	22,	Information received by French Government of state of feeling in German Courts	455
470. Lord Stratford ..	91	7,	Firmans to be issued in behalf of all Christians and Jews	456
471. „ „ .	93	7,	Advice to Porte as to course to be pursued by Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia	457
472. To Lord Stratford ..	94	24,	Satisfaction as to religious firmans	458
473. „ „ ..	95	24,	Approving advice as to instructions to Hospodars	458
474. „ „ ..	98	24,	Distinction between transit through and occupation of any part of Bulgaria	458
475. „ „ ..	100	24,	To urge the Porte to abolish distinctions between Christians and Mahomedans	459
476. Lord Stratford ..	Telegraph	18,	Answer of the Porte to Russian demands sent on 17th ..	459
477. Lord Bloomfield ..	243	21,	Conversation with Baron Manteuffel respecting Austrian intentions	460
478. „ „ ..	244	21,	Communications from French to Prussian Government. Conversation with Baron Manteuffel ..	460
479. „ „ ..	247	21,	Baron Manteuffel pleased with No. 81 to Sir G. H. Seymour ..	461
480. „ „ ..	248	21,	Question of attendance at any conference held in London	461
481. „ „ ..	250	21,	Communication to Baron Manteuffel of Lord Clarendon's despatches to Berlin and Vienna of June 14	462
482. To Lord Westmorland .	168	21,	To ascertain exactly what is to be the policy of Austria	462
483. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	293	15,	Respecting his note to Count Nesselrode on Lord Stratford's proceedings	462
484. „ „ ..	292	16,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on Russian proceedings .	463
485. „ „ ..	298	17,	Russian memorandum on French protectorate of Latin Church ..	466
486. „ „ ..	299	17,	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on communicating Lord Clarendon's despatches Nos. 93, 96	467
487. „ „ ..	300	17,	Count Nesselrode's opinion on Austrian and Prussian conduct at Constantinople	468
488. „ „ ..	Secret ..	17,	Objection to a passage in No. 81 to Sir G. H. Seymour	469

No.			Subject.	Page
489. To Lord Cowley ..	No. 256	June 25, 1853	To submit the inclosed Drafts for consideration of French Government:—Inclosure 1. Draft to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. Inclosure 2. Draft of Convention between Russia and the Porte ..	469
490. Chevalier Bunsen ..	..	25,	Prussian draft of Convention ..	472
491. To Sir G. H. Seymour	117	25,	Approving language in No. 292 ..	474
492. „ „ ..	119	25,	Approving language in No. 299 ..	474
493. Lord Cowley	467	24,	French reports from St. Petersburgh	474
494. Lord Stratford ..	96	10,	Arrival of Russian ultimatum ..	475
495. Lord Bloomfield ..	251	24,	Satisfactory nature of Prussian policy	475
496. „ „ .	254	24,	Conversation with Baron Manteuffel as to Austrian policy ..	476
497. „ „ ..	256	24,	Prussian accounts from St. Petersburgh unfavourable. Russia will not receive Turkish Ambassador	476
498. „ „ ..	257	24,	As to M. Bunsen's attendance at a conference	477
499. Lord Westmorland	247	21,	Conversation with Count Buol as to Austrian policy	477
500. Lord Cowley	473	26,	Conversation between M. Bourqueney and Count Buol ..	478
501. „ „ ..	475	26,	French reply to Russian circular. As to French protectorate of Latin	478
502. French draft of note ..	..	27,	Offer to be made by the Porte to Russia	479
503. To Sir G. H. Seymour	129	28,	Answer to objection stated in Secret despatch of June 17	480
504. To Lord Bloomfield ..	138	28,	Importance of bringing moral influence to bear on Russia ..	481
505. „ „ ..	145	28,	On the Prussian draft of Convention	481
506. Lord Cowley .. .	480	28,	French Government object to Drafts in No. 256 .. .	481
507. „ „	481	28,	Similarity between Russian conduct to Poland and to Turkey ..	484
508. „ „	484	28,	French Government persist in their objections to Drafts in No. 256 .	485
509. Sir G. H. Seymour ..	302	15,	Note to Count Nesselrode urging modification of Emperor's demands	485
510. „ „	303	21,	Instruction to Austrian Chargé d'Affaires	487
511. „ „	304	21,	Language of General Castelbajac respecting movements of French fleet if Principalities are occupied	487
512. „ „	307	21,	Russian reports of feelings of Turkish population	488
513. „ „	306	21,	Further correspondence with Count Nesselrode	489
514. Lord Stratford ..	99	14,	Copy of Count Nesselrode's note: Intentions of the Porte	491
515. „ „	100	15,	As to the answer to be returned to Count Nesselrode's note ..	492
516. To Lord Cowley ..	263	30,	Her Majesty's Government withdraw proposed Draft of Convention, and object to French Draft of Note	492
517. Lord Stratford ..	102	16,	Answer of the Porte to Russian demands	493
518. „ „	103	16,	Audience of the Sultan	495
519. „ „	104	17,	Details respecting Turkish answer, and offer to send Ambassador to St. Petersburgh	496
520. „ „	105	17,	Final departure of members of Russian Mission ..	496
521. „ „	108	17,	Near approach of Russians to Jassy	498
522. „ „ . ..	110	17,	The Turks well pleased at not having to pay for British and French fleets	498
523. „ „ ..	111	17,	Satisfactory language of Austrian and Prussian Ministers	498

No.			Subject.	Page
524.	Lord Westmorland ..	No. 251	June 27, 1853	Satisfactory language of Count Buol as to views and intentions of Austria 499
525.	Sir G. H. Seymour ..	309	24.	Despatches from Paris. French report of German feeling in regard to Russian proceedings 500
526.	.. .. ..	310	24.	Has communicated to Count Nesselrode draft of firman for Christians 501
527.	.. .. ..	312	24.	Satisfactory tone of Austrian communications 501
528.	.. .. ..	313	24.	Conversation with Count Nesselrode on communicating to him No. 108 501
529.	.. ..	314	24.	Further particulars respecting conversation with Count Nesselrode 502
530.	.. .. ..	317	25.	Arrival of news of rejection of Russian demands 504

Correspondence respecting the Rights and Privileges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Turkey.

No. 1.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 161.)

Constantinople, May 20, 1850.

My Lord,

A QUESTION likely to be attended with much discussion and excitement is on the point of being raised between the conflicting interests of the Latin and Greek churches in this country. The immediate point of difference is the right of possession to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem. The Greeks are accused of having usurped property which belongs of right to the Roman Catholics, and of having purposely allowed the chapels, and particularly the monuments of Godefroi de Bouillon, and of Guy de Lusignan, to go into decay. The French Legation at this Court considers itself entitled by Treaty,—the Treaty, I believe, of 1740,—to take the lead in vindicating the alleged rights of the Latin Church; the French Consul at Jerusalem, M. Botta, has been recently here, and returns by-and-bye to assist the cause; and General Aupick, who has received instructions from Paris, and to whom I am indebted for a conversational overture on this subject, has applied for a conference, with the probable intention of bringing his case at once under the notice of the Turkish Government. It appears that the Pope has been moved to exert his influence in furtherance of the views adopted by France; and that all the Catholic Powers will be engaged by His Holiness to cooperate for the same purpose.

General Aupick has assured me that the matter in dispute is a mere question of property, and of express treaty stipulation. But it is difficult to separate any such question from political considerations; and a struggle of general influence, especially if Russia, as may be expected, should take up the cudgels on behalf of the Greek Church, will probably grow out of the impending discussion.

The Porte, I conceive, will do well to abstain from committing itself to either side without the maturest deliberation, and such is the impression which I have conveyed privately to Reshid Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 2.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 170.)

Foreign Office, June 7, 1850.

Sir,

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, with reference to your despatch No. 161 of the 20th of May, that you should watch, and report to Her Majesty's Government, the progress of the contest which you consider likely to arise between the Latin and Greek Churches in the Turkish dominions; but your Excellency will abstain at present from taking any part in that contest.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 3.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 176.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 5, 1850.*

THE French Minister at this Court has communicated to me a *note verbale*, which he gave in at his late conference with the Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha in support of the Roman Catholic claim to certain portions of the Christian Church at Jerusalem, appropriated, unjustly as he thinks, by the Greek ecclesiastical authorities. The note, of which I was not offered a copy, refers to Article XXXIII of the Treaty concluded in 1740, between France and the Porte, as the principal ground of right; and enumerates the several portions of the sacred edifices over which the claim extends. It is couched in firm though moderate terms, expressive of confidence in the soundness of the Latin title, and of the beneficial results to be expected from a just decision.

I am informed that the Spanish, Sardinian, and Neapolitan Representatives have severally given in notes to the Porte, seconding the French demand, and stating that they act by the express command of their respective Governments.

The Greeks, as on former occasions, are understood to be preparing for a vigorous resistance: and, judging from expressions which M. de Titoff has let fall in conversation, I have little doubt that they will be strongly, if not ostensibly, supported by Russian influence.

Austria, notwithstanding the Roman Catholic tendencies of its Government, is more likely to side with Russia than with France on this occasion, from its jealousy of the former Power as to matters of religious influence in the East.

The Porte is fully aware of the important political considerations involved, and the strong conflicting passions likely to be engaged, in the pending controversy. It will probably be slow to commit itself to a conclusive answer; and its reception of General Aupick's application appears, though courteous, to have been reserved. Aali Pasha is evidently inclined to doubt whether the terms of the Treaty referred to by that Minister are calculated to bear him out in his view of the subject.

In reply to the General's communication of the *note verbale*, I confined myself to a simple acknowledgment of the confidence with which he had honoured me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 4.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 177.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 24, 1850.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the manner in which, as reported in your despatch No. 176, of the 5th instant, you received the communication made to you by General Aupick, of the terms of the *note verbale* which he had delivered to the Turkish Minister with reference to the claim of the Latins to certain portions of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 5.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 221. Confidential.) *Therapia, July 5, 1850.*

My Lord,

I AM not aware that any further step of an official character has been taken by the French Legation here concerning the holy buildings at Jerusalem since the *note verbale* delivered to Aali Pasha by General Aupick, and mentioned to your Lordship in one of my preceding despatches. The Porte, it would also appear, has not yet declared or taken any decision on the subject of that Minister's demand.

With respect to the Catholic Representatives, from whom, on such an occasion, the French would naturally expect agreement and support, I learn that the Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires, in seconding General Aupick by means of an official note, acted entirely on his own responsibility; that the Spanish Minister has not yet taken a step of that character; that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has recently received instructions to support the Latin view of the question; and that the Belgian Minister, while continuing to plead for the repair of those chapels in which the monuments of Godefrey de Bouillon and his kindred crusaders were erected, abstains from bearing any direct part in the general claim asserted by France.

I have reason to believe that some animated discussions have lately passed between M. de Blondel and General Aupick on this subject. The point at issue, if I am rightly informed, was not the question of right, respecting which little difference of opinion may be anticipated between any two Catholic Powers, but the manner in which the question had been arrayed, as it were, under the banner of France, and exposed to the hostility of those whom a renewal of the old French influence in Syria could never please. It would seem that when General Aupick asserted the perfect simplicity of his intention, and declared that the matter in debate was a mere question of right and international law, he was reminded of certain publications which were not easily reconcileable with that hypothesis; and that the grounds and mode of proceeding adopted by him had naturally laid him open to the very objections which he disclaimed.

Language of this kind was not likely to prove the less unwelcome from being founded in reason, and expressed with a tone of conviction; and if the Porte should acquiesce, as I am privately assured it will, in M. de Blondel's demand, and does not at the same time extend its compliance to the French proposition, a strong feeling of mortification, if not resentment, will probably be excited on the losing side.

On the part of the Greek interest, nothing that wears the appearance of an angry or hostile opposition has yet been manifested; but no one seems to doubt that every nerve will be strained by that Church and Nation to maintain their present vantage-ground, and that Russian influence, however masked, will be vigorously exerted, as on former occasions, to defeat the attack of the Latin party.

Mindful of your Lordship's instructions, I confine myself to the duty of watching from a distance any movements that may occur in the two antagonist camps. A Christian, having no immediate concern in the dispute, might reasonably wish to see the removal of a scandalous contention between the two Churches, which arrogate an exclusive guardianship of places sanctified by our common religion. But no Englishman, alive to the interests of a true European policy in the East, could witness without regret and anxiety the triumph of a political influence which would always be ready to overflow its bounds, and would render this land of infidels more than ever the battle-ground of Christian antagonists.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 6.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 210.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 3, 1850.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 221, of the 5th of July, that you are quite right in not interfering in any way in the pending dispute between the Greek and Latin Churches respecting their claims to the holy buildings at Jerusalem, and in contenting yourself with attentively watching its progress, and reporting what takes place to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 7.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received August 6.)

(No. 225. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 19, 1850.

INCLOSED herewith for your Lordship's further information, are copies obtained confidentially of several notes addressed to the Porte in recommendation of the French demand respecting the chapels and monuments at Jerusalem.

I am informed that the Sardinian Minister, though he supported General Aupick verbally, and read to Aali Pasha an instruction from his Government, did not present any note to the Porte, and that no communication has yet been made by the Austrian Legation.

The manner in which the Austrian Government views the question brought forward by France appears in another document, which has been privately communicated to me by one of my colleagues, and of which a copy is transmitted herewith.

Aali Pasha assured me three days ago that nothing had yet been done by the Porte respecting that question, and that no orders had been sent to Jerusalem.

I avail myself of this opportunity to forward a transcript of all such Articles of the Treaty concluded between France and the Porte in 1740, as relate to the right claimed by France of protecting the Latins and, on their behalf, the holy places at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

General Aupick to Aali Pasha.

Péra, Mai 28, 1850.

LE Général de Division, Ministre de France près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a eu l'honneur de donner lecture à son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, d'une dépêche par laquelle le Gouvernement de la République le charge de revendiquer efficacement en faveur des religieux Latins la possession des lieux saints que l'Article XXXIII des Capitulations de 1740 leur a garantie.

Ces lieux saints sont :

La Grande Eglise de Bethléem.

Le Sanctuaire de la Nativité, avec le droit d'y placer une nouvelle étoile, de changer la tapisserie de la grotte ; d'y agir, enfin, comme les possesseurs exclusifs.

Le Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge.

La Pierre de l'Onction.

Les sept arceaux de la Sainte Vierge dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre.

Le Gouvernement Français réclame encore pour les religieux Francs le droit de réparer la coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre ; et enfin, il demande que dans cette dernière église, toutes choses soient remises en l'état où elles étaient avant l'incendie de 1808. Il prouvera surabondamment que les sanctuaires et les droits ci-dessus énumérés appartenaient aux religieux Latins en 1740.

La franchise et le courage avec lesquels la Sublime Porte est entrée dans des voies d'amélioration morale et de civilisation ; l'adhésion qu'elle a donnée par sa conduite sage et mesurée aux grands principes du droit public Européen, laissent au Gouvernement Français la ferme conviction que, dans cette circonstance, il ne fera pas inutilement appel à la bonne foi et à l'esprit d'équité du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale ; et que celui-ci en fournira une nouvelle preuve par son respect pour les engagements dont la France réclame l'exécution.

Il mettra de la sorte et pour toujours un terme à des difficultés sans cesse renaissantes, et à d'interminables récriminations qu'il n'entre certainement pas dans sa pensée de vouloir perpétuer.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

M. de Blondel to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Constantinople, le* 6 *Mai*, 1850.

D'APRES l'invitation de votre Excellence, je viens répéter par écrit la demande que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui adresser verbalement, tendant à obtenir l'autorisation de rétablir dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre de Jérusalem, les tombeaux de Godefroy de Bouillon et de Baudouin son frère, que l'incendie du 12 Octobre, 1808, a fait disparaître.

Déjà, M. Eug. de Kerckhove a eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Excellence une note sur cette question en date du 30 Septembre, 1848. En renouvellant cette démarche par ordre exprès du Gouvernement du Roi, j'ajouterai peu de chose.

Quand on se borne à réclamer le respect pour les tombes, pour justifier sa réclamation il suffit de l'énoncer ; et j'ai trop de confiance dans l'équité de votre Excellence et du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, pour qu'il ne me paraisse pas superflu d'entrer dans de longs développemens. Je remarque qu'il a été prêté à cette affaire une importance qu'elle n'a pas en elle-même, et qui ne peut que compromettre son succès. Je crois donc devoir la rétablir dans sa simple vérité. Il ne s'agit pas de discuter les limites entre les diverses communions Chrétiennes dans l'intérieur de l'Eglise ; je n'ai pas à examiner ici si les religieux Francs ou Grecs sont les possesseurs légitimes ou illégaux de telle ou telle partie du temple : toute ma mission consiste à réclamer un acte de justice qui ne peut être mis en doute par personne, qui ne peut rien coûter à personne, qui ne peut préjuger aucun point de droit dans les questions en litige : de restaurer aux frais de la Belgique les pierres sépulcrales de deux Princes Belges, profanées après sept siècles d'existence (1099 à 1808).

Voici, M. le Ministre, la situation des lieux. (Voir le plan ci-joint.)

Dans la partie basse du Calvaire est une Chapelle nommée d'Adam (A du plan). Les tombes étaient placées à l'entrée (102) ; mais après l'incendie, l'escalier qui conduit au Calvaire (3) fut démoli et remplacé par une double échelle construite en B B, dont le mur de soutien a été posé sur les tombeaux. Toute cette partie est possédée aujourd'hui par les Grecs Orientaux.

Ce que je demande, M. le Ministre, c'est de rétablir l'ancien escalier pour remettre les choses dans leur état primitif, ou du moins de tirer un arc de B en B, de façon à laisser à découvert l'emplacement où était les deux monuments que la Belgique entière a le pieux désir de relever avec l'autorisation de la Sublime Porte Ottomane.

Votre Excellence remarquera que personne ne peut avoir intérêt à s'opposer à cette réparation d'un acte gratuit de vandalisme exercé sur les simples tom-

beaux de deux héros que les Belges réclament pour des compatriotes et le monde civilisé pour deux grandes figures historiques.

J'espère, M. le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien me faire délivrer un ordre efficace pour que je puisse faire procéder aux travaux. Je prends d'ailleurs l'engagement, dusse-je aller moi-même sur les lieux, de veiller à ce que tout se fasse sans blesser aucune juste susceptibilité.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BLONDEL VAN CULEBROUK.

Inclosure 3 in No. 7.

Count Rebello to Aali Pasha.

Péra, Juin 1, 1850.

M. le Ministre,

LA sollicitude des Gouvernements Catholiques de l'Europe, excitée par les empiètements qui se sont succédés à Jérusalem et dans d'autres lieux saints, au détriment de droits acquis, reconnus, et confirmés, par plusieurs Augustes Souverains Ottomans depuis des siècles, n'a pu que leur faire naître le désir de s'entendre amicalement avec la Sublime Porte pour faire cesser un état de choses aussi déplorable qu'inquiétant pour l'avenir.

Le digne Représentant de la République Française a déjà exprimé à la Sublime Porte ces mêmes vœux; mais comme il s'agit d'une question qui intéresse au plus haut dégré toutes les nations Catholiques, le Portugal, à ce titre, ne saurait s'abstenir de témoigner aussi de son côté combien il désire qu'elle reçoive une solution favorable, comme il doit l'attendre de la justice qui caractérise les actes du Gouvernement éclairé et paternel de Sa Majesté Impériale.

C'est dans cette conviction que j'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) L. C. REBELLO.

Inclosure 4 in No. 7.

M. de Souza to Aali Pasha.

Péra, le 1 *Juin*, 1850.

M. le Ministre,

LES envahissemens qui se sont succédés à Jérusalem et dans d'autres lieux saints au détriment de droits acquis depuis des siècles, droits reconnus et sanctionnés par plusieurs illustres Souverains de l'Empire, et la crainte que ces envahissements font naître pour un avenir plus ou moins rapproché, ne pouvaient qu'éveiller la sollicitude des Gouvernements Catholiques de l'Europe, et les porter à rechercher les moyens de s'entendre amicalement avec la Sublime Porte pour faire cesser un état de choses aussi regrettable que plein d'embarras pour la Sublime Porte elle-même.

La France, à qui cette tâche est plus particulièrement dévolue en vertu de ses Traités, a pris l'initiative, et par l'organe de son digne Répresentant vous a exprimé ses vœux, qui sont, sans doute, ceux de toutes les Puissances Catholiques; mais, comme il s'agit d'une question d'un si haut intérêt, l'Espagne ne saurait s'abstenir d'y prendre part et de faire connaître aussi de son côté combien il lui tient à cœur de la voir promptement resolue dans un sens favorable.

J'en appelle aux sentiments d'équité de la Sublime Porte; le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale ne peut vouloir que ce qui est juste et raisonnable, et votre Excellence, en faisant prévaloir la justice et le bon droit, ajoutera un titre de plus à ceux qui lui ont acquis déjà l'estime générale de l'Europe.

C'est plein de cette confiance que je me fais aujourd'hui un nouveau plaisir, en vous réitérant, M. le Ministre, &c.

(Signé) GERARD DE SOUZA.

Inclosure 5 in No. 7.

M. Targioni to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, 6 *Juin*, 1850.

LE Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté le Roi du Royaume des Deux-Siciles a reçu de son Auguste Souverain, qui s'intéresse vivement au sort des religieux Catholiques gardiens des saints lieux de Jérusalem, l'ordre positif de prêter son adhésion aux démarches et d'appuyer de la manière la plus efficace les réclamations du Ministre de la République Française auprès de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, tendant à mettre un terme à la pénible position dans laquelle ils se trouvent par suite d'empiètements journaliers qui menacent de les expulser d'une possession et les priver d'un droit dont ils jouissent de temps immémorial, et qui leur a été garanti par les Traités les plus solennels.

Le Chargé d'Affaires ne doute pas que les Puissances Catholiques réuniront leurs efforts pour atteindre ce but, qui ne peut d'ailleurs être considéré comme un intérêt et un droit exclusif de la France, mais comme un devoir de toute la Chrétienté; et plein de confiance dans la justice et dans les lumières du Gouvernement Ottoman, qui, s'avançant d'un pas ferme et intelligent dans les voies de la civilisation, ne cesse de donner les preuves les plus éclatantes de modération, de tolérance en matière religieuse et de respect pour les droits acquis et les capitulations existantes, a la conviction que Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Mussulmans, bien éclairé sur l'objet et la justice des demandes de la Catholicité, s'empressera de répondre à ses désirs, et de donner dans cette occasion ce nouveau témoignage de son amitié à Sa Majesté Sicilienne—témoignage qui remplira de la plus vive joie son cœur éminemment religieux.

(Signé) E. TARGIONI.

Inclosure 6 in No. 7.

Prince Schwarzenbery to the French Minister at Vienna.

Vienne, le 8 *Juin*, 1850.

LA Légation de France a bien voulu, par une note verbale du mois d'Avril dernier, informer le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères que le Gouvernement de la République Française s'était proposé d'intercéder auprès de la Sublime Porte en faveur des religieux Latins en Terre Sainte, dont la situation devenait de jour en jour plus pénible par suite des empiétements continuels de leurs adversaires schismatiques, et qu'en conséquence des instructions avaient été envoyées à M. l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople. A cette communication on a ajouté la demande, si le Gouvernement Autrichien serait disposé à donner des instructions analogues à l'internonciature pour qu'elle secondât la négociation du Général Aupick.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'honneur de répondre à la Légation de France que le Gouvernement Impérial ayant également à cœur de soutenir la cause du Catholicisme en Orient dans les limites des droits que lui assurent ses anciens Traités avec la Porte Ottomane, est prêt à coopérer au but indiqué.

Afin de pouvoir toutefois imprimer aux instructions qui auraient à régler la conduite des Missions à Constantinople, un caractère d'uniformité qui serait de nature à assurer à leurs démarches le succès désiré, le Ministère Impérial serait très-obligé à la Légation de France si elle voulait bien lui faire connaître plus en détail les questions que le Général Aupick est chargé d'aborder vis-à-vis de la Porte.

Inclosure 7 in No. 7.

Articles des Capitulations Françaises ayant trait aux Eglises et aux Religieux.

ARTICLE 1.—TOUS les Français qui iront et viendront à Jérusalem pour visiter les lieux saints, et les religieux qui demeurent dans l'Eglise appelé Canauné, ne pourront être inquiétés en aucune manière.

Article 32. Nos augustes ancêtres d'heureuse mémoire avaient autrefois permis aux nations ennemies qui n'avaient point d'Ambassadeurs spéciaux à notre fortunée Porte, d'aller et venir dans nos Etats sous la bannière de France pour y trafiquer et pour y visiter les lieux saints, et cela était consigné dans les capitulations accordées aux Français; mais plus tard quelques motifs avaient fait totalement défendre de venir dans nos pays aux dites nations, qui ont été exclues des capitulations. L'Empereur de France nous ayant, il y a quelque temps, témoigné par une lettre adressée à notre Sublime Porte qu'il désirerait que ces nations ennemies, à qui il était défendu de trafiquer dans nos Etats, eussent la faculté de visiter Jérusalem comme par le passé sans être aucunement inquiétées, et que si après quelque temps on leur permettait de venir dans nos Etats pour trafiquer que cela fût encore sous la bannière de France, nous avons accueilli la prière de cet Empereur en considération de l'ancienne amitié qui de père en fils existe entre lui et notre Sublime Porte depuis le règne de nos augustes ayeux jusqu'à présent. Nous avons donc ordonné que les individus appartenant aux nations Chrétiennes nos ennemis, qui sont en paix avec l'Empereur de France, et se rendant en pélerinage à Jérusalem, pourront chaque fois qu'ils voudront tranquillement faire ce pélerinage à Jérusalem, y aller et venir sûrement et librement comme par le passé, sans être molestés ni à l'arrivée ni au départ. Si plus tard nous serions dans le cas d'accorder aux dites nations la liberté de venir trafiquer dans nos Etats, alors elles pourront aller et venir sous la bannière de France, de la même manière qu'elles y venaient auparavant, sans qu'il leur soit permis en aucune façon de prendre d'autre bannière: les capitulations Impériales qui existaient anciennement depuis le temps de nos augustes ancêtres jusqu'à présent, seront renouvellées, et l'on y ajoutera à l'avenir les articles susdits, d'après un commandement Impérial orné d'un Hatti-Sherîf. Entre autres, personne ne s'opposera à ce que les évêques et autres religieux Catholiques dépendants de l'Empereur de France, de quelque nation qu'ils soient, exercent leur culte dans les localités où ils se trouvent déjà d'ancienne date, en se tenant dans les bornes de leur profession.

Article 33. Les religieux Latins qui résident présentement, comme de tout temps, en dedans et en dehors de Jérusalem, et dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, dite Canauné, resteront en possession des lieux de pélerinage qu'ils ont, de la même manière qu'ils les ont possédés par le passé; personne ne les molestera, et on ne les inquiétera point aussi par des demandes de contributions. Et s'ils avaient quelque procès qui ne peut être décidé sur les lieux, il sera renvoyé à notre Sublime Porte.

Article 34. Ceux des Français, et des autres nations qui en dépendent, qui se rendront à Jérusalem, ne seront point molestés ni en allant ni en revenant.

Article 35. On n'inquiétera point les deux ordres des religieux Français—à savoir, les Jésuistes et les Capucins—dans la possession des églises qu'ils ont à Galata depuis longtemps; et comme l'une de ces églises a été brulée, elle sera reconstruite avec la permission de la loi, et restera au pouvoir des Capucins. Personne ne molestera non plus les églises de la nation Française à Smyrne, à Seyde, à Alexandrie et dans les autres Echelles, et sous ce prétexte on ne pourra pas leur faire payer de l'argent.

Article 36. On ne les molestera pas lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans leur Hôpital situé à Galata.

Article 42. Ainsi que cela est arrêté dans les Articles anciennement stipulés et renouvelés aujourd'hui, lorsque les lieux que les religieux dépendent de la France possèdent à Jérusalem exigeront des réparations afin de prévenir que, par

le laps du temps, ils ne tombent en ruines, les commandements nécessaires pour réparer ces endroits autant que la loi le permet, seront délivrés sur la demande de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople; et aucun des Pashas, Cadis, Commandants, et autres officiers, ne mettront obstacle à une réparation autorisée par commandement. Mais il arrivait jusqu'ici que, sous le prétexte que les dits lieux avaient été clandestinement réparés, les autorités y faisaient chaque année de fréquentes visites d'inspection et frappaient d'amendes les religieux: cela a été pris en considération; et les Pashas, Cadis, Commandants, et autres officiers de ces contrées, ne pourront inspecter qu'une seule fois par année l'église que les religieux appellent Sépulcre de Jésus, ainsi que les autres églises et lieux de pélerinage.

Les évêques et les religieux dépendant de l'Empereur de France seront protégés tant qu'ils se tiendront dans les bornes de leur état, et personne ne s'opposera à ce qu'ils exercent leur culte, d'après leurs us et coutumes, dans les églises qui sont en leur possession et dans les autres endroits qu'ils habitent.

Et lorsque les Rayas de Ma Sublime Porte auront des relations de commerce avec les Français, ils ne seront pas molestés contrairement à la loi sainte à cause de ces mêmes relations.

Les anciennes capitulations portent que les Français ne seraient point inquiétés lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans leur Hôpital situé à Galata; mais cet article n'est pas exécuté. Or, désormais, et d'après la teneur des dites anciennes capitulations, personne ne les molestera lorsqu'ils prêcheront tranquillement l'évangile dans le dit Hôpital, quelque part qu'il eût été transféré.

No. 8.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 269.)

Therapia, September 4, 1850.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT herewith in copy, for your Lordship's information, an instruction addressed lately by General Aupick to the chief interpreter of the French mission for communication to Aali Pasha. It relates to the pending dispute between the Greek and Latin Churches of Jerusalem. I obtained it confidentially from one of my colleagues. I am not yet informed of the effect, if any, produced by so emphatic a recommendation of the subject advocated by France.

The Porte in its embarrassment between the two conflicting interests animated by religious zeal, would, no doubt, be glad to find an issue in some private arrangement between the parties more immediately concerned. Those of her friends who wish to see her free from the operation of exclusive foreign influences, and who cannot close their eyes to the probable political consequences of that success which the French Government seeks naturally to obtain at the head of the Roman Catholic representatives, can hardly fail to sympathize with the Turkish Ministry in their view, if such be really their view, of the pending case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING

Inclosure in No. 8.

General Aupick to M. Cor.

Therapia, le 12 Août, 1850.

Monsieur,

DANS la conférence que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir, le 28 Mai dernier, avec son Altesse le Grand Vizir et son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, il a été admis que les capitulations entre la Sublime Porte et la France dont je réclamais l'exécution en ce qui concerne les sanctuaires de Jérusalem, étaient en pleine vigueur.

J'ai déclaré de plus que postérieurement au Traité de 1740, un acte diplomatique, consenti et signé par les deux Puissances, pouvait seul infirmer ou

C

modifier régulièrement les dites capitulations ; qu'en l'absence d'un acte pareil, on ne pouvait avoir recours, pour le sens de l'Article 33 des Capitulations, qu'aux firmans antérieurs à l'année 1740 ou contemporains.

Depuis je vous ai chargé de demander à son Excellence Aali Pasha si, après l'examen de cette question auquel il avait annoncé qu'il se livrerait, il admettrait cette base de la négociation que je pose comme un principe incontestable, et qui a, d'ailleurs, le mérite de la circonscrire et de la simplifier.

Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en a fait savoir par votre entremise qu'il subordonnait toute réponse et toute décision a l'avis du Conseil des Ministres ; il a ajouté que la question ne pouvait lui être soumise pendant le Ramazan, et il espérait que je consentirais à ajourner jusqu'après le Bayram la délibération du Conseil sur cette affaire.

La revendication des sanctuaires de Jérusalem que je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement d'exercer, au nom des Traités qui depuis trois siècles unissent la France à l'Empire Ottoman, exige, je le reconnais, un sérieux et mûr examen, et je ne m'étonne ni ne me plains de la voir portée devant le Conseil des Ministres.

J'ai donc consenti au délai proposé. Je vous charge aujourd'hui de rappeler à son Excellence Aali Pasha et sa promesse et la manière dont la question a été posée par moi dans la Conférence du 28 Mai dernier.

L'Europe Catholique, amie de l'Empire Ottoman, attend avec impatience l'heureuse solution de la négociation commencée. La Sublime Porte y apportera la bonne foi et la loyauté qui n'ont fait défaut à aucun des actes du règne de Sa Majesté le Sultan ; mais son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères comprendra, je n'en saurais douter, l'importance que le Cabinet Ottoman doit attacher à ne pouvoir être, dans une circonstance d'un aussi haut intérêt, accusé de délais dont la nécessité ne serait pas manifeste.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) J. AUPICK.

No. 9.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 361.)
My Lord, *Therapia, December 4, 1850.*

IT appears that the question which was brought forward last spring by the French Minister, under special orders from his Government, with the view of obtaining or recovering possession of certain portions of the holy buildings at Jerusalem, is about to terminate in a manner unfavourable to the Latin claim so warmly advocated by France.

I am informed confidentially by Aali Pasha that a firman by which Sultan Selim the First granted the buildings in question to the Greeks, has been recently discovered, and that the tenor of the grant is such as to settle the question entirely in their favour. His Excellency is preparing a communication relating to it for General Aupick, and he proposes to put me in possession of its details as soon as that step shall have been taken.

I have, &c.
Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 10.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20, 1851.)

(No. 393.)
My Lord, *Therapia, December 27, 1850.*

AGREEABLY to your Lordship's instruction that I should give information of the course of General Aupick's negotiation with Aali Pasha relative to the holy buildings at Jerusalem, I have the honour to forward herewith, in copy, a report on that subject addressed to me by the interpreter whom I had directed to afford the Ottoman Minister an opportunity of describing the actual position of the affair.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 10.

M. E. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Pera, December 27, 1850.*

AALI PASHA desires me to tell your Excellency that, since a few days, General Aupick presses the Porte to return a definitive and decisive answer respecting the Jerusalem affair, insisting upon the Treaty of 1740 being enforced in all its contents, and demands that the whole of the documents posterior to that Treaty should be regarded null and void. Aali Pasha observes that, although that Treaty continues to be in full force, yet such a demand cannot be admitted, because the affair in question, being of vital importance, it could not be yielded to without the Porte being involved in serious embarrassment ; for if she pronounces herself in favour of the Catholics, as France wishes it, it will create a general discontent among the Greek population, and it may be that a revolution would break out. Russia then, who seeks every opportunity to increase her influence and supremacy over the Greeks in Turkey, and to draw away the affection of the Rayahs from the Sultan's Government, will not fail to lay hold officially of the question, and try to compel the Porte to do by force what she hopes to be enabled to manage now without the interference of a Power like Russia, which she endeavours to avoid by all means.

Consequently, what the Porte now proposes to do is, to address an official note to the French Minister, requesting that the affair should be settled by a Mixed Commission, composed of one Greek, one Catholic, and one Armenian, who, after minutely examining all the documents in the possession of the contending parties, will express their opinion as to the rights of each of them. The note is drawn up already and submitted to the sanction of the Sultan, and, as soon as it is returned to the Porte, Aali Pasha will transmit a copy of it to your Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 11.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 4.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 4, 1851.*

I AVAIL myself of the earliest opportunity to forward, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, the accompanying translation of an official note, addressed to General Aupick on the 30th ultimo by the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and communicated confidentially to me by his Excellency this morning.

Your Lordship will perceive that it relates to the claim advanced by France on the part of the Latin Church to certain portions of the holy buildings at Jerusalem, and that the Porte endeavours to avoid, or at least to postpone, the responsibility of a decision, by proposing a Mixed Commission for the investigation of documentary evidence on both sides.

It would appear that something has occurred to prevail with the Turkish Ministers to take a more temporizing course than I was entitled, by the previous communications of Aali Pasha, to expect. The present proposal carries with it an air of laudable moderation ; and much will be gained, in more respects than one, if the question, as put forward by France, can be brought into a judicial shape.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 11.

Aali Pasha to General Aupick.

(Traduction.) 30 *Décembre*, 1850.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence m'a adressée sous la date du 28 Mai dernier, et qui renfermait la demande de la restitution aux prêtres Latins des saints lieux à Jérusalem, dont la possession leur est assurée par l'Article XXXIII du Traité conclu entre la Sublime Porte et le Gouvernement Français l'an 1740 de l'ère Chrétienne, ainsi que quelques représentations sur certains points qui se rattachent à cette question.

Il est certain que la Sublime Porte a constamment et de tout temps été dans l'habitude d'exécuter avec droiture et de la meilleure foi du monde ses Traités avec les Puissances amies, et il n'est pas moins vrai de dire qu'un Traité qui n'a subi, à une époque quelconque, aucun changement, aucune modification, du consentement des deux Parties Contractantes, conserve toute sa vigueur dans toutes ses dispositions.

Seulement, et il est superflu de le dire, comme tous les Chrétiens des diverses croyances ont part aux saints lieux Chrétiens qui existent à Jérusalem, et qui sont visités par eux, chaque partie est en possession de plusieurs anciens firmans et titres. Cela étant, la Sublime Porte ne peut pas naturellement prononcer sur cette question, qu'au préalable une Commission Mixte n'ait vu et médité profondément les firmans et autres pièces authentiques et valables qui ont été données, soit avant, soit après, le Traité précité; et nul doute que le Gouvernement Français, qui a déjà donné tant de preuves de son amour pour l'équité et la justice, n'apprécie cette excuse bien fondée et ne l'accepte.

Voilà, M. le Ministre, ce que, par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan, j'ai été chargé de vous faire savoir, et je saisis, &c.

No. 12.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 9.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 6*, 1851.

THE French Minister called upon me this morning, and after stating the substance of Aali Pasha's note to him on the subject of Jerusalem, informed me that he had given in a formal protest to his Excellency against that part of the Turkish communication which goes to include in the proposed inquiry such firmans and other public documents as may have been promulgated subsequently to the Treaty concluded between France and Turkey in the year 1740. He is of opinion that they cannot be admitted as objects of discussion without invalidating the principle maintained by his Government, which is, that no firman of a date posterior to the Treaty can be pleaded in bar of the Treaty's execution. I ventured to ask, without entering at all into the merits of the question, whether the subsequent firmans might not be admitted, under a suitable declaration on his part, with a view to the possibility of their containing relevant clauses which might be shown to be not in contradiction with the terms of the Treaty. I infer from General Aupick's answer that he is not at liberty to modify his present course of proceeding without fresh instructions from Paris, that he cannot officially lose sight of the lead of the Catholic Powers, and that his personal sentiments would induce him to forego that favorite object of French policy for the sake of a practical arrangement calculated to remove the twofold scandal of religious collision and local profanation from the holy Christian buildings of Jerusalem.

A message from Aali Pasha informs me that the French Minister had accompanied his protest with an expression of thanks to the Porte for declaring its readiness to execute literally the terms of its Treaty with France, and that the Pasha had promised to take General Aupick's protest into consideration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 13.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 3.)

(No. 14. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 7*, 1851.

I HAVE just now obtained confidentially from Aali Pasha a copy of General Aupick's protest, mentioned in another despatch, and I hasten to forward it herewith for your Lordship's more complete information. A Council, which is held to-day on the affairs of Samos, will probably be invited to take it into consideration, and this promptitude looks as if the result of the pending deliberation may perhaps prove favourable to the views of the French Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 13.

General Aupick to Aali Pasha.

Péra, le 5 Janvier, 1851.

LE Général de Division, Ministre de France près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a reçu le memorandum que son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser, en date du 17 Safer, 1267 (30 Décembre, 1850), sous le No. 12, en réponse à la note que le Ministre de France avait eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le 28 Mai, 1850, à l'effet de revendiquer efficacement, au profit des religieux Latins de la Palestine, la possession des lieux saints dont les Traités leur assurent la jouissance.

Si c'est avec une vive satisfaction que le Ministre de France a vu la Sublime Porte reconnaître l'existence et la pleine valeur des Traités dont la France, en cette circonstance, réclame l'exécution au nom de tous les Catholiques, c'est avec un douloureux étonnement qu'il a remarqué une déviation manifeste de ces principes dans la fin du memorandum que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a été chargé de lui communiquer.

En effet, étendre aux actes postérieurs aux capitulations de 1740, l'examen proposé par son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, n'est-ce pas infirmer partiellement les Traités dont la Porte reconnait la pleine et entière validité? N'est-ce pas mettre en contradiction avec cette déclaration formelle "qu'un Traité qui n'a pas été modifié et changé du consentement des deux Parties Contractantes continue à être valable et en vigueur?"

Aussi, tout en considérant comme équitable la proposition de son Excellence Aali Pasha, en tant qu'elle ne concerne que les titres antérieurs à 1740, le Ministre de France se voit avec un profond regret obligé de protester formellement contre l'examen dont il est question de toutes pièces ou actes postérieurs à cette époque. En agissant ainsi, il éprouve le besoin de déclarer qu'il cède à l'accomplissement d'un devoir rigoureux et pénible.

En conséquence, et tout en renouvelant à son Excellence sa protestation formelle, tant au nom de la France qu'au nom de Catholicité tout entière, le Ministre de la République a l'honneur de lui faire savoir que ne pouvant accepter en aucune façon la discussion des documents postérieurs aux Traités que lient la France à la Sublime Porte, il va communiquer à son Gouvernement le memorandum de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et demander de nouvelles instructions.

(Signé) J. AUPICK.

No. 14.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 25, 1851.*

SOON after the arrival of the last steam-packet from Marseilles, General Aupick waited upon Aali Pasha and placed in his Excellency's hands an official note relating to the disputed question of the holy places at Jerusalem.

Of this note I have been favoured with a copy, which I have now the honour to inclose for your Lordship's information. It is couched in strong terms, and calculated to make a corresponding impression on the Turkish Ministers.

I learn, on the other hand, from Aali Pasha that M. de Titoff protests against all inquiry into the right of possession, and insists, in the Emperor's name, on the actual state of occupation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 14.

General Aupick to Aali Pasha.

Péra, le 23 Février, 1851.

LE Général de Division, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de la République Française près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a transmis à son Gouvernement le memorandum que son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, lui a fait l'honneur de lui adresser le 30 Décembre, 1850, sous le No. 2, en réponse à la note que le Ministre de France avait eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le 28 Mai, 1850, à l'effet de revendiquer efficacement, au profit des religieux Latins de la Palestine, la possession de lieux saints qui leur est assurée par les Traités.

Sous la date du 28 Janvier de la présente année, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la République Française fait connaître au Ministre de France près la Porte que le Gouvernement Français ne peut prendre au sérieux un acte entaché d'un contradiction manifeste, ainsi que le Ministre de France l'a établi dans son réplique du 9 Janvier.

Pour la France, il s'agit de savoir purement et simplement si la Porte se considère comme liée encore à son égard par les capitulations de 1740, alors qu'il est parfaitement établi qu'aucun acte auquel la France ait pris part n'en a infirmé la valeur.

Le Ministre de France est en conséquence chargé d'insister pour que le Gouvernement Ottoman veuille bien s'expliquer enfin catégoriquement sur ce point. Si la réponse est satisfaisante, ajoute le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, rien ne s'opposera à l'ouverture d'une négociation dans laquelle le Gouvernement Français ne se refusera certes à aucun des changements qui pourront se concilier avec son bon droit et avec les intérêts essentiels d'une cause qu'il défend au nom de la Catholicité toute entière. Si, au contraire, la réponse était négative, ou, ce qui reviendrait au même, si le Gouvernement Ottoman continuait à se renfermer dans des allégations contradictoires, il ne pourrait en résulter, la Porte le comprendra, qu'une grave atteinte aux relations de la France avec elle.

En portant à la connaissance de son Excellence Aali Pasha cette appréciation par le Gouvernement Français du memorandum du 30 Décembre dernier, le Ministre de France ne peut qu'insister pour qu'il veuille bien lui faire connaître dans le plus bref délai possible la décision de son Gouvernement. Dans l'espérance qu'elle sera conforme aux sentiments bien connus de droiture et de loyauté qui animent le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, le Ministre de France saisit, &c.

(Signé) J. AUPICK.

No. 15.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 6, 1851.*

AS far as my information extends, the question of the holy places at Jerusalem remains in the same state as when I last made mention of it to your Lordship.

I am assured through a secret channel that the Russian Envoy has received instructions from his Court directing him to maintain the right of the Greeks, according to their present occupation; but Aali Pasha asserts that M. de Titoff has not yet addressed any written communication on the subject to his Excellency.

Inclosed herewith is the copy of an official note given in by the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires. I have obtained it confidentially from the Porte. Your Lordship will observe that Austria pretends to a right of protection over the interests of the Latins similar in some degree to that which is asserted by France.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 15.

M. Kluzl to Aali Pasha.

Constantinople, le 3 Février, 1851.

LE Soussigné, Chargé d'Affaires de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique près la Sublime Porte Ottomane, a reçu du Gouvernement Impérial l'ordre d'appuyer auprès d'elle les réclamations des religieux Latins en Palestine, ayant pour but de revendiquer les lieux saints et les privilèges dont ils furent successivement dépouillés.

Après avoir recueilli soigneusement les données et les matériaux qui étaient propres à jeter de la lumière sur l'objet de ces réclamations, le Gouvernement Impérial a acquis la conviction que les religieux Catholiques étaient dans leur bon droit. Dès lors il n'a pu hésiter un seul instant à leur prêter son concours en sa qualité de Puissance appelée par ses Traités avec la Sublime Porte à protéger le culte Catholique dans l'Empire Ottoman.

C'est donc en vertu des Articles XIII du Traité de Paix de Carlovitz et de celui de Passarovitz, IX du Traité de Belgrade, et XII du Traité de Sistov, lesquels, ainsi qu'il est connu à la Sublime Porte, renferment des stipulations spéciales en faveur des religieux de Terre Sainte, que le Soussigné est dans le cas de signaler l'objet en question à l'attention toute particulière de son Excellence Aali Pasha, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté le Sultan, ainsi que M. l'Envoyé et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France l'a déjà fait par la note qu'il a adressée à la Sublime Porte dans ce même but, et dont il a bien voulu donner connaissance au Soussigné.

Le Ministre Ottoman, en jugeant la question avec impartialité, ne pourra voir dans la demande des religieux Latins, appuyée aujourd'hui par le concours des Puissances Catholiques, autre chose que la revendication d'un droit tout aussi incontestable qu'il a été longtemps inconnu.

Il est évident que la nature même des engagements que la Sublime Porte a contractés à cet égard, enlève tout caractère de légalité aux actes postérieurs à ces engagements et qui n'ont point été revêtus de l'assentiment commun.

Au surplus, les religieux Latins n'ont pas omis de reserver formellement leurs droits en présence des usurpations qui avaient lieu à leur détriment, ainsi qu'il conste par les renseignements authentiques que s'est procuré le Cabinet Impérial.

Dans cet état de la question, le Gouvernement Impérial d'Autriche pense que le moyen le plus simple et à la fois le plus efficace d'arriver à une solution satisfaisante, serait de confier à une Commission Mixte le soin de constater, avant

tout, l'état de possession des Latins en 1740, époque où la jouissance des sanctuaires qui se trouvaient alors entre leurs mains, leur fut confirmée par des transactions solennelles.

C'est avec une pleine confiance dans la sagesse et l'esprit d'équité de la Sublime Porte, que le Soussigné croit pouvoir énoncer l'espoir que les efforts employés à cette œuvre d'un intérêt général aboutiront à un résultat conforme à la justice.

Il saisit, &c.
(Signé) ED. DE KLEZL.

No. 16.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 91.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 18, 1851.

AGREEABLY to your Lordship's instructions, I have continued to abstain from taking any part in the pending dispute relative to the sacred buildings at Jerusalem. But I was surprised, a few days ago, by receiving a letter from the Guardian, or Père Commissaire, of the Holy Sepulchre, expressing a wish that I should support the Latin view of the question, by way of sequel to the assistance afforded to it, as he alleges, by some of my predecessors in the century before last. I have returned a civil, and I trust a Christian, answer to his suggestion, without intimating any opinion as to the merits of the case. Copies of the correspondence are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. At the Porte, it appears, the question remains in the same state as when I last adverted to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 16.

Père F. Bernardino di Montefranco to Sir Stratford Canning.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Jérusalem, le 5 Février*, 1851.

DU moment où l'Europe semble se rappeler qu'au berceau de sa foi elle a des intérêts à défendre, votre Excellence voudra bien me pardonner de réclamer une protection que l'Angleterre a tant de fois et si efficacement accordée aux religieux, gardiens de Terre Sainte.

En apprenant que plusieurs Puissances veulent bien intercéder auprès de la Sublime Porte, pour nous faire restituer les sanctuaires qui nous ont été successivement enlevés par les Grecs Orientaux et les Arméniens, l'espérance nous est revenue; mais je l'avoue, M. l'Ambassadeur, cette espérance serait bien plus forte si je pourrais croire que votre Excellence ne restera pas paisible spectatrice de cette juste et bien tardive revendication. Nous conservons avec reconnaissance les actes nombreux qui témoignent de la puissante protection que depuis les temps les plus reculés jusque dans ce siècle l'Angleterre nous a accordée; et quand il s'agira de prouver l'antiquité de nos droits et la justice de nos réclamations, les firmans délivrés à l'instance des Ambassadeurs d'Angleterre seront au nombre de nos meilleures preuves. Nous avons retrouvé dans nos archives douze de ces actes dont deux surtout sont très-explicites: le premier de l'an de l'Hégire 1077, et le second de 1099, obtenu par M. le Baron Tomasso Bendig.

Il nous serait consolant de croire, M. l'Ambassadeur, que vous voudrez bien élever la voix en notre faveur, ne fusse que pour faire respecter des actes posés par vos illustres prédécesseurs, et maintenir des engagements pris par la Porte Ottomane envers l'Angleterre.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) F. BERNARDINO DI MONTEFRANCO,
Guardiano del S. Sepolcro e Custode di Terra Santa.

Inclosure 2 in No. 16.

Sir Stratford Canning to Père F. Bernardino di Montefranco.

Monsieur, *Constantinople, le* 18 *Mars*, 1851.

JE viens de recevoir la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 5 Février, relativement aux sanctuaires à Jérusalem dont le droit de possession est disputé entre les Latins et les Grecs.

Je vous prie de croire que j'apprendrais avec plaisir l'arrangement d'une question qui tend nécessairement à exciter les passions et à mettre en jeu les préjugés religieux dans un endroit où plus qu'en tout autre la paix et la bienveillance mutuelle doivent répandre leurs bienfaits.

Il me semble surtout à regretter que jusqu'ici les parties les plus immédiatement intéressées n'ont trouvé aucun moyen de terminer de commun accord un différend qui porte plutôt un caractère litigieux que politique. Le monde Chrétien tout entier aurait raison de se réjouir d'un aussi heureux résultat, et l'autorité Musulmane y verrait, sans doute, avec contentement la solution amicale et mutuellement satisfaisante d'une question qui a dû lui causer plus d'une fois des embarras sérieux.

J'espère, Monsieur, que vous me saurez gré de la manière dont j'envisage le sujet de votre lettre, et que vous comprendrez, sans que je vous le dise, la discrétion avec laquelle je devrais toucher une chorde qui, à moins d'être touchée de la main d'un maître, pourrait bien vibrer en dissonance.

Je vous prie, &c.
(Signé) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 17.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 96.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, April* 7, 1851.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the answer which you have returned, as reported in your despatch No. 91, of the 18th of March, to the application made to you by M. di Montefranco, with the view of enlisting your support in behalf of the claims of the Latin Church to the disputed portions of the sacred buildings at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 18.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 112.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 5, 1851.

WITH reference to a preceding despatch,* by which I communicated a correspondence relating to the holy shrines at Jerusalem, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship translations of two almost identical firmans, issued, as it appears, at the suggestion of the British Ambassador at the time, and which are the same alluded to in that correspondence. Copies of these documents were procured during his late visit to Jerusalem by the Belgian

* No. 16.

Chargé d'Affaires, M. Blondell, who had the goodness to communicate them to me. Your Lordship will observe that they have a very slender bearing on the question now in dispute.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 18.

Translation of a Firman addressed to the Cadi and Governor of Jerusalem.

A L'ARRIVEE de mon ordre Impérial, qu'il vous soit notoire que le modèle des Princes de la nation Chrétienne, Baron Thomas Bendish, Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, près mon seuil de félicité (dont la fin soit heureuse), vient d'adresser une note à Ma Sublime Porte pour nous prier qu'un firman Impérial soit de nouveau expédié afin que les réligieux Francs puissent, d'après le Traité, visiter l'Eglise nommé Dir-ul-Amoud, avec son jardin, et le petite église située à Djuldjulé (Golgotha, ou Calvaire), ainsi que le tombeau de Jésus Christ avec son avant cour et le tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, qui sont des lieux de pélerinage fréquentés, depuis plus de 360 ans, par les religieux susdits, et que de plus ils aient la liberté d'y exercer leur culte, le jour des Olives, selon les rites de leur religion, sans que personne se permette de leur faire la moindre opposition, en contravention aux firmans Impériaux et hodjets sacrés qui se trouvent entre leurs mains, et en vertu desquels ils visitaient jusqu'à présent les susdits lieux.

En conséquence de cette demande, nous avons décidé que tout ce qui a été établi et pratiqué *ab antiquo*, conformément au Traité Impérial, soit maintenu, et nous vous ordonnons qu'à l'arrivée de cet ordre, vous vous y conformiez entièrement, et que vous ayez soin d'agir à cet égard, selon la justice et d'après ce qui a été de tout temps pratiqué, sans permettre à qui que ce soit de contrevenir à la loi sacrée et aux firmans Impériaux dont ces religieux sont munis, ainsi qu'au Traité et aux usages établis d'ancienne date. Après que vous aurez pris connaissance du présent ordre, vous le laisserez entre les mains des religieux Francs. Tenez-le pour su, et ajoutez foi au signe sacré dont cet ordre est revêtu.

Commencement de Djemadi-ul-Evvel 1077 (A.D. 1666).

Inclosure 2 in No. 18.

Translation of a Firman addressed to the Cadi and Governor of Jerusalem.

A L'ARRIVE de mon ordre Impérial, qu'il vous soit notoire que le modèle des Princes de la nation Chrétienne, Baron Thomas Bendish, Ambassadeur d'Angleterre près mon seuil de félicité (dont la fin soit heureuse), vient d'adresser une note à Ma Sublime Porte pour nous prier qu'un firman Impérial soit de nouveau expédié afin que les religieux Francs puissent, d'après le Traité, visiter l'Eglise nommée Dir-ul-Amoud, avec son jardin, et la petite église situé à Djuldjulé (Golgotha), ainsi que le tombeau de Jésus Christ et le tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, qui sont les lieux de pélerinage fréquentés, depuis plus de 360 ans, par les religieux susdits, et que de plus ils aient la liberté d'y exercer leur culte, le jour des Olives, selon les rites de leur religion, sans que personne se permette de leur faire la moindre opposition, en contravention aux firmans Impériaux et hodjets sacrés qui se trouvent entre leurs mains, et en vertu desquels ils visitaient jusqu'à présent les susdits lieux.

En conséquence de cette demande, nous avons décidé que tout ce qui a été établi et pratiqué *ab antiqua*, conformément au Traité Impérial, soit maintenu, et nous vous ordonnons qu'à l'arrivée de cet ordre, vous vous y conformiez entièrement, et que vous ayez soin d'agir à cet égard, selon la justice et d'après ce qui a été de tout temps pratiqué, sans permettre à qui que ce soit de contrevenir à la loi sacrée et aux firmans Impériaux dont les religieux sont munis, ainsi qu'au Traité et aux usages établis d'ancienne date. Après que vous aurez

pris connaissance du présent ordre, vous le laisserez entre les mains des réligieux Francs. Tenez-le pour su, et ajoutez foi au signe sacré dont cet ordre est revêtu.

Commencement de Djemadi-ul-Evvel 1099 (A.D. 1688).

No. 19.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 167.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 19, 1851.

I AM informed that the new French Minister at this Court has resumed the question of Jerusalem, by proposing to pursue the negotiation which his predecessor was unable to conclude. Fuad Effendi excused himself on the ground of not having participated in the previous discussions, and the question awaits the return of Aali Pasha from Broussa.

It would seem that M. de Lavalette in making his first communication expressed the importance attached to it by his Government, but intimated at the same time a readiness to treat the points at issue in a spirit of moderation and fairness.

It would seem that he has not made any communication on the subject to his colleagues, the representatives of the Roman Catholic Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 20.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 206.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 19, 1851.

THE French Minister at this Court is actively engaged in pressing to a conclusion his demands respecting the holy buildings at Jerusalem. He has, however, conveyed to Aali Pasha an impression that the French Government is not without feelings of regret at having taken up the question in so authoritative a manner.

The note to be prepared in answer to General Aupick's note on that subject will probably be couched in general terms of readiness to give effect to all existing engagements between France and the Porte. It will be followed by the appointment of a Mixed Commission instructed to examine documents bearing on the point in question, and I have reason to believe that the appointment will be such on the Porte's side as to secure a maximum of weight in favour of the *status quo*, that is, of the Greek claim as supported by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 21.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 19.)

(No. 218.)

My Lord, *Therapia, July* 4, 1851.

THE Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has communicated confidentially to me an official note, addressed by his Excellency to the French Envoy, on the subject of the holy buildings at Jerusalem. A copy of it is herewith inclosed for your Lordship's information. It is to be followed by the appointment of a Mixed Commission. On the side of the Porte, as I am informed on good authority, Signor Aristarchi and Emin Effendi are to be appointed Commissioners. The former is Grand Logothete to the Greek

Patriarch, and the Prince of Wallachia's Agent at the Porte. He is also distinguished by his unlimited devotion to the interests of Russia. His appointment as one of the Commissioners may be taken as a fair indication of the Porte's intention in this business; and public opinion is consequently not slow in ranging the present negotiation with those abortive attempts which have heretofore failed to produce the adjustment of a question in reality far more embarrassing than really important.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Aali Pasha to General Aupick.

(Traduit du Turc.) *Shauban* 1267. *Juin* 1851.

LES notes que nous avons reçues de la part de votre prédécesseur, portant les dates du 6 Janvier et du 24 Février derniers, en réponse à la note officielle qui lui avait été remise sous la date du 17 Safer, 1267 (30 Décembre, 1850), relativement à certains lieux à Jérusalem, ont été prises en considération.

J'ai été peiné de voir par le contenu des dites notes que le Gouvernement Français a trouvé dans celle du Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse des contradictions.

La Sublime Porte, dont l'une des anciennes et constantes habitudes est aussi d'observer avec la plus grande loyauté et franchise des Traités avec les Puissances amies, n'hésite nullement à déclarer de nouveau que tous les Articles du Traité conclu l'année 1740 de l'Ère Chrétienne, lesquels n'ont pas été modifiés par un autre Traité, conservent leur force et vigueur.

Seulement, il y a ceci à dire: c'est que le droit d'expliquer et de déterminer, de commun accord, et quand cela devient nécessaire, un Article, ou quelques Articles, des Traités conclus entre la Sublime Porte et des Puissances qui sont également amies comme la France, est un de ces droits qui appartiennent également à toutes les Puissances; et le Gouvernement Français lui-même conviendra avec la Sublime Porte qu'aucune Gouvernement ne peut empêcher un autre d'user de ce droit. Mais les modifications dont il est fait mention dans la note de la Sublime Porte, dont l'intention et le désir tendent sans cesse à sauvegarder les droits légitimes et bien fondés de chaque partie, et lesquelles sont une conséquence de ces mêmes droits, ont au premier coup d'œil paru des contradictions au Gouvernement Français.

Vu donc que ces explications franches et loyales, et les nouvelles assurances données ici de nouveau du respect de la Sublime Porte pour les Traités seront, on aime à croire appréciées, par le Gouvernement Français aussi bien que par votre Excellence, que tout soupçon sera dissipé, et que les deux parties sont réellement animées du désir de maintenir et de resserrer de plus en plus les relations amicales qui existent entre les deux illustres Gouvernements, il y a tout lieu d'espérer qu'en se concertant ensemble on pourra aviser aux moyens de résoudre cette question d'une manière conforme à la dignité et aux droits fondés de toutes les parties.

Je saisis, &c.

No. 22.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 282.)
My Lord, *Therapia, September* 17, 1851.

IT appears that the negotiations respecting the holy buildings at Jerusalem are beginning to assume a more serious aspect. The Russian Government has manifested of late an increased interest in the maintenance of the Greek pretensions. M. de Lavalette informs me that the Latin right is clearly established by the Committee of Investigation, and that his Government is fully entitled to insist on the execution of the Treaty which records it. He gave me to understand that if the moderation of his Government, in seeking only a joint participation of the buildings in question, were not appreciated, the claim of undivided possession by the Latins would be urged with all the weight of a demand warranted by Treaty.

Amidst these conflicting demonstrations I cannot perceive any symptom of concession on the side of the Porte, nor do I conceive it probable that the Turkish Ministers will give way, unless their hands be fairly forced; but as I take no part in the contest, the tendency to concession may exist without its falling under my immediate notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 23.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 52.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October* 21, 1851.

IN conversing with the Chancellor I have taken occasion to allude to the statement to be read in Sir Stratford Canning's despatch No. 282, inclosed in your Lordship's No. 18, and while expressing my regret at the existence of any dispute as to rights having again arisen between the Greek and Latin Churches, I thought it advisable to observe that the contest was one from which Her Majesty's Ambassador had kept wholly aloof.

Count Nesselrode said that of this fact he was fully aware.

His Excellency proceeded to observe that the Porte, in this question of the right of possession at Jerusalem, had acted a somewhat insidious part, as they had given some encouragement to the exaggerated pretensions of the French Mission in the hope of obtaining in return the assistance of the Republican Government in the resistance, more or less covert, which they were opposing to the English scheme of establishing railroad communications in Egypt.

His Excellency said that he would tell me in confidence that overtures for the same purpose had been made very directly by the Turkish Government to the Imperial Mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I am informed that M. Oustinoff, of the Foreign Department, will take charge of the Constantinople Mission during the absence of M. de Titoff.
G. H. S.

No. 24.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 308.)
My Lord, *Therapia, October* 17, 1851.

I HAVE ascertained from official sources of information that M. de Titoff at his recent audience of the Sultan referred to the pending differences concerning the holy buildings in Syria, saying that the Emperor of Russia was persuaded that no change would be allowed to take place as to the possession of those sanctuaries.

The Sultan, as I am informed, replied that the Emperor's recommendation would be considered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 25.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received October 31.)

(No. 309. Confidential.)

Therapia, October 17, 1851.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith in copy, for the information of Her Majesty's Government, a cabinet letter addressed to the Sultan by the Emperor of Russia. It was communicated to me confidentially by the Porte. Your Lordship will observe that it relates to the holy buildings situated at Jerusalem and in that neighbourhood, respecting the right of possession to which there exist a pending discussion between the Porte and the French Legation, a correspondence between the Court of St. Petersburgh and the French Government, and also a Mixed Commission of inquiry, composed of Greeks and Latins named respectively by the Porte and M. de Lavalette.

Judging from present appearances the influence of Russia will preponderate, and in that case the *status quo* will be maintained. How far the French Government is prepared to insist upon the right which it asserts under the Treaty of 1740, and enabled to prove that the buildings in dispute were actually in possession of the Latins at that period, remains to be seen, and I cannot presume to hazard an opinion on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 25.

The Emperor of Russia to the Sultan.

LES preuves fréquentes d'amitié et de confiance que votre Majesté m'a données, et celles que j'ai été heureux de lui offrir de mon côté en plus d'une occasion, m'autorisent à espérer qu'elle portera l'œil de sa vigilante justice et de sa sollicitude souveraine sur une question à laquelle j'attache un très vif intérêt, et qui, contre toute attente, fait dans ce moment l'objet d'une négociation diplomatique entre les Ministres de votre Majesté et les agens d'une Puissance Etrangère.

Je veux parler, très illustre et très puissant ami, de l'affaire des saints lieux de Jérusalem, et des prérogatives accordées par vos glorieux ancêtres, et confirmées par votre illustre père, comme par votre Majesté elle-même, aux religieux de l'Eglise Grecque en Orient et aux pieux visiteurs de cette communion qui se rendent en Palestine.

Aucun événement nouveau ou inattendu du dehors, aucune nécessité à notre connaissance, provenant des circonstances intérieures de l'empire de votre Majesté et des besoins de ses sujets, n'a pu, ni dû, provoquer des changements dans l'ordre des choses existant depuis des siècles dans la Cité Sainte et dans le service du temple qui renferme le Sépulcre de notre Seigneur Jésus Christ. Je n'ai pu donc qu'être surpris d'apprendre, par les rapports de mon Envoyé près votre Majesté, qu'on agite depuis quelque temps à Constantinople la question de savoir à qui appartient le droit de première possession de l'Eglise de Jérusalem et de la coupole qui la recouvre—aux sujets Chrétiens de votre Majesté, ou aux religieux venant de l'étranger et appartenant à d'autres communions que celle de la primitive Eglise d'Orient.

Je croirais manquer aux devoirs de l'amitié et de la franchise que je me plais constamment à mettre dans mes relations avec votre Majesté, si je lui laissais ignorer le sentiment pénible que j'ai éprouvé en recevant cette information, et en apprenant aussi que les observations confidentielles faites par mon Envoyé aux Ministres de votre Majesté n'ont pas pu les détourner du nouvel examen auquel ils ont consenti à soumettre une question clairement et positivement résolue par des ordonnances solennelles et des hatti-schérifs souverains, dont même quelques-uns avaient été officiellement communiqués dans le temps à la Mission de Russie à Constantinople.

La haute prudence et l'inébranlable impartialité qui distinguent toutes les décisions émanées de votre Majesté, me donnent la certitude qu'en portant sa bienveillante attention sur l'objet dont je viens de l'entretenir, elle ne permettra pas que des innovations dangéreuses, ou des concessions injustes, soient admises dans les établissements religieux possédés de temps immémorial par les Chrétiens de la Communion Grecque, et visités annuellement par des milliers de mes sujets, en vertu des Traités qui existent heureusement entre nos Gouvernements et de l'intime alliance qui m'unit à votre Majesté.

L'accueil qu'elle voudra bien faire à ma présente communication ne pourra que fortifier ces liens, et c'est dans cet espoir que je vous prie, très illustre et très puissant Padishah, de recevoir, &c.

No. 26.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 11.)

(Private.)

Therapia, October 25, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,

I LEARN from the Porte that nothing is to be done in the sense demanded by France for the settlement of the Jerusalem question; and I learn from M. de Lavalette that he views the disappointment in very strong colours, and feels it his duty to represent it in the same light to his Government. According to him, the treaty-right of France is indisputable; and the resistance of the Porte, grounded, as it seems to be in his eyes, on subserviency to the dictation of Russia, quite intolerable. He talks of France being justified in a recourse to extreme measures, and boasts of her superior naval forces now in the Mediterranean. I will write to you officially on this subject by the first opportunity. Meanwhile, it is difficult to say whether my colleague, in holding such language, has given way to feelings of personal irritation, or whether he is expressing what will prove to be the sentiment of his Government.

I observe that the Porte's formal decision is reserved for another Council: and it is possible, though not likely, that some change of purpose will take place.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 27.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 11.)

(Private.)

Therapia, October 25, 1851.

My dear Palmerston,

I AM informed that the Russian interpreter, Argyropulo, told Aali Pasha, a few days ago, that M. de Titoff had orders to leave if any change took place in the *status quo* of the Jerusalem sanctuaries. He said he was not authorized to make an official communication to that effect, but, knowing the fact, he thought it friendly to apprize the Porte of what it had to expect. M. de Titoff has permission to leave Constantinople for a time on his private affairs, when M. Ostinoff, his temporary successor, arrives. This circumstance may possibly have suggested the idea of a threat of angry departure, but after the course pursued by Prince Dolgorousky in Persia, it would hardly be safe for the Porte to treat the admonition with contempt.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 28.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 323. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 4, 1851.*

THE French Envoy at this Court purposes to send M. de Reculot, the Principal Secretary of his Legation, to Paris, by the steam-packet of to-morrow, with his conclusive report respecting the disputed sanctuaries at Jerusalem and Bethlehem. According to his language in the conversations with which he has honoured me on this subject, and particularly during a visit which I received from him to-day, the question has assumed a character of extreme gravity. His several statements amount in substance to what follows:—

France, says M. de Lavalette, is entitled by its Treaty of 1740 with the Porte to vindicate the right of the Latins to an exclusive occupation of all the sanctuaries which they possessed at that time. The conferences lately opened here have resulted in a clear establishment of that right as applied to the holy buildings, ten, I believe, in number, most of which are now possessed jointly by the two communions, and some exclusively by the Greeks. M. de Lavalette, instead of pushing his right to an extreme, took upon himself the responsibility of declaring his readiness to extend the principle of joint possession to the whole number. In so doing he would have anticipated the instructions of his Government, and exposed himself to the animadversion of Rome and of certain parties in France. An arrangement to this effect was unofficially agreed upon between Aali Pasha and himself, when he learnt that the Russian Envoy had sent in a letter from the Emperor Nicholas to the Sultan, which immediately altered the intentions of the Porte, and left him no choice but that of either accepting an inadmissible proposal or appealing to his Government. The proposal, which he thought it impossible to accept, was that of including in the principle of joint possession all the sanctuaries now possessed exclusively by the Latins. This proposal was represented to me by the Turkish Ministers as embracing all the principal sects of Christianity; but, whichever may be the correct version, it appears that M. de Titoff was as much opposed to it as M. de Lavalette. The former declared to the Turkish Minister, that he and his Legation would immediately quit Constantinople if the *status quo* of the sanctuaries were in any degree unsettled. The Porte has, in consequence, substituted another proposal, namely, that it would reserve its final decision until after a full investigation of the quarrel on which the several conflicting pretensions, including those of the Greeks, of the Latins, and of Russia, are respectively founded. This proposal is scarcely less distasteful to M. de Lavalette than the preceding one. He has acted with moderation throughout,—he has been careful not to commit his Government,—he has made no written communication except his opening note and such documents as were necessary for establishing the joint commission of inquiry,—he may regret that the question was ever opened, and he is anxious to act with moderation to the last; but at the same time he thinks it impossible to submit with honour to the present plan of proceeding,—his Government having embarked, wisely or otherwise, in the question cannot, with any degree of credit or consistency, stop short under the dictation of Russia,—the national party in France, the Catholic party there and elsewhere, will press for the full assertion of right under treaty,—and, as for himself, he will retire rather than be made the instrument, as he conceives he would be in the supposed case, of his country's humiliation; nay more, if it depended upon him, he would not hesitate to make use of the great naval force now possessed by France in the Mediterranean, and by blockading the Dardanelles bring the question in debate forthwith to a satisfactory issue.

Such are the leading points of M. de Lavalette's conversation with me. Bearing in view the purport of your Lordship's instructions, which direct me to preserve a neutral course in these discussions, I have expressed no opinion on the merits of the case. To M. de Lavalette I have made such passing remarks as I thought most likely to abate any excess of heat or precipitancy in his proceedings, and I gave M. de Titoff a sensonable idea of the lengths to which, in opinion at least, our French colleague was disposed to urge his Government,

hoping that, if he were not prepared for extremes, the intimation might incline him to be less peremptory with the Porte.

The Sultan's Ministers, though embarrassed by their position between the contending parties, have not yet expressed to me any apprehension of violence, or coercion, as likely to proceed from either side. Their object, as usual, is to temporize; their inclination would seem to be rather towards France; not that they can feel any direct concern in the question at issue, but as deeming a concession to French influence less dangerous than the triumph of Russian sympathy for the Greeks, whose cause, however, as that of an important section of their own fellow-subjects, they can hardly afford to neglect. The Sultan himself would gladly content Russia by leaving matters as they are, and he has shown some dissatisfaction with his Ministers for having gone too far in compliance with the wishes of France.

Whatever may be the immediate consequence of M. de Lavalette's appeal to his Government, the subject-matter of it, if received by the French President and his Cabinet in the spirit which appears to accompany its transmission, can hardly fail, sooner or later, to be productive of much annoyance, and perhaps of humiliation and eventual danger, to this country. That France, in her present condition, should at once put all to hazard for the sake of vindicating the alleged rights of her protected co-religionists under a Treaty which has more or less slumbered during a century, is not easy to be conceived. But passing interests might possibly concur with other motives to recommend a demonstration sufficiently embarrassing, not merely to the Porte, but also to Her Majesty's Government, though its only object might be to produce a crisis capable of being resolved by means of arbitration. The idea of an arbitration appears to have occurred as well to the French Envoy as to the Turkish Ministers. M. de Lavalette has informed me that the Grand Vizier suggested the notion of a reference to Prussia, which he had rejected with the observation that England was the only Power to be thought of for such a purpose, though, in his opinion, the expedient could not be entertained except in the event of circumstances involving an immediate hazard of collision.

It may be as well to add, that M. de Titoff stated to me in conversation, after being apprized of the language held by M. de Lavalette, that it was impossible for him (the Russian Envoy) to act otherwise, though he did not explain whether that impossibility arose out of the nature of the case, or solely from the peremptory character of his instructions.

In calling attention to the present complicated state of a question which, however injudiciously taken up, even in the judgment of those who are most active in pressing it to a decision, may involve consequences disproportioned to its intrinsic importance, I merely discharge a duty which could not be neglected with prudence or propriety. It remains for your Lordship to consider the language and circumstances reported above, in connection with such evidence of the real intentions of France and Russia as may reach Her Majesty's Government from other sources of information.

Inclosed herewith are three statements, which may possibly assist your Lordship in estimating the merits and bearings of the pending question. The first gives a list of the sanctuaries supposed to have been possessed exclusively by the Latins in 1740. The second is a chronological sketch of the several Hatti-sheriffs issued by the Mahometan Sultans in favour of the Greeks. The third contains references to the principal Articles of the Treaties between Russia and Turkey which might be cited as giving to the former a right of interference on behalf of the ecclesiastical interests of the Greeks.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 28.

Etat des Sanctuaires exclusivement possédés par les Latins en 1740.

A JERUSALEM:

1. Le Saint Sépulcre, c'est-à-dire, la grande coupole appelée coupole de plomb, et la petite coupole située sous la grande et recouvrant le tombeau même.

Tout le parvis qui entoure le tombeau et l'espace circulaire entre les piliers du dôme et le mur, espace aujourd'hui rempli par des chambres bâties par des Grecs après l'incendie.

2. Le grand arceau qui sépare l'Eglise des Grecs du dôme, et qui sert de chœur aux Latins quand ils font leur cérémonies devant le tombeau.

3. La pierre de l'onction et le parvis qui l'entoure, jusqu'à la porte de l'église et la chambre actuellement occupée par les Grecs.

4. La moitié méridionale du Calvaire, celle où Notre Sauveur a été mis en croix ; les quatre arceaux intérieurs qui forment la Chapelle d'Adam, en avant de laquelle se trouvaient les tombeaux de Godefroid de Bouillon et de Baudouin détruits en 1811 ; ainsi que cinq autres tombes royales placées au pied du mur du chœur de Grecs ; la chambre à côté de la Chapelle d'Adam.

5. La grotte de l'invention de la sainte croix et de l'escalier qui y conduit.

6. Tout le parvis et l'autel de l'Eglise de Ste. Madeleine ; les sept arceaux contigus dits arceaux de la Vierge, en bas comme en haut ; et la Chapelle dite de la Prison.

7. La petite église située à côté de celle de La Madeleine ; le couvent des réligieux Latins, avec une moitié de la galerie de la grande coupole ; les chambres contigues, la citerne, la galerie au-dessus des sept arceaux de la Vierge, et un passage de plein pied pour arriver à la coupole.

8. La Chapelle dite de la Sainte Vierge en dehors de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre au midi du Calvaire, et tout la place devant la porte de l'église.

9. Le convent du Saint Sauveur avec ses dépendants, l'église, les jardins, &c.

Hors de Jérusalem :

10. Le Cimetière du Mont Sion.

11. Le Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, avec les autels de St. Joseph, St. Joachim, et de Ste. Anne. Les clefs de l'église étaient dans les mains des Latins, qui en avaient la garde exclusive ; les autres nations avaient cependant chacune un autel dans l'église, mais elles ne pouvaient célébrer sans la permission des Latins, et le tombeau même de la Sainte Vierge était exclusivement réservé à ceux-ci.

12. La Grotte de Gethsémane, avec les oliviers et des terrains voisins.

13. La Grande Eglise de Bethléem tout entière, sauf le batistère ; la grotte de la crèche, et les deux escaliers qui y conduisent. Les religieux Latins avaient seuls les trois clefs, une pour la porte de l'église, les deux autres pour chacune des portes latérales de la grotte. Maîtres de l'église, ils pouvaient y entrer librement et y faire toutes les cérémonies de leur culte sur le maître-autel de l'église comme sur les deux autels situés dans la grotte, celui de la nativité et celui de la crèche. Une étoile d'argent portant une inscription Latine était clouée sur le marbre à l'endroit où Notre Sauveur est né. Une tapisserie portant les armes de Terre Sainte, et appartenant aux Latins, recouvrait les murs de la grotte. Les religieux Latins possédaient en outre à Bethléem la place devant l'église, tout le cimetière, et les magasins dits du moulin vieux.

14. Le couvent situé à côté de la Grande Eglise de Bethléem, avec la petite Eglise de Ste. Catherine et tous les terrains qui se prolongent jusqu'à la Grotte de la Nativité, et dans lesquels se trouvent les sanctuaires de St. Joseph, des Sts. Innocents, de St. Eusepe, des Sts. Saule et Eustasin, de St. Jerome ; du jardin contigu, et d'un autre jardin situé près de la grotte appelée Grotte du Lait.

15. La Grotte des Bergers et des terrains qui l'entourent.

16. L'Eglise de St. J. Baptiste dans le village de Ainkarem, avec le couvent et le jardin.

17. L'endroit où la Sainte Vierge a visité Ste. Elizabeth près du village de St. Jean (Aïntharem), et la Grotte de St. Jean dans le désert.

Sanctuaires possédés par les Latins en commun avec les autres nations en 1740 :

1. La moitié du Calvaire qui appartient en propre aux Grecs, celle où la croix a été plantée. Les Latins avaient et ont encore le droit d'y faire une cérémonie le Vendredi Saint.

2. L'Eglise du Tombeau de la Vierge, en ce sens—que les autres nations y

avaient chacune un autel et y célébraient avec la permission et sous l'inspection des réligieux Latins.

Sanctuaires et possessions desquels les Latins sont actuellement tout-à-fait exclus:

Jerusalem.—1. Les sept arceaux de la Vierge, et la Chapelle de la Prison.

2. Les deux arceaux inférieurs du Calvaire, la chapelle d'avant, et la chambre qui est à côté. Les tombeaux de Godefroid de Bouillon et de Baudouin ont été détruits.

3. Une portion du parvis autour de la pierre de l'onction, celle où étaient les autres tombeaux qui ont été détruits—les Grecs ayant avancé le mur pour agrandir leur église. La chambre de droite a été également usurpée par les Grecs.

4. L'espace situé entre les piliers même de la coupole et entre les piliers et le mur, espace que les Grecs ont rempli en y bâtissant des chambres. Ils ont également usurpé environ quatre pies de l'espace sous le grand arceau en avançant, pour agrandir leur église, le mur qui la sépare de la coupole.

Hors de Jerusalem.—5. Toute l'église qui renferme le tombeau de la Sainte Vierge, et le jardin qui est à côté. Les Latins ne peuvent plus y célébrer, ni même plus y entrer sans la permission des Grecs, qui ont les clefs.

6. La Grande Eglise de Bethléem tout entière ; les deux escaliers qui conduisent à la grotte ; l'autel de la nativité dans cette grotte. L'étoile d'argent a été enlevée ; il ne reste plus que quelque lambeaux de la tapisserie appartenant aux religieux Latins. Les trois clefs sont actuellement entre les mains des Grecs.

7. La moitié de deux jardins du Couvent à Bethléem.

8. La place et le magasin dit du moulin vieux.

9. La Grotte des Bergers et les terrains qui l'entourent.

Sanctuaires appartenant exclusivement aux Latins en 1740, et à la jouissance desquels participent actuellement les autres nations :

1. Le Saint Sépulcre et le parvis qui l'entoure sous la grande coupole.

2. La pierre de l'onction.

3. La Grotte de la Crèche à Bethléem. Les Grecs et les Arméniens y célébrent sur l'autel de la nativité, et les Latins sur l'autel de la crèche.

Inclosure 2 in No. 28.

Résumé chronologique de divers Hati-Chérifs rendus par les Sultans en faveur des Grecs, depuis l'an 15 de l'Egire (ère Chr. 636) jusqu'à nos jours, concernant le droit de possession et autres privilèges accordés aux Grecs des lieux saints à Jérusalem.

(An de l'Egire 15, Ere Ch. 636.) Hazret-Omer-Hatap, le conquérant de Jérusalem, sous le Patriarcat de Sophronius, rendit un Actinané, en vertu duquel le Saint Sépulcre et ses dépendances ont été mises sous l'autorité du Patriarche Grec, et les autres rites et religions soumis à cet egard à son obéissance, ainsi qu'une immunité complète fut accordée au Couvent de Saint Sépulcre.

(862.) Le Sultan Mehemet, après la conquête de Constantinople, sous le Patriarcat d'Athanasius, lorsque ce Patriarche vint présenter ses hommages au Sultan, rendit un hati-chérif qui confirmait les Grecs dans tous leurs droits de possession et d'immunité des lieux saints antérieurement accordés.

(923.) Le Sultan Selim, après avoir conquis Jérusalem, rendit en faveur du Patriarche Attala (ou Dorothée) un hati-chérif confirmant les mêmes droits et privilèges des Grecs.

(933.) Le Sultan Suleiman, le Canuni, sous le Patriarcat de Germain, emit aussi un hati-chérif confirmatif.

(Sefer 1044. Djem-evel 1047.) Le Sultan Murat IV, sous le Patriarcat de Théophane, rendit deux hati-chérifs, l'un contre les Arméniens et l'autre contre les Papistes, lorsque ces derniers tentèrent d'expulser les Grecs des quelques lieux saints, dont ils étaient anciennement en possession et après que cet acte d'agression fut jugé à Constantinople.

(Sefer 1054.) Le Sultan Ibrahim renouvela le hati-chérif de son prédécesseur contre les Papistes, et abrogea toutes les dispositions de reforme précédemment émises en leur faveur.

(Rebiul-ewel 1067. Muharem 1068.) Le Sultan Mehemet, à la suite d'un jugement formel, qui a eu lieu à Constantinople, émit deux hati-chérifs, par lesquels toutes les prétentions absurdes des Arméniens furent rejetées, et leurs empiètements sevèrement défendus.

(Rejib 1086. Zilhadji 1088.) Le même Sultan, sous le Patriarche Dossithée, à la suite d'un nouveau jugement qui a eu lieu entre les Grecs et les Papistes, rendit deux autres hati-chérifs, par lesquels les droits des premiers, ayant été pleinement reconnus, toutes les ordonnances précédentes, émises contre les Papistes, furent derechef confirmées.

(Djemadli-ul-akhir 1099.) Le Sultan Suleiman, à la suite d'une nouvelle contestation soulevée et jugée sous le Patriarcat de Mélétus, renouvela les mêmes hati-chérifs sus-mentionnés.

(Zileadé 1170 ?) Le Sultan Osman, sous le Patriarcat de Parthénius, lorsque les Papistes commencèrent leurs intrigues et leurs empiètements, par un hati-chérif spécial confirma les précédents, et interdit les réformes des Papistes.

(1171 ?) Le Sultan Moustafa renouvella le hati-chérif de son prédécesseur.

(1216-1218.) Le Sultan Selim, sous le Patriarcat d'Anthémos, rendit deux hati-chérifs contre les prétentions des Arméniens.

(Rejib 1223.) Le Sultan Mahmoud, dès son avénement, rendit deux hati-chérifs, concernant l'un les Papistes et l'autre les Arméniens, par lesquels il confirma tous les hati-chérifs antérieurement émis par ses prédécesseurs en faveur des Grecs.

(1224.) Lorsqu'en 1808 le Saint Sépulcre fut incendié, par un hati-chérif spécial la reconstruction de l'édifice en fut accordée de droit aux Grecs.

(1228.) Plus tard les Arméniens ayant fait valoir des prétentions, un hati-chérif en ordonna l'enquête.

(1236.) Sous le Patriarcat de Polycarpe, lorsque les Papistes expulsèrent par force les Grecs du Saint Sépulcre afin de les empêcher d'y célébrer l'office divin, et leur causèrent plus d'un empiètement, le Sultan Mahmoud rendit alternativement trois hati-chérifs en faveur des Grecs concernant le libre exercice de leur liturgie sous le dôme même du Saint Sépulcre.

(1252.) Enfin, lorsque les Arméniens au moyen de ruses et d'intrigues réussirent à obtenir l'autorisation de procéder aux réparations de l'Eglise de la Résurrection, de la Ste. Bythléème, et du Mont des Oliviers, un hati-chérif annula l'autorisation sus-mentionnée et accorda exclusivement aux Grecs le droit de faire des réparations générales.

(Zileadé 1255. Safer 1256.) Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan Abdul Medjid rendit quatre hati-chérifs pour renouveller les quatre hati-chérifs ci-dessous, savoir :

1.	Le hati-chérif de l'année	1223,	concernant	les Papistes.
2.	„	„	1228,	„	les Arméniens.
3.	„	„	1236,	„	la Liturgie du Grecs.
4.	„	„	1252,	„	les réparations.

Inclosure 3 in No. 28.

Traités entre la Russie et la Porte.

Traité de Constantinople du 1er Novembre, 1720.

Article XI. Il est libre aux marchands des deux nations de voyager et de trafiquer en toute sûreté d'un état à l'autre. Il sera aussi permis aux Russes de faire des pélerinages à Jérusalem et en d'autres lieux saints, sans qu'ils soient assujettis, ni à Jérusalem ni ailleurs, à aucun tribut Karatch ou Peskasch, ni à des exactions pécuniaires pour leurs passeports. Les ecclésiastiques Russes qui s'arrêteront sur le territoire de la Porte ne seront point molestés.

Traité de Belgrade de 1739.

Article XI. Il sera permis soit aux séculiers soit aux ecclésiastiques Russes, d'aller librement visiter, soit la cité de Jérusalem, soit les autres lieux qui méritent d'être visités, et il ne sera exigé d'eux aucun tribut ou payement. On ne fera aucun tort ou violence aux ecclésiastiques Russes qui s'arrêteront sur les terres de la domination Ottomane.

Traité de Kiutchouk Kanardgi de 1774.

Article VII. La Porte promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises ; et il sera libre aux Ministres de Russie de faire des représentations en faveur de la nouvelle église dont il est parlé dans l'Article XIV (qui suit).

Article XIV. Il est permis à la Cour de Russie, outre la chapelle bâtie dans la maison du Ministre, de construire dans un quartier de Galata, dans la rue nommée Bey-oglou, une église publique du rit Grec, qui sera toujours sous la protection du Ministre Russe et à l'abri de toute gêne et avanie.

Convention explicative de Constantinople du 21 *Mars*, 1779.

Article VII.—1. La Porte ne troublera en aucune manière l'exercice de la religion Chrétienne dans ces provinces (Valachie et Moldavie), et il sera parfaitement libre aux Grecs de construire de nouvelles églises, comme de réparer les anciennes.

2. Elle restituera aux couvents, ainsi qu'aux particuliers, les terres et les biens qui leur appartenaient aux environs de Braïlow, de Choezim, de Bender, &c.

3. Elle accordera aux ecclésiastiques de ces principautés les égards et distinctions dûs à leur rang.

No. 29.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 328.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 5, 1851.

THE very serious character which M. de Lavalette imparted to his conversation with me yesterday respecting the state of his discussions with the Porte, as related by me to your Lordship in a despatch of the same date, induced me to have some confidential communication on the same subject with Aali Pasha this morning.

His Excellency sent me word that the discussions were suspended with a view to investigating the various grounds of claim in a more comprehensive manner, and he appeared to entertain no apprehension of the consequences likely to result from M. de Lavalette's transmission of this intelligence to Paris.

The proposed suspension is not yet accepted by the French Envoy.

According to Aali Pasha's account, it remains for further deliberation during the next few days. I presume, in consequence, that M. de Lavalette writes by the present occasion only to prepare his Government for an eventual decision in which he cannot acquiesce, and that in opening himself to me he sought to enlist my good offices in favour of his course, both here and in London.

I learn, moreover, from Aali Pasha that the Porte thinks favourably of the French claim without admitting it to its full extent; that M. de Titoff, instead of threatening to retire from Constantinople, had only declared his intention to protest, in case of any change in the *status quo*; that Russia is considered by the Porte as having no right to interfere; and that the former proposal of the Porte, with respect to opening all the sanctuaries, extended to Christians of every established denomination; and, finally, that the Porte had no intention of communicating the Emperor of Russia's letter to the French Legation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 30.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 21.)

(No. 337. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, November 20, 1851.*

HAVING been yesterday informed that M. Rerulot, the Secretary of the French Legation at Constantinople, had arrived in Paris express, in consequence of serious differences which had arisen between M. Lavalette and the Turkish Government on the subject of the negotiation which has for some time been going on with reference to the protectorate of the holy sepulchres: I spoke to M. Turgot this morning on the subject, and expressed an earnest hope that such a question would not be pressed at this moment to an extent likely to lead to a diplomatic rupture, for I had heard that in consequence of the turn which the negotiations had taken, M. Lavalette had been upon the point of quitting his post, and embarking on board a French man-of-war.

M. Turgot assured me confidentially that he much regretted M. Lavalette had pressed the matter forward in the way he had done; that luckily he had not committed himself in any way which need necessarily engage the Government of France; and it was his intention, in which he believed the Council would concur, to direct him to remain at his post and drop this matter for the present.

I have, &c.
(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 31.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 568.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November 21, 1851.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's confidential despatch, No. 337, of the 20th instant, reporting the substance of your conversation with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs upon the subject of the difference which has arisen between the French Legation at Constantinople and the Turkish Government in regard to the holy buildings at Jerusalem.

I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course which you have taken, and the language which you have held to M. Turgot in regard to this matter.

It would indeed be lamentable if, in the present state of Europe, a serious difference were to arise between France on the one hand, and Russia and Turkey on the other, upon a matter in itself so unimportant as the question which has been raised between France and Russia as to certain privileges in regard to the custody of a holy building at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 32.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 334. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 5, 1851.*

THE confidential report, inclosed herewith in copy, relates to the pending discussions about Jerusalem. I forward it under an impression that it will contribute to give your Lordship a correct view of the sentiments entertained upon that subject by the leading Turkish Ministers, and of the spirit in which the Russian Government is prepared to urge its views upon the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Confidential Report.

I AM requested by Aali Pasha to acquaint your Excellency confidentially that having privately informed M. de Titoff of the answer to be given to the French and Russians respecting the pending question of the Holy Land, the Russian Envoy yesterday called on him and remained there for about three hours, when a very warm discussion followed, in which M. de Titoff endeavoured to persuade him of the necessity for the Porte to delay the intended communication until he referred the matter to his Government and received the Emperor's opinion. But seeing that Aali Pasha answered the question evasively by observing that he could not comply with such a request previous to his submitting the proposition to the Council, M. de Titoff then rejoined, that he thought it his duty to tell him frankly, that any further step, foreign to the *status quo* of the holy places, would exceedingly annoy the Emperor, in which case he (M. de Titoff) would find himself compelled to abandon the confidential ground upon which he acted up to this moment, and officially protest against the Porte. He further added, that he very clearly sees the Porte's intention to accept the protectorate of France in this affair.

To this observation of M. de Titoff Aali Pasha replied that the Russian Envoy was mistaken, because the monks concerned being foreign subjects and not Rayahs of the Sublime Porte, the Protectorate of France was rather bearing upon other Foreign Powers than the Porte. M. de Titoff appeared to be aware that his last remark was misplaced, but too late.

No. 33.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received November 26.)

(No. 336.)
My Lord, *Therapia, November 8, 1851.*

I AM informed by Aali Pasha that the Porte intends to refer the investigation of the Jerusalem question to a special Council of State composed of members of the Ulemah and some of the principal Ministers.

The object of this plan is, no doubt, to gain time, and to avoid an embarrassing decision with the least possible amount of offence to the adverse claimants, and of inconvenience to the Turkish Government. It does not appear that any written communication is to be made at present on the subject of the sanctuaries either to the French or to the Russian Legation, though, doubtless, an answer must be returned to the Cabinet letter presented by M. de Titoff. The language of Aali Pasha does not imply that the Porte entertains any immediate apprehension of coercive measures from any side.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 34.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 291.) *Foreign Office, November 27, 1851.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatches Nos. 323, 328, 334, and 336, of the 4th, 5th, and 8th instant, respecting the questions touching the holy buildings at Jerusalem, which have been under discussion between the French Minister and the Porte; I have to instruct your Excellency to report to me what is understood to be the relative numbers of the adherents of the Greek and Latin Churches, and what portion of the adherents of the latter Church are French citizens, or have any direct connection with France.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 35.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 8.)

(No. 343.) *Therapia, November 19, 1851.*

My Lord,

THE French Envoy in his conversations with me continues to hold the same language respecting the affair of Jerusalem, which I have already reported to your Lordship. If I am to give full credit to his account of the opinions which he has transmitted to Paris, the President of the French Republic, if he acts at all, will have to choose between a blockade of the Dardanelles and the recall of his Minister, or, should he not adopt M. de Lavalette's suggestions, to sustain the inconvenience of his retirement with an appeal to the public explanatory of its motive. He asserts loudly that, in his opinion, the honour of his country and Government would be compromised by a tame acquiescence in the temporizing line of conduct adopted by the Porte in subserviency, as he conceives, to Russian dictation. The use of similar language to the Belgian Minister and to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires would seem to have made a considerable impression on those gentlemen. Among the Turkish Ministers I perceive more symptoms of annoyance than of apprehension. The Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, with whom I had some incidental conversation on the subject this morning, describe M. de Lavalette as being in error when he stated that they had both expressed to him a complete agreement with his opinions respecting the Latin claim, and their wish, unaccepted by the Sultan, to retire from office in consequence of their inability to act accordingly.

Since I had last the honour of addressing your Lordship on this subject, an exchange of official notes has taken place between the French Envoy and Aali Pasha. The points in question, as I am informed, are the suspension of the conferences of inquiry, and the appointment instead of a commission composed of Turkish Ministers and members of the Ulema. M. de Lavalette objects to both these measures, and the Porte persists in pursuing its own course.

The Russian Minister has not made any fresh move, as far as I know. His intimation of having the Emperor's orders to go away if the *status quo* of the sanctuaries were disturbed, was given to Aali Pasha by his dragoman unofficially. M. de Titoff's threat was that of a protest and the adoption of an official attitude, in case of the supposed contingency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 36.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 26.)

(No. 362.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 27, 1851.*

HAVING received from M. de Lavalette an unofficial communication of the procès-verbaux of the Mixed Commission appointed some time ago by the Porte and the French Legation with a view to investigating the adverse claims of the Greeks and Latins to certain sanctuaries in the Holy Land, and having his permission to transcribe them, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy for your Lordship's information.

I avail myself of the opportunity to forward in copy also the last correspondence which has taken place on this subject between Aali Pasha and the French Envoy. I have since learnt in confidence from an authentic source that two days before the departure of the last steam-packet for Marseilles, M. de Lavalette renewed his endeavours to obtain some arrangement acceptable to France, and that during his visit to Aali Pasha for that purpose he grounded his entreaties on the apprehensions which he entertained of measures being taken by his Government to compel the Porte to comply with their demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 36.

Procès-Verbaux of the Jerusalem Commission.

CEJOURD'HUI, 4 Août, 1851 (23 Juillet, 1851, vieux style), la Commission instituée pour l'examen des documents relatifs aux saints lieux de Jérusalem, composée de son Excellence Emin Effendy, Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de M. Botta, Consul de France à Jérusalem, de M. Nicolas l'Aristarchi, Logothète de l'Eglise Patriarcale, et de M. Charles Schefer, second drogman de la Légation de France à Constantinople, s'est réunie à dix heures du matin chez son Excellence Emin Effendy.

Son Excellence a d'abord donné lecture de la note adressée par M. le Général Aupick au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale sous la date du 23 Mai, 1849; puis de la réponse de la Sublime Porte sous la date du 30 Décembre; de la protestation de M. le Général Aupick sous la date du 6 Janvier, 1851; enfin, du memorandum de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale sous la date du 29 Juin, 1851. Il a été unanimement reconnu que ce memorandum traçait de la manière la plus nette la ligne de conduite de la Commission, et qu'elle devait chercher à établir par l'examen des documents authentiques l'état des sanctuaires garantis par le Traité de 1740. L'Article XXXIII de ce Traité a été lu, et les Commissaires ont reconnu que le texte était clair et précis, mais qu'il ne mentionnait aucun des lieux qui se trouvaient aux mains des Latins. Les Commissaires du Gouvernement Impérial ont demandé aux Commissaires Français, avant de commencer l'examen des documents délivrés par le Gouvernement Ottoman, la liste des khatti-chérifs, firmans, hudjets (actes juridiques) qui se trouvent entre leur mains, afin de pouvoir rechercher les pièces accordés aux religieux Grecs. Les Commissaires du Gouvernement Français se sont engagés à fournir cette liste dans le plus bref délai, de manière à ce que l'examen des titres peut être commencé à la première séance, qui a été fixée au Mardi, 12 Août. Lecture de ce procès-verbal a été donnée au commencement de la séance du 12 Août. Son Excellence Emin Effendy a demandé qu'il fût bien entendu que la solution des difficultés ne devait pas être basée seulement sur les pièces présentées par les Commissaires Français, mais encore sur les documents que les Commissaires Ottomans pourront présenter de leur côté.

(Signé) EMIN MONHLIS.
P. E. BOTTA.
CH. SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, Mardi, 12 Août, 1851 (31 Juillet, 1851, vieux style) correspondant au 20 Chevval 1267, la Commission formée pour l'examen des documents relatifs à la question des saints lieux de Jérusalem, s'est réunie à dix heures du matin chez son Excellence Emin Effendy. Après la lecture du procès-verbal, la Commission a pris connaissance du khatti-chérif de Sultan Suleyman donné sous la date du 15 Redjeb de l'année 1101 de l'Hégire (1689 de Jésus Christ). Son Excellence Emin Effendy avait sur la liste des documents présentée par M. Botta réclamé du Divan Impérial, la copie de ce firman. Cette copie a été reconnue parfaitement exacte. Il a été ensuite donné lecture du hudjet délivré par le tribunal de Jérusalem sous la date du 20 Ramazan, 1101 (1689). La rédaction de cette pièce a fait connaître qu'un firman avait été délivré à la requête du Baron de Chateauneuf, Ambassadeur du Roi de France. MM. les Commissaires Ottomans ont réclamé cette pièce. Les Commissaires Français se sont engagés à la présenter, ainsi que le firman de Sultan Murad de l'année 1045 (1635), qui est invoqué dans le khatti-chérif de Sultan Suleyman. Les Commissaires Ottomans ont de plus demandé la copie des pièces qui se trouvent aux mains des Commissaires Français. La séance a été close par la lecture du khatti-chérif de Sultan Suleyman II, sous la date de 1102 (1690). Il a été de plus résolu que les procès-verbaux seraient rédigés en deux langues, à savoir, en Français et en Turc.

(Signé) EMIN MONHLIS.
P. E. BOTTA.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.
CH. SCHEFER.

En vérta d'une décision prise entre le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte et la Légation de France, une Commission Spéciale a été formée pour lire et examiner scrupuleusement les khatti-chérifs, firmans, et autres documents authentiques relatifs aux lieux saints situés tant à l'intérieur qu'à l'extérieur de Jérusalem, et qui sont l'objet de contestation entre les religieux Latins et la communauté Grecque. La Sublime Porte a choisi pour ses Commissaires son Excellence Emin Effendy, Secrétaire Général du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, et M. Nicolas Aristarchi, Logothète de l'Eglise Patriarcale. La Légation de France a désigné M. Botta, Consul de France à Jérusalem, et M. Schefer, second drogman de la Légation. La Commission s'est réunie aujourd'hui, 2 Septembre, 1851 (6 Zilcaade, 1267), chez son Excellence Emin Effendy. Déjà la Commission s'était précédemment réunie plusieurs fois et avait tenu plusieurs séances sans avoir pu entrer dans une ligne de conduite bien tracée. M. le Ministre Plénipotentiaire de France et son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères ont eu à ce sujet une entrevue, à la suite de laquelle il a été convenu de la manière la plus positive que la mission des Commissaires consistait seulement dans l'examen des titres et des documents qui se trouvent entre les mains des Latins et des Grecs, et particulièrement de ceux qui ont été délivrés depuis l'année 1101 (1689), jusqu'à l'année 1153 (1740).

Des khatti-chérifs, firmans, et autres documents nécessaires qui ont été donnés aux Latins, seront d'abord lus avec la plus grande attention dans l'ordre où ils ont été délivrés. Le contenu de chaque pièce sera consigné en abrégé au procès-verbal. On examinera ensuite les pièces qui seront produites par la communauté Grecque. Le sens de ces pièces sera aussi inséré en abrégé au procès-verbal. Après ces explications les Commissaires ont examiné en premier lieu le khatti-chérif délivré par Sultan Suleyman II, sous la date du 15 Redjeb de l'année 1101 (1689), et qui se trouve aux mains des religieux Latins.

La teneur de cet ordre est que bien que les religieux Latins aient le droit de tapisser et d'orner le lieu appelé le Sépulcre de Jésus (sur qui soit le salut), situé au milieu de l'Eglise de Kamamé sise à l'intérieur de Jérusalem ; qu'ils possèdassent les deux coupoles, l'une grande et l'autre petite ; qu'ils jouissent du droit d'étendre des tapis, de dire la messe, et de poser des chandeliers et des tentures au-dedans et au-dehors du dit Sépulcre et sur la place qui se trouve devant ; qu'ils eûssent la possession du petit autel qui se trouve entre les grilles de fer qui sont posées comme limite devant la porte depuis ce lieu jusqu'à l'Eglise des Grecs ; qu'ils eûssent le droit de suspendre des lampes sous le grand arceau qui se trouve au-dessus de cet emplacement, de dire la messe, de placer des flambeaux et des lampes dans la moitié du Calvaire appelée lieu de la crucifixion ; bien enfin, qu'ils jouissent de la préséance sur les autres nations dans les visites

aux lieux de dévotion ; et qu'ils eûssent le droit de célébrer leurs cérémonies dans la partie inférieure et supérieure des sept arceaux de la Vierge Marie et sur la pierre de l'onction ; cependant, les Grecs les ont violemment et abusivement privés de ces droits ; ils ont ôté les lampes des Latins et placé deux chandeliers de pierre sous le grand arceau en face le Sépulcre, mis deux flambeaux sur la pierre de l'onction, et construit un petit autel dans le lieu appelé Grotte de la Croix.

Ils ont de plus enlevé aux religieux Latins la clef de la grande église située à Bethléem et les clefs des deux portes de la grotte où est né Jésus. Ils ont construit une porte dans le limitière des Latins au midi de la grande église, une autre porte au midi en face la Grotte de la Nativité, et au-dessous un escalier, ainsi que plusieurs sièges autour de la dite grotte, au midi et au nord. Ils ont fermé deux ventes précédemment ouvertes en face la porte de cette grotte, élevé deux portes nouvelles, enlevé les anciens autels placés au nord de la grotte et mis en leur place des sièges ; ils ont également fermé les portes de deux jardins dépendants de la grotte et construit deux portes nouvelles. L'enquête a constaté que les lieux précités avaient été *ab antiquo* affectés aux Latins, et que les Grecs s'en étaient emparés depuis quelques années au moyen de déclarations mensongères.

Il a de plus été reconnu que le Traité présenté par les Grecs et attribué par eux au Khalife Omar, n'a ni fondement ni réalité.

Conformément à la sentence juridique à l'attestation générale appelée Arzi Maghar et aux ordres des Sultans mes prédécesseurs, ordres bâsés sur des fetwas —conformément aussi au hudjet et au khatti-chérif délivré en l'année 1045 (1635), par le Sultan Murad, les lieux susmentionnés sont confirmés aux Latins après que les Grecs en auront été expulsés.

Que les religieux Latins se gardent bien de rien faire qui soit contraire à l'ancien état de choses ainsi que l'avaient faits les Grecs.

Les Commissaires ont jugé nécessaires de prendre connaissance du khatti-chérif délivré en 1045 (1635), par Sultan Murad ; ainsi que du procès-verbal d'enquête mentionné dans le khatti-chérif qui vient d'être mentionné. Mais ces documents ne se trouvant pas entre leurs mains, ils ont dû poursuivre leur examen et lire le procès-verbal délivré en l'année 1101 (1684), le vingt du mois de Ramazan, par le tribunal de Jérusalem. Cette pièce porte que : "En vertu d'un khatti-chérif délivré le 15 Redjeb de l'année 1101, et dont la teneur a été consignée ci-dessus, et d'un autre firman accordé à la fin du même mois à la requête du Baron de Chateauneuf, Ambassadeur de France, et qui ordonne que Hassan Aga sera délégué pour le faire mettre à exécution, le jour de la date du présent acte le Gouverneur et le Cadi de Jérusalem, accompagnés par le Commissaire Hassan Aga et par les notables, les Cheikhs, les Ulemas, les officiers, et autres Musulmans dont les noms sont consignés, se sont transportés aux lieux énumérés ci-dessus. En présence des religieux Latins, du procureur, et des drogmans du Patriarche Grec, on a procédé à l'enquête des lieux de visitation, localités, et endroits sis soit dans l'Eglise de Kamamé dans l'intérieur de Jérusalem, soit la Grande Eglise de Bethléem. Les lieux ont été repris aux Grecs, et rendus et restitués aux Latins. Tout ce qui a été mentionné comme innovation a été remis dans son ancien état, et les religieux Latins ont pu en toute sécurité mettre à exécution leurs règles et leurs coutumes anciennes telles qu'elles existaient précédemment en vertu du khatti-chérif de Sultan Murad et du hudjet qui se trouvent entre leurs mains.

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
P. E. BOTTA.
NICOLAKI D'ARISTARCHI.
CH. SCHEFER.

Pour traduction conforme à l'original en langue Turque.
CH. SCHEFER.

La Commission s'est réunie cejourd'hui, 9 Septembre, 1851 (13 Zilcaade, 1267). Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et reconnu exact par les Commissaires des deux Gouvernements. Ils l'ont approuvé en y apposant leurs signatures et leurs cachets. Puis, la Commission a pris connaissance du khatti-chérif de Sultan Murad IV, délivré à la fin du mois de Chevval 1045 (1635).

On n'a pu se procurer l'original de cette pièce, qui ne se trouve pas enrégistrée dans les bureaux du Divan Impérial: cependant les Commissaires Français en ont produit une ancienne copie portant en tête le *Toughra* Impérial.

Voici le contenu de ce document: "Les religieux Latins établis à Jérusalem ont revendiqué la pierre de l'onction de Jésus (sur qui soit le salut), située au midi dans l'intérieur de l'Eglise de Kamamé; les quatre arceaux du Calvaire; la partie inférieure et supérieure des sept arceaux de la Vierge: à Bethléem, la grotte où naquit Jésus, située dans l'église; les clefs des deux portes au nord et au midi, ainsi que les deux jardins. Le Patriarche Grec établi à Jérusalem et ses religieux ayant réclamé ces lieux et produit à l'appui de leurs prétentions des actes faux et fabriqués, ont obtenu à l'aide de déclarations contraires à la vérité un ordre Impérial donnée dans la plaine de Daoud Pacha au milieu du mois de Chevval 1043 (1633).

"A la faveur de cet ordre ils se sont emparés des lieux précités, et ils les ont possédés pendant deux ans. Les religieux Latins ont, à leur tour, produit d'anciens titres de la teneur desquels il ressort d'une manière évidente qu'ils possèdent les dits lieux et les clefs des trois portes depuis le temps de la conquête d'Omar le Khalife; qu'en outre, lors de la conquête de la Terre Sainte par feu, le Sultan Selim Khan I, ces lieux étaient restés aux mains des religieux Francs.

"Cependant, la communauté Grecque ne cessant de les inquiéter, ils ont, à différentes reprises, comparu devant le tribunal de Jérusalem, et il a été constaté que les Latins sont toujours restés en possession de ces lieux depuis le temps des anciens Sultans.

"Enfin, ils ont entre leurs mains de nombreuses pièces juridiques délivrées par les Cadis de Jérusalem en 972 et 973 (1561-1565), et en dernier lieu en 1041 et 1043 (1631-1633). Deux de ces pièces attestent que les lieux susdits ont été mis entre les mains des Francs par quatre Gouverneurs d'Egypte. Outre ces pièces, conformément au témoignage de personnes désintéressées, les Cadis postérieurs ont signé des hudjets en vertu desquels on a délivré des ordres Impériaux.

"En outre, les Rois Catholiques nous ont écrit et ont intercédé auprès de nous pour que les lieux et endroits désignés plus haut fussent restitués aux Latins: nous avons favorablement accueilli leurs demandes. En conséquence, les lieux susmentionnés sont confirmés aux religieux Francs, et ce signe auguste, ce noble firman, a été délivré pour leur servir d'acte authentique.

"Outre les lieux nommées plus haut, les Francs jouiront, suivant l'usage antique des localités qui ne leur ont point été contestées jusqu'à ce jour, et qui sont à Jérusalem, le tombeau de la Vierge Marie, le Convent de Saint Sauveur, avec ce qui en dépend et ce qui est attenant; à Nazareth, l'église, le couvent, et les autres localités, quelles qu'elles soient; que les Grecs et les Arméniens ne s'immiscent point dans les affaires des Francs et qu'ils ne les molestent point.

"En résumé on restitue aux Latins les sanctuaires et les lieux de visitation, et on détruit tout ce que les autres communautés avaient élevé par innovation."

La Commission a passé ensuite à l'examen du khatti-chérif de 1102 (1690), qui se trouve entre les mains des Commissaires Français. Cette pièce, qui porte la date du 15 Rebiul-akhir, 1102, a été délivrée par Sultan Suleyman II, et confirme la teneur du procès-verbal délivré par le tribunal de Jérusalem en 1101 et dont la Commission a pris connaissance dans la dernière séance.

Ce khatti-chérif porte que les lieux situés à Jérusalem et à Bethléem, et qui étaient l'objet de contestations entre les Latins et les Grecs, sont confirmés aux premiers comme cela existait *ab antiquo*, en vertu de l'enquête qui a suivi l'ordre Impérial, et conformément au hudjet ou procès-verbal qui a été délivré et aux khatti-chérifs octroyés par les Sultans précédents.

Cette pièce se termine par l'injonction d'empêcher les Grecs de s'immiscer et de s'ingérer dans les choses qui seraient contraires à l'usage antique.

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
P. E. BOTTA.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.
CH. SCHEFER.

Pour traduction conforme,
CH. SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, 16 Septembre, 1851 (20 Zilcaadé, 1267), la Commission après s'être réunie a lu et signé le procès-verbal de la séance précédente. Les Commissaires Français ont présenté une pièce juridique ou hudjet datée du 13 Sefer de l'année 1046 (1636), portant la signature et le sceau du Cadi de Jérusalem, Cheickh Mohamed Ibn Mahmoud, et attestant que les prescriptions du khatti-chérif de l'année 1045 (1635), ont été exécutées.

Voici la teneur de cet acte: Mustafa Aga, Mutiferrika de la Sublime Porte, et un autre Aga, Capidje Bachi de Bairam Pacha, Caimacam de Constantinople, ont été envoyés comme Commissaires. Ils apportaient le khatti-chérif délivré à la fin du mois de Chevval 1045, et deux ordres Impériaux dont les sens est que les religieux Latins dans une requête présentée à la Sublime Porte ont exposé que depuis les temps anciens ils possédaient à Jérusalem dans l'intérieur de l'Eglise de Kamamé la pierre d'onction de Jésus (sur qui soit le salut); la partie inférieure et supérieure des quatre arceaux de Calvaire et les sept arceaux de la Vierge Marie: à l'extérieur de Jérusalem, dans la grande église du village de Bethléem, la Grotte de la Crèche de notre Seigneur (sur qui soit le salut); les trois clefs qui sont celles des portes du midi et du nord, et de la porte de la grotte attenant au Convent Latin, et au-dehors de l'église deux jardins qui étaient leur propriété.

Les Grecs s'étant, le 15 Chevval, 1043 (1633), emparés des lieux susnommés par des mesures de violence, les religieux Latins demandent dans leur enquête qu'ils leur soient rendus et restitués pour qu'ils les possèdent comme cela existait anciennement.

En conséquence, il est ordonné par le firman Impérial qui vient d'être octroyé, que les lieux précités seront rendus aux Latins pour qu'ils en jouissent suivant l'usage antique, que tout ce qui a été innové par les Grecs, tel que la pose de lampes, de flambeaux, la construction d'escalier, &c., sera aboli. Cependant, on ne pourra empêcher les Grecs de visiter, suivant les rites de leur secte, les lieux précités.

Le Cadi de Jérusalem et le Gouverneur Hassein Aga ont réuni en leur présence un conseil formé des Ulémas, des muderris (professeurs), des notables et d'autres personnages de distinction. Les ordres Impériaux ont été lus devant eux; puis on s'est rendu à la pierre de l'onction. Là, en présence de Mustafa Aga, délégué comme commissaire, on a demandé au Père Antoine, fils de Christophe, procureur des religieux Latins, à qui appartenaient les deux flambeaux placés à l'orient et à l'occident de la pierre d'onction. Celui-ci a répondu, que les Grecs après s'être emparés de la pierre de l'onction y avaient placé ces deux flambeaux, après avoir enlevé ceux qui appartenaient aux Latins. Les Musulmans présents ayant par leur témoignage certifié le fait, le Commissaire Mustafa Aga les enleva et mit à leur place des flambeaux appartenant aux Latins. Puis, en vertu de l'ordre Impérial, il restitua aux religieux la pierre de l'onction; puis après, les quatre arceaux situés sur la Calvaire; et enfin, les sept arceaux de la Vierge. On se rendit à Bethléem, et après avoir retiré des mains des Grecs la Grotte de la Crèche de Jésus située dans l'église, ainsi que les clefs de trois portes, et les deux jardins, on les remit au procureur des Latins. Tout ce qui avait été élevé par les Grecs contrairement à l'usage a été detruit, et toutes choses ont été remises dans l'état où elles se trouvaient auparavant.

Après la lecture de cet acte il a été demandé aux Commissaires Français s'ils avaient entre les mains quelques autres pièces capitales, firmans ou autres. Ceux-ci ont répondu que les Latins une année plus tard, c'est-à-dire en 1047, avaient été dépouillés par les Grecs, qui avaient possédé les lieux dont il a été question plus haut jusqu'à l'année 1101; qu'ils ne produiraient aucune pièce de cette époque, mais qu'en revanche ils produiraient, à partir de 1101—époque à laquelle avait été donné le khatti-chérif qui remet les religieux Francs en possession des lieux qu'ils avaient à Jérusalem et à Bethléem—jusqu'en 1153 (1740), un grand nombre d'ordres Impériaux, de hudjets, et de pièces juridiques de différentes dates qui confirment le sens et les dispositions du khatti-chérif de 1101 et de khatti-chérif délivré par Sultan Murad en l'année 1045.

Il a été ensuite donné lecture à la Commission du firman Impérial accordé en l'année 1107 (1695) par Sultan Mustafa Khan, lors de son avénement au Trône. Il confirme en tous points, et mots par mots, le khatti-chérif délivré par Sultan Ahmed Khan en 1115 (1703), lors de son avénement au Trône, et qui

confirme le firman donné précédemment par Sultan Mustafa. Cette pièce est en tout semblable aux précédentes, et il a été jugé inutile de l'analyser.

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
P. E. BOTTA.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.
CH. SCHEFER.

Pour traduction conforme,
CH. SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, 23 Septembre, 1851 (27 Zileaadé, 1267), la Commission s'est réunie chez son Excellence Emin Effendy. M. d'Aristarchi, qu'une indisposition avait empêché d'assister à la dernière séance, a pris connaissance du procès-verbal qui y avait été rédigé. Les Commissaires l'ont signé après en avoir entendu la lecture. La Commission a examiné ensuite le khatti-chérif de Sultan Mahmoud Khan I, délivré à la fin du mois de Rebiul-ewel 1144, et présenté par les Commissaires Français. Le Sultan Mahmoud à l'occasion de son avénement renouvelle toutes les dispositions du khatti-chérif de Sultan Suleyman II (1101), lequel khat est basé sur les décisions contenues dans le khatti-chérif de Sultan Murad IV de l'année 1045, et dont il a été fait mention à plusieurs reprises. Il confirme également les khatti-chérifs donnés par Sultan Mustafa en 1107, et par Sultan Ahmed en 1115, à l'occasion de leur avénement à l'empire.

Il a été ensuite donné lecture du khatti-chérif donné par Sultan Ahmed sous la date du 15 Zilhidgé, 1131, concernant la réparation de la grande coupole de l'Église de la Résurrection appelée Kamamé.

Voici le résumé de cette pièce: "Une longue succession d'années a causé la détérioration de certaines parties de la grande coupole de l'Église de la Résurrection à Jérusalem et a nécessité leur réparation. Des ordres Impériaux avaient précédemment été expédiés à cet effet, mais différents empêchements en ont arrêté l'exécution. M. le Marquis de Bonnac, Ambassadeur de France, ayant représenté que si on laissait plus longtemps les choses en cet état, toute la grande coupole s'écroulerait, nous avons décidé conformément à sa requête que la grande coupole et tous les lieux appartenant aux religieux qui menacent ruine seraient réparés. Par la même occasion les Grecs pourront restaurer l'Église de St. Constantin attenant à la grande coupole, et la cuisine située au-dessous de cette église. Le clocher qui se trouve en dehors de l'église, et qui *ab antiquo* a été abandonné aux religieux Grecs, l'Eglise de St. Jacques, qui leur appartient également, ont aussi besoin de réparations. Si le clocher venait à tomber, il n'y a nul doute qu'il détruirait la grande coupole. Les Grecs devront donc le restaurer le plus solidement possible. Quant à la petite coupole qui surmonte le Tombeau de Jésus, si pendant la réparation de la grande coupole elle venait à être détériorée et qu'elle eût besoin d'être restaurée, elle le sera sous la surveillance des religieux Grecs, sans qu'il soit rien changé à son antique structure. C'était à ces conditions que précédemment des ordres Impériaux avaient été délivrés. La loi religieuse ne s'opposant pas à ces réparations et à ces restaurations, un ordre Impérial a été sollicité de nous à cet effet, conformément aux précédents enrégistrés au Divan; vu les procès-verbaux d'enquête des localités dressés dans les années 1102, 1103, 1109, et 1123;

"Vû les ordres Impériaux accordant la permission de réparer sous la clause que rien ne sera ajouté aux anciennes constructions; vû le rapport juridique et l'attestation envoyés de Jerusalem; vû les fetwas rendus à ce sujet, les religieux Latins ont la permission de réparer la grande coupole à la condition de ne point endommager d'autres endroits pendant les travaux, et de ne point empiéter sur ce que possèdent les Grecs et les Arméniens, sujets de ma Sublime Porte. Si pendant les réparations la petite coupole venait à être endommagée, elle serait restaurée sous la surveillance des religieux Grecs.

"Que l'on se garde surtout de toucher aux pierres du tombeau de Jésus; s'il en était brisé quelqu'une elle serait replacée telle quelle dans l'état où elle se trouve.

"Outre la grande coupole les Latins pourront réparer, après les avoir fait

examiner, et relever les localités qui sont en leur possession, à condition toutefois de ne rien changer à la manière dont elles sont disposées."

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
P. E. BOTTA.
CH. SCHEFER.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.

Pour traduction conforme,
CH. SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, Mardi, 30 Septembre, 1851 (4 Zilhidje, 1267), la Commission s'est réunie chez son Excellence Emin Effendi. Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu, et les Commissaires l'ont revêtu de leurs sceaux et de leurs signatures. La Commission a décidé qu'après les khatti-chérifs précédemment examinés elle passerait à la lecture d'une pièce juridique revêtue du cachet du Cadi de Jérusalem, Mustafa Ibn Ali, et délivrée sous la date du 20 du mois de Chevval de l'année 1112. Cette pièce constate que le procureur de la Terre Sainte, Raphael, a présenté deux actes d'enquête juridique émanés des Cadis de Jérusalem—l'un sous la date du 18 Redjeb de l'an 1097, l'autre sous celle du 20 Ramazan, 1101—attestant que les religieux Latins possédaient *ab antiquo* en vertu de khatti-chérifs, de firmans Impériaux, et d'actes authentiques, outre les lieux saints mentionnés précédemment, le tombeau de la Vierge Marie sis en dehors de Jérusalem. Un rescrit Impérial de la fin du mois Zileaade de l'année 1006, affirme en outre que les Latins possédaient, depuis les temps anciens, le tombeau de la Vierge et des lieux saints mentionnés précédemment.

Considérant le rescrit Impérial précité, et conformément aux capitulations renouvellées avec l'Empereur des Romains à la fin du mois de Rebiul-akhir, 1112, et ses clauses appuyées sur le témoignage de personnes désintéressées, confirment aux Latins la possession du tombeau de la Vierge et celle des lieux saints qu'ils occupent.

Résumé d'un rapport juridique rédigé par le Cadi de Jérusalem, Mustafa Effendi, sous la date du dernier jour de Djemazi-ul-Akhir de l'année 1168:

Le monument isolé élevé sur le tombeau de la Vierge Marie situé hors de la ville de Jérusalem, et dans les dépendances duquel il ne se trouve ni couvent, ni monastère, ni église, menaçant ruine, il est devenu nécessaire d'en réparer la terrasse en y tassant de la terre et du mortier. Les moines Latins ont représenté qu'ils avaient faits des réparations à plusieurs reprises, et qu'ils avaient l'intention de restaurer le toit en y fesant tasser de la terre et du mortier. Mais le firman délivré aux religieux en 1155 ne contenant que la permission de réparer deux magasins de provisions et deux chambres pour y loger les pélerins, et ne parlant pas du monument lui-même, le Cadi demande l'expédition d'un ordre Impérial autorisant la réparation, après avoir entendu les notables de la ville, les Ulemas, les Cheickhs, les Chérifs et les autres Musulmans lui déclarer que les Latins avaient l'habitude de réparer le tombeau.

Les Commissaires Français ont produit un firman Impérial daté du 15 Mohurrem, 1170 (1757), basé sur le rapport précédent et délivré à la demande de M. le Chevalier de Vergennes, Ambassadeur de France. Ce firman porte que conformément aux capitulations Impériales, les religieux Latins ont le droit de réparer les sanctuaires dont ils ont la possession et la jouissance. Les notables de la ville, les Ulemas, les Cheickhs, les Chérifs, et une nombreuse assistance de témoins Musulmans, ont déclaré que les religieux Latins avaient le droit de réparer la terrasse du tombeau de la Vierge en y tassant de la terre et du mortier. Un rapport juridique nous a fait connaître cette déclaration. Considérant les règles précédemment établies, enregistrées dans les archives du Divan Impérial, et le rescrit Impérial détaillé de l'année 1066, concernant la possession du tombeau de la Vierge par les religieux Latins; considerant que la loi religieuse permet de pareilles réparations, la faculté de réparer le tombeau, en lui conservant sa forme ancienne, est accordée aux religieux Latins.

En vertu de ce firman Impérial, le Gouverneur et le Cadi de Jérusalem préposent des inspecteurs qui examinèrent le tombeau et dressèrent procès-verbal

de l'état où il se trouvait. Une pièce juridique délivrée à Raphaël, procureur des Latins, et datée du mois Djemazi-ul-ewel de la même année, constate que les religieux Latins ont fait les réparations nécessaires sans rien ajouter aux constructions qui existaient précédemment.

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.
P. E. BOTTA.
CH. SCHEFER.

Pour traduction conforme,
CH SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, 14 Octobre, 1851 (19 Zilhidgé, 1267), la Commission s'est réunie chez son Excellence Emin Effendy. Le procès-verbal de la dernière séance a été lu et signé. Les Commissaires ont ensuite pris connaissance d'un acte ou hudjet rédigé en langue Arabe et délivré aux religieux Latins par le Cadi de Jérusalem sous la date du 1 Zilhidgé, 1104 (1694). Cet acte constate que les moines Francs établis au Convent de Saint Sauveur ont acheté à Beit Sahour Emmassara—village dépendant du canton de Bethléem, situé dans la banlieue de Jérusalem—la moitié, soit douze kirats, d'un terrain renfermant trente pieds d'oliviers, la Grotte des Pasteurs, une citerne d'eau, le tout entouré d'un mur antique appelé le mur Romain. Le dit terrain est borné au sud par la propriété de Znid, habitant de Bethléem; au levant par celle de Saulh, habitant de Bethléem; au nord par celle de Hamouda; et à l'occident par celle de Latha Allah le Chrétien. Le terrain de la Grotte des Bergers, avec les arbres et tout ce qui s'y trouve, se compose de vingt-quatre kirats. La moitié, soit douze kirats, a été vendue légalement et définitivement en vertu des titres qui se trouvent entre leurs mains par Djabin, fils de Onweis, agissant en son nom et comme tuteur de Handjoum, sa nièce mineure, et par Onweis, fils de Moussa, Chrétien, agissant en vertu de la procuration que lui a donnée son père. Une autre pièce Arabe délivrée par le tribunal de Jérusalem sous la date du 29 Mohurrem, 1184, se trouve entre les mains des religieux Francs. Cet acte porte que le nommé Mouslih Sabiha et ses fils Younis et Salih, et le nommé Salih, avaient donné en gage aux religieux Latins le terrain avec ses arbres, formant l'autre moitié de la terre de la Grotte des Bergers. La première moitié dont les limites ont été définies, se trouve en vertu d'un acte d'achat entre les mains des religieux Latins. Les personnes susnommées par le présent acte vendent définitivement la portion carrée qui leur appartenait, et à dater de ce jour la propriété toute entière, avec ses contenances, passe en la possession de religieux Francs.

Il a été ensuite demandé si outre les khatti-chérifs, firmans, et autres pièces authentiques qui ont été examinées et lus jusqu'à ce jour, on ne produirait pas comme preuves d'autres actes délivrés aux Latins. Les Commissaires Français ont répondu qu'ils avaient d'autres documents entre les mains, mais qu'il ne leur semblait pas nécessaire d'en prendre connaissance. Il a été convenu en terminant la séance que l'on devrait présenter de la part des Grecs les pièces, quelles qu'elles soient, qu'ils ont à opposer à celles des Latins et qui servent de base à leurs prétentions.

(Signé) ESSEID MEHEMED EMIN.
P. E. BOTTA.
N. D'ARISTARCHI.
CH. SCHEFER.

Pour traduction conforme,
CH. SCHEFER.

Cejourd'hui, Mardi, 21 Octobre, 1851, la Commission s'est réunie chez son Excellence Emin Effendy. Au début de la séance, qui devait être consacrée à l'examen des firmans et des titres fournis par les Grecs, MM. les Commissaires Ottomans ont déclaré qu'ils commenceraient par lire et faire insérer au procès-verbal le Traité du Khalife Omar, qui sert de fondement et de base à toutes leurs pièces. Ils produisaient en même temps une copie du dit Traité.

Les Commissaires Français ont répliqué, que cette pièce, délivrée fort long temps avant le Traité conclu avec la Sublime Porte en 1133 (1740), était complétement étrangère à la question; que les clauses du Traité conclu entre les deux Puissances confirmaient aux religieux Latins les sanctuaires et les lieux de visitation situés au-dedans et au-dehors de Jérusalem, et dont ils avaient la possession depuis 1101 (1689), et en 1153 (1740); que les pièces délivrées en différentes années entre ces deux dates, et qui avaient été présentées, suffisaient pour établir l'état des possession des religieux Latins. Les religieux Grecs, ont ajouté les Commissaires Français, n'ont qu'à produire, s'ils en possèdent, des documents prouvant que, dans l'espace de temps qui vient d'être défini, les lieux et les localités dont il s'agit ont passé dans leurs mains. Les Commissaires Français ont terminé leurs observations, en n'acceptant point l'insertion au procès-verbal du pacte du Khalife Omar. Les Commissaires Ottomans ont répliqué que l'original de ce pacte se trouvait aux mains des Grecs; qu'il servait de base à toutes leurs prétentions; que toutes les clauses des ordres et des titres postérieurs étaient fondées sur les dispositions de ce Traité; qu'il fallait donc commencer l'examen des documents des Grecs, par la lecture de cette pièce et son insertion au procès-verbal; que ce pacte étant une pièce fondamentale, sa lecture et son insertion au procès-verbal étaient de toute nécessité. Les Commissaires Français ne s'étant point rangés à ces raisons, il a été décidé à la fin de la séance que les Commissaires des deux Gouvernements en référeraient à leurs supérieurs.

Les procès-verbaux sont ordinairement signés à la séance suivante. M. de Aristarchi ne s'étant point rendu à cette dernière, celui-ci n'a pu être signé.

Inclosure 2 in No. 36.

M. de Lavalette to Aali Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Therapia, le 14 Novembre*, 1851.

DANS la conférence que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir hier avec vous, votre Excellence m'a demandé d'ajourner sans terme défini les réunions de la Commission instituée d'un commun accord par la Sublime Porte et la Légation de France, pour examiner les documents officiels qui doivent préciser et définir d'une manière positive l'état de possession des saints lieux en 1740.

Votre Excellence n'ignore pas, et les procès-verbaux en font foi, à quel point en étant arrivés les travaux de la Commission: les délégués Français ont présenté les documents sur lesquels reposent les droits des Pères de Terre Sainte: l'examen de de ces pièces est terminé; mais depuis quatre mois et demi, malgré les instances réitérées de la Légation et de ses Commissaires, les délégués du Cabinet Ottoman n'ont produit ni un titre ni un document à l'appui des prétentions contraires aux droits incontestables des Latins, à l'exception de l'acte du Khalife Omar antérieur de plus de mille ans aux capitulations et complétement étranger à la discussion.

C'est dans ces circonstances que votre Excellence me propose, sans assigner aucun motif à l'appui de sa demande, d'ajourner indéfiniment les travaux des Commissaires après les avoir interrompus de fait par l'abstention de ses délégués dans les trois derniers séances.

Il demeure donc établi que toute interruption des travaux de la Commission proviendra du fait du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et non du notre, et cela au moment même où la Sublime Porte était mise en demeure de produire les documents qui elle pouvait avoir à opposer à ceux que nous avons présentés.

Pour ma part, je dois me borner aujourd'hui à prendre officiellement acte de la demande qui m'est adressée par votre Excellence sans lui dissimuler que cette proposition implique un premier pas fait en dehors des engagements pris par le Cabinet Ottoman dans la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 29 Juin dernier.

Je charge M. Schefer, second dragoman de la Légation, de remettre cette lettre à votre Excellence. Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) LAVALETTE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 36.

Aali Pasha to M. de Lavalette.

(Translation.) *Moharem* 25, 1267. (*November* 20, 1851.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive the official note dated November 14th sent in by your Excellency, containing the decision given concerning the Mixed Commission, for examining into and taking into consideration certain documents relative to the places of holy pilgrimage at Jerusalem.

No. 37.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 16.)

(No. 364.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November* 28, 1851.

IT does not appear that the menacing insinuations used by M. de Lavalette, as stated in a preceding despatch, No. 362, have produced any strong impressions on Aali Pasha's mind. I am led by the interpreter's report to believe that his Excellency attributed the language of the French Envoy rather to his zeal than to any well-founded anticipation of his Government's resentment.

Be that as it may, the time is fast approaching when the result of M. de Lavalette's reference to Paris, on the subject of Jerusalem, will be known, and, meanwhile, the Commission of further inquiry appointed by the Porte, holds occasional meetings with little progress, and still less prospect of an early termination.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 38.

The Marquis of Normanby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 18.)

(No. 413. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, December* 17, 1851.

PRINCE CALLIMACHI has requested me to convey to your Lordship his anxious desire that you should communicate to Sir Stratford Canning your instructions to do all in his power to maintain the existing ministry in Turkey. Prince Callimachi hopes that his former connection with your Lordship in England will excuse his appearing at such an important moment to travel out of his proper province; but he adds that the establishment of arbitrary power by such violent means, in a country like France, which has hitherto been considered hand-in-hand with England as the great support of liberal opinions, has evidently alarmed every country which has of late years made any attempt at constitutional government, and that the effect of this is sure to be still more seriously felt in a place like Turkey, where innovation of every kind was so difficult.

The Prince felt convinced there would be a great effort made for the overthrow of Reschid Pasha, as part of a general plan to the existence of which no one could shut his eyes; that if Reschid Pasha was disgraced and a reactionary ministry established, there would be an end of all English influence at Constantinople, and arbitrary measures would at once be taken, which would probably lead to an insurrection on the part of the Christian population, and the consequent overthrow of the Turkish empire.

I promised Prince Callimachi to report to your Lordship his sentiments just as he had stated them to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) NORMANBY.

No. 39.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 370.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December* 4, 1851.

THE day after the arrival of the last steam-packet from Marseilles, the French Envoy called in succession on Aali Pasha and the Grand Vizier. The object of his visit to each of those ministers was the same. He informed them that although M. de Reculot had arrived at Paris before the departure of the courier, he had not been able to present his despatches in time to allow of their being answered by that opportunity. M. de Lavalette, however, added that he was in possession of instructions written previously, and that he was authorized by them to deal with the question of the disputed sanctuaries, in such manner as he might judge the dignity of France to require. He availed himself of the occasion to go over the old ground once more, and to repeat his complaints of the manner in which the Porte had acted on that subject towards him and his Government. It was evidently his aim to make a strong impression on the fears of the Porte, and to obtain thereby the appointment of an early period at which a final, and of course a satisfactory, answer should be given to him.

I have reason to believe that he failed in this endeavour, and I am also under an impression, produced by his subsequent language to me, that he is not prepared to take any step calculated to commit his Government, without further instructions, which may be expected on the 12th instant.

As Aali Pasha no less than M. de Lavalette related what had passed between them to me, I expressed myself to each of them, without entering into the merits of the case, in such terms as I thought calculated to prevent precipitancy on either side. I endeavoured, in particular, to dissuade the French Envoy from taking any step which might suddenly and, perhaps, irrevocably convert a quiet diplomatic discussion into a breach of those friendly relations which it is so desirable to maintain between France and Turkey, and which can hardly be put to hazard for a question involving little more than a religious sentiment and the application of a Treaty permitted to lie more or less in abeyance for a century, without causing general surprise, and not impossibly some additional entanglement in the present situation of Europe.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 40.

Viscount Palmerston to Sir Stratford Canning.

(No. 307. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December* 24, 1851.

WITH reference to the language which appears from your despatch No. 343, of the 19th of November, the French Minister is in the habit of holding to you respecting his discussions with the Porte on the subject of the holy buildings at Jerusalem; I have to state to your Excellency that I have been confidentially informed by the French Government that it is their intention to give M. de Lavalette leave of absence for a time, as a method of evading the difficulty in which his over-zeal has engaged them.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 41.

Viscount Palmerston to the Marquis of Normanby.

(No. 641.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December* 24, 1851.

I HAVE received your Excellency's confidential despatch No. 413, of the 17th instant, stating that Prince Callimachi had requested you to convey to me his anxious desire that I should instruct Her Majesty's Ambassador at Con-

stantinople, to do all in his power to maintain the existing ministry in Turkey; and I have to instruct your Excellency to assure Prince Callimachi, that there can be no need of any special instructions to Sir Stratford Canning in regard to this point, because Sir Stratford Canning will always, in pursuance of his standing instructions, give the present Grand Vizier all the support which, as the representative of a Foreign Government, he can properly afford.

I am, &c.

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 42.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 2, 1852.)

(No. 383.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 18, 1851.*

THE last French packet having been detained by bad weather, it was only on the 16th instant that M. de Lavalette appears to have received his expected instructions concerning the sanctuaries in Syria. He lost no time in waiting upon the Grand Vizier, at whose house he was met by Aali Pasha. Being accompanied by two interpreters, it would seem that he meant to produce an imposing impression on the Turkish Ministers. He began by asking him whether any decision had been taken with respect to the pending question, as he wished to transmit their answer to Paris on the following day. He added, with expressions of regret, that if the answer were such as to hurt the honour and dignity of France, he should be obliged to break off the negotiation, and to open thereby a door to serious consequences, which would prove detrimental to both parties, and particularly to Turkey.

Aali Pasha stated, in return, that he was not yet prepared to comply with M. de Lavalette's demand, but he requested the delay of a few more days, after which he hoped to be at liberty to give him an answer. The necessity of this delay was referred to certain formalities attendant on the report of the Commission, and the Sultan's sanction.

The French Envoy consented, with apparent reluctance, to this delay, but only on condition that it should not be extended beyond the 24th instant, the day previous to the departure of the next French steam-packet.

His acquiescence was accompanied with complaints of the Porte's unnecessary dilatoriness from the commencement of the proceedings. Aali Pasha, on the other hand, excused his Government by a natural reference to the difficulties of the negotiation, which had led to inquiries likely to terminate, now that the whole question was simplified by them, in an easy solution.

It appears that the French Minister gave in nothing in writing, and did not even show any part of his instructions.

Aali Pasha, in stating this circumstance to M. Pisani, observed that he did not anticipate any serious opposition on the part of France to his intended proposal. He said that the sanctuaries claimed exclusively by the Latins, were only two, namely, the Church of Bethlehem and the Tomb of the Virgin, and that the firman and title-deeds on which the French grounded their claim, accorded to the Latins the right of possessing two keys of the church, and a joint occupation of both the church and the tomb.

It appears that the Porte builds its hope of an amicable adjustment on this foundation, and not perhaps without reason in the present state of affairs at Paris, though the pretension of the Latins, as explained to me formerly by M. de Lavalette, extends to the exclusive possession of a larger number of the sanctuaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 43.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1, 1852.)

(No. 387.)

My Lord, *Therapia, December 30, 1851.*

THE French Envoy has not relaxed in his efforts to obtain a satisfactory arrangement of the Sanctuary Question. He has had several interviews with Aali Pasha since I last wrote to your Lordship on that subject, and it does not appear that there has been any further intimation of a threatening character connected with the Toulon squadron. The last French steam-packet went away, as far as I am informed, without conveying to France any decisive answer from the Porte. The Turkish Commission has, in the meantime, completed its report. Some proposition may come out of it, though hardly sufficient to satisfy France without offending Russia, which is naturally enough the object of the Porte's manœuvres.

M. de Lavalette has, however, concluded the year by announcing his intention to break off the negotiation, demanding, before he does so formally, an audience of the Sultan, which will probably be granted with reluctance. He pleads the commands of his Government, and takes credit for having delayed their execution in the hope of a more satisfactory conclusion.

The interference of Russia continues to be cautiously managed by M. de Titoff. His Government appears to apprehend that even a slight departure from the *status quo* would, instead of settling the question permanently, open a door to further pretensions in future.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 44.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1, 1852.)

(Private and Confidential.)

My dear Lord, *Therapia, December 31, 1851.*

I PROPOSE to state in this manner, for your own particular information, some points connected with the question at issue between France and Turkey, which I do not feel myself at liberty to commit to the ostensible correspondence.

The report of the Turkish Commission has been communicated privately, and indeed personally, to me by Aali Pasha. It was printed for the exclusive use of the members, and I beg to request that your Lordship will consider the accompanying translations of it as confidential in the strictest sense of the term.

About ten days ago Aali Pasha sent me, in the same spirit of personal confidence, a statement relative to the true bearing of the Porte's existing Treaties with France on the question of the disputed sanctuaries. A copy of this confidential memorandum is inclosed herewith. My opinion was requested in reply to the queries with which it concludes. This request, proceeding as it did from the Grand Vizier as well as from Aali Pasha, I could not entirely refuse, but I was careful to couch my answer, a verbal one, in guarded terms. It amounted in substance to this: I understood the question to be whether Article XXXIII of the Treaty of 1740 applied to the state of possession then, or, as a mere recapitulation, to that which existed at the date of the prior Treaty; taken in that manner the question was a fair one, having some appearances in favour of the latter construction; it could only be resolved by a special examination of the terms in which the Treaty was expressed.

I learn, in private, from M. de Titoff that the Emperor Nicholas entertains a strong religious persuasion on the subject, and maintains the *status quo* under a conviction that the smallest concession would throw the whole existing arrangement into confusion.

The zeal of M. de Lavalette, excited by desire of success, and still more by Russian interference, has, I suspect, been further stimulated by the Catholic sympathies of his Belgian colleague. M. Blondeel de Coulenbruck belongs to

the school of De Maistre. His idol is Montalembert. He has travelled much and acquired the habits of general society, without a proportionate enlargement of mind. In religion he sees nothing but Rome; in politics, out of Belgium and England, no hope but from despotism. I may be wrong, but it would seem that influence of this colour, exerted not unskilfully at such a time, is more likely to inflame than to abate an irritation which those who look on with coolness cannot but deplore.

The Porte's position is, at any rate, most embarrassing. Her independence of action is more or less threatened on both sides, and, if it be thought worth while in France to make any further sacrifice to the religious party, even worse consequences than her humiliation may eventually ensue.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 44.

Report of the Turkish Commission.

(Traduction.)

L'AN 1045 de l'Hégire, un firman a été donné disant que certains lieux saints à Jérusalem ont été donnés aux Latins.

L'an 1047, c'est-à-dire, deux ans plus tard, comme on a compris que les lieux saints susdits revenaient aux Grecs, le firman donné aux Latins a été annulé, et les lieux saints susdits ont été donnés aux Grecs: voilà dans quel sens un firman a été donné.

Le firman donné, comme il a été dit plus haut, aux Grecs l'année 1047, a été renouvelé et confirmé l'année 1051.

Il est dit dans le Traité conclu l'année 1084 entre la Sublime Porte et la France, que les lieux qui sont possédés par les prêtres Latins doivent rester en leur possession, sans que personne ait à les molester pour cela.

L'année 1086, c'est-à-dire, deux ans plus tard, des discussions se sont élevées entre les Grecs et les Latins au sujet de lieux saints susmentionnés. Lorsqu'ils se sont fait juger à Constantinople, on a demandé des Latins un document capable d'invalider le firman de l'année 1047, qui se trouvait entre les mains des Grecs, et il leur fut même accordé un terme de six mois; mais ils n'ont pu produire aucun document de cette sorte, ainsi on a décidé que la raison était du côté des Grecs, et il a été donné à ceux-ci un autre firman confirmant leurs firmans antécédents: et l'année 1090 un autre firman, conçu dans le même sens, leur a été donné.

L'année 1101, un firman a été donné ordonnant la restitution aux Latins des lieux saints susmentionnés; et l'année 1102, un firman fut donné faisant foi que ces saints lieux leur ont été restitués.

L'an 1153, un autre Traité a été conclu; dans ce Traité, le Traité susdit de l'an 1084 se trouve cité textuellement en forme de narration, et de cette manière-là il a été confirmé.

Questions.

Ainsi donc, le firman donné en 1101, c'est-à-dire, dix-sept ans après la conclusion du susdit Traité, peut-il, parceque le Traité de l'an 1084 se trouve inséré en guise de narration dans le Traite de l'an 1153, être considéré compris dans le Traité de l'an 1084? C'est-à-dire, parceque le Traité conclu l'an 1084, dans lequel il est dit que les prêtres Latins ne seront molestés par personne dans la possession des lieux dont ils sont maîtres, se trouve inséré dans le dernier Traité, ce Traité est-il applicable aux dispositions du firman donné l'an 1101?

Et l'insertion du Traité de l'an 1101 au Traité dernier, n'était-ce pas pour confirmer entre les mains des Latins seulement les lieux qu'ils possédaient l'année 1084?

No. 45.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received February 1.)

(Private.)

My dear Palmerston, *Therapia, January 5, 1852.*

LAVALETTE was to have his audience of the Sultan to-day. I have no chance of knowing the result before the packet starts. The dependents of the French Legation describe the affair as very serious. The only proposal, tending towards compromise, which has been hitherto put forward by the Porte, since the establishment of its Commission, is rejected by M. de Titoff, who stands resolutely to his *status quo*.

Should anything of interest occur, I will write by the Vienna post of the 7th. Lavalette does not talk, I understand, as if he meant to go; but rather reckons upon the increasing influence of the President, confirmed by the success of his appeal to the people.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 46.

Sir Stratford Canning to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord, *Therapia, January 7, 1852.*

THE French Envoy's audience of the Sultan with reference to the pending question of the Sanctuaries appears to be put off; and perhaps even relinquished altogether. His Majesty has directed his Council to reconsider a point by means of which the Turkish Ministers conceive that some facility may be obtained for bringing the whole question at issue to a fair conclusion. It would seem that the Greeks, Armenians, and other Christian sects, and even the Mahomedans, have an equal right of visiting the shrine of the Holy Virgin, and officiating there. It is affirmed that Mussulmans themselves have an altar in that place of worship, while the Latins, notwithstanding the right accorded to them of old by an Imperial Firman, are excluded. The Porte proposes to remove this exclusion, in so far as visiting the shrine is concerned, and M. de Titoff has been requested to accede to the proposal, with an assurance that the Porte would thereupon issue new firmans, explaining and fixing the extent of the rights on both sides, with a due regard to the *status quo*.

The Russian Envoy, after some reflection, has declared his inability to comply, not feeling himself at liberty to make any concession which would have the effect of changing in any degree the existing order of things.

Under these circumstances, there is little prospect of the Sultan's reference to his Council resulting in any arrangement satisfactory to the French Legation, whose members are seriously irritated, and complain loudly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 47.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 17, 1852.*

ALTHOUGH no decision has yet been officially announced to M. de Lavalette in the affair of the Sanctuaries, I have reason to believe that an answer in writing, calculated to arrange the question, is now in preparation at the Porte.

The terms of it will probably be a concession to the Latins of the right of officiating in the shrine of the Virgin near Jerusalem, together with keys to the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem.

This intended departure from the *status quo* has induced the Russian Envoy to look out for some concession in favour of the Greeks; and I am informed that an equivalent is to be given to them, in the shape of an admission to the right of officiating, on certain occasions, in the Mosque of Mount Olivet.

The Turkish Ministers appear to be persuaded that an arrangement of this kind will satisfy both parties, and terminate for the present a question which is at once vexatious and uninteresting to the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 48.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 25, 1852.*

I HAVE learnt this morning by a message from Aali Pasha that the Council has decided on settling the affair of the Sanctuaries in the manner which I described to your Lordship in my last despatch on that subject. The formal sanction of the Sultan is expected. A communication to this effect was made to M. de Lavalette yesterday at a visit he made to the Ottoman Secretary of State, and I understand that he appeared to be satisfied. The Russian Envoy is to have an interview with Aali Pasha to-morrow. It would seem that the Porte does not apprehend any serious objection on his part.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 49.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 4, 1852.*

IT would appear that the Porte is still under some embarrassment concerning the question of the Sanctuaries. The decision of the Council has received the Sultan's confirmation, and the official note prepared in consequence for communication to the French and Russian Legations will be finally considered in Council to-day. But the Russian Envoy has offered a stronger opposition to the proposed arrangement than he had previously given reason to expect; and it is difficult to foresee how far the Council may be swayed even now by that circumstance. I am assured, however, by Aali Pasha, that his own opinion has undergone no change, and there seems to be no longer question of a protest on M. de Titoff's side. It may be presumed that M. de Lavalette, though appearing to be more satisfied, will only accept the note under reserve of the President's approval.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 50.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 30.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 18, 1852.*

THE question of the Sanctuaries in Judea has quite unexpectedly assumed, in so far as Russia is concerned, an angry and almost a threatening aspect. I have already informed your Lordship of the terms on which the difference was settled by a decision of the Porte.* No change has taken place in that respect. That part of the arrangement which is favourable to the

* See No. 51.

view of France has been communicated officially to the French Minister. The Russian Envoy was to have received a written communication of the corresponding concession intended for the Greeks. He had been previously apprised by Aali Pasha of the whole proposal, as founded on the report of the Turkish Commission, and there was nothing in his language, or in the tenour of his communications to the Porte, if I am correctly informed, to warrant an apprehension of any serious dissatisfaction on his part. Whatever may have caused the change in his mind, he sought an interview with Aali Pasha on the 11th instant, and expressed himself with unusual vehemence and no small degree of irritation against the proposed arrangement. I should conjecture, from what has reached me on the subject, that he had not expected the Porte to commit itself to the French Minister before the sentiments of his Court were ascertained. His disappointment in that respect may have gathered some additional annoyance from the satisfaction affected, if not experienced, by the French party, and also from indications of a contrary feeling among the Greeks.

To judge from present appearances, the French President will accept the concessions made to him, keeping open a door for the remaindor of his claims, but practically abstaining for the present, perhaps even for a long time to come, from any further prosecution of them. The latitude thus given to France is naturally distasteful to Russia, who, to prevent its occurrence, had constantly insisted on the *status quo*. I am assured by Aali Pasha that the Firman prepared for giving effect to the Porte's decision is so worded as to preclude any reasonable apprehension on that score, and, moreover, that the pretensions of the Greek Church will be more completely secured than heretofore.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

P.S.—I have omitted two circumstances worthy of notice: first, that Aali Pasha reminded M. de Titoff that he had never authorised him to expect that he would wish to ascertain the sentiments of the Russian Cabinet; secondly, that M. de Titoff has refused to receive any communication of the pending arrangement in peremptory terms.—S. C.

No. 51.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 31. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, February 18, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of the Porte's official note to the French Minister respecting the Sanctuaries at Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and also of an instruction to the Dragoman of the Porte, prepared by Aali Pasha for communication to the Russian Envoy, regarding the same subject. These papers were communicated to me in strict confidence before they were sent to their respective destinations. The communication to M. de Titoff of the above-mentioned instruction is still, indeed, suspended. The copy of the Firman prepared for giving effect to the Porte's decision concerning the Sanctuaries will also be sent to me. But notwithstanding these marks of confidence towards Her Majesty's Embassy, I have not felt myself at liberty to risk a misinterpretation of my conduct, by offering any suggestion which might be construed into a departure from the neutral line injoined by the instructions of your Lordship's predecessor. The Ottoman Ministers appear, indeed, to have afforded themselves the best chance of escaping from a position of most unprofitable embarrassment, by forming a Commission of their own, and founding an equitable decision upon its report.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 51.

Aali Pasha to M. de Lavalette.

(Traduction.)

16 Rabiul Akhir, 1274.
4 February, 1858.

LA Sublime Porte a médité de la manière la plus minutieuse et avec la plus sérieuse attention elle a approfondi la question que le Gouvernement Français a soulevée relativement à certains Lieux Saints situés tant dans la ville que hors de la ville de Jérusalem.

La Sublime Porte tout en mettant ses soins à maintenir inviolablement ses traités avec les Puissances amies, elle tache aussi naturellement de conserver dans toute leur intégrité les droits et les concessions que les anciens Sultans ont octroyés aux sujets de l'Empire; et c'est pour cela que, comme résultat de la conciliation de l'un de ces deux points essentiels avec l'autre, le tombeau qui se trouve dans l'Eglise dite du Saint Sépulcre, la Hadjir el Moughtesil,* et les voûtes, sont visités, à l'heure qu'il est, sans obstacle, et que les deux jardins attenant au Couvent Franc se trouvent, ainsi qu'il est établi depuis un ancien tems, sous l'inspection des deux parties. Mais on n'a pu trouver la moindre indication dans les Firmans de telles choses qu'une place dans le circuit de la Hadjir el Moughtesil, d'une place dite Tahomel-atique, ni des magasins qui se trouveraient là, et par conséquent, il n'y a pas lieu de contester là-dessus.

La grotte qui est la Sainte Crèche estaujourd'hui un lieu visité par les diverses nations Chrétiennes, et il est établi depuis un très-ancien tems qu'une clef de la porte du côté du nord de la grande Eglise à Bethléem, une clef de la porte du côté du midi de cette Eglise, et une clef de la porte de la grotte susmentionnée, doivent se trouver entre les mains des prêtres Latins aussi. En cas donc que ces clefs ne se trouvent point en la possession des Latins, il faut qu'on leur donne une clef de chacune de ces trois portes, pour qu'ils les aient comme par le passé.

Quant à la question du Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie, l'impossibilité de former un jugement à cet égard, d'après les vérifications faites jusqu'ici, est devenue claire et patente. Toutefois il n'est pas permis de priver une multitude de sujets Ottomans, qui professent la religion Catholique, de la faculté de faire leurs dévotions dans un lieu tel que celui-là, qui est considéré par tous les Chrétiens comme un lieu saint et vénérable; et par conséquent, la Sublime Porte a décidé que les prêtres Latins et les sujets Ottomans de la religion Catholique auront aussi la faculté de pratiquer les cérémonies de leur culte, dans les tems établis, au Saint Sépulcre, comme ceux qui professent les religions Grecque, Arménienne, Syriaque et Copte y exercent aujourd'hui les leurs; mais à condition qu'il ne sera fait aucun changement ni à l'administration ni à l'état des choses actuel; et je m'empresse de porter tout ce que ci-dessus à la connaissance de votre Excellence, d'après les ordres de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Il est superflu de dire à votre Excellence, qui est douée de sagacité, que la Sublime Porte a l'espoir fondé que le Gouvernement Français appréciera et agréera une décision qui est le résultat du désir de la Sublime Porte de consolider ses relations amicales avec la France, et de toute attention que demandait cette grave question.

Je saisis.

Inclosure 2 in No. 51.

Aali Pasha to the Dragoman of the Porte.

LE Premier Interprète de la Mission de Russie ayant remis dernièrement au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, de la part de son Excellence M. de Titoff, une instruction relative aux Saints Lieux de Jérusalem qui sont en contestation, la susdite instruction a été minutieusement méditée et Sa Majesté le Sultan l'a vue aussi.

* La pierre sur laquelle le corps de notre Seigneur a été lavé et embaumé.—*Note du Traducteur.*

Ainsi que M. l'Envoyé en connoit toutes les particularités, lorsque cette question a pris naissance, les Latins, s'appuyant sur certains actes, ont demandé que les Saints Lieux qui sont un objet de contestation, leur fussent assignés d'une manière exclusive; ils ont ensuite demandé qu'ils pussent en faire usage en commun avec d'autres, c'est-à-dire, qu'ils eussent les mêmes droits que les autres dans la grande Eglise du village de Bethléem, dans l'endroit qui est la crèche où naquit le Bienheureux Jésus, endroit qui se trouve dans la susdite Eglise, et qui appartient particulièrement aux religieux Grecs et Arméniens, et dans la chapelle sépulcrale de la Bienheureuse Marie.

Comme la Sublime Porte ne saurait en aucune manière souffrir qu'il soit apporté la moindre atteinte aux droits et aux concessions qui ont été accordés par les anciens Sultans à leur sujets, et comme de l'autre côté elle a dû avant tout vérifier les droits que les traités donnent à une prétention mise en avant en s'appuyant sur un traité conclu entre la Porte et la France, et puis changé du consentement des deux Parties Contractantes, la vérification s'est faite de la manière la plus minutieuse et la plus régulière, et le résultat a été consigné dans un Firman qui est orné d'un Hatti Shérif, et qui vient d'être remise à la nation Grecque. Et comme une copie de ce Firman a été remise à votre Excellence, elle voudra bien la transmettre à son Excellence M. de Titoff.

En méditant la susdite copie on verra que, mettant tout-à-fait de côté la prétention, d'abord d'une possession exclusive, et plus tard d'une possession commune, la Sublime Porte a confirmé complètement l'état actuel des Saints Lieux, qui a acquis par là plus de vigueur qu'auparavant.

Si la permission de célébrer leur culte dans la Chapelle de la Bienheureuse Marie a été renouvelée en faveur des Catholiques, à condition de ne changer ni l'état ni l'administration actuelle, ce n'est pas là, certes, prendre quelque chose sur les droits exclusifs d'une religion et la donner à une autre, et c'est pour cela qu'on n'a vu aucun mal à ce que les Catholiques jouissent, par rapport à l'exercice du culte, de la même faculté dont les autres religions jouissent. Il est clair, quand on considère qu'actuellement Grecs, Arméniens, Coptes et Syriaques font également leurs dévotions dans la Chapelle du Tombeau de Marie,—qu'anciennement un portier Musulman était placé, comme à Jérusalem, à la porte de la chapelle comme une marque de communauté,—que dans cette même chapelle il existe un Mehreb,* destiné aux prières des Musulmans,—tout cela faisant voir que cette chapelle n'est pas un temple consacré à une religion particulière,—la participation de la religion Catholique aussi à cette chapelle, comme les autres religions, n'empiète pas sur les droits acquis d'aucune partie.

Il est dit dans l'instruction de M. l'Envoyé, que le Tombeau de Marie est un des Lieux Saints que toutes les nations Chrétiennes vénèrent le plus, et l'un des plus importants Saints Lieux, et qu'à cause de cela il est permis à tous de le visiter. Seulement si une nation est exclue de l'exercice de son culte, il lui est défendu d'y officier comme elle le fait dans les autres Lieux Saints. Or, la Sublime Porte a déclaré, il y a quelque tems, qu'accorder une faveur si petite qu'elle soit à une partie et ne rien donner à l'autre, est une chose injuste.

Cette observation serait tout-à-fait à sa place, si la chapelle sépulcrale en question était un Lieu Saint particulier aux Grecs, et étant en la possession des prêtres Grecs on leur aurait associé des Latins. Mais il n'est pas ainsi. La Sublime Porte l'a déjà dit plus haut, et toute le monde sait, que le Tombeau de Marie est un des Lieux Saints de beaucoup d'autres religions, indépendamment de la religion Catholique. Ce monument n'est nullement à comparer à ces autres Lieux Saints qui sont restés en possession d'une seule religion. La Sublime Porte a donc jugé et décidé comme une mesure extrêmement salutaire, de faire cesser la prétention que les Latins ne cessent de mettre en avant, et qu'ils appuient sur des actes solennels et sur des Firmans, à la possession exclusive du tombeau dans lequel à présent les nations Grecque, Arménienne, Copte et Syriaque exercent leur culte, en renouvelant la permission qui leur avait été accordée d'y exercer seulement leur culte comme les autres; car de cette manière la Sublime Porte confirme le *status quo* des autres Lieux Saints. Autrement, si la Sublime Porte, qui considère les droits de ses sujets comme ses propres droits administratifs et d'autorité indépendante, voyait dans cette décision l'ombre de faiblesse, si elle trouvait dans cette décision un motif pour faire soupçonner qu'elle n'a pas parfaitement apprécié les conseils confidentiels et

* Espèce d'autel indiquant le site de la Mecque.

amicaux qui ont été adressés par Sa Majesté l'Empereur à Sa Hautesse, cette décision n'aurait pas été prise. Les choses étant ainsi, Sa Majesté le Sultan a donné dans cette circonstance aussi une nouvelle preuve de ses dispositions bienveillantes envers ses sujets de la religion Grecque, et du désir dont il est animé qu'ils reçoivent dans leur affaires religieuses les facilités les plus complètes, et il a accordé la faveur que, comme les Catholiques exerceront leur culte dans le Tombeau de Marie, les Grecs aussi ayant à exercer leur culte dans la Coupole dite Coubei el Messad, qui est situé au Mont Olivet, et pour les soustraire à la prohibition dont ils étaient l'objet à cet égard, ils pourront, en vertu du Firman donné l'année de l'Hégire 1254 (1838), pratiquer aussi leur culte dans la coupole susmentionnée, ainsi que les Latins ont la faculté de le faire, c'est-à-dire, que les Grecs aussi pourront entrer dans la coupole et y exercer leur culte comme les Latins.

Il y a une grande différence entre cette nouvelle concession et la permission renouvelée aux Latins d'exercer leur culte dans le Tombeau de Marie; c'est-à-dire, le nouveau privilége que les Grecs ont obtenu étant patent et évident, il n'a pas besoin d'être developpé.

La Sublime Porte ne doute pas que le Gouvernement Impérial et son très-estimable Ministre à Constantinople, qui sont doués des belles qualités de justice et d'équité, n'apprécient justement le résultat des efforts qu'elle a fait et de la scrupuleuse atiention qu'elle a mise dans cette importante et difficile question, et de sa sollicitude incessante à maintenir et à sauvegarder les droits de ses sujets, et c'est ce que vous voudrez bien porter à la connaissance de M. l'Envoyé, en lui remettant aussi copie de la présente instruction.

No. 52.

Sir Stratford Canning to Earl Granville.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 52.)

Constantinople, March 5, 1852.

My Lord,

THE long pending affair of the Syrian Sanctuaries may be at last considered as finally, though not, I believe, yet formally settled. The Russian Envoy had already softened his tone upon that subject, when despatches received from St. Petersburgh enabled him to act more agreeably to his own individual impressions. There is no material change in the arrangement, such as I have already had the honour to describe it to your Lordship, and I hope that the Firman prepared for transmission to the Greek Patriarch will be found couched in such terms as to preclude a return, at any future period, to so embarrassing a subject of discussion. It was by turning Monsieur de Titoff's attention to the importance of that instrument, as a safeguard against further change, that I hope to have contributed in some degree to his acquiescence in the Porte's decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

No. 53.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 27. Confidential.)

Paris, March 8, 1852.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will have learnt, before this despatch reaches you, that the question respecting the Sacred Places at Jerusalem has been settled. M. de Turgot, although, I suspect, not quite satisfied with the arrangement made, is overjoyed at having got rid of the question, which had become a source of great annoyance to him. He claims great merit for the prudence and forbearance with which he has acted in it; and, to take his own statement, he makes good his claim.

He told me that when he took his present office, he found this question

the source of great irritation. He at once saw, he said, that a great mistake had been made in bringing it forward; but that, as it had been brought forward, and as France was without doubt in the right, he could not abandon it altogether.

He had, more than once, he continued, been urged to make a demonstration to back the claims of the French Legation at Constantinople, by ordering a French fleet to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles; but he had always resisted having recourse to anything like a threat; because he felt, in the first place, the peril of provoking a collision in that part of the world; and because, in the second, he was unwilling to endanger the administration of Reschid Pasha, whose name was identified with the civilisation of the East. The Turkish Ministers had, he added, understood and appreciated the delicacy of his conduct, and had offered such an arrangement as France could accept, under protest, and with a reserve of all rights belonging to her by treaty;—but he assured me that the question would now be allowed to drop.

I congratulated M. de Turgot on having got rid of this question, and said that I was sure that Her Majesty's Government would hear with great satisfaction the moderation which he had displayed.

He replied that what he had stated to me was in confidence; as although he could not but be pleased at the success of his policy, he had no wish to make any boast of what he had done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 54.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 19, 1852.

ONCE more, and it may be hoped for the last time, I have the honour to announce the termination of the ill-advised and long pending question of the Syrian Sanctuaries.

A report, inclosed herewith in copy, from M. Stephen Pisani to me, and a Firman inclosed in translation, will afford your Lordship ample information on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure 1 in No. 54.

M. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir,

Pera, March 18, 1852.

I HAVE the honour to report that I am informed by Aali Pasha, that the long pending question of the Sanctuaries has finally been settled in the following manner:

Three of the keys of the Church of Bethlehem are given to the Latins, who are also admitted to officiate in the Holy Virgin's shrine;—and, on the other hand, the Greeks are allowed to officiate in the Mosque situated on the Mount of Olives in common with the other Christian sects.

This arrangement, which appears to satisfy the parties concerned, has been sanctioned by an Imperial Firman invested with a Hatti scheriff, delivered to the Greeks, and a legalised copy of the same to the Latins. This document is addressed to the Governor, the Cadi, and Members of the Council of Jerusalem, with an injunction to attend scrupulously to the execution of its contents, and to have it duly registered in the records of the Mehkemé or Court of Justice.

A copy of the above-mentioned Firman has been communicated by Aali Pasha for your Excellency's information, and a translation of it will immediately be sent to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

(Traduction.)

ATTENDU que les dispositions de mon présent commandement Impérial sont le résultat réel et définitif de l'examen approfondi qui vient d'être fait des vieux documens contradictoires qui se trouvent en la possession de mes sujets Grecs et des moines Francs, concernant les Lieux Saints de Jérusalem, qui ont été un objet de discussion jusqu'ici; et attendu que les susdites dispositions confirmant les Firmans qui ont été donnés par mes nobles aïeux et surtout par mon auguste père, et confirmés et renouvelés précédemment par moi-même, que l'on se donne bien de garde d'y jamais contrevenir.

Firman.

A toi, mon Vizir Hafiz Ahmed Pacha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem; à toi, Cadi de Jérusalem; et à vous, Membres du Medjliss.

Les disputes qui naissent de tems à autre entre la nation Grecque et la nation Latine, au sujet de quelques Lieux Saints qui existent tant dans la ville que hors de la ville de Jérusalem, viennent cette fois encore d'être mises en avant. En consequence, une Commission a été formée, Commission composée de quelques Muchirs, et quelques hommes de loi de distinction; et d'autres personnes, pour examiner cette question à fond, et voici ce qui résulte des recherches et des vérifications de cette Commission et de celles des Conseils de Cabinet tenus après la Commission. Les Lieux en contestation entre les deux religions sont:—

La grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre; la petite coupole qui est sur l'endroit appelé le Tombeau de Jésus, sur qui soit la bénédiction de Dieu, et qui existe dans la susdite église; la Hadjir el Mouglitésil; le Golgotha, lequel se trouve également dans l'enceinte de l'Eglise du St. Sépulcre; les voûtes de Ste. Marie, la grande Eglise qui est dans le village de Bethléem, ainsi que la Grotte qui est le véritable endroit où Jésus, que la bénédiction de Dieu soit sur lui, est né, et qui se trouve sous cette église, et le Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie, que Dieu la bénisse.

Vu que la grande coupole susmentionnée concerne l'Eglise entière, les Latins n'ont pas raison de prétendre à la possession exclusive ni de cette coupole, ni de la petite coupole, ni de la Hadjir Mouglitésil, ni du Golgotha, ni des voûtes de Ste. Marie, ni de la grande Eglise de Bethléem, ni de la Sainte Crèche; il faut laisser tous ces endroits dans leur état actuel. Dans les tems passés on a donné une clef de deux portes de la grande Eglise de Bethléem et de la Sainte Crèche à chacune des nations Grecque, Latine et Arménienne: mesure confirmée aussi par le Firman délivré à la nation Grecque l'année de l'Hégire 1170, et cette disposition restera la même. Mais comme il ne suit pas de là qu'il est permis de porter atteinte à l'état actuel des choses dans cette église, ou d'empêcher aux Latins d'y officier, ou enfin de faire quelque chose de nouveau capable de gêner les autres, soit dans le passage de l'Eglise pour aller à la Sainte Crèche, soit sous d'autres rapports, on ne souffrira, on n'acceptera en aucun tems la moindre prétention à ces égards de la part de qui que ce soit.

On ne fera aucun changement à l'état actuel des portes de l'Eglise de Bethléem.

Considérant que, d'après les anciens et les nouveaux documens, les deux jardins appartenants au Couvent Franc à Bethléem, sur lesquels les Latins ont aussi élevé des prétentions, sont sous la surveillance des deux parties, ils resteront tels quels.

Les Latins, se basant sur quelques Firmans dont ils sont en possession, ont élevé la prétention que le Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie leur appartient exclusivement, mais ils n'ont pas raison en cela non plus. Seulement, comme actuellement les Grecs, les Arméniens, les Syriaques, et les Coptes exercent leur culte dans ce saint tombeau, c'est-à-dire, comme l'exercice du culte n'est pas restreint à une seule religion, il a été déclaré être juste de maintenir et de confirmer aux Chrétiens Catholiques la permission qu'ils ont *ab antiquo*, d'exercer, eux aussi, leur culte dans un endroit où plusieurs nations exercent les leurs, mais à condition qu'ils ne feront aucun changement ni dans l'administration, ni dans l'état actuel de ce monument.

Comme cette décision confirme et consolide les droits qui ont été octroyés aux sujets Grecs de mon Empire par mes augustes ancêtres, et confirmés par des Firmans, ornés par des Hatti Shérifs émanés de mon trône Impérial, aussi comme j'ai beaucoup à cœur de maintenir leurs susdits droits, elle a obtenu mon adhésion souveraine. Aucune des parties ne se permettra pas de contrevenir à cette décision.

Les Latins actuellement encore officient une fois par an, le jour de l'Ascension, dans un oratoire appelé Coubet el Mess-ad, qui existe au Mont Olivette, à Jérusalem; et les Grecs font leurs prières hors de cet oratoire. Or, cet oratoire c'est un temple Mahometan, et il n'appartient, par conséquent, exclusivement à aucune secte Chretienne, et je ne trouve pas à propos que les sujets de mon Empire qui professent la religion Grecque, soient privés de la faculté de pratiquer leur religion dans l'intérieur de l'oratoire susmentionné. Ainsi on n'empêchera pas aux Grecs d'exercer leur culte dans l'intérieur du Coubet el Mess-ad (la Coupole de l'Ascension), à condition qu'ils ne feront aucun changement à l'état actuel de cet oratoire, et qu'il y aura un portier Mahometan à la porte, comme par le passé.

Cette mesure sera enregistrée en haut de la copie du Firman Impérial en date du mois Sheval 1254 (Décembre, 1838).

Telle est ma volonté catégorique et souveraine, et conformément aux ordres que j'ai donnés en conséquence, le présent Firman, qui est orné d'un Hatti Shérif et émané de mon Divan Impérial, a été remis entre les mains de la nation Grecque.

Lorsque mes ordres souverains vous seront connus, vous mettrez tous vos soins afin que désormais il ne soit en aucune manière contrevenu à la décision et à mes ordres susmentionnés, ni de la part de ceux qui professent les religions Grecque, Arménienne, Syriaque et Copte, ni de la part des Latins.

Vous aurez soin de faire enregistrer le present commandement Impérial aux archives du Mahkémé, et de le faire constamment et toujours servir de règle permanente. Ayez-le pour entendre, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont il est orné.

Donné vers la fin du mois de Djema di ul avil, 1268 (Février, 1852).

No. 56.

Sir Stratford Canning to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 59. Confidential)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 10, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, in copy, a translation of the Sultan's answer to the Emperor of Russia's letter respecting the Syrian Sanctuaries. It has been communicated to me confidentially by Aali Pacha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD CANNING.

Inclosure in No. 56.

The Sultan to the Emperor of Russia.

19 *Rebiul Akhir*, 1268 (10 *Février*, 1852).

J'AI reçu la lettre confidentielle que votre Majesté Impériale m'a envoyée dernièrement concernant les Saints Lieux de Jérusalem, et j'ai pris en mûre considération les communications amicales qu'elle contenait.

Je regarde comme le devoir de l'amitié sincère que je porte à votre Majesté Impériale, que je commence par lui experimer ma vive satisfaction des assurances sincères qu'elle m'a données à cette occasion aussi.

Il était de la plus grande importance pour mon Empire, que dans cette question il ne fût point touché aux droits que mes augustes ancêtres ont accordés à plusieurs millions de Grecs, mes fidèles sujets, et que j'ai confirmés volontiers. Aussi je n'ai pas cessé, depuis que cette question a commencé à s'agiter, de tourner toute ma pensée vers ce but, et tous mes efforts ne tendaient qu'à l'atteindre.

Il vaudrait vraiement mieux, sous tous les rapports, que des questions d'une nature délicate, comme celle dont il s'agit, ne devinrent point des sujets de discussion, mais, comme vous savez, les contestations qui datent de loin sur cette question sont provenues jusqu'ici de ce qu'elle n'a pas reçu une solution telle qu'il fallait. Et puis il existe un Traité solennel, et l'on n'a pas besoin de dire à un Souverain tel que votre Majesté Impériale, qui est du nombre de ces monarques qui se distinguent par leur amour pour l'observation des traités, qu'il y va de mon honneur comme Padishah de consulter les Traités existants et de mettre complètement à exécution les dispositions claires et nettes qu'ils renferment, et de là est née la nécessité d'entrer en discussion sur cette affaire; comme tout cela a été complètement expliqué au Ministre de votre Majesté Impériale auprès de moi, j'évite d'entrer en détail là-dessus.

Vous verrez par les rapports de l'Envoyé que, comme heureux résultat des recherches complètes qui avaient été faites, le *statu quos* des Lieux Saints disputés a été confirmé et consolidé. Seulement l'ancienne permission donnée aux Catholiques aussi d'officier dans le Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie, qui a de tout tems été et qui est aujourd'hui encore un lieu de prière pour les différentes sectes Chrétiennes, a été renouvelée avec certaines réserves. Et comme une compensation, il a été décidé que les Grecs, qui jusqu'à présent étaient privés de la faculté, [auront la faculté?] d'officier aussi désormais sans obstacle dans l'intérieur du Coubet el Mess-nd les jours établis. Et comme par là les anciens droits donnés par ma Sublime Porte à mes sujets Grecs ont été augmentés, et parfaitement sauvegardés, je m'empresse de porter à votre connaissance la décision ci-dessus énoncée, et de renouveler les assurances de ma véritable amitié pour votre Majesté Impériale.

No. 56.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received July* 2.)

(No. 380.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 1, 1852.

IT having been reported that the French Government had applied to that of Austria in order to obtain the co-operation of the latter at Constantinople, in the question of the Sacred Buildings at Jerusalem, it may be as well that I should state to your Lordship that M. de Turgot took occasion lately to allude to these reports, for the purpose of denying their veracity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 57.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received July* 9.)

(No. 401. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, July* 8, 1852.

IN the former of the two letters referred to in my preceding despatch, addressed by Aali Pacha to Prince Callimachi, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs complains of the accusation made by the French Government that he had deceived M. de Lavalette, by giving, in the question of the Sacred Buildings at Jerusalem, a Firman to the Greeks at variance with that given to the Latins.

Aali Pacha protests against ever having held any other language to M. de Lavalette than that the Porte would never consent to exclude any sect of Christians from places venerated by them all; consequently, he argues, there is nothing inconsistent in giving a Firman to the Greeks, in which their right to worship in those places is recognised.

Prince Callimachi has told both the President and M. de Turgot, that so long as they have an agent like M. Sabatier, who envenoms every question, at Constantinople, there is but little chance of cordiality existing between the two Governments, and he has since had confidential intimation that M. Sabatier is to be removed to Alexandria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 58.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 3, 1852.

AALI PASHA tells me that M. de Lavalette has told him that he had no intention to reopen the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, but that he wishes two or three points of that matter to be set right by the Porte.

M. d'Ozeroff thinks that Austria will now support the action of the French Government in this matter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 59.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received August* 31).

(No. 50. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 14, 1852.

THE question of the Holy Places will probably ere long again become the subject of discussion between the Porte and the French Ambassador.

His Excellency says, that even allowing that the Firman does not state that the claims of the Latins are "injustes et mal fondées," the whole purport of it goes to deny the right of the Latins, that is, France, to the Holy Places.

M. de Lavalette states that both the President and himself were very anxious to get rid of this question, and that therefore he accepted, last February, the tenth part only of the Sanctuaries to which France has a positive right by the Treaty of 1740; that he was obliged, at the same time, to give in a nominal protest in favour of the Treaty, but assured the Porte that all appeal to the Treaty should be waived for five, ten years, perhaps for ever; that the Porte, with a "trahison inouie," gave, the day after he left Constantinople on leave, a Firman to the Greeks, which made out the Treaty to be valueless; that this conduct of the Porte was as treacherous as it was impolitic, as it forced the French Government either to reopen the question, or to allow that the Treaty was an untruth.

M. de Lavaletto intimates that, unless the objectionable parts in the Firman are altered or explained by a note, France must eventually go to war with Turkey if she sides with Russia, or with Russia if she alone supports the Firman in its present form.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 60.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received August* 31.)

(No. 55. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August* 18, 1852.

M. DE LAVALETTE called on me to-day, and again brought forward the matter uppermost in his mind—the Holy Places.

He said that, a few days since, he had received a letter from the Latin Patriarch, Valerga, at Jerusalem, telling him that it would be ruin to Catholicism, and dishonour to France, if she allowed the Firman of the Greeks to remain in its present form; that the Catholic interest in general, and the religious party in France, on whose support the President counted so much, held the same language; that neither the President nor himself cared for the question itself, but that these influences would force them to go to extreme measures; that even Fuad Effendi had said to him, that he could understand if France had taken the steps as to the Holy Places which she did about Tripoli.

M. de Lavalette continued: "Both the President and myself wish to get rid of this question, but let us be enabled to do so. I would be satisfied if the Porte would address me a note, saying that the Firman merely meant that the Latins had not an exclusive right to the Holy Places. The question may be very easily settled now, but not if it goes on. If we go to war with Russia,

none of the Powers could side with her, because they have all Catholic populations. Besides, we should go to war for Treaty, and therefore the Powers who are so anxious that France should adhere to the Treaties of 1815, which are irksome to France, ought to sympathise with her. If we were to blockade the Dardanelles, and the Russian fleet were to attack, we should certainly take them. Last November, the President had actually given orders to the squadron of Admiral La Susse to go to Basika Bay, on account of the Holy Places, and the events preceding the 2nd of December alone caused the order to be countermanded."

M. de Lavalette has not, as yet, taken any steps at the Porte respecting the Holy Places. On the whole, I think that his tone is more moderate than it was; that he feels that his Government committed themselves in the affair of Tripoli, and that he would like to get out of the question with just enough to save appearances.

My Russian colleague has spoken to me as confidentially about the Holy Places as M. de Lavalette has done. He is evidently very uneasy about the matter. He does not talk so much of the rights of the Greeks as of the great impolicy of giving them any cause of discontent in Turkey. He says positively that M. de Lavalette knew the tenour of the Firman from the Porte before it was issued. But I think, in this respect M. d'Ozéroff is mistaken.

I have told both the French Ambassador and M. d'Ozéroff that, acting on the instructions given to her Majesty's Ambassador, I must remain perfectly neutral in the matter in dispute.

I venture to think that it is very desirable that the difference should be settled peaceably, and that neither of the two parties in it should obtain a triumph.

The general opinion here is that the Porte committed a breach of faith, and indeed an error in policy, in inserting in the Firman to the Greeks terms at variance with the understanding which had just before been come to between the Porte and the French Embassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 61.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 7.)

(No. 519.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 6, 1852.*

PRINCE CALLIMACHI called upon me a few days ago, and stated that he had received despatches from Constantinople, complaining of the high tone taken by the French Ambassador in his late discussion with the Porte. The Prince, at the same time, expressed his conviction that so long as M. de Lavalette remained at Constantinople, there would be imminent danger of violent proceedings on the part of the French towards Turkey. He said that he know that M. de Lavalette had openly declared that he would make the Porte pay for the deceit which it had practised upon him in the question of the Holy Places;—that this feeling had dictated the high tone which he had assumed lately, and which had no doubt occasioned the fall of Reschid Pacha. He begged me, if I had an opportunity, to give M. Drouyn de Lhuys a hint to restrain M. de Lavalette's too jealous conduct. As Prince Callimachi's statements tallied in some measure with the reports which your Lordship has been good enough to transmit to me from Colonel Rose, I mentioned to M. Drouyn de Lhuys this morning that it appeared that M. de Lavalette had used very strong language in his late discussion with the Porte. The French Minister replied that M. de Lavalette's reports did not show anything of the kind, but he must admit that he had been astonished at the facility with which the outstanding question between France and the Porte had been settled. He then said that he was sincerely desirous of maintaining the most amicable relations with the Ottoman Ministry; for that certainly France had nothing to gain by quarrelling with the Porte.

It is very possible that M. de Lavalette may have acted under an understanding with the President, with whom he is known to be on intimate terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 62.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 14.)

(No. 532. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 12, 1852.*

IN referring lately to the affairs of Turkey, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed that he was very anxious to put the question of the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem in a state which would permit him to consider it as terminated. He admitted, in confidence but with much fairness, that the question ought never to have been raised. He attributed the raising of it to the inexperience of General La Hitte, while Minister for Foreign Affairs; and he did not deny my observation, that it had been carried on with too much heat by M. de Lavalette at Constantinople. Nevertheless, he said, there the question was: the French Government had taken a position for which he personally was not responsible, but which he could not abandon; and what he desired was, that without embarrassing the Porte, this question should be settled honourably for France, and that France should not have the appearance of being duped by Russia. In a conversation which he had had with Prince Callimachi, he had told him that it could not be supposed that the Porte really cared whether the Latins or Greeks were most favoured, both being her Christian subjects; but that the Latins being under the protection of France, and the Greeks under that of Russia, the real question at issue was, whether the Ottoman Government preferred the friendship of France or of Russia. That, for his part, as France had no ambitious views in Turkey, and as Russia undoubtedly had, he could not conceive that there could be much doubt as to the line of policy which the Porte ought to pursue.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether he would be satisfied with a declaration on the part of the Ottoman Government that, by the Firman given in respect of the Holy Buildings to the Greeks, there was no intention of departing from the promises made to France. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that a declaration in these terms would be sufficient.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 63.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 17.)

(No. 541.)

My Lord, *Paris, September 16, 1852.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has spoken to me with some anxiety on the subject of the great increase which, he has been informed, the Russian Government is making to its naval establishment in the Black Sea. He stated that the marine forces were to be raised to the number of 60,000 men. He mentioned, likewise, that he had received information that a Russian fleet was to be sent to the Chinese Seas.

I repeat these statements to your Lordship, as they appear to have made a certain impression on the French Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 64.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 19.)

(No. 70.)

My Lord, *Therapia, August 30, 1852.*

THE Grand Vizier tells me that M. de Lavalette has not yet made any written communication or demand respecting the Holy Places; that he told M. de Lavalette, when he remonstrated with him lately respecting the Firman to the Greeks, that he should not object to address a note to him, saying that the Porte had not intended to say anything in the Firman which would be at variance with the understanding which the Porte had come to with the French Embassy on that question; that M. de Lavalette has made no reply to this communication.

I thought that M. de Lavalette had become quieter on this subject; but

two days ago he dined with me, when he commenced the subject again, saying that he did nothing now as to the Holy Places, with a view to allow the irritation consequent on the Tripoli affair to subside; that France might wait one, two, five months, but that she would sooner or later insist on a satisfactory explanation of the obnoxious passages in the Firman, and a fulfilment of the promises made to the French Embassy respecting the Holy Places.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 65.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received September 27.)

(No. 267. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 17, 1852.*

I THINK it my duty to express to your Lordship my conviction that very serious consequences would be likely to follow any successful attempt on the part of the French Government to have explained away or modified the Firman regarding the Holy Places which has lately been issued.

M. de Séniavine's language upon this point appears to be very significant. He says that the Firman has been officially notified to the Imperial Cabinet, though it has not been published, because the Government are always desirous of avoiding causes of offence and altercation; but that the Government are prepared to uphold provisions which they consider to be only such as the Greeks are justly entitled to—that the Emperor is always ready to make allowance for the interests and the feelings of others—but that unquestionably upon a subject to which he attaches so much importance, His Majesty is little disposed to permit his rights to be encroached upon.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 66.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 274.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, September 23, 1852.*

I HAD the honour of receiving on the 21st instant by Mr. Hamilton your Lordship's despatches down to No. 183 inclusive.

With reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, No. 177, and to its inclosure, I am desirous of again stating to your Lordship my belief that a revival by the French Government of the Latin claims upon the Holy Places, or the successful demand for explanation which would affect the character of the Firman lately issued by the Sultan, would be likely to involve very serious consequences.

Such has for some time been my opinion, and it is confirmed by learning that the Russian Government have reason for believing that M. de Lavalette was perfectly well acquainted with the provisions of the forthcoming Firman, if, indeed, the text of the instrument were not brought confidentially to his knowledge.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 67.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 4.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 7, 1852.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 55, I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship a translation of the Firman* issued to the Greeks in February

* See Inclosure 2 in No. 54.

last, respecting the Holy Places, which has caused so much unfavourable feeling amongst the French.

The Firman tells the Greeks, repeatedly and emphatically, that the claims of their rivals, the Latins, that is, the French, are not founded on right. And although the Sultan, in His Majesty's answer to the Emperor of Russia, states that a "Traité solennel" exists between France and the Porte respecting the Holy Places, yet in the Firman not a word is said of that Treaty; but the claims of both parties are described as resting on "quelques vieux documens contradictoires."

Again, the Porte in the document in which she transmitted to M. de Titoff a copy of the Firman states that the Latins had first demanded "exclusive," but afterwards only "common possession," of the Holy Places.

And yet in the Firman the Porte taunts, as it were, and disallows the claim of the Latins to the "exclusive possession," making no allusion even to M. de Lavalette's concession as to a "common possession" by the Latins of the Holy Places.

However politic it may have been for the Porte to conciliate her Greek subjects, it certainly was impolitic to irritate France's present ruler by issuing a Firman, published in the newspapers, which must create the impression that France had advanced unfair pretensions, supported only by doubtful old documents, and distinguished by obstinacy, rather than by concession.

All, even the Porte herself, admit that the Firman to the Greeks was the main, although unavowed cause of the appearance of the French squadron in support of the late French demands.

When M. Sabatier first got possession of the Firman in the spring, the French loudly complained that "France had been betrayed," and some even unjustly insinuated with the cognizance of M. de Lavalette.

I believe that M. Sabatier's conduct in that matter was one of the causes of his removal to Egypt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 68.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 682.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 3, 1852.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS stated to me yesterday that he had received intelligence from Constantinople of the arrangement of the question of the Sacred Places. Satisfactory assurances had been given to the French Ambassador by the Porte of its intention to abide by the engagements into which it had entered in favour of the Latins, and the matter might now be considered as terminated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 69.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 11.)

(No. 289. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, October 1, 1852.*

AS a general rule, my object is, if not to suppress the suspicions which cross my mind as to the ambitious designs of Russia, at all events to forbear giving expression to them.

Combining, however, the account given in the inclosures of your Lordship's despatch No. 184, of the claims of the Russian Government upon those of the Principalities, with the demands of Austria upon the Porte, it is difficult to avoid feeling anxiety as to futurity, should these be simultaneously pressed, as they readily might be if either one or other of the claiming Governments

should, with or without reason, become upon less friendly terms with the Sultan.

A very intimate alliance between her two principal neighbours must, I apprehend, always involve a certain amount of danger to Turkey; and I do not doubt that the appearance of the Emperor in the Crimea, attended by an Austrian Envoy, will be regarded as somewhat ominous at Constantinople.

It may be supposed hardly probable that the Emperor and his companion will visit the Black Sea, and examine the works of Odessa and Sevastopol, without conversing upon eventualities, all of which are likely to be of a nature disastrous to the Sultan; but I should feel greater anxiety as to this intercourse, were I not aware that personal motives have had much to do with the Emperor's invitation to Count Mensdorff to attend him, his Majesty being known to take much pleasure in the society of the young general and envoy.

Enough, however, remains to give rise to mistrust as to a close alliance, the effects of which might, in a few weeks, be so serious to Turkey, and hence an increased necessity for the avoidance by the Porte of any just cause of complaint towards two neighbours—separately most formidable, and when united irresistible.

Once again I would, then, venture to lay before your Lordship the danger which would arise from the reopening of the question of the Holy Places, and to express my hope that, as the French Government do not conceal their belief in the ambitious views of Russia, they will have the prudence to refrain from demanding from the Sultan any concession which might be displeasing to his Greek subjects, and which would be considered in the light of a personal affront by the Emperor.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 70.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 89.)

My Lord, *Therapia, September 27, 1852.*

THE French Ambassador has told me that the President had said to him at Paris, that he could not understand why there should be any differences between British and French policy at Athens or Constantinople. His Excellency has frequently expressed similar sentiments, adding that he approved all the leading principles of British policy as to Turkey, and that I should find him ready to co-operate with me in support of them. I made suitable answers.

A violent religious dispute is going on here between two parties of the Roman Catholic Armenian Rayas.

M. de Lavalette has sided with the party favoured by the Court of Rome.

In replying, a day or two ago, to His Excellency's declarations as to sympathy with British policy, I observed that there appeared to me to be one point as to which divergence existed, and which was, moreover, a cause of uneasiness to the Porte.

"What is that," said M. de Lavalette.

I replied "the Protectorate which France claims of Christianity in the East."

"But," replied M. de Lavalette, "France only claims the Protectorate of the Pope, his rights in the East, and of European Roman Catholic ecclesiastical establishments, which is our right by treaty."

"And not of Turkish Christian Rayas?" I said.

"Certainly not."

"Not even of a Turkish Christian church or convent?"

"Certainly not," reiterated M. de Lavalette; "c'est une erreur complète. In this Armenian dispute the Porte has dismissed the temporal Archbishop. I think that she is wrong; but as the Archbishop's is a temporal appointment, I shall not interfere officially. I only interfere in favour of

Rayas unofficially, as you would do, in case they were wronged by the Porte."

I listened, with as much surprise as satisfaction, to these important declarations. If they represent the sentiments of the French Government, France's Protectorate of Christianity in the East, which she has hitherto assumed, loses the larger half of its dangerous attributes.

In order to give all possible formality to these declarations, I replied that I had heard them with sincere pleasure, and that I should communicate them to Her Majesty's Government, who, I knew, would receive the intelligence with unmingled satisfaction.

Your Lordship is aware that M. Guizot in the French Chambers, and M. de Bourqueney here, over and over again, have declared that France never would surrender the Protectorate of Christianity in the East. The Earl of Aberdeen, when he did me the honour to praise in the House of Lords, in 1845, my conduct in a Lebanon matter, stated that France claimed this Protectorate. In Syria, I repeatedly had to resist the assumption of it.

I will not occupy your Lordship's valuable time by examining the causes of this very important concession, but merely venture to suggest that it would be advantageous to obtain, if possible, from the French Government the confirmation of it. And if Russia were to follow, with respect to her co-religionists in Turkey, so good an example, the Porte's independence and the balance of power would be relieved from two dangerous trammels.

And as regards the Rayas themselves, they will be far safer under the ægis of civilization, and of the sympathy of the Powers at large, than under the half-and-half protection of two great Powers, one day warmly protected, and thus made objects of Ottoman jealousy, and another day abandoned to Ottoman vengeance, as it suits circumstances and policy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 71.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received October 28.)

(No. 92.)

My Lord, *Therapia, October 1, 1852.*

AFIF BEY, who conveyed to Abbas Pasha the Firman, has gone from Egypt to Jerusalem, in order to superintend the execution of the arrangement made by the Porte as to the Holy Places.

M. de Lavalette now states that his complaint as to the Firman to the Greeks is satisfied.

In a previous despatch, I had the honour to state that M. de Lavalette complained also of the non-execution of what the Porte had promised him in her note to him of the 8th of February last, respecting the Holy Places.

Your Lordship will see in that note, Inclosure in Sir Stratford Canning's despatch No. 31, that the Porte grants to the Latins three keys of the Church of Bethlehem.

The Grotto of the Nativity is a vault under the Church of Bethlehem, and to get to it one must pass through the church.

The Latins had, up to last February, only a small side-door in this church, by which they passed to the grotto.

M. de Lavalette apprehends that the Greeks will refuse permission to the Latins to enter the church by the great door, of which they have now a key.

He says that he has the most positive instructions to resist any attempt of this sort on the part of the Latins; and that he will make the Porte responsible that this concession to France is carried out to the letter.

This important question, therefore, which M. de Lavalette gives me clearly to understand involves war, now hinges on a great door and a little door.

The question will probably make its exit out of the great door.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 72.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 6.)

(No. 113.)

Therapia, October 19, 1852.

My Lord,

I HAD a long conversation yesterday with the representative of the Greek-Turkish sect at the Porte respecting the Holy Places. He said that he hears that M. de Lavalette has obtained from the Porte some assurances, whether verbal or in writing he does not know, which had satisfied his complaint as to the Firman to the Greeks.

He added that the question of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem was "grave, très grave;" that the Latins insisted on having a key of the great door, and entering it in religious procession; that the Greeks, rather than consent to that, would have recourse to any extremities.

M. de Lavalette says, that France would do the same if the Latins have not a key of the great door, and the right to pass through in religious procession.

The difference of opinion, therefore, is decided; and the only thing the two parties have in common as to the subject of the dispute is their extreme violence.

However, experience shows that hitherto both sides say rather more than they do.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 73.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received November 15.)

(No. 11. Political.)

Jerusalem, October 27, 1852.

My Lord,

ON the 18th ultimo I had the honour to report the arrival of Afif Bey four days previously on a special mission from the Sultan on matters pertaining to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, and other sanctuaries.

On the 21st, arrived M. Basily, the Russian Consul-General, with M. Marabutti, the Vice-Consul, and Prince Garari, an Attaché of the Russian Embassy. They were received with extraordinary honours: refreshments awaited them at three different stations between Jaffa and Jerusalem; the Greek Patriarch went out to meet them, and they entered the city with an escort of one hundred irregular Cavalry, drums beating, and muskets fired for joy.

M. Botta, the French Consul, and Count Pizzamano, the Austrian Consul, had arrived at Jaffa, from Beyrout, in the same steamer with M. Basily: the former rode on, and arrived here alone some hours before him; the latter, with his lady, came on more slowly afterwards.

But on Sunday, the 24th instant, M. Basily and the Vice-Consul left Jerusalem in great anger and disappointment, the more remarkable after the hilarity of spirits in which he had entered Jerusalem.

The interval of the month had been employed in the following manner:—

After the Corban Beiram festivals were over, and ceremonial visits fully exchanged, the Commissioner, Afif Bey, with a suite of the local Effendis, met the three Patriarchs, Greek, Latin, and Armenian, in the Church of the Resurrection, just in front of the Holy Sepulchre itself, and under the great dome;—there they were regaled with sherbets, confectionary, and pipes, at the expense of the three Convents, who vied with each other in making luxurious display on the occasion. M. Botta was the only Consular person present.

Afif Bey made an oration upon the desire of His Majesty the Sultan to gratify all classes of his subjects, and his particular concern for the dilapidated state of the great dome above them, which His Majesty offered to repair at his own expense.

The Bey then introduced to notice the architect sent for that task, and invited the three communities to appoint a person each to assist him in the work.

Up to that time the only topics of business discussed by the parties commissioned on all sides, had been the repair of the dome, and such matters of detail. But M. Basily, with the Greek Patriarch (arrived not long before), and the Russian Archimandrite were becoming impatient for the business which had brought them here, namely, the public reading of a Firman, which was to give to their interest the whole of the Christian Sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

Afif Bey then invited all the parties concerned to meet him in the Church of the Virgin, near Gethsemane. There he read an order of the Sultan for permitting the Latins to celebrate mass once a-year, but requiring the altar and its ornaments to remain undisturbed. No sooner were these words uttered than the Latins, who had come to receive their triumph over the Orientals, broke out into loud exclamations of the impossibility of celebrating mass upon a schismatic slab of marble, with a covering of silk and gold instead of plain linen, among schismatic vases, and before a crucifix which has the feet separated, instead of one nailed over the other.

There, however, were the words of the Firman, and so that proceeding ended in nothing.

M. Basily afterwards called on the Commissioner at his house, and angrily insisted upon the great Firman being read. The latter inquired, "What Firman?" "That which you yourself drew up, and wrote with your own hand, as Second Secretary in Constantinople, declaring that the Latin claims to the Sanctuaries are null and void."

The Bey explained that he had no directions to read it; that he had no copy of it with him, and could not go beyond his special instructions.

Thereupon M. Basily sent off Prince Garari to Jaffa, to convey these tidings to Constantinople in any Arab vessel that could be found.

At Jaffa the latter stayed six days, detained by contrary winds.

M. Basily then went to the Pasha of Jerusalem, and demanded to have a Special Council assembled, with himself and the Greek Patriarch in attendance, to receive a final declaration whether the important Firman had been sent here or not.

At that meeting Hafiz Pasha made a smooth speech on the well-known benevolence of His Majesty towards all classes of his subjects, and that was all that could be said.

And so ended for the present the business upon which so much excitement had been raised—both parties duped by a stratagem characteristic of Turkish policy.

The architect is proceeding with protracting his task of surveying the Dome.

There remains the comparative easy question of Bethlehem Sanctuaries.

The silver star which was stolen in 1847, and which, by the Firman in question, was to be replaced at the Latin expense, was supposed to be brought on this occasion, having been approved of in Constantinople; but on inquiry it was found that no one had brought it, or knew where it had been left behind.

The Austrian Consul, who makes no secret of ridiculing French proceedings, and French Protection of Christianity in the East, chuckles with delight at the failure of both parties, especially since the French would suffer no other Roman Catholic Power to assist them in the task of rescuing the Sanctuaries from the Schismatics.

They (the Austrians) claim to be the real efficient supporters of Latin interest in Palestine, but in other ways than by a crusade, for which sort of measures they consider the time to be past.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FINN.

No. 74.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 20, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places has become graver, and causes the Porte much anxiety.

All the evils resulting from the contradictory nature of the concessions made in February last by the Porte, in the note of the 9th of February and the Firman to the Greeks, to the two rival interests engaged in this ill-omened difference, are coming into evidence, and striking contrast, as the time approaches when Afif Bey, the Porte's Commissioner at Jerusalem, is to perform the difficult task of executing the Porte's conflicting decisions as to the Sanctuaries.

A graver cause of difference than the great door of the Church of Bethlehem has appeared, and taken precedence of it.

The Porte, under the influence of French and Russian menaces, conceded to the French Embassy the note of the 9th February, and the Firman of mi-Février to the Greeks.

The Russian Government considers the Firman the charter of rights of the Greek Church. The President, and M. de Lavalette, consider it an affront to France, because it describes her claims grounded on the Treaty of 1741, as "haksig," unjust, and establishes a *status quo*, which wholly invalidates that Treaty. M. de Lavalette tells me that the Porte promised to M. Sabatier that it should not be read at Jerusalem, and he tells the Porte that read it never shall be.

M. d'Ozeroff tells the Porte, with equal vehemence, that the Firman must be read at Jerusalem; he declares that if it be not read, according to usage, in the Medgliss at Jerusalem, before the Pasha, Cadi, Members of the Council, Patriarchs of the different sects, it will be valueless and a dead letter, and that consequently faith will have been broken with Russia.

The Latin clergy laid claim to a lamp, and means of saying mass, and keeping the priestly robes and sacred vessels in the Tomb of the Virgin, where, by the note of the 9th of August, [February?] they are now allowed to perform their devotions, "dans les lieux établis." But M. de Lavalette tells me that he disapproves these pretensions, because they are not sanctioned by the note, and that a "maisonnette" is to be erected in Gethsemene, where what is requisite for the church service in the tomb is to be kept.

Your Lordship is aware, that the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre has for a length of time been in decay, and that the violent disputes of the Greeks and Latins, as to who shall repair it, are the cause that nothing has been done to it.

It has now been decided that the Sultan is to repair it, and in consequence, M. de Lavalette apprehends no dissension on this score. But Fuad Effendi foresees that embarrassments will arise from the pretensions of the rival sects, as to whether the inscriptions round the cupola are to be in Greek or Latin; whether the sacred images in it are to be made and habited according to Greek or Latin fashions.

M. de Lavalette tells me that he has had serious discussions with Patriarch Valerga and the Latin clergy, and has been obliged to take a high tone in order to induce them to withdraw undue pretensions as to the Holy Places, which are not sanctioned by the Porte's concessions to France.

M. d'Ozeroff says the same to me, in a more modified sense, as to the Greek clergy. The Russian Legation is much more under the influence of religious feeling and of the clergy than the French Embassy.

M. de Lavalette speaks, invariably, in the highest terms of the moderation and good feeling evinced by the Pope in the matter of the Holy Places, a good example which, he says, is not followed by the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and his clergy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 75.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 17.)

(No. 140.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 20, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places is becoming more serious. France and Russia, with the view to coerce the Porte to execute her contradictory concessions of February last to them, have taken the same menacing position towards her which they did twelve months ago, only with this difference, that M. de Lavalette menaces to defend the advantages he has gained since his return from leave, whilst M. d'Ozeroff menaces to regain what he has lost.

M. de Lavalette has induced the Porte to address him a note, which nullifies the *status quo* established by the Firman to the Greeks, and states that nothing can be done by the Porte, affecting the Treaty of 1740, without the consent of France. The French Government have expressed their approbation of this note.

M. de Lavalette has also addressed instructions to M. Botta at Jerusalem, in which he enjoins him to watch vigilantly over the strict execution of the note of the 9th of February, and particularly of the provision in it which he says allows the Latins to pass through the great door of the church at Bethlehem, without however interfering with the Greeks when they are at their devotions. These instructions M. de Lavalette has shown to the Porte, who, he says, has expressed her approval of them. With these advantages, and the Porte's promise to M. Sabatier that the Firman to the Greeks is not to be read, M. de Lavalette is satisfied, and only protects his position by announcing the extreme measures he would take, should the Porte leave any engagements to him unfulfilled. He has, more than once, talked of the appearance, in that case, of a French fleet off Jaffa; and once he alluded to a French occupation of Jerusalem, "when," he said, "we shall have all the Sanctuaries."

M. de Lavalette has obtained these advantages, because he gained a hold on the Porte by making her responsible to France, and her ruler, so prompt to resent her wrongs, for having issued the Firman to the Greeks, which, his Excellency says, "is an insolent denial of the rights conceded to France by Treaty, and the note of the 9th of February."

The irritation and bitterness caused to M. de Lavalette, and, as he says, to the President, by that Firman is excessive. "I will tell you very confidentially," said M. de Lavalette to me, the other night, "the affair of the Charlemagne, Tripoli, all our anger with Turkey, tout, tout doit son origine au Firman que."

M. de Lavalette has also said to me lately, "If the Porte does not keep her engagements to me, France will make a demonstration; she will then accept England's mediation, but the demonstration must first be très vive, très vive."

Such is the French position.

The Russian Legation has heard of the note to M. de Lavalette; and Russian policy now endeavours, as a set-off to it, to give validity and dignity to the Firman.

A Russian Feldjäger arrived lately here, ostensibly for the purpose of bringing instructions to M. d'Ozeroff, to obtain from the Porte immediate satisfaction for an affront, offered some months back, to a Russian merchant flag. Others think that he brought very stringent instructions as to Jerusalem. Be that as it may, M. d'Ozeroff, a few days since, in a formal interview with the Grand Vizier, accused the Porte of having been guilt of perfidy and treachery, and, in language said to be "comminatoire," demanded that the Firman should be formally and publicly read at Jerusalem.

The Porte, under the influence of this angry communication, has instructed Afif Bey to cause the Firman to be read, with the least possible publicity, at Jerusalem.

I now learn, also confidentially, that besides the Firman, the Porte gave, in February last, a vizirial letter, confidentially, to M. de Titoff, promising

that the Latins should not pass through the great door of the Church of Bethlehem.

Such is the Russian position.

The Porte's position is most disadvantageous. Against all her wishes and interests she has been dragged into a most dangerous and difficult dispute between the great Powers, who found their respective claims on contradictory documents, which date from remote and dark ages. The Porte, a Mahomedan Power, is called on to decide a quarrel which involves, ostensibly, sectarian Christian religious feeling, but which, in reality, is a vital struggle between France and Russia for political influence, at the Porte's cost, in her dominions.

The Sultan is required to be a judge, and to decide this dispute; but, so far from having judicial independence and immunity, His Majesty is coerced, and humiliated before his subjects by menaces, forced to give contradictory and dishonouring decisions, and then accused of perfidy by those who have driven him into it.

In this dilemma Fuad Effendi requested to see me on what he called "the rather serious turn which the affair of the Holy Places had taken."

His Excellency went at length into all the disadvantages of the Porte's position. He said:—

"France, with her Treaty with the Porte in her hand, demanded the rights as to the Holy Places granted by it to the Latins; that is, a total change of the *status quo*. The Porte was on the point of making concessions to her, when the Emperor of Russia, last year, in a letter to the Sultan, required the Porte's strict adherence to the *status quo*, saying that the question of the Holy Places was 'clairement et positivement résolue par des ordonnances solennelles et des Hatti Shérifs souverains.' M. de Titoff declared also to the Porte, as M. d'Ozeroff admits to me, that he would leave Constantinople with all his Legation, if she permitted the slightest departure from the *status quo*. Immediately, to get to windward of Russia, M. de Lavalette threatened to blockade the Dardanelles with a French fleet, if the Porte adhered to the *status quo*.

"The *status quo* is protected by Russian, and attacked by French menaces.

"These two Powers, at that time and since, have coerced the Porte into a series of deceptions, to the prejudice of her free agency and credit, and she is now threatened with their vengeance if she does not effect a settlement of a dispute, which they themselves, by their mutual antagonism, render impossible. If France and Russia persist in this course, our only chance of safety will be an appeal to England to intervene, in our behalf, with those Powers, and induce them to agree to some practicable arrangement of their difference."

There was so much truth in all that Fuad Effendi said, that all I could do was to ask him how he thought I could assist the Porte in her difficulties, observing, that without leaving my position of neutrality, I had already pointed out to the French and Russian representatives the evils which might result to the policy which protected the peace of the world, from a continuance of their difference, and that I had used my friendly endeavours to remove causes of irritation and misunderstanding, and to induce them to settle a quarrel of Christians in a Christian spirit.

Fuad Effendi said that he was aware of my peaceful wishes, and that the Porte would be very much obliged to me if I would avail myself of my good relations with M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff, and see if there was a possibility of a reconciliation.

With the view, therefore, of obtaining exact information on this point, I visited these two gentlemen, disclaiming the part of a mediator, and only taking the unofficial one of a mutual friend, anxious to explain possible misapprehensions as to details, trifling in themselves, but involving the most important interests. And this mode of proceeding was the more advantageous, because M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff see each other but seldom, and when they do, never mention the Holy Places. They both received me in the best spirit; and although I effected no reconciliation, I at least removed two causes of misapprehension. M. d'Ozeroff said that he had not considered the great door of the Church of Bethlehem as so serious a cause of difference as M. de Lavalette had done, even adding, that that matter might have been arranged if M. de Lavalette had not opposed the reading of the Firman at Jerusalem.

On the other hand, M. d'Ozeroff thought that M. de Lavalette had supported the claim of the Latins to have a cupboard and a lamp in The tomb of the Virgin. I assured him that he, on the contrary, had disallowed it.

M. d'Ozeroff said that he could not deviate in the slightest degree from the positive orders of the Emperor; that Russia would not go to war; she would only, should the Porte not fulfil her engagements as to the Holy Places, withdraw her legation from Constantinople; that there are other Courts at which Russia had no Representative.

M. de Lavalette said that he could not deviate in the slightest degree from the note of the 9th February last, but that he was perfectly ready to reopen the examination of France's rights as to the Holy Places, taking as the basis of them the Treaty of 1740; that the Latins would seldom pass through the great door; perhaps, for what he knew, never at all.

I said all that I thought most likely to produce a good effect on the French and Russian Representatives, and concluded by assuring them that having visited the Holy Places, and made myself thoroughly acquainted with all the bearings of that matter, I should always be happy to remove, as I had done in the present instance, misapprehensions which might prevent a favourable solution of this unfortunate difference.

Both the French and Russian Representatives returned me their expressive thanks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 76.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 11.)

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Therapia, November 23, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to submit a few reflections, founded on local knowledge, as to the best mode of solving the difficult question of the Holy Places, should it not, by some unexpected turn of good fortune, be terminated speedily either here or at Jerusalem.

It is quite clear that the present attitude of France and Russia towards Turkey menaces her independence, if not her integrity. For the result of France's "très vive démonstration" in favour of an alleged broken treaty, would be an occupation of Jaffa and Jerusalem, and probably a great deal more; and the consequence of Russia's rupture with the Porte, would, I have no doubt, entail her occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia; both eventualities being fatal to British policy, and to the balance of power.

It is equally clear that either France or Russia must be in the wrong; and as their difference, if unsettled, must entail a breach of the Convention by which the five Powers guarantee Turkey's independence, Great Britain and the other two Powers have a right to require that the Power which is in the wrong should not, by the assertion of an unfounded right, nullify the conditions of a Convention which she has ratified in common with her allies.

The first step towards settling a wrong is to examine it. Nobody regrets more than I the revival of France's dormant rights to the Holy Places. But they are revived, and they must be treated with policy and justice.

Now the French Government, from the beginning, demanded of the Porte examination of her claims as to the Holy Places, which she grounds on Treaty; and the French Representative still declares, unceasingly, that he wishes nothing more than that those claims should be thoroughly examined and tried.

But the Emperor of Russia met France's demand for examination, by calling on the Porte to refuse all examination; and the Russian Representative here, in the same sense, condemns anything like examination of the dispute as to the Sanctuaries, saying that the question, regarding the conscientious and religious feeling of the Emperor and of his co-religionists, ought not to be considered "sous un point de vue juridique."

I think that I have said enough, in this and preceding despatches, to show that the ill-omened difference ought not to remain any longer in its present

unsettled state, which discredits Turkey, hurts her independence, and endangers the peace of Europe.

It would not be prudent, especially as the world now is, when the dangerous power of France is kept within proper limits by the Treaties of 1815, to disregard her frequent appeals to the rights guaranteed to her by the Treaty of 1740. And Great Britain would not cease to regret, were the overthrow of Turkey and of the balance of power to ensue from the quarrel about a great door or a little door, a cupboard or no cupboard, when a calm examination of France's claim by Treaty, would have settled this momentous difference on the safest of all foundations, those of justice and international right.

Under these circumstances the time, I venture to think, is come when it would be advisable that Great Britain should tell France, Russia, and the Porte, that should the settlement of the difference as to the Holy Places be any longer delayed, the Convention of 1840, the general peace, and the balance of power will be placed in peril; and that therefore it would be desirable that claims which one party grounds on Treaty, and the Sultan, in his letter of last year to the Emperor of Russia, called it "un Traité solennel," should be impartially tried by the Porte in enjoyment of her full free agency and of her territorial rights as to Jerusalem, and other legitimate arbitration. Another advantage of such a step would be, that Russia would then come to an arrangement with the Porte as to the Holy Places; for my belief is, she would never submit her claims to a trial with those of France.

As regards French and Russian influence in Turkey, I agree with the view taken of them by the late Grand Vizier and Aali Pasha, that the former is the least dangerous.

France has no geographical influence except in Africa. Her co-religionists are a few Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, and Roman Catholic Armenians, scattered over the face of Turkey. The only population like a mass, are about 120,000 Maronites, who, certainly not warriors, I believe respect England more than France. And so little influence has the French Ambassador over the Armenians, that he told me only the other day, in much irritation, "que ces ingrats, ces coquins d'Arméniens" had had the insolence to present a petition to the Sultan complaining of his interference in an Armenian matter.

But Russia, geographically, encompasses Turkey's vitality; and nearly, if not quite, half of Turkey's subjects are Russia's co-religionists, blind believers, who are taught by their clergy to look on the Emperor of Russia as their protector against Turkish injustice.

Russia claims the protectorate of the Turkish-Greek Church. The French Ambassador declares to me that France has no right to that of the Turkish Roman Catholic Church.

French policy in the East is noisy and rash. Russian policy is silent and cautious.

Abstractedly, therefore, it would be better for British policy, that if one of the two influences were to be curtailed, it should be Russian. For it were idle to suppose that either France or Russia would go to war for the great door of the Church of Bethlehem; the struggle is for influence in the East, which stands behind that door.

But in the Jerusalem affair, as I had the honour to say before, I think it desirable that neither of the litigants should gain a triumph. Besides, it would not be advisable that Russia should isolate herself; for the day may come when the Powers, who for their protection united against Napoleon, may have to do the same against his nephew.

I should observe that both the Emperor of Russia's letter to the Sultan, and the Russian advocacy of the Firman to the Greek subjects of the Porte, involve an assumption of Russian protectorate of the Turkish Greek Church.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 77.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Colonel Rose.

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, December 14, 1852.*

I HAVE received your despatches, Nos. 139, 140, and 145, of the 20th and 23rd of November, respecting the fresh difficulties which have occurred to impede a settlement of the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches to various portions of the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem; and while I acquaint you that I entirely approve of the language which you have held to Fuad Effendi, and to the Representatives of France and Russia, with the view of bringing all parties to a more reasonable and more practical view of the matters in dispute; I have, at the same time, to instruct you to abstain from any direct or official interference in a question with which, in itself, Her Majesty's Government have nothing to do, and which can only interest them in so far as it may appear likely to interrupt the amicable relations of the parties immediately concerned in it.

As it seems, from your despatches, doubtful whether Mr. Consul Finn has transmitted to you a copy of his report to me, on the subject of Afif Pasha's proceedings at Jerusalem respecting the Firman, I inclose a copy of it for your information. You will observe that allusion is made to two Firmans, namely, one touching the Shrine of the Virgin, which corresponds so far with the Firman of February last, of which copies were sent to this office by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, in his despatch No. 58, of the 19th of March, and by yourself, in your despatch No. 76, of the 7th of September; the other called by M. Basily, the Great Firman. Her Majesty's Government have no knowledge of the existence of any other Firman than the one first mentioned; and if there should be any other, you will procure a copy of it, and send it home.

I am, &c.

(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 78.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(*Received December* 19.)

(No. 153.)

My Lord, *Pera, December 4, 1852.*

THE question of the Holy Places wears, on the whole, a more favourable appearance than it did when I last had the honour to address your Lordship.

The subjects of discussion, the publication or reading of the Firman, and the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, are the same; but the French and Russian Representatives have modified their tone in their communications with the Porte on the matter.

I ascribe this favourable result a good deal to the advice which I gave to Fuad Effendi, on his consulting me what he should do when the Porte was accused by the two Representatives of having acted with perfidy.

Both M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff did not scruple to bring the same serious charge, couched in the strongest terms, against the Porte, in their conversation with myself, and, I hear, with others.

I saw that their accusations were not only most prejudicial to the credit and influence of the Porte, but that the tenacity and asperity with which they were repeated, looked ominous, and indicated the possibility of a coming demand for satisfaction for continued "perfidy and treachery."

I therefore, courteously but frankly, told both M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff, that I could not admit the justice of these accusations, because the coercive nature of French and Russian demands had forced the Porte to give conflicting decisions, against her will, her interest, and her conviction; that the Porte had been compelled to act as a judge in a most difficult and, to her, distasteful matter, and then deprived of the immunity and independence of a judge. All M. d'Ozeroff could reply was, "Pourquoi donc est ce que la Porte n'a pas tenu ce langage dès le commencement."

Fuad Effendi has spoken, in a similar sense, to the two Representatives.

These unanswerable arguments have produced a favourable effect by placing matters in their true light. M. de Lavalette now says that nothing can be "plus doux et plus aimable" than he is with the Porte. "Je demande humblement et respectueusement mon droit." M. d'Ozeroff also says, that although he admitted that last year there had been a declaration that the Russian Legation would, under certain circumstances, leave Constantinople, yet that he could not bring to his recollection having talked of the Legation leaving it on account of present causes of difference with the Porte.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of a report from Mr. Stephen Pisani, which shows the nature of the coercion used last year, and which forced the Porte to give contradictory decisions. M. de Titoff threatened the Porte with immediate rupture of relations if the Porte infringed, in the least, the *status quo* as to the Holy Places; and M. de Lavalette threatened her with the appearance of a French fleet at the Dardanelles if she adhered to it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 78.

Statement by M. E. Pisani.

December 4, 1852.

M. DE TITOFF said, in November last, to Aali Pasha, that if a single thing was changed in the *status quo* as to the Holy Places, it would be considered as an offence by the Emperor; and that he (M. de Titoff) would, in that case, leave Constantinople, with all the members of his mission, in twenty-four hours.

M. de Lavalette said, about the same time, that the question of the Holy Places would not have a fair solution without the presence of the fleet at the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 79.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 154. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Pera, December 5,* 1852.

M. D'OZEROFF has prejudiced much his position, at this important moment, by making a formal declaration to the French Ambassador, that Russia, by virtue of the Treaty of Kainardgi, protects the orthodox, that is, the Greek religion, in Turkey. M. de Lavalette takes this the more to heart, because he has lately formally declared that France makes no claim to protect the Turkish Roman Catholics. He has made known M. d'Ozeroff's declaration to his colleagues and the Porte. The Porte has heard this assertion of Russian protection of the religious interests of ten or eleven millions of her subjects with unmingled dissatisfaction.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the two articles of the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardgi, which relate to Russia in connection with the Greek Turkish Christians.

M. d'Ozeroff founds his claim on Article VII; but I venture to think, that your Lordship will agree with me that a promise of the Porte to protect the Christian religion and churches, does not bear out the Russian Representative in saying that Russia has a right to protect the Greek Turkish Church, more especially as the 14th Article expressly limits the right of Russian protection of the Greek Church to that of the chapel of the Russian Legation, and of a new Greek church which the Court of Russia was about to build in Galata.

The Grand Vizier informs me to-day, confidentially, that two deputies from Montenegro have arrived here, and are secretly lodged in the Russian Embassy House; this circumstance has of course increased the unfavourable impression already existing with respect to Russia at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 79.

Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji.

(Extrait.)

ARTICLE VII.—La Porte promet de protéger la religion Chrétienne et ses églises: et il sera libre aux Ministres de Russie de faire des représentations en faveur de la nouvelle Eglise dont il est parlé dans l'Article XIV.

Article VIII.—Il sera permis aux sujets de l'Empire Russe de visiter la ville de Jérusalem et les Lieux Saints; et il ne sera exigé d'eux, ni à Jérusalem ni ailleurs, aucun droit ni contribution.

Article XIV.—Il est permis à la Cour de Russie, outre la chapelle bâtie dans la maison du Ministre, de construire dans un quartier de Galata, dans la rue nommée Bey Oglou, une église publique du rit Grec, qui sera toujours sous la protection du Ministre Russe, et à l'abri de toute gêne et avanie.

No. 80.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 19.)

(No. 155.)

My Lord, *Pera, December 5,* 1852.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a confidential instruction to M. Pisani respecting the question of the Holy Places.

I have always told the Turkish Ministers that my instructions did not permit me to interfere in that question, and that even if they did not, I could not safely have given an opinion as to decisions of one day, contradicted by those of the next, not knowing besides whether other counter-engagements may not have been given secretly, or unknown to me.

On the other hand, I told Fuad Effendi that it would be my duty to support the Sultan when His Majesty claimed the right to give, in enjoyment of his independence and free agency, a conscientious opinion on any matter which he was bound to examine and decide on.

Fuad Effendi has now volunteered telling me, at three different interviews, that having again, with some of his colleagues, gone over the documents and treaties relating to the Holy Places, he has come to the conviction that France's claim to the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem is just; and that if her Treaty of 1740 were examined "d'une manière juridique," France might claim many more Sanctuaries than the two given her by the note of the 9th February.

The Grand Vizier, whom I saw to-day, volunteered also a declaration in a similar sense.

Both his Highness and Fuad Effendi stated that they were resolved to extricate the Porte from the critical position in which she had been involved by the contradictory promises of the last Ministry respecting the question of Jerusalem; that the longer the question lasted, the more critical and embarrassed would be the position of the Porte; and that in this sense the Sultan intended, without further delay, to decide and settle the question of the Holy Places, which had been most thoroughly discussed and examined, according to the strictest rules of justice and impartiality; and that if any party complained of the decision, the Porte would reply, that she had decided according to the best of her ability and her conscientious conviction.

It is due to the Grand Vizier to say, that he has acted with as much prudence and consistency as was possible in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed.

The Grand Vizier informed me, very confidentially, that the French Ambassador was now satisfied with the manner in which the Firman to the Greeks was to be read.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Colonel Rose to M. E. Pisani.

(Confidential.)

Therapia, November 28, 1852.

Sir,

AFTER thinking duly over Fuad Effendi's question of yesterday, as to whether the Porte would do well to give the key of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, that is, the French, I cannot—pray tell his Excellency, with my best compliments—answer the question, as by my instructions I am bound to be neutral in this matter of the difference between the French and Russians. I have written, as I told his Excellency, at length, on the subject, to Lord Malmesbury, and I have no doubt that the result will be, that the question will be treated hereafter in accordance with the rights of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 81.

The Earl of Malmesbury to Colonel Rose.

(No. 106.)

Foreign Office, December 21, 1852.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that I approve of the endeavours which you have made, as reported in your despatch, No. 153, of the 4th instant, to moderate the vehemence of the several parties engaged in the discussion respecting the Greek and Latin claims at Jerusalem.

I am, &c.
(Signed) MALMESBURY.

No. 82.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 24.)

(No. 739.)

Compiègne, December 19, 1852.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS, who arrived here from Paris this afternoon, mentioned to me that the tenour of his last despatches from Constantinople had been very disagreeable; that the question of the Sacred Places was not settled, and, he was afraid, would give rise to further difficulties. He was, he said, most anxious to see it terminated. He admitted that it ought never to have been raised, and said that if the Porte would only give to France a semblance of satisfaction, so that she could retreat with honour, he would take care that it should be dropped.

As M. Drouyn de Lhuys had begun the subject with me, I thought it a good opportunity to call his attention to the menacing language which M. de Lavalette was in the habit of using to the Porte on every occasion on which he happened to differ in opinion with the Turkish Ministers. One would think from it, I said, that the French fleet was to settle every question, however trivial. M. Drouyn de Lhuys assured me that if M. de Lavalette had ever used threatening language, he had done that which he was not warranted to do by his instructions.

I was careful to let M. Drouyn de Lhuys understand that I did not make these remarks under any directions from your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 83.

Extract of a Memorandum by Baron Brunnow on the Political Relations between England and Russia, in December, 1852.

A L'ENTREE en fonctions de toute nouvelle Administration, le devoir le plus important que j'ai à remplir, comme Ministre de l'Empereur, consiste à préciser et à constater bien clairement la nature de nos relations quant aux affaires de l'Orient.

Dans ce but, je dois m'en référer avant tout au contenu d'un mémorandum que M. le Chancelier, Comte Nesselrode, lors de son dernier séjour en Angleterre, a remis à Lord Aberdeen, alors Principal Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères.

Ce mémoire expose les intentions et les principes de l'Empereur relativement à la situation des choses en Turquie. Il énonce le désir de Sa Majesté de combiner ses efforts avec ceux de l'Angleterre pour conserver l'Empire Ottoman dans son état actuel, comme étant la combinaison qui se concilie le mieux avec l'intérêt général de la paix. Enfin, il exprime le vœu de s'entendre, le cas échéant, avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, sur les éventualités qui pourraient se présenter dans l'avenir, si des circonstances indépendantes de notre prévoyance nécessitaient de nouvelles déterminations dans l'intérêt du maintien de l'équilibre Européen.

Pour le présent, comme pour l'avenir, la pensée de l'Empereur tient ainsi en vue un accord franc et cordial entre la Russie et l'Angleterre.

Durant mon dernier séjour à St. Pétersbourg, il y a de cela un an, Sa Majesté a daigné me réitérer à ce sujet l'expression de sa volonté formelle.

En exécution fidèle de ses ordres, je ne saurais donc mettre assez de soin à m'ouvrir envers le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique avec une entière franchise sur toutes les questions qui se rapportent à l'intérêt commun de la conservation de la paix dans le Levant.

Au moment même où le Ministère Derby touchait à sa fin, j'ai entretenu Lord Malmesbury d'une circonstance sérieuse, qui nous présage une nouvelle complication de ce côté, gratuitement suscitée par la violence de la conduite de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople.

J'ai mis Lord Malmesbury au fait de cette situation grave, en l'invitant à la signaler à l'attention immédiate de son successeur, lorsqu'il lui remettrait sa gestion.

Je ne perdrai pas un instant, de mon côté, pour placer cette question dans son vrai jour, aux yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Les faits principaux peuvent se résumer en peu de mots:—La Porte, au printems dernier, a tranché, par un Firman revêtu d'un Hatti-Shérif, toutes les difficultés élevées entre les Grecs et les Latins quant à la question des Saints Lieux. Les prétentions des uns et des autres se trouvaient réglées par ce Firman d'une manière équitable. Il imposait même aux Grecs quelques concessions au-delà du *statu quo*, dont le maintien leur avait été précédemment assuré.

Malgré ces concessions, faites en faveur des Latins, ce règlement final de la controverse avait été envisagé comme une solution contre laquelle il n'y avait rien à objecter.

Le Sultan a annoncé cette conclusion à Son Majesté l'Empereur, par une lettre qui a sanctionné même d'une manière plus formelle encore les stipulations du Firman qui nous a été également communiqué.

Aujourd'hui, les intrigues de M. de Lavalette ont eu pour objet d'engager les Ministres Ottomans à éluder l'exécution de ce Firman.

Les concessions qu'il accorde aux Latins ne suffisent plus à la France. Elle en exige d'avantage, et menace la Porte de l'envoi d'une flotte sur les côtes de la Syrie.

Intimidée par cet acte de violence, la Porte cède aux exigences de l'Ambassadeur de France. En cédant, elle manque d'une part à ses engagemens envers nous; et de l'autre elle mécontente l'immense majorité de la population Grecque dans ses états, au profit de la minorité du rit Latin.

L'indépendance du Sultan, dans ses rapports directs envers la Russie, se trouve ainsi compromise, en ce que ce Souverain, intimidé par la menace de la

France, se trouve réduit à rompre sa parole envers l'Empereur; et en même tems le repos intérieur de la Turquie est mis en péril par les concessions que la France arrache à la faiblesse de la Porte, en faveur des Latins, au risque de soulever la population Grecque orthodoxe contre l'injustice flagrante de cet acte de faiblesse.

La Russie ne saurait se montrer indifférente à un pareil état de choses, qui tout à la fois met l'indépendance du Sultan et la tranquillité de son Empire à la merci de la violence d'un Ambassadeur de France!

Cette situation pourrait conduire à des conséquences graves, si le Gouvernement Français, cédant aux conseils de la prudence, ne se hâte point de revenir sur ses pas.

Déjà Lord Cowley a été chargé d'agir dans ce sens. Mais il est à craindre que cette démarche n'ait été tardive, si dans l'intervalle la violence de M. de Lavalette a précipité les Ministres Ottomans dans une fausse voie. Il leur faudra alors réparer le mal qu'ils auront fait, et remplir une parole à laquelle ils auront manqué.

Le Grand Vizir, il est vrai, a promis à notre Chargé d'Affaires que le Firman, dont nous demandons l'exécution, allait être publié à Jérusalem. Mais Fouad Effendi, gagné par la France, cherche à éluder les dispositions de ce Firman, malgré la sanction solennelle dont il a été revêtu par la volonté du Sultan!

Telle est la situation des choses, d'après les nouvelles qui me sont parvenues de St. Pétersbourg, jusqu'à la date du 9 Décembre.

Après en avoir fait connaître le contenu à Lord Malmesbury, à la veille de sa retraite, il me restera à remplir le devoir de reprendre avec son successeur un sujet de si haute importance que je ne saurais signaler assez vivement à la sollicitude du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

No. 84.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received December 29.)

(No. 15. Political.)

Jerusalem, December 9, 1852.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Firman which confirms the property of the Sanctuaries to the Greek community here, as alluded to in my despatch No. 11 Political of 27th October, was read in public Divan on the 29th November, in presence of the three Patriarchs and the French Consul.

It is not expected by the best-informed persons here, that the French will remain satisfied with gaining only one out of the eighteen points in their demand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FINN.

No. 85.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received December 31.)

No. 9. (Confidential.)

Paris, December 30, 1852.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship's attention has no doubt been already called to a question of serious importance in the East, namely, the difference which has arisen between the French Embassy and the Russian Legation at Constantinople respecting the rights claimed by the former over the Holy Places at Jerusalem.

As your Lordship has at hand the means of obtaining a full statement of all the proceedings which appertain to this complicated affair, it is not necessary that I should say more than that your Lordship's predecessor, in a private letter which he wrote me a few days before he left office, desired me to press earnestly on the French Government the necessity of its being terminated as promptly as possible. I had, consequently, a long conversation with M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the subject at Compiègne. I should premise that that Minister has, from the moment of taking office, expressed great regret that the question should

ever have been mooted: he looks upon it as a bad legacy bequeathed him by his predecessors; and he has always asserted that his only solicitude was to find an honourable means of retreat for France from the false position which she had taken; and that though her rights under treaty in regard to the Sacred Places were unquestionable, he lamented that they should have been uselessly and mischievously put forward. The Emperor also has, on more than one occasion, while President, termed it "une question mal engagée, et qu'il était bien content de voir terminée," as he thought it had been by the arrangement made by M. de Lavalette in the spring of the year.

When, therefore, I spoke to M. Drouyn de Lhuys at Compiègne, he repeated his former assurances, and added that the difference must and should be settled. He quite understands that it is a question of such vital importance to Russia, that she cannot give way upon it, while the interest of the Latins he admits to be comparatively small. His only anxiety, therefore, is to find an honourable retreat for France. He had written, he said, to M. de Lavalette, to accept the best arrangement which he could make, and then to let the matter drop. I asked him why, if he really wished for an amicable adjustment of the difference, he did not desire the French Ambassador at Constantinople to put himself in direct communication with the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, instead of leaving to a Musselman potentate the settlement of a Christian dispute. I suggested that M. de Lavalette should state to M. d'Ozeroff that France had treaties with the Porte which secured to the Latins certain privileges in the Holy Places, but that she had no wish to make those treaties a handle for preventing facilities being afforded to other Christian sects to worship in the same places, each according to the form required by their particular dogma; and that he should then enter into friendly arrangement with M. d'Ozeroff for preventing any future scandal between the Latin and Greek worshippers.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appeared to approve of the suggestion. He said that he would turn it in his mind, and speak to me again upon it on my return to Paris.

Yesterday he renewed the subject with me. He said that he had adopted my suggestion, and had written in that sense to M. de Lavalette, and he proposed instructing M. de Castelbajac to make similar overtures at St. Petersburgh. He was quite determined that the question should be amicably settled.

I am the more anxious that there should be no further delay, because M. de Kisseleff informed me confidentially, this morning, that he is in hourly expectation of instructions desiring him to enter into some explanations with the French Government upon this matter. I told him that I was convinced the French Government was anxious to see it settled, and I informed him of the suggestion which I had thrown out for settling it. He seemed to fear that as long as M. de Lavalette remained at Constantinople there was no chance of terminating the question amicably. He complained that that Ambassador had no other argument with the Porte than a menace of the French fleet, giving me at the same time distinctly to understand that Russia was prepared with hers.

With regard to M. de Lavalette's continued menaces of the French fleet, I have the honour to refer your Lordship to my despatch, No. 739, to Lord Malmesbury.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 86.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 5, 1853.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 16, 1852.

THE Porte has given her decision, the same as that of the 25th January last, as to the Holy Places, and communicated it to the French and Russian Representatives. Inclosed is M. Etienne Pisani's report on the subject.

In order to give your Lordship a correct idea of this decision and of the

grounds on which the Porte bases it, I shall recapitulate shortly the circumstances relating to it.

In 1850 General Aupick first addressed a note to the Porte, demanding the settlement of France's claim as to the Sanctuaries by virtue of Treaty.

In 1851 the Porte named a mixed Commission, composed of French and Turkish Greek members, with Emin Effendi as president, to examine the French claims.

This Commission showed too much French tendency, by rejecting as evidence "le Traité du Khalif Omar," which is the groundwork of Greek claims as to the Sanctuaries. It had held several sittings when the letter of the Emperor of Russia arrived and caused its dissolution.

The Porte then named, in opposition to the wishes of the French, a purely Turkish Commission of inquiry. This Commission, after examining "le Traité du Khalif Omar," the two French Treaties, and all the Firmans and documents relating to the Holy Places, gave a decision as to them, on which was founded the Porte's decision of the 25th January, which is described as "equitable" by the valuable testimony of Her Majesty's Ambassador, as appears from the inclosed extract from His Excellency's despatch,* No. 31, of this year. The decision now taken by the Porte is the same, and consequently it is an equitable one.

M. de Titoff, disapproving the infraction of the *status quo* resulting from the Porte's decision of the 25th of January last, and the Porte's note to the French Envoy of the 9th of February, lost no time in endeavouring to re-establish the *status quo*, by persuading the Porte to issue to the Greeks the much talked-of Firman. So much was M. de Titoff concerned in the framing of it, that, as M. Pisani informs me, he was allowed by Aali Pasha to make such alterations in the draft of it as he thought proper.

The complaints of the Russian Legation here against the Porte in the Jerusalem question are two, an ostensible one and an undefined one.

The first is, that the Firman to the Greeks has not been read at Jerusalem in full council, and in presence of the Patriarchs and clergy of all the Christian sects.

The second one is, as to the delivery of the key of the great door of the Church at Bethlehem to the Latins.

As regards the first complaint, the Porte has ordered the Firman to be read in presence of the Pasha, Mufti, Cadi, and Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, and then registered. By so doing, the Porte made a great concession to Russia, and offended much the French Ambassador, who had insisted that the Firman should not be read in any way, but merely registered. However, Fuad Effendi assures me that M. de Lavalette, in a conciliatory spirit, will shut his eyes to the reading, in the manner I now state, of the Firman, and will not make it a cause of quarrel with the Porte.

But the Porte would have committed a fatal error if she had ordered a public, which must have become an ostentatious, reading of a Firman which declares to be "unjust" the claims which France makes, by virtue of a Treaty, in presence of rival sects, implacably opposed to each other for ages, ecclesiastics, who, for the sake of a lamp or some religious emblem, frequently shed, in fierce conflicts, each other's blood on the very stones which mark the Nativity and Crucifixion. I venture to ask, how would such rivals have used a triumph, or supported an humiliation? How would France, which, in anger on account of this very Firman, sent a fleet with hostile purpose to Tripoli for the sake of two deserters who by military law had forfeited their lives, have brooked such a public affront and denial of her rights by Treaty? For my part, I cannot understand the wish to mortify deeply, by a public reading of the Firman, the feelings of France's high-spirited ruler and people.

The Firman is to be read, although the Firman itself only prescribes that it shall be registered: the registration being all that is necessary for its legalization.

Under these circumstances, the Porte's decision that the Firman should be read, was more than could justly be required of her.

With respect to the second cause of Russian complaint, the key for the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, it is so vague and undefined that neither the Porte nor any Representative here can comprehend it.

* See No. 51.

The Porte's note of the 9th of February, and even the Firman, states that the Latins are to have three keys, two for the doors of the Church, of which the great door is one, and a key of the Grotto.

It has been stated amongst the Diplomatic body here, that the Greek ecclesiastics and the Russian Legation wish to make out that as the Firman upholds the *status quo*, and forbids "aucun changement à l'état actuel des portes de l'Eglise de Bethléem," the Latins may have the key, but cannot use it. But the anomaly that a man may have a key of a door, but not open the door with it, can never be sustained in a discussion or in a note, more especially as it is founded on the double meanings of a Firman drawn up by the Porte, the judge, and then altered, to his views, by the Russian Envoy, a party in the suit.

It is clear that the Envoy felt that the Firman gave, by its real meaning, the key in question to the Latins, because he afterwards obtained a vizirial letter to Afif Effendi, instructing him to do all he could to withhold the key from them, and if he could not succeed, to refer to Constantinople.

Therefore, as the note of the 9th of February, to the French Envoy, and the Firman obtained and altered by the Russian Envoy, concede the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, the Porte did wisely and right in confirming the concession.

I venture, therefore, to congratulate your Lordship on being able to support the decision of the Porte as to the important question of the Sanctuaries, taken by the Porte after mature and impartial consideration of the rights of both the opposite interests engaged in it, and qualified by Her Majesty's Ambassador and Chargé d'Affaires as an equitable one.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 86.

M. E. Pisani to Sir Stratford Canning.

Sir, *Pera, January 25, 1852.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the decision taken at the Ministerial Council held yesterday at the Grand Vizier's residence respecting the long-pending question of Jerusalem, is, that three of the keys of the Church of Bethlehem will be given to the Latins, who will also be admitted to officiate at the Holy Virgin's shrine. And on the other hand, the Greeks and Armenians are to have the right of officiating, in common with the other Christian sects, in the mosque situated on the Mount of Olives.

This decision, which seems to satisfy the French and Russians, says Aali Pasha, has been submitted to the Sultan's sanction, and as soon as His Majesty's approval is given, the communication will be made in writing to both missions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 86.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Confidential.)

Pera, December 4, 1852.

IN a private interview I had with Aali Pasha, he informed me, four or five days ago, that when he presented the Firman for the Greeks to the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, in the presence of Prince Vogorides, M. d'Aristarchi, he, Aali Pasha, told them very distinctly that it was not to be read, but only kept to be produced in case of any emergency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

Inclosure 3 in No. 86.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Confidential.)

Pera, December 7, 1852.

Sir,

FUAD EFFENDI told me most confidentially, that instructions were last night transmitted to Afif Bey to settle the long-pending question of the Holy Places at once, and according to the Porte's decision, and the declaration of the 25th January last.

I beg to inclose a copy of my report to Her Majesty's Ambassador, by which you will be fully acquainted with the decision that was then taken by the Council, and which was subsequently sanctioned by the Sultan, and communicated to the parties interested.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 87.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 5, 1853.)

(No. 164. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 18, 1852.

A SECRETARY of the Russian Legation complained to me, a few days since, without my having even alluded to the subject of the Holy Places, of the improper and slighting manner in which Fuad Effendi had acted towards the Russian Legation in that matter: he seemed to allude particularly to the manner in which the Porte's decision had been communicated to the Legation. I replied that I fully shared his regret if anything of the sort had taken place; that from the usual extreme courtesy of Fuad Effendi, and the principle which he had always advocated, as his invariable rule, to show civility to the foreign missions, any neglect of form must have arisen, not from intention, but from the awkwardness with which the Porte sometimes transacted affairs.

I lost no time in speaking seriously to Fuad Effendi, telling him amicably that I could not conceive anything more impolitic than that the Porte, in making what naturally was not an agreeable communication to Russia, should have failed in the least in perfect courtesy.

Fuad Effendi replied, that the charge was wholly groundless; that he had only been too polite and considerate in all his communications with the Russian Legation; that he had even offered to resign at once, if that step would be in any way gratifying to them; that the Russian Legation knew all this, but were determined to sacrifice him because he had advised the Porte conscientiously to take the decision she had done.

Fuad Effendi has Ottoman faults, but he is by far the most practical and intelligent Minister the Porte has perhaps had for centuries. In the Loan, and all financial affairs, he has been of the greatest use; and it would be a circumstance much to be regretted were he to be visited with dismissal, merely because he gave what he declares to be a conscientious decision, and one which he says he would not alter for the sake of his office or any other consideration.

Fuad Effendi, so far from having French tendencies, was always considered Russian. If your Lordship were pleased to give him any assistance in his dilemma, you would do much service to the Porte.

M. Balabine also complained of the great disadvantages which must result from the claim of France to reopen this dangerous and most delicate question when she chooses. This complaint I consider perfectly well founded; and if her Majesty's Government could induce the French Government to consider the present arrangement as a final one, Russia, I think, would accept it, and the peace of the world would be strengthened by a fresh guarantee.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 88.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, January 6, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has already expressed to M. de Kisséleff his desire to see the question of the Sacred Buildings at Jerusalem terminated in a manner that may be satisfactory and honourable to both Governments. The French Government has no wish, he says, to stand out on extreme rights; and if the Russian Government will meet them in the same conciliatory spirit, he sees no reason why the matter should not be amicably arranged between them.

The state of the French and Russian relations in the East appears to me to afford another reason for congratulation that the late question about the credentials should not have degenerated into a quarrel.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 89.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 11, 1853.)

(No. 455.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, December 31, 1852.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch of the 14th instant, containing copies of three of Colonel Rose's very interesting despatches relating to the dispute of the Greek and Latin Churches at Jerusalem.

Your Lordship will perhaps recollect the pertinacity with which, during the summer and autumn of this year, I continued to allude to the dangers which I foresaw would spring from a continuance of these religious, or rather these sectarian feuds, and it is with infinite regret that I find that my apprehensions were so well founded.

I entertain no doubt of the correctness of Colonel Rose's opinion as to political differences being concealed behind such unworthy screens as a church door or a vestry cupboard; but it is not the less true that the whole question, from its partly religious character, and from the personal share which he has taken in its attempted solution, is one of deep interest to the Emperor.

His Majesty, with a view to maintaining his religious as well as political influence in Turkey, was extremely eager to place his co-religionists in the East in the best possible position with regard to their access to the Holy Places, and the direct appeal which he made to the Sultan upon the subject rendered the question still more personal to himself.

Further, I cannot doubt that the Emperor—the known champion of unlimited monarchy—attaches much greater value to the word of a Sovereign than to the assurances of a Government; and his application to the Sultan, and his Highness's promises in return, cannot fail of having had a powerful effect upon his Imperial Majesty's resolution of abiding by what he considers the just, and vested, and confirmed rights of the Greeks at Jerusalem.

Since the above lines were written I have held a conversation with the Chancellor, which only confirms the impression already existing in my mind.

I commenced the conversation by observing that I could not help feeling great anxiety about the continued disputes respecting the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches in Turkey. "Et vous avez bien raison," Count Nesselrode replied, "d'en être inquiet, car je ne vous cacherai pas que c'est une très-mauvaise affaire."

His Excellency proceeded to say, that the position of the Russian Government was simply this:—That after two years of laborious negotiation, an arrangement had been effected, fair to all parties, and by which certain concessions had been made to the Latins; that this arrangement was notified not only by a Firman written in February last, but by a formal letter from the Sultan to the Emperor; that the business was suddenly unsettled by the French Ambassador, who, under threats of violence, had suspended the reading of the Firman; that certainly this was a state of things which His Imperial Majesty

could not tolerate, and the less as the interests of the Porte, as well as those of Russia, were compromised, the Sultan being very directly interested in attending to the feelings of those large bodies of his subjects who profess the Greek religion, while nothing was to be gained by consulting the wishes of some occasional Roman Catholic tourists.

I begged his Excellency to believe that Her Majesty's Government had no further interest in the question than that of preventing misunderstandings between friendly Governments and injury to an ancient ally, itself no way concerned in the matters in dispute.

To this Count Nesselrode replied, that till lately Colonel Rose had, he thought, taken a correct view of the disputed question, but that lately he had been led to believe that Colonel Rose leaned ("peuchoit") too much on the side of France; that he did not understand the grounds of this change.

I observed, in return, that I was extremely glad that this remark had been made to me, as I had the fullest means of refuting it, having, I said, read various late despatches from Colonel Rose, and having had the means of ascertaining in what an amicable and impartial spirit he had endeavoured unofficially to settle difficulties between his diplomatic colleagues. "I apprehend," I added, that Colonel Rose (if *arrière pensée* there be on his part) feels what I do—and it is a consideration to which you yourself, M. le Comte, would attach great weight,—namely, that if any of the claims of France are to be justified by reference to the Treaty of 1740, it would not be prudent to shut the door against the consideration of these pretentions, when, on our side, we must all feel that the peace of Europe depends upon the respect which we may, or may not succeed in inducing the French to continue paying to the Treaties of 1814 and 1815."

I infer that the observation produced a certain effect upon the Chancellor's mind; for upon my remarking afterwards that I thought it highly desirable that the question should be approached in the most conciliatory spirit, and that the difficult position of the Porte should not be aggravated by differences growing, as Count Nesselrode had stated, out of the intemperate conduct of the French Ambassador, his Excellency replied that he really did not see what middle course ("terme moyen") could be adopted, but that he was ready to examine the business under the influence of such conciliatory feeling.

I read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch to Colonel Rose of the 14th instant, which satisfied him as to the impartial feeling manifested in this affair by Her Majesty's Government; but I took especial care to decline compliance with his Excellency's request to be put in possession of some of Colonel Rose's reports upon the question between Russia and France.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 90.

Consul Finn to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 17, 1853.)

(No. 16. Political.)

My Lord, *Jerusalem, December 28, 1852.*

I HAVE to report that on Wednesday last, the 22nd instant, the silver star for the sanctuary of Bethlehem was deposited in place of the long-missed one, by the Latin Patriarch, with great ceremony.

It had been brought up a few days before, with much pomp, from Jaffa.

Some of the Moslem Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, and the rest rode out a considerable distance on the road to bring it into Jerusalem with triumph.

When we consider how much these Effendis (the aristocracy of the city, and members of the Council) subsist upon fees and bribes received on similar occasions from the Greek, Latin, and Armenian convents, it cannot be doubted that the bringing up of the silver star from Jaffa to Jerusalem under their escort, must have cost considerable sums of money. Count Pizzamano, the Austrian Consul, assured me some time ago, that the new star was supplied at the expense of Austria.

At the time of depositing the star, the Latin authorities received the keys

into possession, not only of the inner, but of the outer church at Bethlehem, which were taken from the Greeks to be given to them. The Greeks feel this severely and are highly indignant.

The Austrian Consul informs me that he is purchasing several large houses in the vicinity of the Church of the Sepulchre, from funds with which he is liberally supplied from Vienna for that purpose, one of which houses is to be appropriated to the Archbishop of Vienna.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. FINN.

No. 91.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 6, 1853.*

I BELIEVE that I may state to your Lordship, confidentially, that measures have been taken by the Russian Government to ensure the 5th Corps d'Armée being placed in a state of preparation for active service.

Two generals of the Emperor's suite have, if I am correctly informed, been despatched to the south to inspect the reserves and the artillery, and General Lüders, commanding the 5th Corps, will leave St. Petersburgh, in the course of a few days, for the purpose of placing himself at the head of this force.

I ought to observe that the 5th Corps is about 50,000 strong, and that it is stationed at Odessa and the neighbouring places.

I believe these military preparations not to have been noticed either by the Emperor or the Chancellor to any member of the Corps Diplomatique; and much mystery appears to have been observed about them. One of my diplomatic colleagues, however, as well as a person in daily communication with the Emperor, upon being questioned here, assured me that they are satisfied that no act of aggression is in contemplation; but that his Imperial Majesty desires to be prepared for all eventualities.

I purpose taking an early opportunity of speaking to the Chancellor upon the subject of the information which I now feel authorised in submitting to your Lordship, with the observation that I cannot help connecting these military preparations with the threat partly made by the French Government of sending an expedition to Syria in the event of satisfaction not being obtained for the claims of the Latin Church.

The Austrian Minister's courier, who is about to be sent as far as the frontier, will be the bearer of this and of three or four other despatches.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 92.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 6, 1853.*

IN acknowledging the receipt of the Earl of Malmesbury's despatch, marked No. 311, of the 21st ultimo, inclosing various despatches relating to the quarrels of the Greek and Latin churches at Jerusalem, your Lordship will, I trust, not consider me presumptuous in observing that the moment is fully come for putting an end, if possible, to those feuds, threatening as they do to become at any moment the motive or the pretext of a trial of strength in the East between the two powerful nations by whom those religions are especially protected.

I would venture to remark, that the chances of a composition are very remote, if on one side the French Embassy declares itself resolved not to abate a tittle of the claims which it founds upon the concessions made in 1740 and 1757, while Russia is equally resolute in insisting upon the *status quo*, the strict execution of the Firman of February, 1852, and of the promises contained in the Sultan's letter to the Emperor Nicholas.

Again, if, as Colonel Rose announces in his despatch No. 155, the Porte intends to take upon itself the office of settling conflicting claims, with a view to making a concession to the Latins at the expense of the Greeks, I can hardly doubt that the Sultan, acting as umpire, will lose almost the only advantage which he now enjoys in the affair; and that, instead of being considered, as at present, a sufferer from disputes in which he has no concern, he will be regarded by the Russians as the violator of promises very recently and very solemnly given to the Emperor and his co-religionists.

I observe, however, from Lord Cowley's despatch No. 739, that M. D. de Lhuys appears sensible that the French Ambassador has run somewhat unnecessarily into this religious dispute, and that probably, under cover of a small amount of satisfaction, the French Government would be glad to withdraw from the contest.

It occurs to me, therefore, to submit to your Lordship whether the Turks might not be advised to make friends with the French Embassy by delivering up to French protection one of those Holy Places which (little to the honour of Christendom) are now occupied by unbelievers.

Of these it appears that there are four, the remains of the Church of St. Helena, built on the site of the well where the conversation was held between our Saviour and the Samaritan woman;

2. The Church of the Presentation to the Temple;

3. The Church of the Apostles, on Mount Sion; and

4. The Church of the Ascension, on the Mount of Olives.

These last three are represented by the Abbé Michon as being now used as mosques.

The restoration of one of these to a branch of that religion for whose service it was originally built, would perhaps not be too great a price to pay for the settlement of a dispute with France; and if the sacrifice be one to which the Turks will not submit, it is possible that the ruins of the Church of St. Helena might be accepted in its place.

If some such arrangement as the above be considered unworthy and impracticable, I hardly know what means could be devised for the settlement of the Greek and Latin disputes, unless they were submitted to arbitration.

It would remain to be seen whether the Russian Government would lend itself to this proposal; but, certainly, no conversation which I have held with Count Nesselrode warrants my believing that the Emperor will be contented with anything short of the exact fulfilment of the promises made to the Greek Church and to himself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 93.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 7, 1853.*

SINCE my last despatches were written, the intelligence which has reached me is of a nature even more alarming than that which I have already had the honour of submitting to your Lordship.

A person whose means of obtaining correct information are peculiarly good, states that orders have been despatched to the 5th Corps d'Armée to advance to the frontiers of the Danubian Provinces, without waiting for their reserves; and that the 4th Corps, under the command of General Count Tannenberg, and now stationed in Volhynia, will be ordered to hold itself in readiness to march if necessary.

Each of these Corps consists of twenty-four regiments, and, as your Lordship is aware, each Russian regiment is composed of three battalions (each of about 1000 men), of which one battalion forms the reserve.

General Lüder's Corps d'Armée, accordingly, being now 48,000 strong, will receive a reinforcement of 24,000 men soon after its arrival at its destination, and supposing the 4th Corps to follow, the whole force will amount, at least according to official returns, to 144,000 men.

It is evident that nothing but either very painful inducements or very excited feelings could induce the Emperor to put such an army in movement at a time when the utmost moderation is necessary to preserve Europe from the dangers of a war, and when the finances of Russia, already far from flourishing, and encumbered with the coming expense of the railroad between St. Petersburgh and Warsaw, are so little in a state to encourage unnecessary expenditure.

It is extremely painful to me to transmit to your Lordship intelligence of so alarming a nature, but the source from which it is derived is such as hardly to justify my waiting for its confirmation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 94.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell—(Received January 19.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 7, 1853.*

THE language of the Chancellor respecting Turkish affairs was, when we last met, extremely moderate, as your Lordship will have learned from my despatch No. 455 of last year; it has been, therefore, with increased surprise that I have learned the military preparations which I notice in another report, preparations obviously directed against events which are considered likely to arise in Turkey.

My apprehensions have been, I will add, increased by the violent language which I learn, upon certain authority, to have been used by the Emperor respecting the Turks. Among other expressions, His Majesty has observed that their insolence has become such that they must be made to feel that it will not be submitted to; and this, and much more, at a time when I was bound to infer, from the Chancellor's observations to me, that Turkey was viewed here rather with pity than with anger, nothing beyond weakness having been laid by his Excellency to the charge of the Porte, whilst the hesitations of which the Emperor had to complain, were ascribed, by his Excellency, to the violence of the French Ambassador.

Under these circumstances I am extremely anxious to see Count Nesselrode, and to point out to him the danger which must be incurred by the following up of a course so rash as that which I understood to have been entered upon.

I had previously intimated my wish to see the Chancellor, and I have to-day repeated the wish in the private letter of which I beg to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private.)

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, January 7, 1853.*

THE reports respecting warlike preparations have assumed such consistency, and have now reached me from so many quarters, that I hope you will have the kindness to allow me to call upon you as soon as it may suit your convenience.

I should fail in my duty if I neglected to apprize Her Majesty's Government of the measures already so widely circulated, and it will be most agreeable to me to be enabled to add anything which may tend to allay the anxiety which they are so well calculated to excite.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 95.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 8, 1853.*

THE departure of the Austrian messenger, about to be despatched to the Prussian frontier, having been deferred till to-day, I am enabled to offer your Lordship in a few lines the *précis* of a long conversation which I have held this afternoon with the Chancellor upon the subject of the armed preparations of Russia.

Of the extent of these armaments his Excellency is not prepared to speak with certainty; he believes that marching orders have only been given to the 5th Corps, and is not aware of the 4th Corps having received directions to hold itself in readiness.

Count Nesselrode treats as exaggerated the apprehensions which I expressed as likely to arise in Turkey and elsewhere from the appearance of a Russian army on the frontiers of the Sultan's dominions. The nature of these apprehensions was fully explained in a sort of memorandum which I had drawn up hastily, and which I read to the Chancellor. Some of the expressions of this paper, a copy of which will of course be transmitted to your Lordship, Count Nesselrode thought too strong for the occasion.

His Excellency entered into long explanations and assurances tending to prove that the Emperor deprecated the fall of Turkey, and had, under critical circumstances, rendered those services to the Porte by which alone such a catastrophe could have been averted.

As regards the present crisis (brought about by the intrigues of the French Ambassador at Constantinople), his Excellency expressed the hope and the belief that it would be brought to a conclusion by negotiation, but observed that it was necessary that the diplomacy of Russia should be supported (*appuyé*) by a demonstration of force. It would be required that the Porte should strictly fulfil its engagements towards the Greek Church and the Emperor; it would further be exacted that a corresponding compensation should be made to the Greek, for any new concession made (I believe his Excellency said, at the expense of the Emperor's co-religionists) to the Latin Church. Finally, his Excellency expressed his firm belief that this alarming question would be brought to a satisfactory conclusion, if exertions were made by Her Majesty's Government at Paris and at Constantinople to advocate the rights which the Russian Government are entitled to claim, and to discountenance the pretensions of the French Cabinet.

I beg to apologise to your Lordship for the extreme haste in which this despatch is necessarily written. On Thursday next I propose despatching the messenger in attendance upon the Mission.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 96.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 42.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 20, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me yesterday that he had received advices from St. Petersburgh, announcing that the Emperor of Russia had ordered a large concentration of troops on the frontiers bordering on Turkey.

Although this display of force will not prevent the French Government, according to M. Drouyn de Lhuy's assurances, from terminating, at whatever price, the question of the Sacred Places, your Lordship may well understand that it has not increased the goodwill of France towards Russia, or diminished

the desire of this Government to come to a common understanding with that of Her Majesty on all questions relating to the Ottoman Empire.

Your Lordship has probably been informed that M. de Lavalette is to leave Constantinople immediately. He is to be succeeded by Baron Brennier, late Secretary General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Baron Brennier is a sensible man, but I should have imagined, hardly equal to the very difficult and delicate position in which he will find himself. His instructions will prescribe to him to finish the question of the Sacred Places in the best way he can ("d'enterrer la question, coûte qui coûte," was the expression made use of to me), and then to wait until some joint plan of action is decided on by Her Majesty's and the French Governments.

Count Walewski appears to have been very active in recommending this policy to the French Government, and he assures me that upon this and all other questions, the Emperor has no other desire than to act in concert with Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 97.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7, of yesterday's date, I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship a copy of the paper which I mentioned as having read to Count Nesselrode.

Before doing so I remarked to his Excellency that this memorandum had been hastily prepared, but that the reflections which it contained were the result of my anxious consideration of a subject of great importance, and that in such a crisis as the present I had been desirous that no doubt should exist as to the expressions which I employed in treating the subject.

The Chancellor was of opinion that the views set forth in the inclosed paper were too decided, and that they had been expressed in language more forcible than was necessary.

To this I replied that I should have been quite ready to admit of any verbal corrections, but that it had been my wish to convey to his Excellency correctly the impression produced on my mind by the intelligence of the Russian preparations, as well as the result by which I conceived they might be followed. Any observation, I added, which his Excellency might think proper to make, which would have the effect of allaying these impressions and anticipations, would, he might be assured, be most acceptable to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 97.

Memorandum.

(Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, January 8, 1853.*

IT is hardly necessary to state that there is no object upon which Her Majesty's Government are so intent as upon the preservation of peace in Europe, and (as closely connected with this object) upon preventing the downfall of the Turkish Empire.

It is not to be doubted, that the same importance is attached to these objects by the Imperial Cabinet.

The question then presents itself, will these great ends be promoted by the advance of a large Russian force upon the Turkish frontier? and it

should appear that the inquiry admits of only one reply. At a moment when an unfortunate dispute is carried on at Constantinople,—a dispute in which the Porte itself has no interest, one which should never have been originated, and which, without great difficulty, might be arranged,—the appearance near the frontier of Turkey of a large Russian army can hardly fail to alarm the jealousy of the new French Government—for all new Governments are by their nature prone to be jealous—and is likely to produce counter-demonstrations on their part. What the consequence would be of the simultaneous presence of a Russian and French force in the East, it would be impossible to foresee; thus much, however, is certain, that it must tend to injure, most materially, the independence of Turkey, and to strike, perhaps, a fatal blow to the authority of the Sultan.

But if the presence of a Russian army on the borders of the Principalities is likely to arouse the apprehensions of foreign Governments, what effect is it calculated to produce upon the subjects of the Porte?

The inquiry may be readily answered. It cannot fail of inspiring the Mussulman population with the deepest apprehensions, and is equally calculated to induce the Christian subjects of the Sultan to rise in rebellion against their Sovereign; this, too, at a moment when, besides suffering from severe financial embarrassments, the Porte finds its resources severely taxed by the efforts which it is compelled to make for putting down the movements which have broken out in Syria and in the neighbourhood of Montenegro.

It cannot be that the Russian Cabinet would willingly incur the responsibility of a crisis brought about by a demonstration not called for by any great military or political emergency. But it may be said, that France has uttered the threat of making a naval or military demonstration in the East, and that this menace demands a corresponding demonstration on the part of the Imperial forces.

To this it may be replied, that the threat, even if seriously made, will, according to all appearances, not be acted upon, and that one military act, from which the Porte would suffer the greatest inconvenience, could hardly be alleged in justification of a similar act, proceeding from another quarter, and which would be to the full as detrimental to the Sultan's interests.

It has been, by some, assumed that the object of Louis Napoleon in re-opening the question relating to the Holy Places, has been to produce confusion, and to introduce discord into the councils of the allied Governments.

Now this suspicion is correct or it is unfounded; if unfounded, a resolution, the carrying out of which may have the most serious consequences, will have been taken upon false grounds; if correct, it may be asked, whether it would be politic to resort to measures by which the conflict, which it is assumed to be the desire of France to promote, may be brought about.

To this may be added the observation that there is considerable reason for believing that the dispute respecting the Latin rights at Jerusalem originated not so much in the decisions of the Cabinet, as in the personal views of a diplomatic agent; and further, that grounds are not wanting for imagining that the French Government may not be reluctant to withdraw, if enabled to do so with dignity, from a diplomatic contest entered upon without sufficient reflection. To these observations one other might be added,—it would be unusual that so strong a measure as that of the gathering of an imposing military force upon the frontiers of a friendly country, should be adopted without notice or warning; whereas so little notice has been given at the Porte of the resolutions which there are appearances of having been carried into execution, that it may be remarked that the threat, hitherto made to the Porte, has never gone beyond that (of itself sufficiently alarming) of the Imperial Mission being withdrawn from Constantinople, in the event of the non-execution of the Sultan's engagements with regard to the Holy Places.

It cannot be desired by the allies of Russia that the Emperor should be asked to forego any of those rights to which he is justly entitled; but it may properly be submitted that those rights should not be sought under a demonstration of military force, when, according to all probability, they might be attained by the usual course of negotiation.

The above reflections are submitted respectfully to the consideration of Count Nesselrode, with the expression of a hope that they may be found

worthy of his attention, and that they may possibly lead to a fresh proof of that regard to the interests of his allies, and of that desire to promote a good understanding among the European Governments, of which the Emperor's conduct has offered so many and such striking examples.

No. 98.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 19. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1853.*

ON the evening of the 9th instant I had the honour of seeing the Emperor at the palace of the Grand Duchess Helen, who, it appeared, had kindly requested permission to invite Lady Seymour and myself to meet the Imperial family.

The Emperor came up to me, in the most gracious manner, to say that he had heard with great pleasure of Her Majesty's Government having been definitively formed, adding that he trusted the Ministry would be of long duration.

His Imperial Majesty desired me particularly to convey this assurance to the Earl of Aberdeen, with whom, he said, he had been acquainted for nearly forty years, and for whom he entertained equal regard and esteem. His Majesty desired to be brought to the kind recollection of his Lordship.

"You know my feelings," the Emperor said, "with regard to England. What I have told you before, I say again: it was intended that the two countries should be upon terms of close amity; and I feel sure that this will continue to be the case. You have now been a certain time here, and, as you have seen, there have been very few points upon which we have disagreed; our interests, in fact, are upon almost all questions the same."

I observed, that I really was not aware that since I had been at St. Petersburgh there had been any actual disagreements whatever between us, except with regard to Louis Napoleon's No. III.,—a point, respecting which each Government had its own opinion (*manière de voir*), but a point which, after all, was very immaterial.

"The No. III," the Emperor replied, "would involve a long explanation; I will, therefore, not touch upon the subject at present; I should be glad, however, that you should hear what I have to say upon the question, and will beg of you to call upon me some morning when I am a little free from engagements."

I, of course, requested that his Majesty would be good enough to lay his orders upon me.

In the meantime, the Emperor went on to say: "I repeat that it is very essential that the two Governments—that is, that the English Government and I, and I and the English Government—should be upon the best terms; and the necessity was never greater than at present. I beg you to convey these words to Lord John Russell. When we are agreed (*d'accord*), I am quite without anxiety as to the west of Europe; it is immaterial what the others may think or do. As to Turkey, that is another question: that country is in a critical state, and may give us all a great deal of trouble. And now I will take my leave of you," which his Majesty proceeded to do by shaking hands with me very graciously.

It instantly occurred to me that the conversation was incomplete and might never be renewed, and, as the Emperor still held my hand, I said, "Sir, with your gracious permission, I would desire to take a great liberty." "Certainly," his Majesty replied; "what is it—let me hear."

"Sir," I observed, "your Majesty has been good enough to charge me with general assurances as to the identity of views between the two Cabinets, which assuredly have given me the greatest pleasure, and will be received with equal satisfaction in England: but I should be particularly glad that your Majesty should add a few words which may tend to calm the anxiety with regard to the affairs of Turkey, which passing events are so calculated to excite on the part of Her Majesty's Government; perhaps you will be pleased to charge me with some additional assurances of this kind."

The Emperor's words and manner, although still very kind, showed that his Majesty had no intention of speaking to me of the demonstration which he is about to make in the South. He said, however, at first with a little hesitation, but as he proceeded, in an open and unhesitating manner, "The affairs of Turkey are in a very disorganized condition; the country itself seems to be falling to pieces (*menace ruine*): the fall will be a great misfortune, and it is very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding upon these affairs, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other is not apprised."

I observed in a few words, that I rejoiced to hear that his Imperial Majesty held this language;—that this was certainly the view I took of the manner in which Turkish questions are to be treated.

"Tenez," the Emperor said, as if proceeding with his remark, "tenez; nous avons sur les bras un homme malade—un homme gravement malade; ce sera, je vous le dis franchement, un grand malheur si, un de ces jours, il devait nous échapper, surtout avant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires fussent prises. Mais enfin ce n'est point le moment de vous parler de cela."

It was clear that the Emperor did not intend to prolong the conversation, but I determined upon having the last word. I therefore said—"Votre Majesté est si gracieuse qu'elle me permettra de lui faire encore une observation. Votre Majesté dit que l'homme est malade; c'est bien vrai, mais votre Majesté daignera m'excuser si je lui fais observer, que c'est à l'homme généreux et fort de ménager l'homme malade et faible."

The Emperor then took leave of me in a manner which conveyed the impression of my having at least not given offence, and again expressed his intention of sending for me on some future day.

Whether the intention will be acted upon, is not to me so certain. It may be right that I should state to your Lordship that I propose giving Count Nesselrode an account of my conversation with his Imperial master.

I am convinced that the Chancellor is invariably favourable to measures of moderation, and as far as lies in his power, to English views. His desire, then, to act in harmony with Her Majesty's Government cannot but be strengthened by learning the cordial declarations which the Emperor has made to me upon the subject.

Upon reading over my despatch, I am convinced that the conversation, although abridged, has been faithfully reported; the only point of any interest which I am aware of not having touched upon being, that the Emperor observed that the last accounts from Constantinople were more satisfactory, the Turks appearing to be more reasonable, although by what process they had become so had not been made apparent.

I will only observe that we have every interest in its being understood that no decision should be taken in the affairs of Turkey, without concert with Her Majesty's Government, by a Sovereign who can dispose of several hundred thousand bayonets.

Would the understanding be acted upon?—that indeed may well be doubted, and the rather as the Emperor's assurances are a little contradicted by the measures to which it has been my duty to call your Lordship's attention.

Still His Imperial Majesty's words appear to me to possess considerable value, and certainly they offer me at this moment an advantage of which I shall not be backward in availing myself.

Your Lordship will pardon me if I remark that, after reflecting attentively upon my conversation with the Emperor, it appears to me that this, and any overture of the kind which may be made, tends to establish a dilemma by which it is very desirable that Her Majesty's Government should not allow themselves to be fettered. The dilemma seems to be this:—if Her Majesty's Government do not come to an understanding with Russia as to what is to happen in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey, they will have the less reason for complaining if results displeasing to England should be prepared. If, on the contrary, Her Majesty's Government should enter into the consideration of such eventualities, they make themselves in some degree consenting parties to a catastrophe which they have so much interest in warding off as long as possible.

The sum is probably this, that England has to desire a close concert with

Russia, with a view to preventing the downfall of Turkey—while Russia would be well pleased that the concert should apply to the events by which this downfall is to be followed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written, I have heard from the Austrian Minister, that the Emperor has spoken to him of the conversation which he had held with me. "I told Sir Hamilton Seymour," his Majesty said, "that the new Ministry appears to me to be strong, and that I am anxious for its duration—although to say the truth, as regards England, I have learned that it is the country with which we must be allied. We must not lean to this or that party."
G. H. S.

No. 99.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 11, 1853.*

ON the 8th instant I had the honour of offering your Lordship a hurried abstract of a conversation which I had held that day with Count Nesselrode respecting the military demonstrations about to be made upon the Turkish frontier. It is perhaps unnecessary that I should now fill up that outline, but I am desirous of remarking that the Chancellor's object appeared to be to prove that Russia was entitled to negotiate under circumstances as favourable as France, while my object was to demonstrate that the intemperance of one party was no excuse for that of another, directed not against the assumed aggressor, but against a third party perfectly passive in the affair.

To show the tendency of my arguments, I venture to report to your Lordship a very familiar illustration which I made use of when his Excellency stated that as the Turks had been seen to give way to French pressure, it was only fair that they should be subjected to a little pressure from their, the Russian side.

Getting up from my chair and walking into the middle of the room, I said, "M. le Comte, you must allow me to show you to what point your argument goes. A man is sitting quietly in his room when a violent neighbour rushes in and thrusts him up against the wall; do me the favour to tell me whether this act of aggression authorizes a second neighbour to come in and to repeat a similar act of violence. You must admit that, if liable to such attacks, the man would be driven out of his house, if indeed he were not driven to throw himself out of the window."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 100.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1853.*

I CALLED yesterday, by his desire, upon the Chancellor, who had the kindness to read to me the long and very important instruction upon the present position of affairs, which is about to be addressed to Baron de Brunnow. The draft bore marks of having been already sanctioned by the Emperor, and the despatch will be sent off by messenger to London, to-morrow or the next day. This interesting paper, of which I should be able to give but an imperfect sketch, will be communicated to you by the Russian Mission, and will, I am willing to believe, be left in your Lordship's hands.

The chief points touched upon appeared to me the following:—

That since the question of the Holy Places had been noticed by the Russian Minister to the Earl of Malmesbury it had assumed a new character; that

the acts of injustice towards the Greek Church, which it had been desired to prevent, had been perpetrated, and, consequently, that now the object must be to find a remedy for those wrongs; that the success of the French negotiations at Constantinople was to be ascribed solely to intrigue and violence,—violence, which had been supposed to be the *ultima ratio* of kings, being, it had been seen, the means which the present ruler of France was in the habit of employing in the first instance; that the Emperor was as solicitous as he ever had been to prevent the overthrow of Turkey, the state of that country being, indeed, very precarious, but the maintenance of Turkey as it now exists being, perhaps, more suited to the interests of Russia, and, at all events, more favourable to the maintenance of peace, than exposure to those chances of disagreement among the Powers, which might ensue upon the downfall of the Turkish Empire. Nevertheless, that his Imperial Majesty's rights, secured to him and to the Greek Church, could not be withheld with impunity; but that he was prepared to seek satisfaction through diplomatic means.

At the same time, as force had been employed in extorting concessions from the Porte, and as a moral influence, which may still prevail, had thus been created in her favour by France, it is necessary that the same means should be prepared by the Imperial Government, and the rather as there was danger of the Turks continuing to act, as they had been seen lately to do, under fear and compulsion.

The Emperor, it is further stated, has nearly settled, in his own mind, what demands it will become his duty to make of the Porte,—when his Majesty's resolution is finally taken it will be notified to the Porte, and their nature will be made known to Baron Brunnow, who is desired to communicate with your Lordship, and to obtain the approbation of Her Majesty's Government in the steps about to be taken by the Emperor for securing his acknowledged rights.

I will only observe, that judging from this paper, of which I have given an imperfect abstract, and as well from the language held to me by the Chancellor, some change has taken place in the explanations offered as to the military demonstration contemplated by the Emperor.

Very little is now said of the injustice of the Porte's decisions, and great stress is laid upon the necessity of taking such precautions as may prevent the French from interfering in such a manner as to prevent the Sultan from fulfilling his engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 101.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 18.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1853.*

THE accounts which I have heard of the amount of warlike preparation in the South have been so conflicting, that even now I am unable to state with certainty whether the report which I had the honour of making to your Lordship in my despatch No. 6 was correct, or whether the first orders sent off by the Emperor have been modified by those subsequently despatched.

When I questioned Count Nesselrode yesterday upon the subject, he assured me that he was himself unacquainted with the details which I sought, but that as far as he knew, the only Corps under orders was the 5th, which was filling up its ranks by the recall of the "Sinestricks," but which had not been directed to move towards the frontier.

This version agrees with an account which I have received from a military man, usually very well informed upon such affairs, who states that the 5th Corps is to be completed, but not upon the footing of war; that orders for its march are suspended and that no orders of any kind have yet been sent to the 4th Corps, which, nevertheless, is already complete and ready for immediate service.

When I saw Count Nesselrode yesterday, his tone about the affairs of Turkey was considerably more cheerful and reassuring than when we last

spoke upon those questions. He did not hesitate to express his confident hope that all difficulties would be settled by negotiation.

On the preceding occasion, his Excellency had commented with some severity upon the conduct of the Turkish Government, and more especially on that of Fuad Effendi, whom he represented as having been bought by M. de Lavalette. Yesterday any strong expressions made use of by his Excellency were applied to the French Government, whose intrigues and violence at Constantinople he denounced in the plainest language.

Count Nesselrode has been informed, that salutary advice with regard to the Turkish question has been given at Paris by Her Majesty's Government, and expresses his hope that these conciliatory efforts will be continued both at Paris and Constantinople.

To the advice given by your Lordship, Count Nesselrode is disposed to ascribe an overture which he is led to expect from the French Mission, the nature of which, although he believes it to be conciliatory, he is as yet unacquainted with.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 102.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 23.)

(No 19.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 13, 1853.*

JUST as the messenger Ball is about to start for Berlin, I have learned upon good authority, that the head-quarters of the 4th Corps d'Armée had been moved, before the late disputes with the Porte had reached their actual stage, from Kieff to Kamenetz, situated close to the southernmost point of Gallicia.

The 4th Corps likewise is, I should observe, already in a state fitted for efficient service ("sur pied de guerre").

As to the 5th Corps, of which I have spoken in various despatches, although its head-quarters are Odessa, several regiments forming the right wing of the army are scattered throughout Bessarabia; so that, as your Lordship will at once perceive upon looking at the map, a very slight advance either of the 4th or 5th Corps would bring the Russian forces within the Moldavian frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—General Lüders, who commands the 5th Corps, is still here; his departure is fixed for the $\frac{9}{21}$th instant. G. H. S.

No. 103.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, Jan. 24.)

St. Pétersbourg, le 14 Janvier, 1853.

JE profite du courrier que j'expédie aujourd'hui à votre Excellence pour lui accuser la réception de son expédition du $\frac{17}{29}$ Décembre, et l'assurer du vif intérêt avec lequel nous en avons pris lecture. L'Empereur a été surtout très satisfait des premières explications que vous avez échangées avec le Chef de la nouvelle Administration Britannique, et des soins que vous avez pris pour bien établir dans son esprit, comme dans celui de Lord John Russell, avec lequel nous aurons désormais à traiter plus particulièrement, les points principaux sur lesquels vont s'engager nos rélations avec le nouveau Ministère. Parmi ceux que vous avez touchés, nous avons surtout remarqué ce qui concerne notre situation actuelle en Turquie, et le compte que vous avez rendu à Lord Aberdeen et à Lord John Russell du véritable caractère de la grave question des Lieux Saints. Vous aviez déjà abordé ce sujet avec Lord Malmesbury au moment où

il se retirait des affaires, et vos efforts pour le lui faire envisager sous son vrai jour n'avaient pu que rencontrer l'approbation de notre auguste Maître. Malheureusement les démarches que Votre Excellence avait cherché à obtenir de lui, tant à Paris qu'à Constantinople, se rapportaient à une situation qui n'est plus la même aujourd'hui. A cette époque les manœuvres de l'Ambassadeur de France en Turquie, et ses menaces pour forcer les Ministres Ottomans à éluder l'exécution du Firman, n'avaient pas encore définitivement réussi. On pouvait conserver l'espoir que les représentations de l'Angleterre au Cabinet Français auraient pour effet d'arrêter M. de Lavalette dans sa marche. Cet espoir a été frustré. Depuis lors, les intrigues de l'Ambassade Française ont triomphé à Constantinople. Non seulement le Firman revêtu du Hatti-Schérif du Sultan n'a pas été exécuté à Jérusalem, mais il a été traité avec dérision par les Ministres de Sa Hautesse. A l'indignation de toute la population du rit Grec, la clef du Temple de Bethléem a été livrée aux Latins de façon à constater publiquement leur suprématie religieuse en Orient.

Le mal est donc fait, M. le Baron, et ce n'est plus de le prévenir qu'il s'agit. Il faut maintenant y porter remède. Les immunités du rit orthodoxe lésées, la parole que le Sultan avait donnée solennellement à l'Empereur violée, exigent un acte de réparation quelconque. C'est à l'obtenir qu'il faut travailler. Voilà l'état actuel de la question. Si nous prenions pour exemple les procédés impérieux et violents qui ont conduit la France à ce résultat,—si nous étions, comme elle, indifférents à la dignité de la Porte, aux conséquences qu'un remède héroïque peut exercer sur une constitution déjà aussi fortement délabrée que celle de l'Empire Ottoman,—notre marche serait toute tracée, et nous n'aurions pas de longues réflexions à faire. La menace, et l'emploi de la force, seraient nos moyens immédiats. On a appelé le canon la dernière raison des rois. Le nouvel Empereur des Français en a fait sa raison première. C'est l'argument par lequel il a déclaré de prime abord vouloir débuter à Tripoli, comme à Constantinople. Malgré nos griefs légitimes, et au risque d'en attendre quelque tems de plus le redressement, nous chercherons à adopter une méthode moins expéditive. Nous voulons encore, de même que nous l'avons toujours voulu, la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, comme étant à tout prendre la combinaison la moins mauvaise à interposer entre tous les intérêts Européens, qui ne manqueraient pas de se heurter violemment en Orient, si le vide venait à s'y faire. Nous nous efforcerons conséquemment d'éviter jusqu'au bout, autant qu'il peut dépendre de nous, sans compromettre notre honneur, tout ce qui serait de nature à ébranler encore davantage ce corps si faible et si chancelant, au risque de le faire tomber en poudre. Quoique nous ayons vainement tâché jusqu'ici de rendre la Porte accessible aux conseils de la raison, nous allons faire encore dans ce but une dernière tentative conciliante. Nous sommes donc en ce moment à la recherche d'un arrangement qui puisse rendre au Firman la validité qu'on lui a ôtée ; rétablir à Jérusalem les deux rits sur un pied de légalité, et concilier leurs prétentions sans léser les droits de l'un et de l'autre. Les conseils pacifiques, mais fermes, dont ces propositions seraient accompagnées, auront pour but d'éclaircir la Porte sur la conséquence des torts qu'elle s'est donnés, par faiblesse, envers nous, et en même temps de la rassurer contre les éventualités qui la préoccupent et l'effrayent du côté de la France. Les bases principales de cet arrangement sont déjà arrêtées dans la pensée de l'Empereur, et dès que sa Majesté les aura fixées définitivement, je ne manquerai pas, M. le Baron, de les faire connaître à votre Excellence.

Mais tout en désirant et voulant fermement n'employer que des moyens pacifiques, il est toutefois une considération que nous n'avons pu entièrement perdre de vue. C'est que l'ascendant moral de la France a pris de telles proportions à Constantinople, depuis surtout qu'on y a vu le nouvel Empire, avec tous les souvenirs de suprématie qu'il évoque, s'élever et se constituer sans aucun obstacle au dehors, qu'il devient fort à appréhender que toutes nos démarches ne finissent par échouer contre l'idée que les conseillers du Sultan se sont faite de la force irrésistible du Gouvernement Français. Il peut arriver que la France, en voyant balancer la Porte, ait recours encore une fois à son système comminatoire, et pèse sur elle de manière à l'empêcher de prêter l'oreille à nos justes réclamations. La partie devint trop inégale entre nous et le Gouvernement Français, si tandis que celui-ci fait mouvoir sans opposition son escadre sur tous les points de la Méditerranée, et présente la moindre de ses demandes à la bouche du canon, nous laissons indéfiniment s'enraciner dans

l'esprit des Turcs l'idée de notre impuissance à les défendre, comme à protéger nos propres intérêts. L'Empereur a donc cru devoir aviser d'avance à quelques mesures de précaution, pour appuyer nos négociations, neutraliser l'effet des rodomontades de M. de Lavalette, et se prémunir, en tout état de cause, contre les entreprises aventureuses d'un Gouvernement habitué à ne procéder que par surprises et par coups de main. Nos mesures n'ont point le but de mettre en question d'aucune manière l'indépendance de la Porte Ottomane. Elles ont, au contraire, celui de maintenir cette indépendance contre une dictature étrangère, en assurant le repos du Sultan, en relevant son autorité compromise par l'Ambassadeur de France aux yeux de ses sujets du rit Grec, qui forment en Europe la majorité de la population de ses Etats. C'est vous dire, M. le Baron, que dans la pensée de l'Empereur, la destination de nos préparatifs est d'avoir un effet plus moral que matériel.

Comme les bruits exagérés qui se sont déjà répandus à ce sujet pourraient inspirer des alarmes, il nous importait d'établir le véritable esprit de nos intentions. Nous espérons que le Gouvernement Anglais ne se méprendra pas sur leur nature. Les preuves de modération qu'a données l'Empereur dans sa conduite envers la Turquie, en tant d'occasions antérieures, sont un gage que dans celle-ci il ne se départira pas des mêmes principes. Un intérêt commun appelle l'Angleterre, comme la Russie, à veiller à la conservation de la paix en Orient. C'est intérêt nous l'invoquons, en nous adressant franchement aujourd'hui à l'impartialité du Gouvernement Britannique. Si, comme nous n'en doutons pas, il tient aussi fortement que nous au maintien du *status quo* Oriental, c'est à lui qu'il appartient d'élever à présent la voix. Nous aider à Constantinople à dissiper l'aveuglement ou la peur panique des Turcs,—ramener, à Paris, le Cabinet Français aux conseils de la prudence,—décourager en lui l'idée qu'il puisse compter sur la co-opération de l'Angleterre, dans les complications gratuites qu'auraient provoquées ou sa légèreté irréfléchie, ou des calculs d'ambition plus coupables,—telle doit être, selon nous, la double tâche des Ministres Anglais; et s'ils veulent bien la prendre sur eux, les négociations que nous allons ouvrir, se résoudront, nous l'espérons, sans danger pour la paix Orientale.

C'est à agir auprès d'eux en ce sens que l'Empereur vous charge, M. le Baron, de consacrer tout vos efforts et votre zèle.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 104.

Lord John Russell to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 18. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, January 25, 1853.

Sir,

I WAITED for the receipt of further despatches before I replied to your notification of the movement of the 5th corps of the Russian army towards the Turkish frontier.

I felt a sanguine hope that the wisdom of the Emperor would induce him to refrain from so warlike a step. This hope appears to have been well founded.

In the present condition of Europe, with a recent restoration of the Imperial dignity in the family of Napoleon Bonaparte, it behoves every Power which desires the maintenance of peace upon the basis of treaties and engagements, to refrain from any act which would imply a willingness to decide any pending difference by the sword.

The hot spirits among the French army would gladly avail themselves of any example of a hasty appeal to arms, not arising in France, but in the ancient and settled monarchies of Europe.

The Emperor Nicholas is too sagacious, and has too much regard for the welfare of other States, his neighbours and friends, not to give full weight to these considerations.

Her Majesty has directed me to express her gracious approbation of the language you have used to the Emperor and his Chancellor on this occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 105.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 51.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 24, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has informed me that he received a few days ago a despatch from the French Minister at St. Petersburgh, acknowledging the receipt of the instructions which I informed your Lordship, in my confidential despatch No. 9, had been addressed to him, desiring him to put himself into immediate communication with Count Nesselrode for the purpose of terminating the question of the Holy Places. M. de Castelbajac adds that these instructions had reached him very opportunely, as the question on which they touched threatened to take a serious turn. M. Drouyn de Lhuys hopes to hear in a few days the result of this overture to the Russian Government.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys to state to me, confidentially, what the French Government now wished to obtain at Constantinople. He replied, that a memorandum on the whole question had been sent to London for communication to your Lordship, and all that he desired was that the instructions sent by the Porte to Jerusalem should be fairly carried out. He added that he was quite ready to listen to any advice that might be offered him with the view of setting this question at rest.

It appears to me that as the French Government has now manifested at St. Petersburgh the desire of terminating this question by a common understanding, nothing further can be done until the result of that step is known.

Baron Brennier is to set out for Constantinople on the 28th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 106.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 54. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 25, 1853.*

I DINED yesterday at the Tuileries.

After dinner I had some conversation with the Emperor, and I profited by the opportunity to tell him how anxious Her Majesty's Government was to see the question of the Holy Buildings amicably settled. The Emperor's assurances were, upon the whole, satisfactory, though not so positive as had been those of M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The conversation having naturally led us to talk of Russia, the Emperor asked if I had seen his answer to the letter which he had received on the 30th November, from the Emperor of Russia. Your Lordship will recollect that the object of this letter was to induce His Majesty not to take the title of Napoleon the Third, and you will remember that some umbrage had been shown at St. Petersburg in consequence of no answer having been immediately returned to it.

On my replying in the negative, His Majesty took me into his room, and read it to me. It is, perhaps, as able a document as ever came from the Emperor's pen, and, as far as my humble opinion is of any weight, this is no mean praise.

After thanking the Emperor of Russia for his letter, and excusing himself, on grounds already known to your Lordship, for not returning an earlier answer, the Emperor explains, in a few words, the reasons why he assumed the

title of Napoleon the Third. It is not necessary that I should repeat those reasons, as they have already been too often before Her Majesty's Government. The Emperor then expresses some surprise that the argument used by the Emperor of Russia for objecting to the title of Napoleon the Third, should be that in recognising it he would be doing injury to the memory of his brother, the Emperor Alexander; for, His Majesty observes, it is well known that the Emperor Alexander considered the Restoration a capital political fault. He has now in his possession, he continues, some unpublished memoirs of his mother, in which she gives accounts of various conversations which she had held with the Emperor Alexander during the occupation of Paris by the Allies, in all of which the Emperor Alexander expresses an opinion that the restoration of the Bourbons was a great mistake, and that France ought to have been left free to choose her own Sovereign. His Majesty then cites an occasion when a *Te Deum* was celebrated in the presence of the Allies for the return of the Bourbons, and when the Emperor Alexander refused to be present, preferring to spend the day with Queen Hortense, at Malmaison.

Finally, the Emperor states that he has accepted the letters accrediting Monsieur de Kisseleff, though he does not deny that the refusal of the Emperor Nicholas to give him the title of Brother has greatly pained him; but he adds, "My heart has felt it more deeply than my vanity." His Majesty concludes by saying that he had hoped, where two characters were so much in unison as his and the Emperor of Russia's, in their respect for religion, in their desire to preserve social order, to develop the prosperity of their subjects, and to promote military discipline, the title of Brother would not have been refused him; and that if he has accepted the letters, which do not give him that title, it has been to show to Europe the conciliatory spirit which animates him.

I have given but a faint sketch of this interesting letter. The Emperor read it quickly, and I could not ask for a more leisurely perusal of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 107.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 55. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 26, 1853.*

YESTERDAY evening M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me that he had received despatches from St. Petersburgh, which he considered to be of a satisfactory nature, and he invited me to call upon him this afternoon, in order that he might communicate to me their contents. I had not time after seeing him to write to your Lordship by this day's mail.

M. Castelbajac's latest despatch is dated the 16th instant, after the Emperor Nicholas had received his credentials. He gives an account of the conversation which he had with His Majesty on that occasion. The Emperor expressed himself satisfied with the manner in which the question of receiving M. de Kisseleff's credentials had been arranged, and with the excuses made by the Emperor Napoleon for the delay which had occurred in answering His Majesty's letter respecting the title of Napoleon the Third. The conversation then turned on European affairs, and the Emperor expressed an anxious desire to see peace preserved. He alluded to the question of the Holy Buildings, and said that he had heard with pleasure from Count Nesselrode that the French Government was desirous of entering into direct communication with the Russian Cabinet for the settlement of the misunderstanding which had arisen between the two Governments with regard to it. The Emperor approved highly of this step, observing that it was far better that such differences between Christian sects should be settled betwixt the parties interested, than that they should be referred to the arbitration of a Mussulman potentate, who could hardly be said to have a free will on such a question. M. Castelbajac replied, that he was not yet in possession of his instructions, but that he had been induced to inform Count Nesselrode that those instructions were promised, in order that it might not be supposed that France

had been influenced in taking this conciliatory course by the warlike preparations which were making in Russia. It would be seen now by a reference to dates, that the offer of the French Government was spontaneous, and dictated by no other desire than that of preventing religious differences fermenting into a serious quarrel. The Emperor replied, that the accounts of his military preparations were much exaggerated; that they were not caused by the question of the Holy Buildings, though he avowed the intention of inspiring awe at Constantinople, in consequence of some insult which had been offered to the Russian flag. (No details respecting this insult were given.) Nothing, however, was further from the Emperor's intention than to attack Turkey. He had more interest than any other sovereign in the maintenance of the Turkish Empire. Its dissolution, of which he was apprehensive, would give greater embarrassment to Russia than to any other Power; and his wish was to uphold, not to destroy, the Sultan's authority. He, on his part, hoped that France was not trying to create difficulties for him in the East, in order to mask her own schemes in the West; a tortuous policy, which M. de Castelbajac of course repudiated.

Your Lordship will, perhaps, permit me to express some personal satisfaction at the turn which the question of the Holy Buildings has taken at St. Petersburgh, because the determination of M. Drouyn de Lhuys to try the possibility of a settlement of that question by a direct appeal to the Russian Cabinet, is founded on advice which I ventured to offer him, as detailed in my despatch No. 9.

After communicating to me the substance of M. de Castelbajac's despatches, M. Drouyn de Lhuys read to me the instructions of which that Minister stated himself to be in expectation, and which were sent from Paris on the 15th instant. As a copy of them has been transmitted to London, I presume that they have been communicated to your Lordship. I will therefore only add, that I was sorry to find in them a rather elaborate vindication of the course which France has pursued in this matter, while the possibility of a direct adjustment of differences is rather implied than tendered. But as M. Drouyn de Lhuys states positively that his intention in so writing is to induce the Russian Government to offer propositions, and as he affirms that he is ready to make concessions, if the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh will meet him half way, I am willing to hope that a settlement, which, if not altogether satisfactory, can at all events be accepted by both parties, may yet be effected.

One thing only causes me apprehension. I am not without anxiety, nor, I fear, is M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that M. de Lavalette should have further envenomed the question at Constantinople; for it does not appear to me, that when the determination was taken to refer the matter to St. Petersburgh, M. de Lavalette was forbidden to continue his negotiations at Constantinople. On the other hand, various circumstances which have come to my knowledge, leave no doubt on my mind that Baron Brenner's instructions will be of a most conciliatory character.

One objection to the final settlement at St. Petersburgh of these differences has struck me latterly, namely, that the Porte might take umbrage that a question which, in fact, regards a large portion of her subjects, should be taken out of her hands; and further, that there might be some danger for the future in two such Powers as Russia and France setting on one side the jurisdiction of the Porte in any matter of internal administration. I said, therefore, to-day, to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that it would hardly be prudent to set Russia the example of settling any question in which Turkey was concerned, without a final reference to the Porte, and that he probably would agree with me, that whatever arrangement the two Powers might make, ought to be submitted for the sanction of the Sultan. M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied that such was his intention. He proposed that the two Powers should come to an understanding as to the demands which each should make of the Porte; that no written documents should be exchanged, but that they should agree verbally that neither would oppose the other at Constantinople in certain points to be settled between them at St. Petersburgh. The independence and dignity of the Porte would thus be amply guaranteed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 108.

Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.

(No. 16.)

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1853.*

THE statements contained in the various despatches of which I now transmit to you copies, although relating to matters not identical in themselves, are such as, when taken together, must afford grounds for serious anxiety to all Powers friendly to the Porte, and should convey to the Turkish Government a salutary warning which it would do well to heed, that if the Porte is to retain an independent position among the nations of Europe, it must lose no time in endeavouring to extricate itself from its present difficulties, before fresh complications arise still further to impede, if not to render altogether unavailing, its endeavours to do so.

The discussions respecting the Holy Places at Jerusalem, which at first appeared to be of no great consequence, have, at the moment when they were supposed to be closed, acquired a degree of importance, in itself sufficiently alarming, but rendered still more so by the pretext which they are affording to a neighbouring Power deeply interested in their solution, to assume a menacing attitude on the Turkish frontier. And at this most inopportune moment, the Porte is unfortunately involved in a struggle for the assertion of its sovereignty over Montenegro, the result of which, whether successful or unsuccessful, may not impossibly lead to consequences prejudicial to the welfare, if not to the stability, of the Turkish Empire.

It is evident, that the only escape from the difficulties which thus beset the Porte, is to be found in a speedy settlement of the questions in which they have originated; and Her Majesty's Government would earnestly press the Porte to bestow its undivided attention on that object.

The British Government has studiously abstained from pronouncing any opinion on the conflicting claims of the Greek and Latin Churches in regard to the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem. It has no desire to advance any pretension to possess, either exclusively or in common with other nations, any part of those Sanctuaries which the traditions of ages have pointed out as objects of respect and veneration for all Christian people. The Turks, as professing the creed of Mahomet, cannot regard these Holy Places with the same feelings as Christian nations, in whose view they are indissolubly associated with the most solemn and affecting passages of Christian history; and the real interest which the Porte must have in the appropriation of any portion of these Holy Places to any particular Christian sect, must be limited by the consideration of what is due to the feelings of its own Christian subjects, of whom the great proportion are members of the Greek Church.

It appears, therefore, to Her Majesty's Government that the Porte might with honour extricate itself from the difficult and embarrassing position to which the discussions on this subject have reduced it, by expressing its willingness to sanction any arrangement in regard to these Holy Places, not inconsistent with the rights of the Sultan as territorial Sovereign, which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments, which, as advocates of the respective claims of the Latin and Greek Churches, have taken the prominent part in the late discussions.

No. 109.

Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.

(No. 51.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1853.*

A FEW days ago M. Baulin, the Chargé d'Affaires of France, read to me a despatch which he had received from his Government, addressed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to General Castelbajac, the Minister of France at St. Petersburgh.

Some days later Baron Brunnow read to me a despatch addressed to him by Count Nesselrode.

Both these despatches relate to the question of the Holy Places.

It is with great regret that Her Majesty's Government have perceived that this question is not yet settled, although the instructions given to General Castelbajac may lead to a favourable termination of this unfortunate dispute. As, however, this happy result may not be attained, it is desirable that you should be made aware of the view which is taken of this matter by Her Majesty's Government.

In the first place, Her Majesty's Government desire to abstain altogether from giving any opinion on the merits of the question. Treaties, Conventions, and Firmans are quoted with equal confidence on both sides.

But Her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving that the Ambassador of France at Constantinople was the first to disturb the *status quo* in which the matter rested. Not that the disputes of the Latin and Greek Churches were not very active, but that without some political action on the part of France those quarrels would never have troubled the relations of friendly Powers.

In the next place, if report is to be believed, the French Ambassador was the first to speak of having recourse to force, and to threaten the intervention of a French fleet to enforce the demands of his country.

I regret to say that this evil example has been partly followed by Russia; and although the report of the march of fifty thousand Russian troops to the Turkish frontier appears to have been unfounded or premature, yet it is but too certain that if the quarrel is prolonged, the Emperor means to support his negotiations by arms.

To a Government taking an impartial view of these affairs, an attitude so threatening on both sides appears very lamentable. We should deeply regret any dispute that might lead to conflict between two of the great Powers of Europe; but when we reflect that the quarrel is for exclusive privileges in a spot near which the heavenly host proclaimed peace on earth and goodwill towards men,—when we see rival Churches contending for mastery in the very place where Christ died for mankind,—the thought of such a spectacle is melancholy indeed.

Your Excellency will understand therefore, 1st, that into the merits of this dispute Her Majesty's Government will not enter; 2ndly, that Her Majesty's Government disapprove of every threat, and still more of the actual employment of force; 3rdly, that as the French have raised this controversy, it is for them to set the example of concession and forbearance; 4thly, that both parties should be told, that if they are sincere in their professions of a desire to maintain the independence of the Porte, they ought to abstain from the employment of any means calculated to display the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. Above all, they ought to refrain from putting armies and fleets in motion for the purpose of making the Tomb of Christ a cause of quarrel among Christians.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 110.

Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1853.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 61, dated yesterday, and containing matters of very serious import.

The Chargé d'Affaires of France, M. Baudin, spoke to me yesterday in the same sense in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys has spoken to you.

The anxiety felt by the French Government is very natural, and M. Baudin observed very justly, that Powers who professed themselves so anxious to preserve the *status quo* in Europe, ought to be the last to meditate so great a disturbance of the balance of power as the overthrow of the Turkish Empire must produce. Yet, notwithstanding this natural anxiety on the part of France, Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that the Emperor of Russia will not enter willingly, and certainly not without the consent of England, into any schemes for the subversion of the Ottoman Power.

Her Majesty's Government have reasons quite satisfactory to them for this persuasion.

At the same time, there is no doubt that the Ottoman Empire is in great peril. It is so weak, so disorganised, and at the same time so tempting a prize to ambition, that each of the great Powers of France and Russia entertain no unnatural fear that its conquest may be accomplished to the aggrandisement of the other.

France expects Russia will be the aggressor; the Emperor of Russia expects the same of France.

Thus each Power is induced to action, not from its own ambition, but from suspicion of the ambition of another great and formidable Empire.

These dangers, it must be owned, are increased by the irritating activity of Turkey, which, with a restlessness not unfrequently combined with weakness, tries to show its vitality by efforts which only exhibit its sense of decrepitude and its impatience of decay.

At the same time, I cannot agree with your Excellency that it would be right to go further than we have already done on the subject of Montenegro.

The title of the Porte to the sovereignty of Montenegro is not contested by Austria, and has been allowed by England and France.

The imprudence of asserting that title has been repeatedly pointed out to the Porte, both by Her Majesty's late Government and by her present advisers.

Her Majesty's Government think it desirable, however, that some understanding should be arrived at between the great Powers on this important subject, and I will immediately take into consideration the steps that may be necessary for this purpose.

I shall write to your Excellency again on this important subject in a very few days.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 111.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Paris, January 28, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having requested to see me, I called upon him this afternoon. He told me that he had transmitted yesterday to M. Baudin, for communication to your Lordship, the copy of a despatch dated the 23rd instant, which he had received from Vienna, and in which M. de Lacour states that he has reason to fear that an Austrian expeditionary corps of 6,000 men, under the Ban Jellachich, is preparing to enter Bosnia. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, on the receipt of M. de Lacour's despatch, directed him by telegraph to ask explanations of Count Buol, and he received this morning an answer, dated yesterday evening, to the following effect.

The Austrian troops assembled on the Turkish frontier are intended to cover the Austrian territory, and to give protection to all those whom pressing events may drive over the frontier. Austria has no intention to interfere in Montenegro, nor will she enter Bosnia unless to protect the Catholics, which she is entitled to do under treaty.

Count Leiningen is to proceed to Constantinople on a special mission to persuade the Porte to re-establish the *status quo* as regards Montenegro, to demand that Hungarian deserters and refugees shall not be permitted to serve in the army of Omar Pasha, which is operating on the frontiers of Austria, and to endeavour to restore diplomatic relations between Austria and the Porte.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys proceeded to say that, although this latter despatch had somewhat reassured him, he could not contemplate without anxiety the assembling of Russian and Austrian forces on the Turkish frontier. Advices which he had received from Trieste showed that the Austrian forces were also collecting in that direction, and he was obliged to ask himself more seriously than ever whether there was not some understanding between those two Powers

in regard to Turkey; whether, in short, they had not made up their minds that the dissolution of the Turkish Empire was inevitable, and whether they were not getting ready to be beforehand with others to partake the spoils. Both had questions in reserve on which they appeared to make depend their future attitude towards the Ottoman Government. He thought, therefore, that the time was fully arrived when Her Majesty's Government and that of the Emperor should prepare for such eventualities as the occupation of Bosnia by Austria, and of the Dambian Principalities by Russia. What in that case should be the attitude of the two Governments? The question was full of difficulties, for although they might render effectual assistance against Austria by the Adriatic, they could give but little, if any, against Russia, nor would it be a very glorious task to help Mussulmen against Christians.

I should not follow M. Drouyn de Lhuys, even if I had time, into the wide range of surmises which he proceeded to give me, as to what would be the conduct of Austria and Russia were the Turkish Empire at an end. I said that the main point was to prevent such a catastrophe as long as possible, and to employ all the influence of the two Governments to that end. The last time, I said, that I had heard from your Lordship upon the subject, you had no reason to think that any understanding dangerous to the stability of the Turkish Empire existed between Russia and Austria. Whether recent circumstances had changed this opinion I did not know. At all events, the first thing to be looked to was to prevent the Porte giving unnecessary umbrage to those two Powers. Now the expedition against Montenegro had been undertaken contrary to the advice of England and France, and this expedition was probably the secret though not the ostensible cause of the sudden movement of Austrian and Russian troops towards the Turkish frontiers. Should not the first step taken by England and France be a renewal of their remonstrances at Constantinople against any further prosecution of this expedition, and perhaps a menace that if the Turkish troops were not withdrawn within the Turkish territory, the two Governments would not interfere, should the continued occupation of any part of the Montenegrin territory involve the Porte in dispute with her powerful neighbours. I could not doubt, I said, that language such as this, held firmly but amicably at Constantinople, would induce the Porte to abandon Montenegro, and thus remove all further pretext for an armed demonstration on the part of Austria, the proximity of Omar Pasha's army being the excuse for that demonstration.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied, that if ever a Government was able to grapple with the difficulties of such a question as the preservation of the Turkish Empire, it was Her Majesty's present Cabinet. He therefore entreated your Lordship to consider it in all its bearings. Any opinion emanating from Her Majesty's actual advisers would be most attentively and respectfully considered by him. He thought, however, that the time was come when the two Governments should endeavour to arrive at a thorough understanding as to what their common policy should be under every contingency which might happen to Turkey. No doubt the first object should be to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; but would it not be prudent, also, to take into consideration that its dissolution may be near at hand?

I have not time to give your Lordship more than this hasty outline of M. Drouyn de Lhuys's observations. They will be sufficient to show your Lordship the anxiety respecting Eastern affairs to which it is too evident he is a prey. There being no mail to-morrow, I have thought it better to write at once.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 112.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 2.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 1, 1853.*

IT is a favourite argument of Russian policy, that it would be ill-advised, on the part of the Porte, to alter in any way the *status quo* of the Holy Places; because the so doing would alienate Greek Rayas from her; that if the Sultan were to give a decision in that matter in favour of the Greeks, he would receive their gratitude and attachment.

But this reasoning is not founded on experience or the Oriental character. Experience shows that since the time of the Empress Catherine, whenever Russia has obtained from the Porte concessions in favour of her Turkish co-religionists, Russia, and not the Porte, gets the credit of them. And as regards Greek gratitude, it is like that of all Orientals—subservient to the influence of power.

If the Greek interest had come triumphantly out of the Jerusalem question, it would have felt increased respect for the power of Russia, which had maintained the *status quo* against the power of France. But the Greeks would have felt neither respect nor gratitude for their Sultan who had ignored a Treaty, which he had called "a solemn one," for the purpose of complying with a foreign demand, the more unpalateable because it was supported by menace, and an assertion of the Russian right of protection of twelve millions of Greek Rayas.

But when the Porte, regardless of French and Russian menaces, and asserting her rights of independence, decided the question of the Holy Places according to her conscientious conviction, then Greek Rayas felt respect for the Porte's influence. And it is remarkable that, so soon as the Porte did so, Greek Rayas of influence here, and supposed to be Russian, blamed Russia, and not the Porte, for having neglected their rights, even accusing the former of making political instruments of them, and going so far as to state that Russia brings forward, from time to time, her claims to protect the Turkish Greek Church, in order to keep up jealousy and animosity between Greeks and the Porte.

I only speak of the sentiments of enlightened Greek laymen; not of the Church and their ignorant flocks. The Church and Russia have a common object in Turkey, and that is to keep Greek Rayas under their exclusive influence. They can only do so as long as these Rayas are unenlightened by civilization.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 113.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Malmesbury.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 4.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, January 4, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 97, I have the honour to say, that in speaking of the great Firman Mr. Finn means the Greek Firman, the same sent to your Lordship by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe in his despatch No. 58, and by me in my despatch No. 76 of last year. That was the only Firman given with reference to the present discussion as to the Sanctuaries.

Mr. Finn is mistaken in saying in his despatch No. 15, to your Lordship, that the Firman was read in presence of the three Patriarchs and the French Consul. Of course neither the Latin Patriarch nor the French Consul were present at the reading of the Firman.

I hear that the Porte, besides the order for the delivery of the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, has instructed Afif Bey that the Latins may make use of the altar of the Greeks in the Tomb of the Virgin for the celebration of mass.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys instructed M. de Lavalette that to allow the Latins to "officier" in the tomb, and then not to let them have the means of doing so, was "dérisoire," and not to be thought of. M. de Lavalette says that he has received very strong instructions as to the Holy Places from his Government; that they now take up that matter more warmly than he does; that they express great displeasure at the public reading of the Firman, and insist on a literal execution of all the provisions in favour of the Latins contained in the note of the 9th February last. It appears that the Firman was read with more

publicity than Fuad Effendi had promised M. de Lavalette that it should be. But he has resigned himself to this result with much moderation, and accepts it, he says, as a "fait accompli."

The repair of the great cupola, which would have afforded such endless scope for ill-omened discussion, will, owing to the good sense of M. de Lavalette, I trust, be put off. His Excellency says that it will hold together for four or five years longer, and that as far as he is concerned, he will consent to the question of its repair being adjourned till such time as it becomes necessary.

If the Greeks do not resist the Porte's decision as to the key and the altar of the tomb, the only remaining matter of discussion is the replacing of the silver star mentioned in Mr. Consul Finn's despatch No. 16 to your Lordship: but the Latin right to replace at their own expense a star stolen from them is so legitimate, that I trust no opposition could be made.

I hear that a Tatar, with Russian despatches for Jerusalem, went through Beyrout on the 22nd ultimo; it is supposed they relate to the key and the Tomb of the Virgin.

M. Benedetti, the French Secretary of Embassy here, embarked yesterday, it is said, ostensibly, for Alexandria, but it is supposed that he goes to Jerusalem for the purpose of making sure the delivery to the Latins of the key, and the fulfilment of the Porte's engagements to them with respect to the Tomb of the Virgin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 114.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 63.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 31, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt, yesterday morning, by the messenger Blackwood, of your Lordship's various despatches of the 28th and 29th instant, relative to Turkish affairs. I beg to thank your Lordship for these important communications, and more particularly for the clear and lucid explanation which you have been good enough to give me, in your despatch No. 51, of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of the question of the Holy Buildings. If I have appeared to your Lordship to have been in more frequent intercourse than is desirable with the French Government upon this matter, I would beg you to believe that that intercourse has seldom or ever been of my seeking, and that it was difficult for me to avoid a subject which the French Government, partly from a natural desire of interesting Her Majesty's Government in their favour, and partly from knowing that I had some experience in Turkish affairs, were continually bringing under my notice. I have, however, the satisfaction of feeling that my language, though far inferior in eloquence and force, has been substantially in perfect accordance with your Lordship's opinions, both in reserve as to the merits of the question, and in appreciation of the conduct of the parties interested. If I took upon myself to recommend direct negotiation with Russia as the best means of terminating a dispute which ought never to have been engaged in, I did so under an apprehension, arising from experience of Turkish intrigues, that so long as the Porte was looked to by both parties as arbiter in the question, there was small hope of its being settled; and I shall much regret if your Lordship thinks that, in so doing, I overstepped the limits of due discretion. You may be assured that I shall observe more caution in future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 115.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 66.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 31, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having expressed a wish to see me yesterday, and being myself unable to go out, he came to me yesterday evening. He said that he had received despatches from Constantinople, dated the 15th instant, which augmented the disquietude he had previously entertained respecting the state of affairs in Turkey. M. de Lavalette had sent him the copy of a note, addressed, on the 7th instant, to the Porte, by M. Kletzl, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, and had given him the details of a conversation which he, M. de Lavalette, had subsequently had with Fuad Effendi. Your Lordship has, of course, received a copy of this note from Colonel Rose, and I need not allude to it further. In the conversation which M. de Lavalette had had with Fuad Effendi, the latter had characterised the note as a violation of every diplomatic courtesy, and said that it had even been disapproved by M. Ozeroff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires. This gentleman had advised the Porte to return no answer to it, as it did not require a reply,—advice in which M. de Lavalette had concurred.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has also written to Constantinople, to state that his opinion coincides with that of M. de Lavalette.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then referred to the question of the Holy Places. He said that he had received despatches from M. Botta, the French Consul at Jerusalem, reporting the great irritation which prevailed in the Latin community in consequence of the concessions which had been made to the Greeks. The Latin Patriarch had remonstrated at Rome. M. Drouyn de Lhuys added, that if the Emperor of Russia was not satisfied with the advantages which the Greek Church had gained, he did not know what further concessions the Latins could make, short of ceding the Holy Places altogether. He had heard, however, that the Greek Patriarch demanded still more; and perhaps no better proof could be given that the present arrangement was equitable, than that both the Greek and Latin Patriarchs should protest against it.

The few words I said in reply were strictly based on the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 51.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys' language on the question appeared to me less conciliatory yesterday than it has been for some time past. This may have been the effect of momentary irritation, caused by the reports which he had received from Jerusalem of the anger of the Latin community at the concessions which have been made to the Greek Church; or it may have been dictated by a more general dislike, which is daily gaining ground with him, of the Russian Government. It is, at all events, my duty to report that he stated that the French Government could not, and would not, make greater concessions than it had done.

M. Brennier is to leave Paris, to embark at Marseilles, before the end of the week. It is uncertain whether he will still find M. de Lavalette at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 116.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 68.)
My Lord, *Paris, January 31, 1853.*

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys those parts of your Lordship's despatch No. 57 which are in answer to the observations reported in my despatch No. 61 to have been made by him with reference to the attitude taken by Austria and Russia on the Turkish frontiers, and to the desire which he evinced to establish with Her Majesty's Government some

common line of action in face of the complications which appear to him to be daily increasing in the Ottoman Empire. M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself to be perfectly satisfied with your Lordship's intentions.

Your Lordship states in the same despatch, that "you cannot agree with me that it would be right to go further than we have already done on the subject of Montenegro." Although anxious not to take up your Lordship's time unnecessarily, perhaps you will allow me to state that I never intended to be so presumptuous as to offer an opinion respecting the conduct which Her Majesty's Government should pursue in a matter with which I had no direct concern. My despatch No. 61, to which your Lordship's remark applies, was written against time, and is not as clear as it might have been. The facts are these. M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in stating his wish that the British and French Governments should act together, appeared to have in view the possibility of an armed interference in favour of the Turks. I observed that the action of the two Governments might perhaps be better employed at Constantinople in recommending the recall of the expedition, the sending of which to Montenegro was against the advice of the two Governments, while it justified the Austrian and Russian Governments in assembling corps of observation on the Turkish frontier; but this was said rather as a suggestion of what might be done, than as an opinion of what should be done; and I have ascertained since that M. Drouyn de Lhuys understood my observations in that sense. Further, when I made those observations, I was not aware that Her Majesty's Government recognised the sovereignty of the Porte in Montenegro. The only despatches I ever received upon that subject, were Lord Malmesbury's, Nos. 90 and 96, to Colonel Rose, and they both imply doubts of the Porte's rights. I had, therefore, less scruple in suggesting the recall of an expedition, one of the objects of which was to enforce the recognition of a title not, as I thought, distinctly acknowledged by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 117.

Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley.

(No. 71.) *Foreign Office, February 3, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 53, of the 31st ultimo, relative to your communication with the French Government in regard to the question of the Holy Buildings at Jerusalem, and I have the satisfaction to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the conduct which you have observed in your communications with the French Government upon the above-mentioned question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 118.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 5.)

(No. 70.) *Paris, February 4, 1853.*

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received last night despatches from Vienna, dated the 30th ultimo. The assurances of Count Buol to M. de la Cour, in regard to Turkey, continued to be of a pacific nature. The Austrian Minister stated the numbers of the Emperor's forces on the Turkish frontier to be greatly exaggerated, and said that they were now only employed to prevent the emigration of Austrian subjects into Turkey, and to preserve order among the refugees arriving from Turkey. M. de la Cour's opinion seems to be, that the Austrian Government, in insisting on the *status quo* being resumed in Montenegro, is impelled by the fear that it will be impossible, should the Turks prove victorious, to prevent the Russians openly espousing the cause of the

Montenegrins. It would appear that M. Fontin, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, had hinted something of the kind.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has formed an hypothesis in his own mind of the policy of Russia, which, without partaking it, I ought to submit to your Lordship. It is that the Emperor of Russia is disappointed that the question of M. de Kisseleff's credentials should not have led to a rupture between the two countries;—that the Emperor had hoped to entangle Austria and Prussia in his quarrel with France, and while the two latter were bearing the brunt of it in the West, to have had an easy game of conquest in the East. M. Drouyn de Lhuys is convinced that the agglomeration of Russian troops on the Turkish frontier was undertaken with this hope. In fact, he cannot divest himself of the idea that Russia intends the dissolution of the Turkish Empire,—that Austria is aware of it, and is getting ready, without meaning to aid in it, to assert her right to a share in the spoils.

M. de la Cour's despatches mention that the news received at Vienna from Montenegro was unfavourable to the Turks, but that no one seemed to doubt of ultimate success remaining with the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 119.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 21, 1853.*

I NEED not remark to your Lordship, that the secrecy observed by the Russian Government renders it at all times difficult to obtain information respecting their acts and intentions; whilst, as the Emperor's displeasure has been excited by the knowledge which lately transpired of the orders which had been sent to the 5th Corps d'Armée, it may readily be believed that the usual difficulty has been increased.

On the night of the 18th instant, a report reached me of a naval aide-de-camp of the Emperor's having left St. Petersburgh with orders for the assemblage of a Russian force destined to proceed to the Albanian coast, and there to form a squadron of observation.

I was bound to disbelieve the rumours, as the only naval force disposable for such an object would be one which would have to pass the Dardanelles. My informant, however, appeared to be convinced that his intelligence was not unfounded, and, in the doubt, on the following morning I addressed Count Nesselrode the short private letter, of which I beg to inclose a copy. I had the less hesitation in taking this step, because I reflected that of the small means at my disposal for causing the Imperial Government to pause before taking an imprudent step, none is more likely to produce an effect than that of their being rendered sensible that their movements are closely observed, and their intentions a little mistrusted.

The same day I received from the Chancellor in reply the private note, of which I beg likewise to inclose a copy.

I have some reason for believing that Admiral Kornileff has been ordered to proceed to the Dalmatian coast, for the purpose of obtaining correct information as to what is passing in the neighbourhood of Montenegro, and if this is so, the origin of the report which I mentioned to Count Nesselrode is accounted for.

Admiral Kornileff is the Chef d'Etat-Major of the Sevastopol fleet, and is, in fact, the officer by whom all its operations are directed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 119.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

My dear Count Nesselrode. *St. Petersburgh, January* $\frac{7}{19}$, 1853.

YOU will, I hope, pardon what is, I hope, over-anxiety on my part, if I beg of you, should you feel at liberty to do so, to re-assure me by a word.

A report has reached me of orders having been sent for some of the Emperor's naval forces to assemble in the Adriatic, so as to form a squadron of observation.

Assuming the report to be correct, I need not say that the demonstration would tend to increase the apprehensions of those who look to a peaceable solution of these Turkish difficulties. To existing dangers, those of collisions by sea would be added.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 2 in No. 119.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

$\frac{7}{19}$ *Janvier.*

NOTRE flotte de la Mer Noire n'a pas le droit de passer les Dardanelles; celle de la Baltique est prise par les glaces jusqu'au mois de Mai.

Ce double fait vous prouvera, mon cher Sir Hamilton, combien le bruit qu'on vous à rapporté est peu fondé.

Mille amitiés.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 120.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 24. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1853.*

ON the 14th instant, in consequence of a summons which I received from the Chancellor, I waited upon the Emperor, and had the honour of holding with his Imperial Majesty the very interesting conversation of which it will be my duty to offer your Lordship an account, which, if imperfect, will, at all events, not be incorrect.

I found His Majesty alone; he received me with great kindness, saying, that I had appeared desirous to speak to him upon Eastern affairs; that, on his side, there was no indisposition to do so, but that he must begin at a remote period.

"You know," His Majesty said, "the dreams and plans in which the Empress Catherine was in the habit of indulging; these were handed down to our time; but while I inherited immense territorial possessions, I did not inherit those visions, those intentions, if you like to call them so. On the contrary, my country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire more territory or more power than I possess; on the contrary, I am the first to tell you that our great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given to an Empire already too large.

"Close to us lies Turkey, and in our present condition, nothing better for our interests can be desired; the times have gone by when we had anything to fear from the fanatical spirit or the military enterprise of the Turks, and yet the country is strong enough, or has hitherto been strong enough, to preserve its independence, and to ensure respectful treatment from other countries.

"Well, in that Empire there are several millions of Christians whose interests

I am called upon to watch over ("surveiller"), while the right of doing so is secured to me by treaty. I may truly say that I make a moderate and sparing use of my right, and I will freely confess that it is one which is attended with obligations occasionally very inconvenient; but I cannot recede from the discharge of a distinct duty. Our religion, as established in this country, came to us from the East, and there are feelings, as well as obligations, which never must be lost sight of.

"Now, Turkey, in the condition which I have described, has by degrees fallen into such a state of decrepitude that, as I told you the other night, eager as we all are for the prolonged existence of the man (and that I am as desirous as you can be for the continuance of his life, I beg you to believe), he may suddenly die upon our hands ("nous rester sur les bras"); we cannot resuscitate what is dead; if the Turkish Empire falls, it falls to rise no more; and I put it to you, therefore, whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of an European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched; this is the point to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government.

"Sir," I replied, "your Majesty is so frank with me, that I am sure you will have the goodness to permit me to speak with the same openness. I would then observe, that deplorable as is the condition of Turkey, it is a country which has long been plunged in difficulties supposed by many to be insurmountable.

"With regard to contingent arrangements, Her Majesty's Government, as your Majesty is well aware, objects, as a general rule, to taking engagements upon possible eventualities, and would, perhaps, be particularly disinclined to doing so in this instance. If I may be allowed to say so, a great disinclination (répugnance) might be expected in England, to disposing by anticipation (d'escompter) of the succession of an old friend and ally."

"The rule is a good one," the Emperor replied, "good at all times, especially in times of uncertainty and change, like the present; still it is of the greatest importance that we should understand one another, and not allow events to take us by surprise; "maintenant je désire vous parler en ami et en *gentleman*, si nous arrivons à nous entendre sur cette affaire, l'Angleterre et moi; pour le reste, peu m'importe, il m'est indifférent ce que font ou pensent les autres. Usant donc de franchise, je vous dis nettement, que si l'Angleterre songe à s'établir un de ces jours à Constantinople, je ne le permettrai pas; je ne vous prête point ces intentions, mais il vaut mieux dans ces occasions parler clairement; de mon coté, je suis également disposé de prendre l'engagement de ne pas m'y établir, en propriétaire, il s'entend, car en dépositaire je ne dis pas; il pourrait se faire que les circonstances me missent dans le cas d'occuper Constantinople, si rien ne se trouve prévu, si l'on doit tout laisser aller au hazard."

I thanked His Majesty for the frankness of his declarations, and for the desire which he had expressed of acting cordially and openly with Her Majesty's Government, observing at the same time, that such an understanding appeared the best security against the sudden danger to which His Majesty had alluded. I added that, although unprepared to give a decided opinion upon questions of such magnitude and delicacy, it appeared to me possible that some such arrangement might be made between Her Majesty's Government and His Majesty, as might guard, if not for, at least against, certain contingencies.

To render my meaning more clear I said further: "I can only repeat, sir, that in my opinion, Her Majesty's Government will be indisposed to make certain arrangements connected with the downfall of Turkey, but it is possible that they be ready to pledge themselves against certain arrangements which might, in that event, be attempted."

His Imperial Majesty then alluded to a conversation which he had held, the last time he was in England, with the Duke of Wellington, and to the motives which had compelled him to open himself to his Grace; then, as now, His Majesty was, he said, eager to provide against events which, in the absence of any concert, might compel him to act in a manner opposed to the views of Her Majesty's Government.

The conversation passed to the events of the day, when the Emperor briefly recapitulated his claims upon the Holy Places, claims recognised by the

Firman of last February, and confirmed by a sanction to which His Majesty said he attached much more importance, the word of a Sovereign.

The execution of promises so made, and so ratified, the Emperor said he must insist upon, but was willing to believe that his object would be attained by negotiation, the last advices from Constantinople being rather more satisfactory.

I expressed my belief that negotiation, followed, as I supposed it had been, by the threats of military measures, would be found sufficient to secure a compliance with the just demands of Russia. I added, that I desired to state to His Majesty what I had previously read from a written paper to his Minister, viz., that what I feared for Turkey were not the intentions of His Majesty, but the actual result of the measures which appeared to be in contemplation. That I would repeat, that two consequences might be anticipated from the appearance of an Imperial army on the frontiers of Turkey,—the one the counter-demonstration which might be provoked on the part of France; the other, and the more serious, the rising, on the part of the Christian population, against the Sultan's authority, already so much weakened by revolts, and by a severe financial crisis.

The Emperor assured me that no movement of his forces had yet taken place (n'ont pas bougé), and expressed his hope that no advance would be required.

With regard to a French expedition to the Sultan's dominions, His Majesty intimated that such a step would bring affairs to an immediate crisis; that a sense of honour would compel him to send his forces into Turkey without delay or hesitation; that if the result of such an advance should prove to be the overthrow of the Great Turk ("le Grand Turc"), he should regret the event, but should feel that he had acted as he was compelled to do.

To the above report I have only, I think, to add, that the Emperor desired to leave it to my discretion to communicate or not to his Minister the particulars of our conversation; and that before I left the room, his Imperial Majesty said, "You will report what has passed between us to the Queen's Government, and you will say that I shall be ready to receive any communication which it may be their wish to make to me upon the subject."

The other topics touched upon by the Emperor are mentioned in another despatch. With regard to the extremely important overture to which this report relates, I will only observe, that as it is my duty to record impressions, as well as facts and statements, I am bound to say, that if words, tone, and manner offer any criterion by which intentions are to be judged, the Emperor is prepared to act with perfect fairness and openness towards Her Majesty's Government. His Majesty has, no doubt, his own objects in view; and he is, in my opinion, too strong a believer in the imminence of dangers in Turkey. I am, however, impressed with the belief, that in carrying out those objects, as in guarding against those dangers, His Majesty is sincerely desirous of acting in harmony with Her Majesty's Government.

I would now submit to your Lordship that this overture cannot with propriety pass unnoticed by Her Majesty's Government.

It has been on a first occasion glanced at, and on a second distinctly made by the Emperor himself to the Queen's Minister at his Court, whilst the conversation held some years ago with the Duke of Wellington proves that the object in view is one which has long occupied the thoughts of his Imperial Majesty.

If, then, the proposal were to remain unanswered, a decided advantage would be secured to the Imperial Cabinet, which, in the event of some great catastrophe taking place in Turkey, would be able to point to proposals made to England, and which, not having been responded to, left the Emperor at liberty, or placed him under the necessity, of following his own line of policy in the East.

Again, I would remark that the anxiety expressed by the Emperor, even looking to his own interests, for an extension of the days "of the dying man," appears to me to justify Her Majesty's Government in proposing to his Imperial Majesty to unite with England in the adoption of such measures as may lead to prop up the falling authority of the Sultan.

Lastly, I would observe that even if the Emperor should be found disinclined to lend himself to such a course of policy as might arrest the downfall of

Turkey, his declarations to me pledge him to be ready to take beforehand, in concert with Her Majesty's Government, such precautions as may possibly prevent the fatal crisis being followed by a scramble for the rich inheritance which would remain to be disposed of.

A noble triumph would be obtained by the civilization of the nineteenth century, if the void left by the extinction of Mohammedan rule in Europe could be filled up without an interruption of the general peace, in consequence of the precautions adopted by the two principal Governments the most interested in the destinies of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—It occurs to me to observe to your Lordship that, although no doubt can exist as to the Emperor's overture having been sincerely made, it ought to be borne in mind that at the time of making it, his Imperial Majesty was under the influence of feelings of considerable displeasure with three of the great Courts,—with that of France, just advanced to Imperial dignity, for the pretensions so unfortunately renewed with regard to the Holy Places; with the Courts of Berlin and Vienna, on account of their wavering policy, as exhibited in the style which they employed in addressing the French Emperor.

G. H. S.

No. 121.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(*Received February* 6.)

(No. 26. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE generally found straightforward conduct to be the best policy, and as it is peculiarly called for towards those who have acted by us in a similar manner, upon leaving the palace on the 14th inst., I drove to the Foreign Office, and gave Count Nesselrode a correct summary of the conversation I had just had the honour of holding with the Emperor.

When I told the Chancellor that I had great confidence in the moderate views of the Emperor, but that, as I had ventured to remark to his Majesty, what I feared were not his designs with regard to Turkey, but the consequences which might be anticipated in that country, were a Russian force to be assembled upon its frontiers. His Excellency thanked me for my frankness, adding, "Je suis enchanté que vous lui ayez dit cela; le fait est que l'Empereur est trop disposé à voir ces affaires en noir, il s'occupe trop de ce qui pourrait résulter de la chute de l'Empire Ottoman. C'est une existence précaire—soit; mais, avant tout, occupons nous du soin de la prolonger le plus long-tems possible; les nations ont plus de vitalité que le plus souvent on leur accorde."

"And now," Count Nesselrode said, "as we are speaking on subjects the most delicate and confidential, let me take the opportunity of stating that to you which you will hear with satisfaction. I believe that you have great confidence in the Emperor, and perhaps not less in his Minister; but you may very naturally ask what is beyond the Emperor and his Minister, who, as you see, is no longer very young. Well, I am happy to tell you that my ideas as to the policy to be followed towards Turkey, and as to the inexpediency of increasing the Russian dominions, are fully shared by Prince Paskewitch, by Count Orloff, by Prince Menzikoff, by Prince Tchernichoff,—in a word, by all the men who stand the nearest to the Emperor. Prince Paskewitch, who arrived here a few days ago, has been much consulted upon these Turkish questions, and nothing can exceed the moderation of the advice which he has offered upon them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 122.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1853.*

I HAVE held some interesting conversation with General de Berg, an officer who is very much in the confidence of the Emperor, and one of the very few who are ever disposed to express any opinion as to the events of the day.

"You have had a sharp alerte," General de Berg said, "and during a few days I dare say that you thought some serious events were at hand;—it is natural enough, but when you have been here longer you will see that this sort of thing occurs frequently. Decisions are taken in a hurry, orders are given—then they are cancelled, and in a few days everything is forgotten.

"You must always bear in mind that the Emperor is as peaceably inclined as you can be, and that if you dread the downfall of the Turks, he dreads it even more. All the old policy upon these subjects is altered. We could go to Constantinople if we pleased, that is clear, but no one is so little disposed as the Emperor.

"The fact is this, our interests are perfectly well understood: Moscow, St. Petersburgh, these are the seats of a national force, which constitutes our strength; if we extend ourselves to the south, our national feeling is destroyed, and the Empire loses its vitality.

"We pass for being profound politicians, and yet our policy is of the simplest order; our great affair is to have weak pliant neighbours.

"This advantage, among others, we possess—our two maritime issues are in the hands of weak States, and we are very much interested in their prolonged continuance. From weak neighbours we obtain all the facilities we can require, and this without those inconveniences and dangers which we must incur were we to take possession of their territories. In a word, then, the Emperor may be obliged by some extraordinary circumstances to march upon Constantinople; but he will never possess Constantinople, neither will his son, nor, in all probability, his grandson—for both are brought up under the system which I am explaining."

I fell back upon my old observation, that I do not mistrust the Emperor, but that I am apprehensive of the effect which may be produced by some sudden resolution like that which has so lately occupied all my thoughts. I might have added, but refrained from doing so, that the sudden military inspiration of an autocratic Sovereign are particularly to be dreaded, if by only ringing the bell he can ensure the orders which they suggest being sent off in the course of five minutes to the frontiers of Germany, by means of the telegraph which is established above his writing-room.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 123.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 6.)

(No. 36. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, January 27, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE, in reply to an inquiry which I addressed to him yesterday, informed me that his last intelligence from Constantinople was not of a more satisfactory nature; that if, on the one hand, the "Firman" of last February had been publicly read, on the other, fresh concessions, at the expense of the Greek Church, had been made to the Latins.

As is usually to be observed, these Church grievances were rather alluded to than enumerated.

The Chancellor proceeded to remark that, alongside of this question, another was growing rapidly into magnitude; his advices speaking of the intention of the Turks to attack Montenegro, in despite of the assurances given to M. Ozeroff that Omar Pasha's operations would be wholly of a defensive nature.

I informed Count Nesselrode that Her Majesty's Government had shown themselves as desirous as himself that the utmost moderation should be observed by Omar Pasha, but begged that he would not lose sight of the fact of a series of very wanton aggressions having been perpetrated by the Montenegrins; that if, then, under such provocations, the Turks retaliated severely, they would only act as the Austrian Government had done towards the same offenders in the year 1836 or 1838.

Count Nesselrode, as of late he has been in the habit of doing, expressed opinions the most unfavourable of Fuad Effendi, saying that he is a man whose word is not to be trusted, and that he appears destined to involve his Sovereign in the greatest embarrassments.

I will here remark to your Lordship (as I ought to have done sometime since) that, according to the Russian version, Fuad Effendi is at present devoted to the interests of France, his services having been retained by the French Ambassador.

We spoke again of the critical posture of affairs in Turkey, and I must observe that the opinions which I had expressed in the written paper, a copy of which was inclosed in my No. 10, opinions, at the time considered by Count Nesselrode to be exaggerated, appear now to be precisely those which he himself entertains.

He did not hesitate to speak of the inflammatory spirit of the Christian population of Turkey, remarking that any excesses committed against the Christian population might cause that spirit to break out in extensive flames.

Once again Count Nesselrode desired to impress upon my mind the dread, the sincere dread, with which the Emperor regarded the great probability of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

"I believe," his Excellency said, "that, involved as they unquestionably are, the Emperor takes too dark a view of Turkish affairs; of the sincerity of his feelings, however, no one who has had good opportunities of judging can doubt; in short, no state of things can serve our interests better than that which now prevails in Turkey."

"You will allow me," I replied, "Monsieur le Comte, to speak to you with perfect openness; and my answer will be, I am convinced, very much what such observations would meet with from Her Majesty's Government.

"You say that the Turkish Empire is in a very precarious condition; you say, and I believe with perfect truth, that the Emperor's interests require the prolongation of its term of existence; what inference then is to be drawn?—there can be but one, viz., that you and all of us are bound to take all precautions against increasing the difficulties of Turkey, and consequently that it would be highly impolitic to make any warlike demonstration on the frontiers of the Sultan's dominions."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 124.

Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, February, 1853.)

(Confidentiel.) *St. Petersburgh, [illegible].*

LE Marquis de Castelbajac nous a communiqué dernièrement une dépêche de son Gouvernement, ayant trait à la question des Lieux Saints de Jérusalem.

Nous en avons pris connaissance avec d'autant plus d'intérêt que M. Drouyn de Lhuys y dit, dès les premières lignes, qu'au point où est arrivée cette question, elle lui paraît devoir faire l'objet d'une explication amicale et confiante avec nous.

Cette pensée nous l'avions eue et exprimée de notre côté, il y a plus d'un an, à l'époque où ce déplorable conflit venait à peine d'être soulevé par l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople, et où une commune et préalable entente, soit à St. Pétersbourg, soit entre nos Représentans respectifs en Turquie, eût prévenu sans doute les embarras dans lesquels le Gouvernement Ottoman se trouve placé aujourd'hui, et les regrets que nous éprouvons nous-mêmes de

devoir tenir à la Porte un langage en opposition à celui que le Gouvernement français lui adresse.

Vous vous rappelez sans doute, monsieur, de la communication que nous vous avions chargé de faire au Ministère Français en Novembre 1851, et la réponse que le Ministre des Relations Extérieures d'alors, M. le Comte de Turgot, y fit, en vous donnant l'assurance la plus positive que nous pouvions envisager cette affaire comme assoupie à Constantinople, et qu'il était désormais inutile de la discuter à Paris.

Les mêmes assurances, et en termes plus explicites encore, avaient été données vers la même époque à M. le Baron de Brunnow, à Londres, par le Comte Walewski, de la part du Président.

Nous avons dû, dès alors, considérer cette contestation comme ne devant plus se reproduire, du moins dans les termes dans lesquels l'avait posée à Constantinople le General Aupick, et plus tard M. de Lavalette.

Le Gouvernement Ottoman, de son côté, avait si bien compris qu'en annulant tous les édits souverains des Sultans émanés depuis 1756, et en reculant de plus de cent ans pour faire revivre des droits contestés et contestables au profit d'une communion qui n'est pas celle de la presque totalité de ses sujets Chrétiens, il jetterait parmi ses populations le germe d'un violent mécontentement, qu'il se décida, après mûre délibération, et après avoir soumis la question et les documents y relatifs à l'examen d'un comité spécial des principaux Oulémas de l'Empire, à y donner une solution définitive, formulée dans un Firman et un Hatti-Chérif autographe du Sultan, qui furent solennellement remis au Patriarche de Jérusalem, et dont on communiqua officiellement les copies à notre Légation à Constantinople. Cette solution était équitable, selon nous; car, loin d'enlever au culte Catholique et à ses desservans à Jérusalem les établissemens et les oratoires dont ils étaient en possession, elle leur accordait, au contraire, l'accès de quelques sanctuaires réservés jusqu'ici aux autres communions. Loin de placer la religion Catholique Romaine dans une position inférieure ou humiliante en Palestine, elle en établissait mieux la parité avec les autres professions. Il nous semble qu'on ne pouvait pas exiger davantage d'un prince Musulman qui compte dans ses états plus de dix millions de sujets appartenant au culte orthodoxe Grec. Aucune des Puissances Catholiques représentées à Constantinople, et intéressées dans la question, sous le rapport religieux et moral, autant que la France elle-même, n'a réclamé ni porté plainte, que nous sachions, contre ces dispositions du Souverain de la Turquie. Nous devions penser enfin que le Cabinet de Paris, qui venait de nous exprimer son intention d'assoupir cette affaire et de modérer le zèle exagéré de son Ambassadeur, donnerait du moins tacitement son adhésion au mode de conciliation adopté par la Porte.

Nous laisserons le Ministère Français juge de la pénible surprise que nous avons éprouvée en apprenant qu'à son retour à Constantinople, après un court séjour en France, M. de Lavalette avait soulevé de nouveau la question, en exigeant de la Porte, en termes péremptoires, et sous menace d'une rupture avec la France, la suppression du dernier Firman; l'envoi à Jérusalem d'un Commissaire Turc, avec de nouvelles instructions; la remise au clergé Latin de la clef et de la garde de la grande Église à Bethléem; le placement sur l'autel de la Grotte de la Nativité d'une étoile aux armes de la France, qui s'y trouvait, dit-on, jadis, et qui en avait été enlevée; l'adjonction au Couvent Latin de Jérusalem d'une bâtisse attenante à la coupole du St. Sépulcre; d'autres concessions enfin, qui de loin peuvent paraître des minuties, mais qui, sur les lieux, et aux yeux des populations indigènes, y compris même les Musulmans, sont autant de passe-droits et d'empiètemens sur les autres communautés Chrétiennes, autant de motifs de dissensions et de haine entre elle et l'Église Romaine, dont on prétend soutenir par ses moyens les intérêts.

Il nous répugne de faire mention ici des scènes scandaleuses qui ont déjà eu lieu à Jérusalem par suite de ces mesures, auxquelles la Porte a eu la faiblesse de prêter la main, et qui ont déjà reçu en partie leur exécution contrairement à la teneur du dernier Firman, dont, par une autre contradiction étrange, on donnait lecture aux autorités locales au moment même où l'on chargeait celles-ci d'en violer les dispositions principales.

D'après les derniers rapports que nous avons de la Syrie et de Constantinople, les choses en étaient venues à Jérusalem à ce point de confusion et de désordre que, tandis qu'un prélat Catholique, assisté du Consul de France,

appelait à son aide les serruriers de la ville pour se faire ouvrir la grande porte de l'Église de Bethléem, bien que l'accès lui fût ouvert par deux autres portes latérales, le Patriarche de Jérusalem, Cyrille, vieillard vénérable, et généralement connu par son esprit conciliant et la modération de son caractère, se voyait obligé de protester par écrit contre ces actes de violence, et de partir pour Constantinople, afin de porter ses plaintes et celles de sa nation au Sultan. En rappelant ici, comme nous venons de le faire, les évènemens de l'année dernière et les faits récents qu'on vient de nous signaler des lieux mêmes, il est loin de notre pensée de récriminer contre qui que se soit, ou de vouloir en conclure qu'une entente directe entre nous et le Gouvernement Français, sur cette question, serait aujourd'hui impossible ou tardive; mais désirant répondre avec une entière franchise à l'ouverture qu'on vient de nous faire, il nous importait de constater la situation actuelle des choses, et les causes qui, selon nous, ont amené les complications que nous devons tous également regretter.

Le principal obstacle à un arrangement équitable du différend actuel, quel que soit le lieu où l'on veuille le discuter, serait, nous le craignons, l'insistance que voudrait mettre encore le Gouvernement Français à rétablir en Palestine l'ordre des choses que la capitulation obtenue de la Porte en 1740 est censée avoir consacré, bien qu'il soit connu, cependant, que cet acte n'a jamais reçu son exécution, vu les termes vagues dans lesquels il est écrit, sans désignation des lieux et des sanctuaires adjugés au clergé Latin, dans la ville de Jérusalem et au dehors. On sait d'ailleurs que, peu d'années plus tard, et nommément en 1757, le Gouvernement Ottoman se vit obligé d'expliquer et de commenter l'Article XXXIII de la capitulation susdite par un nouvel édit souverain, dont les dispositions beaucoup plus explicites, à l'égard des différents établissemens religieux de Jérusalem, avaient été confirmées sous tous les règnes suivants, et restent en vigueur jusqu'à ce jour, nonobstant les réclamations partielles que les Pères Franciscains de la Terre-Sainte adressaient de temps à autre à Constantinople par l'entremise de l'Ambassade de France.

Nous citerons enfin un évènement assez récent pour être dans la mémoire de tout le monde, et qui, sur une question et dans un pays où tout précédent fait autorité, peut constituer en faveur de l'Église orthodoxe, et des nations qui en professent les dogmes, un droit difficile à contester. Lorsqu'en 1808 une violente incendie consuma le Temple du Sainte Sépulcre, le Patriarche de Jérusalem réclama et obtint du Sultan l'autorisation de reconstruire le temple dans ses anciennes formes et dimensions, sans aucune intervention étrangère, et moyennant les seules offrandes des populations Greco-Slaves.

On peut se rappeler aussi qu'à cette époque nous étions en pleine guerre avec la Turquie; qu'aucune pression ou intervention diplomatique de notre part n'a pu influencer les déterminations de la Porte, ni contrarier les réclamations que les Puissances Catholiques et la France elle-même, gouvernée alors par l'Empereur Napoléon, se seraient cru en droit de former.

Ce précédent nous semble de nature à être plus particulièrement cité au Gouvernement actuel de la France, à l'appui des intentions qu'il vient de nous manifester et de l'assurance qu'il nous donne de n'avoir pas songé à retirer aux Chrétiens du rit Grec le droit de jouir des avantages que le tems a consacrés entre leurs mains.

Sur cette base, qui est parfaitement conforme à nos vœux, et qui s'accorde également avec le texte du dernier Firman de la Porte dont nous réclamons la fidèle exécution, l'entente sur le principe se trouverait tout établie. Les seules difficultés qu'il resterait à aplanir seraient pour son application, et pour les questions de détail qui doivent nécessairement être régularisées sur les lieux dans le sens du dernier Firman, et qui l'auraient déjà été peut-être si les ordres contradictoires de la Porte, la duplicité de ses agens, et les prétentions exagérées du clergé Catholique, n'avaient essentiellement nui à cette œuvre de conciliation et de paix, et laissé toute chose indécise jusqu'à cette heure.

Le Cabinet Impérial ne négligera aucun moyen pour hâter une conclusion désirable sous tant de rapports, et à laquelle la Russie entière prend le plus sérieux et le plus légitime intérêt. Il se plaît à compter sur les dispositions et le concours de la France. Il ne doute pas de la co-opération efficace que la Cour Impériale d'Autriche, appelée par ses traités avec la Turquie à intervenir dans la question, y apportera de son côté.

C'est dans ce sens que nous allons faire à Constantinople de nouvelles et énergiques démarches, qui, tout en rappelant à la Porte ses engagemens vis-

à-vis de nous, la convaincront, il faut l'espérer, qu'il n'y a, en réalité, ni conflit ni antagonisme entre nous et la France aujourd'hui, pas plus qu'à d'autres époques, pour ce qui concerne l'ordre des choses établi depuis des siècles dans les lieux vénérés de Palestine; que toutes les grandes Puissances de l'Europe désirent également la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, sa tranquillité intérieure, et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement dans ses actes, lorsque la justice et ses propres intérêts les lui commandent.

Nous sommes convaincus, d'après les termes de la dernière communication dont le Général Castelbajac a été chargé, que les instructions dont l'Ambassade de la France à Constantinople est peut-être déjà munie à cette heure, s'accordent parfaitement avec les vues que nous venons de développer ici avec autant de franchise que de confiance. Dans ce cas l'entente, qui n'a pu jusqu'ici s'établir entre nos Représentans à Constantinople, autant que nous l'avions désiré, pourra avoir incessamment les plus heureux résultats dans la question qui nous préoccupe.

Vous voudrez bien, monsieur, donner lecture de la présente à M. Drouyn de Lhuys, et lui en laisser même copie s'il la demande.

Recevez, &c.

(Signed) NESSELRODE.

No. 125.

Lord John Russell to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 38. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE received, and laid before the Queen, your secret and confidential dispatch No. 24 of the 22nd of January.

Her Majesty, upon this as upon former occasions, is happy to acknowledge the moderation, the frankness, and the friendly disposition of his Imperial Majesty.

Her Majesty has directed me to reply in the same spirit of temperate, candid, and amicable discussion.

The question raised by his Imperial Majesty is a very serious one. It is, supposing the contingency of the dissolution of the Turkish Empire to be probable, or even imminent, "whether it is not better to be provided beforehand for a contingency, than to incur the chaos, confusion, and the certainty of an European war, all of which must attend the catastrophe if it should occur unexpectedly, and before some ulterior system has been sketched: "this is the point," said his Imperial Majesty, "to which I am desirous that you should call the attention of your Government."

In considering this grave question, the first reflection which occurs to Her Majesty's Government is that no actual crisis has occurred which renders necessary a solution of this vast European problem. Disputes have arisen respecting the Holy Places, but these are without the sphere of the internal government of Turkey, and concern Russia and France rather than the Sublime Porte. Some disturbance of the relations between Austria and the Porte has been caused by the Turkish attack on Montenegro; but this, again, relates rather to dangers affecting the frontier of Austria, than the authority and safety of the Sultan; so that there is no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours.

It occurs further to Her Majesty's Government to remark, that the event which is contemplated is not definitely fixed in point of time. When William the Third and Louis the Fourteenth disposed, by treaty, of the succession of Charles the Second of Spain, they were providing for an event which could not be far off. The infirmities of the Sovereign of Spain, and the certain end of any human life, made the contingency in prospect both sure and near. The death of the Spanish King was in no way hastened by the Treaty of Partition. The same thing may be said of the provision made in the last century, for the disposal of Tuscany upon the decease of the last prince of the house of Medici. But the contingency of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire is of another kind. It may happen twenty, fifty, or a hundred years hence.

In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings towards the Sultan which animate the Emperor of Russia, no less than the Queen of Great Britain, to dispose beforehand of the provinces under his dominion. Besides this consideration, however, it must be observed, that an agreement made in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide. Austria and France could not, in fairness, be kept in ignorance of the transaction, nor would such concealment be consistent with the end of preventing an European war. Indeed, such concealment cannot be intended by his Imperial Majesty. It is to be inferred that as soon as Great Britain and Russia should have agreed on the course to be pursued, and have determined to enforce it, they should communicate their intentions to the great Powers of Europe. An agreement thus made, and thus communicated, would not be very long a secret; and while it would alarm and alienate the Sultan, the knowledge of its existence would stimulate all his enemies to increased violence, and more obstinate conflict. They would fight with the conviction that they must ultimately triumph; while the Sultan's generals and troops would feel that no immediate success could save their cause from final overthrow. Thus would be produced and strengthened that very anarchy which is now feared, and the foresight of the friends of the patient would prove the cause of his death.

Her Majesty's Government need scarcely enlarge on the dangers attendant on the execution of any similar Convention. The example of the Succession War is enough to show how little such agreements are expected when a pressing temptation urges their violation. The position of the Emperor of Russia as depositary, but not proprietor, of Constantinople would be exposed to numberless hazards both from the long-cherished ambition of his own nation and the jealousies of Europe. The ultimate proprietor, whoever he might be, would hardly be satisfied with the inert, supine attitude of the heirs of Mahomet the Second. A great influence on the affairs of Europe seems naturally to belong to the Sovereign of Constantinople, holding the gates of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

That influence might be used in favour of Russia; it might be used to control and curb her power.

His Imperial Majesty has justly and wisely said, "My country is so vast, so happily circumstanced in every way, that it would be unreasonable in me to desire more territory or more power than I possess. On the contrary," he observed, "our great, perhaps our only danger, is that which would arise from an extension given to an Empire already too large." A vigorous and ambitious State replacing the Sublime Porte might, however, render war on the part of Russia a necessity for the Emperor or his successors.

Thus European conflict would arise from the very means taken to prevent it; for neither England nor France, nor probably Austria, would be content to see Constantinople permanently in the hands of Russia.

On the part of Great Britain, Her Majesty's Government at once declare that they renounce all intention or wish to hold Constantinople. His Imperial Majesty may be quite secure upon this head. They are likewise ready to give an assurance that they will enter into no agreements to provide for the contingency of the fall of Turkey, without previous communication with the Emperor of Russia.

Upon the whole, then, Her Majesty's Government are persuaded that no course of policy can be adopted more wise, more disinterested, more beneficial to Europe than that which his Imperial Majesty has so long followed, and which will render his name more illustrious than that of the most famous Sovereigns who have sought immortality by unprovoked conquest and ephemeral glory.

With a view to the success of this policy it is desirable that the utmost forbearance should be manifested towards Turkey; that any demands which the great Powers of Europe may have to make, should be made matter of friendly negotiation rather than of peremptory demand; that military and naval demonstrations to coerce the Sultan should as much as possible be avoided; that differences with respect to matters affecting Turkey, within the competence of the Sublime Porte, should be decided after mutual concert between the Great Powers, and not be forced upon the weakness of the Turkish Government.

To these cautions Her Majesty's Government wish to add, that in their

view it is essential that the Sultan should be advised to treat his Christian subjects in conformity with the principles of equity and religious freedom which prevail generally among the enlightened nations of Europe. The more the Turkish Government adopts the rules of impartial law and equal administration, the less will the Emperor of Russia find it necessary to apply that exceptional protection which his Imperial Majesty has found so burthensome and inconvenient, though no doubt prescribed by duty and sanctioned by treaty.

You may read this despatch to Count Nesselrode, and, if it is desired, you may yourself place a copy of it in the hands of the Emperor. In that case you will accompany its presentation with those assurances of friendship and confidence on the part of Her Majesty the Queen, which the conduct of his Imperial Majesty was so sure to inspire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 126.

Lord John Russell to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 39.)

Foreign Office, February 9, 1853.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch, No. 23, of the 21st ultimo, I have to acquaint you that in a despatch, dated Odessa, January 24, Mr. Consul-General Yeames reports that orders have reached Sevastopol for the equipment of the fleet, so that it may be ready for sea at a short notice.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 127.

Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.

(No. 22.)

Foreign Office, February 10, 1853.

Sir,

AS Baron Brenmer is detained by illness in France, I have to instruct you to abstain from giving any advice or opinion in the matter of the Holy Places, and to confine yourself to recommending moderation and caution in any step taken on that subject by any of the Foreign Ministers at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 128.

Lord Cowley to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 12.)

(No. 93.)

Paris, February 11, 1853.

My Lord,

THE messenger, whom the French Government has been for some days expecting from St. Petersburgh, is arrived, but has brought nothing conclusive respecting the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem. Count Nesselrode had received the French despatch upon the subject *ad referendum*, and General Castelbajac did not expect an answer for some days. I regret to add, that the language of M. Drouyn de Lhuys on this vexed question is less satisfactory than it was. I fear that the contemplated agglomeration of Russian troops on the Turkish frontier, added to a report which has reached the French Government, that Russian troops are on the march towards the frontier of Germany, has alarmed the Emperor's pride, and that he does not like to have the appearance of yielding to menace. At the same time, M. Drouyn de

Lhuys told me that the Emperor had received another letter from the Emperor of Russia, which he had not seen, but which he believed to be written in very friendly terms.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 129.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 44. Confidential.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, February 3, 1853.

I LEARN from an officer who is about the Emperor's person, and in the enjoyment of his full confidence, the correctness of the report of Prince Menchikoff having received orders to repair to Constantinople.

"Our diplomacy," this person observed, "has for some time been too inactive in Turkey; it is time that Russian interests should be better protected, when attempts are made to dispossess us of our rights."

From other parts of the conversation, it appeared that I had been correct in stating, as I did some weeks ago, that much greater importance was attached to the word of the Sultan than to any acts of the Turkish Ministry.

"Our position," my acquaintance observed, "is this:—we have the Firman of last year, indorsed by an autograph letter of the Sultan's, securing us rights of which we (the Greek Church) have been in the enjoyment for 140 years: the reading of the Firman was delayed by Fuad Effendi, and the *status quo* has, since the reading took place, been altered under the dictation of France; this we cannot submit to." I observed, that I had not been backward in blaming the activity and violence of M. de Lavalette, but that common fairness required that we should all recognize the conciliatory spirit of late manifested by France to settle the disputes respecting the Holy Places with the Russian Government. This plea, my Russian acquaintance observed, was not admissible; Russia had nothing to do with France in this question; the point was one to be settled between the Emperor and a Sovereign whose word the Emperor held. "What Prince Menchikoff may do," he added, "I do not know: but I can say this, that were I to be sent in his place to Constantinople, my first demand would be the expulsion of so false a man as Fuad Effendi from the Ministry."

It occurred to me that a Russian, high in place and favour, is not apt to talk of the line of political conduct which he should pursue, unless he had previously made himself well acquainted with the feelings of his master; and I inferred that the conversation of which I have given the outline, ought to be noticed to your Lordship.

I suppress any report of what passed further with respect to the Montenegrins, the object of my acquaintance being to prove that those people were unjustly attacked, whilst mine was to show that Montenegrin independence was one question, and the right which seems claimed by them to plunder and murder with impunity is another and a widely different one.

On this, as on all occasions, I endeavour to demonstrate that the very interest taken by the Emperor in the Montenegrins should be shown by efforts to restrain their appetite for acts of lawlessness and violence; that, as I have expressed it, a person may keep a dog without allowing him to go about biting the neighbours.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 130.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 51. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's confidential despatch of the 25th ultimo, marked No. 18, and have learned with sincere gratification that the Queen has been pleased to express her gracious approbation of the language which I have held to the Emperor and the Chancellor respecting the Russian differences with Turkey.

A great point will, I think, be gained if the Imperial Government can be made to feel that, considering the indifference of the Porte with regard to the question of the Holy Places,—considering, too, the desire so manifestly felt by the French Cabinet to settle matters in an amicable manner,—it must be the fault of Russia if that difficulty be not surmounted in a satisfactory manner.

Again, with the question of Montenegro, it may well be that Russia has a warm interest in the independence and well-being of a small community professing the Greek faith; but it will be, I conceive, of great importance that the Russian Cabinet should be brought to understand that at least as much respect is to be paid by the Montenegrins to the rights of their neighbours and former masters as is claimed from them in favour of the Montenegrins.

Upon this point it will be well that no doubt should be allowed to subsist; and the more so, as indications are not wanting of the desire felt here to represent the Turks as the aggressors in the present struggle. It will be my business to prevent, as far as lies in my power, all misapprehension on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I ought to observe that, although marked confidential, I propose reading your Lordship's despatch to Count Nesselrode. I shall do so, not from any personal feeling, but because I consider it of great importance that Her Majesty's Envoy should be known, whilst speaking plain language, to have expressed the feelings of Her Majesty's Government.

G. H. S.

No. 131.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 52. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 4, 1853.

My Lord,

ONE of my diplomatic acquaintances, who happens to be upon terms of intimacy with a Russian officer who is among those the most consulted upon naval affairs, has inquired of him whether it is true that orders had been sent to the few Russian vessels of war to be found in the Levant to proceed to the Albanian coast.

The Admiral answered, that he had no knowledge of any orders of the kind having been issued.

"Will you," the other person rejoined, "take upon yourself to say that no such orders have been sent?"

That assurance the Admiral professed himself unable to give; and my informant remarked thereupon, that he felt at liberty to draw his own conclusions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 132.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 56.)

St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED yesterday, by appointment, upon the Chancellor, and held a conversation with him upon Turkish affairs.

It commenced by my expressing my satisfaction at the conciliatory attitude of the French Cabinet, remarking that, with such amicable dispositions on their part, it was impossible but that the question of the Holy Places should be speedily disposed of.

His Excellency replied, that the conduct of the French Government was becoming more conciliatory, "qu'il semblait mettre de l'eau dans son vin;" that a communication had been received from the Marquis de Castelbajac upon the subject of the religious question, and that he proposed soon to reply to this overture; the reply, when made, would be communicated to me.

Count Nesselrode then said, that he desired to acquaint me that Prince Menchikoff had received orders to prepare for departure for Constantinople, where the affairs of the Russian Mission had been for some time conducted by a Chargé d'Affaires, whose rank did not give him the weight which was required in affairs of such gravity as those now pending.

His Excellency wished to assure me that the instructions with which Prince Menchikoff would be provided were of a conciliatory nature, and that although bred to arms, the Prince himself was animated by intentions the most pacific.

I inquired whether Prince Menchikoff would be instructed to occupy himself with the affairs of Montenegro, as well as with that of the "Lieux Saints;" and was acquainted that would be the case.

The conversation then turned to the war in Montenegro, and Count Nesselrode spoke with animation of the bad faith exhibited by Omar Pasha, who was waging a war of extermination, when, according to the promises of the Porte, a defensive war was alone about to be undertaken.

I endeavoured to show that the Montenegrins had been the notorious aggressors, and that however deplorable the fact, so it is, that with Turks as with Christians, violent attacks were apt to provoke violent retaliation. "Are you," I inquired, "prepared to advance that this unfortunate feud was commenced by the Turks?"

Count Nesselrode replied, that certainly he made this assertion; that the Sultan's troops had endeavoured to possess themselves of a tract of country belonging to Montenegro, and that this attempt had brought down the Montenegrins in defence of their countrymen; that subsequently operations had been carried on with great violence by Omar Pasha, and that, in proof of the fact, he would state that a convent which had been defended by the mountaineers had, upon their expulsion, been burned by the Turkish troops.

I remarked that such acts of violence were common to all wars; that it appeared to me that the great point to be sought by all parties was to put a stop to hostilities, but that I must be permitted to retain my opinion, and to suggest that when tranquillity shall be restored to Albania, an inquiry (*enquête*) should be instituted as to the causes and the authors of the war. I would then only request that it should be observed whether my statements were or were not borne out by evidence. Some slight controversy upon the point continuing, I concluded the conversation by requesting permission to use a familiar expression which, as I stated, I had just employed in speaking with M. de Seniavine. "The interest," I said, "M. le Comte, which you feel in the mountaineers is very intelligible; so is the affection often felt towards a dog; remember, however, that the proprietor or the protector of a dog is bound to prevent his becoming a nuisance to the neighbours; and permit me to observe that in the present case the dog passes as belonging to you."

The observation was taken, as it was intended to be, in good part, and possesses the slight merit, not always belonging to diplomatic conversations, of leaving no doubt as to the speaker's meaning.

I have only to add, that as I left the room I said, "It will be satisfactory

to Her Majesty's Government to learn that, in your Excellency's opinion, there is a fair prospect of existing difficulties being settled, and I think you may authorise me to convey that assurance."

Count Nesselrode replied that he certainly felt more sanguine than he had lately been as to the amicable adjustment of the questions pending with the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 133.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 57.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 5, 1853.*

THE Chancellor was good enough to place in my hands yesterday five despatches, dated the 25th ultimo, which he had received from Baron Brunnow.

They relate severally:—to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Russia and Belgium; to the question of the communications of the 8th May to the German Diet; to the marriage of the French Emperor; to a conversation held with the Earl of Aberdeen by Baron Brünnow, on the question of the Holy Places; and to the non-communication of the memorandum of the 3rd December to the French Cabinet.

In this last paper I found a confirmation of my notion of its being suspected by the Russians that some private understanding had been entered into between Her Majesty's Government and that of France with regard to the Secret Act. Taken as a whole, the correspondence offered a fresh indication of Baron Brunnow's desire to promote the best intelligence between the Court at which he resides, and that which he represents with so much credit to himself and advantage to his Imperial master.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 134.

Mr. Jerningham to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 12.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 17, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that his last accounts from St. Petersburgh respecting the Holy Places, received a day or two since, state that Count Menchikoff was about to be despatched to Constantinople, for the purpose of coming to a joint understanding on the subject with the French Embassy and the Porte.

His Excellency expressed an expectation that a settlement would be arrived at, provided Russia did not ask too much, while France was disposed to moderation.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys said it was uncertain if M. de Lavalette would be at Constantinople when Count Menchikoff should arrive.

His Excellency said, also, that he could not tell if Baron Brennier would go or not, as he complained of illness; but that either he or another would be sent as soon as possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 135.

Mr. Jerningham to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 18.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 17, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS expressed himself to me to-day as he has more than once done to Lord Cowley regarding the East, namely, in the sense that Austria and Russia might be speculating on the fall of the Turkish Empire, and that such a possibility rendered of the utmost importance a good and intimate understanding between England and France, not only in fact but in appearance; whilst he feared that foreign Governments might be shaken in their belief of such an understanding by circumstances like the recent speeches of Sir James Graham and Sir Charles Wood relative to the Emperor, as well as by the armaments of England.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed satisfaction with the late explanations of your Lordship and the Earl of Aberdeen, excepting your Lordship's statement that the French Government were increasing their navy, which M. Ducos had since assured him was completely erroneous; adding, that M. Ducos had promised to make him a written statement on the subject, which he would communicate to me as soon as it should reach him.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys respecting the English armaments, that our object appeared to me to be simply to place England in the state of defence rendered advisable by the existence of steam navigation, and by the uncertainty of the future, while it must not be forgotten that this defensive armament began before the Revolution of 1848.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself as being also much preoccupied with the question of Cuba; and he represented it as another reason why England and France ought to appear thoroughly united.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 136.

Lord John Russell to Colonel Rose.

(No. 27. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, February 19, 1853.*

THE Russian Minister at this Court has read to me a despatch from Count Nesselrode to M. Kisseleff, giving an account of the result of General Castelbajac's explanations of the views of the French Government in reference to the Holy Places.

The open and conciliatory language of the French Government appears to have produced a favourable impression on the Emperor of Russia. Yet there is no disposition to recede from the terms of the Firman of February, 1852; and it appears that Prince Menchikoff is about to proceed to Constantinople, to express the firm resolution of the Russian Government not to rest satisfied with the departures from the terms then proclaimed by the Sultan, and assented to both by France and Russia.

The British Government has never concealed from the Government of France its conviction that, apart from the merits of the case, the fresh demands made by the French Embassy at Constantinople, on this matter, were ill-timed and likely to prove a source of embarrassment.

You are, therefore, instructed to hold to the Sultan's Minister, to Prince Menchikoff, and to the French Minister, language calculated to bring back the state of this question to its position of February in the last year. This should be effected in the manner most consistent with the dignity of the French Government, which has been somewhat compromised by the language of M. Lavalette.

It is said that the Emperor of Russia will demand the dismissal of Fuad Effendi. On this question, you will take no part, one way or the other.

If the Russian troops should advance to the frontier, you must give immediate information to Her Majesty's Government.

I trust I need not suppose the case of their advancing beyond the frontier to the attack of the capital. In such a case, Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe will be upon the spot, furnished with the requisite instructions.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. RUSSELL.

No. 137.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 19.) *Constantinople, January 21, 1853.*

My Lord,

AFIF BEY, the Porte's Commissioner for the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, returned here on the 16th instant from Jerusalem, having concluded his mission by giving up the key of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins, and settled the matter of the Tomb of the Virgin. I have the honour to inclose a copy of a report from M. E. Pisani on this subject.

The position of the Porte with respect to the cession of the key is a safe one. She may, acting under undue pressure from the two rival interests in this question, have been guilty of some Ottoman want of form and breach of faith, to which she so often has recourse in her difficulties; but no note can be written proving that the Porte did not act legitimately in giving the key to the Latins. That act was in accordance with the written decision of a Commission of Ulemas which the Porte, in consequence of Russian representations, named last year for the purpose of examining and reporting on all the documents, Greek and Latin, relating to the Holy Places.

The inclosed copy of a report from M. Pisani shows that only a few days ago, Fuad Effendi asserted to the first Russian Interpreter, without being contradicted by him, the justice of the Porte's mode of proceeding with respect to the key.

The Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem, who went to that city from hence this summer, returned to Constantinople a day or two ago. On Afif Bey's giving the key to the Latins, he, the Greek Patriarch, offered his keys of the same Church to the Bey, and, when he would not accept them, to the Governor of Jerusalem. The intention of the Patriarch in so doing was to make a sort of protest, and because it moreover to appear as if the giving of the keys to the Latins necessitated his surrender of them. It appears that he has come with similar intentions to Constantinople; but the inclosed report from M. Pisani shows that they have been frustrated by the attitude of the Porte and the prudent conduct of his Greek co-religionists here. The Patriarch likes Constantinople, and dislikes Jerusalem, and it was always supposed that he would avail himself of the first pretext for returning here.

M. d'Ozeroff once told me that if the Firman were read, the matter of the key might be arranged. Fuad Effendi praised to me, the other day, both M. de Lavalette and M. d'Ozeroff's present moderation in the question of the Holy Places. I am in hopes that M. d'Ozeroff and his Government will bear the little disappointment about the key with the same good humour exhibited by M. de Lavalette in the reverse he experienced as to the public reading of the Firman. In a question like that of the Holy Places, where two powerful parties maintain wholly different claims, it is impossible that one of them can have it all his own way. France claimed some eighteen Sanctuaries. She has only obtained two; and the Greeks have received one, the Sanctuary of the Mount of Olives, which they had not before.

The cession of the key is in fact nothing; it gives the Latins no right to hold divine service in the church; it merely allows them to pass through it to the Grotto of the Nativity, a vault under the church, where the Latins have two Sanctuaries, "la Crèche" and "la Grotte des Mages."

Any concessional feeling exhibited by the Emperor of Russia in this purely religious matter would be universally attributed to his well-known religious sentiments, and to the self-denying interest which his Imperial Majesty has so often exhibited for the preservation of general peace.

M. de Lavalette has declared to me that the question of the Holy Places is not again to be revived by France, and if the French Government would confirm this assurance, Russia would have a still further inducement for considering the ill-omened question of Jerusalem as finally settled.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 137.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, January 18, 1853.*

M. ARGYROPULO having, two days ago, called on Fuad Effendi, to tell him, on the part of M. d'Ozeroff, to whom Fuad Effendi thought advisable to communicate M. de Klezl's note, that he was of opinion that the Porte ought not to give any hurried answer, and to behave with calm; Fuad Effendi's reply was, that the same advice was given to the Porte by the others. After this, M. Argyropulo began to talk of the Jerusalem question, and told Fuad Effendi that, "la Mission Impériale venait de recevoir de son Consul à Jérusalem l'avis que la clef de l'Eglise de Bethléem avait été donnée par Afif Bey aux Latins: que la bienséance ne permettait pas à la Mission Impériale de qualifier cette conduite du Gouvernement Turc, mais que M. d'Ozeroff se ferait un devoir de faire son rapport à l'Empereur, qui saura apprécier cette conduite. Il s'étonnait, pourtant, que dans une affaire aussi grave, Fuad Effendi n'avait pas donné dans le temps aucune communication à ce sujet."

To this Fuad Effendi replied, that Afif Bey, in delivering the key to the Latins, acted in conformity with the Porte's instructions, and begged to observe to M. Argyropulo, that more than once, both through him (M. Argyropulo) and through M. Logothéti, his Excellency made several communications on the subject to M. d'Ozeroff, who refused to enter into any discussion or explanation, and went so far as to avoid to meet Fuad Effendi, and used to wait and treat direct with the Grand Vizier, not as Prime Minister, but as a member of the Imperial family. Upon which M. Argyropulo withdrew.

With respect to the Shrine of the Holy Virgin, Fuad Effendi says, that the matter is arranged in the following manner. The Latins are to bring with them, when they are to officiate, their sacred vase and garments, and remove them, after they officiate, into a room which they are going to build next to the Sacred Shrine, in a garden belonging to the Latins themselves.

Inclosure 2 in No. 137.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Extract.) *January 18, 1853.*

THE following question was put, on the 17th January, by Fuad Effendi to M. d'Argyropulo:—

"N'est-ce pas la Mission de Russie qui a demandé qu'une Commission, composée de membres Turcs, examine et prononce sur cette question? Nous nous sommes adressés à cette même Commission, qui nous a déclaré par écrit que les Latins étaient dans leur droit de demander et d'obtenir les clefs."

M. d'Argyropulo made no reply, but retired.

Inclosure 3 in No. 137.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Extract.) *Pera, January 22, 1853.*

FUAD EFFENDI told me that the object of the Patriarch of Jerusalem in coming to Constantinople, was to protest against the line taken by the Porte in the Jerusalem question, as he was induced to believe that the greatest portion of his co-religionists had already done so, and he was greatly surprised

on his arrival here, that he was misinformed. At all events, his Excellency thought it prudent and advisable to send him a message through M. S. Aristarchi, to the effect that he was to remain quiet, and not to undertake to make any representations calculated to create an embarrassment to the Porte, otherwise he would incur the displeasure of the Sultan's Government.

Fuad Effendi has not yet seen Ahmed Bey, and therefore he is not aware of the result of the mission to Tunis.

His Excellency informed me that the Jerusalem question was to be finally settled in Paris between Russia and France. He also acquainted me very confidentially, that letters from Vienna announce the recall of M. de Lavalette, and the appointment of M. Barri, or Berain, as his successor.

No. 138.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 30)

My Lord, *Constantinople, January 28, 1853.*

I HAVE very great satisfaction in informing your Lordship that I have every reason for believing that the dangerous and very difficult question of the Holy Places of Jerusalem is terminated. The French Ambassador declares to me that, as far as he is concerned, it is settled, and that France will not again revive it.

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, also, told me on the 26th instant, that the settlement of the question, as already announced by me to your Lordship, was a "chose faite;" only, he added, that he feared that further discussions must be opened respecting it, because there were one or two details as to the settlement, which were interpreted very disadvantageously to the Greeks; that the Latins claimed to have the Tomb of the Virgin, one day, exclusively for themselves; that such an arrangement would be very disagreeable, and produce much discontent amongst the Greek pilgrims. Finding that M. d'Ozeroff's observations were well-founded, and that I should do a bad service to the peaceful and disinterested policy of Her Majesty's Government, and to the interests of peace and good policy, were I to allow one little cause of difference to prevent the settlement of this most grave difference, I quite unostentatiously and unofficially told M. de Lavalette of the observations of my Russian colleague. His Excellency instantly, and in the most conciliatory manner, declared that with the view of preventing any collision between the sects, he merely wished that the Latins, and other sects, should have possession of the tomb for the time that was necessary for the performance of their devotions; but that for the rest of the day, the Sanctuary should of course be open to the Greeks and other sects. M. de Lavalette assured me further that, although if he had strained the meaning of the note of the 9th February, he might have demanded that the Latins should have lamps and images in the tomb, he, from a feeling of moderation, had forborne to do so, and had thus consented that the Latins should not have the privileges in the tomb which all the other Christian sects, even the Copts and Blacks, had.

I communicated to M. d'Ozeroff, who dined with me yesterday, M. de Lavalette's explanations, and he seemed quite satisfied with them. I cordially concurred with my Russian colleague's wish that this ill-omened question should never again be mooted, and assured him that I had written strongly in that sense to my superiors.

Both the French and Russian Representatives exhibit now most laudable moderation in the matter of the Holy Places. And I cannot praise too highly the excellent feeling exhibited by the Greek Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem. They have borne the disappointment as to the key in a manner which does the highest honour to them as Christian prelates, and to the feeling of duty which animates them towards their Sovereign. I bear willing record, that, by so acting, they have gained more influence, and acquired more respect for the Christian creed, which has produced such Christain results, than if they had acquired, by discussion or by arms, all the Sanctuaries.

I wish that I could say as much for the Latin Patriarch Valerga, who, unmindful of the great moderation evinced by the Pope in this question, has entered at Jerusalem a violent protest against the settlement of the question of the Holy Places by Afif Bey. M. de Lavalette blames highly, and does not intend to pay the slightest attention to the objections of the Patriarch, who will therefore have gained by his ill-advised step nothing but the notoriety of having alone, of all the great and numerous interests concerned in this important discussion, in vain sought to continue a religious difference which might have involved the world in war.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 139.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1853.*

THE Minister of Greece has spoken to me of the affairs of Turkey, and of his extreme apprehension that the effects of internal decay, hastened, possibly, by external pressure, may bring about the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire before Greece will be sufficiently consolidated to assert successfully her pretensions to a portion of the inheritance.

I did not fail to point out to M. de Zographo, that no Power can be more interested than Greece in the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey; and that consequently it should be the object of the Greeks to avoid in every way increasing the embarrassments with which their neighbours were contending.

M. de Zographo concurred entirely in these views; and informed me that a few days since he had sought a conversation of the Chancellor, for the purpose of expressing his anxiety respecting the military demonstrations of the Russian Government, which he feared might lead to very serious consequences.

M. de Zographo had, he said, felt at liberty to question the Chancellor as to the probability of war taking the place of negotiation; and had done so upon the ground that if there were any question of military operations being resorted to, he thought it would be advisable that his Government should be placed upon their guard, and that precautions should be taken for preventing the inflammable spirits among the Greeks from being so acted upon as to be induced to take up arms.

The answer returned to the Greek Minister by Count Nesselrode leads him to infer that he is sanguine as to existing difficulties being surmounted without an appeal to arms; and the more so, as his Excellency observed, that no one deprecated more sincerely than himself the disruption of the Turkish Empire,—a catastrophe, he observed, which might lead to an European war of fifty years' duration.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 140.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 69. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1853.*

AS the fact of Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople has become generally known, a considerable sensation has been excited here, a feeling which appears to be increased by the reflection that the affair must be a serious one which can have induced the Emperor to have selected an Aide-de-camp General, the head of one of the chief departments, and, above all, a man hardly recovered from severe illness, for its management.

The Prince is a remarkably sensible and well-informed man, with more independence of character than, perhaps, belongs to any of the Emperor's associates, his peculiar turn of thought constantly showing itself by sarcastic

observations, which make him a little dreaded by the St. Petersburgh society; he has, however, particularly good manners, and, as I have already stated, is believed to be of the number of those wise counsellors who would be opposed to any unnecessary extension of an already overgrown Empire.

He has served, and with some distinction, in the campaigns against the Turks, and was severely wounded by a cannon ball before Varna.

According to present arrangements, the Prince will set off this very day for Odessa, and will arrive there, if an open wound which he has in the leg does not become troublesome on the journey, in ten days.

He is to be accompanied by Count Dimitri Nesselrode, the Chancellor's only son, and three aides-de-camp.

If it were necessary to send a military man to Constantinople, the Emperor could, probably, hardly have made a better selection, in the interests of conciliatory measures, than he has done; it is, however, impossible not to reflect that the choice of a soldier has in itself a certain significancy, and that, should a negotiation (the precise objects of which are not known out of the limits of the Emperor's intimate advisers) prove ineffectual, the negotiator may readily become the commander, who has authority to call in 100,000 soldiers, and to place himself at their head.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 141.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 70.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1853.*

IN speaking to me yesterday of Prince Menchikoff's instructions, which were again represented to be moderate in their character, the Chancellor observed that there was necessarily some vagueness in his orders, as on one side it was hardly ascertained to what extent the rights, secured last year to the Greeks, had been infringed; and, on the other, there could be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any of the privileges which they might subsequently have acquired at Jerusalem. The object to be sought for was therefore an equivalent for any privilege lost by the Greeks. "Thus," Count Nesselrode observed, "we have no wish to demand the restoration of the key of the Bethlehem Church."

As it is always desirable to guard against misapprehensions, I ventured to inquire whether, in this case, a key meant an instrument for opening a door, only not to be employed in closing that door against Christians or other sects; or whether it was simply a key—an emblem.

Count Nesselrode replied, unhesitatingly, that his meaning was that the key was to be used in giving the Latins access to the church, but not to be used for securing the door against Greeks and other Christians.

I then took the liberty of inquiring how the Austrian Cabinet regarded the views of the Russian Government upon these, so termed, religious questions. Count Nesselrode's answer was, that no difference with regard to them existed between the two Governments; that Austria had been applied to by France, some months ago, to join her upon the question of the Holy Places, but that the overture had been rejected; the Emperor of Austria, although an ardent Catholic, not considering the pretensions of Russia exorbitant, and being withal opposed to that supremacy in religious questions in the East, which the French were inclined to claim for themselves.

With regard to the affairs of Montenegro, the Chancellor seemed to feel considerable anxiety, and but slight inclination to speak of them. He observed only, that it was an unfortunate business, ("mechante question"); that it might very well be settled forcibly before the two Imperial Missions reached Constantinople; but that it must not be forgotten that history shows that the Turks have been able to overrun Montenegro, without being strong enough to retain possession of the territory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 142.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 21.)

(No. 73.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February 10, 1853.*

IN reply to an inquiry which I addressed to Count Nesselrode yesterday, as to whether he proposed that the question of the Holy Places should be settled at St. Petersburgh or at Constantinople, his Excellency stated that for various reasons he thought it better that the negotiation should be conducted at the latter of these places.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to say that he should do well to let me read a despatch dated $\frac{31 \text{ January}}{7 \text{ February}}$, which had just been addressed to M. de Kisseleff, which was intended as a reply to the overture made to the Russian Cabinet through General Castelbajac.

This despatch, written in conciliatory language and (as far as a hasty perusal enabled me to judge) moderate in substance, will be forwarded from Paris to Baron Brunnow, with directions for its communication to your Lordship.

It begins by reminding M. de Kisseleff that the desire felt by the Government of Russia to come to an amicable understanding with that of France upon the question of the Holy Places, had been expressed a year ago, and that if it had been acted upon it might have led to the avoidance of great difficulties. M. de Turgot, however, had represented the affair as put to rest (*assoupie*), whereas it had, on the contrary, been brought forward with great violence.

After stating that the rights promised to France by the Convention of 1740 were vague and undefined, whilst the privileges accorded to the Greeks, some millions of whom are subjects of the Porte, have been uninterruptedly enjoyed since 1756, Count Nesselrode's despatch refers more particularly to the events of 1808 as showing that the rights of the Greek Church were then uncontested.

This part of the despatch appears to me the most forcible, as it proves that when, in the year in question, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre was destroyed by fire, its restoration was left exclusively to the Greeks, although the French throne was then occupied by the Emperor Napoleon, and although the existence of a war with Turkey prevented Russia from exercising any diplomatic influence at Constantinople; this, too, without any objection to the arrangement being raised by any of the Roman Catholic or other Governments.

In conclusion the despatch, after announcing in courteous language the fixed resolution of the Emperor to insist upon the *status quo* as guaranteed by the Firman, and by the Sultan's letter of last year, expresses the hope that instructions to acquiesce in these views may be sent to the French negotiator at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 143.

Mr. Jerningham to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 24.)
My Lord, *Paris, February 21, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12, of the 17th instant, I have the honour to state that I understand from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that the opening proposition of the Extraordinary Russian Mission to Constantinople will be the withdrawal of the recent Firman. But then will come the entire question of what is to replace it.

We learn here that the person sent on this mission is no other than the Russian Minister of Marine. I may be permitted, perhaps, to express a hope that he is not destined to be followed by the Russian fleet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 144.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 36. Most confidential.)

Constantinople, February 4, 1853.

My Lord,

IT has often been stated of Russian policy towards Turkey, that the Government of the former are not merely actuated by the political wish to acquire the Turkish provinces on the Danube, or European Turkey, and other Asiatic territories, which would suit Russia,—but that they are also impelled into anti-Turkish policy by their own and the Russian people's religious feeling, and the natural tendency of a population inhabiting a country not favoured by fate to occupy that of a weaker neighbour to which nature has been lavish.

I myself had a proof of this feeling. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, and his father-in-law, General Patchhoff, a retired Russian general officer, were dining with me. General Patchhoff told me, during dinner, that he had visited St. Sophia: he added, "What a shame it is that these Turks—these infidels—should have it. It ought to be taken from them." I replied, "But what would become of the balance of power?" He said, "There you are with your diplomacy. But these infidels should be driven into Asia, and let them live there if they like."

I was the more surprised at these declarations, which were made with much energy, because General Patchhoff is a very quiet sensible person. The fact that he could utter, almost publicly, such sentiments at the table of an agent whose Government so notoriously supports Turkey, proves how general, and how undisguised, is the anti-Turkish feeling in Russia.

This incident had nothing to do with any feeling as to the Holy Places, because, at that time, the Russian Legation had no particular complaint against the Porte on that head.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 145.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 25. Confidential.)

Paris, February 23, 1853.

My Lord,

I BEG to add to what I have had the honour of addressing to Lord John Russell, during Lord Cowley's absence, that M. Drouyn de Lhuys has, in conversing with me, ridiculed (and very naturally) the excessive apprehension of a sudden French invasion, said to exist with some persons in England; but his Excellency has also made allusion, however indirectly, to a point on which might possibly hinge a rupture between the two countries,—namely, the outbreak of an European war, as proceeding from the possible designs of Russia and Austria upon Turkey. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has observed to me, emphatically, that were a Russian and Austrian increase of territory to lead to a like arrangement on the part of Prussia, France could not remain content with what she has. But peace with England would, I presume, then depend upon the way in which France should attempt to adjust the balance; and, were that peace to suffer, an invasion of England, whether on a large or a small scale,—whether directed to internal lodgment, or to a series of seaport devastations,—would be naturally a thing to be expected.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has spoken to me in the most friendly manner possible regarding England, and I have not failed to receive his sentiments as one who has long considered the nature of the relations between England and France to be the decisive point of European affairs,—the pivot on which, to an incalculable extent, the good or evil of Europe, and even of the world at large, cannot fail to turn.

I should say that M. Drouyn de Lhuys regards the Eastern question with considerable disquietude; but it may soon be dispelled, at least for a time, by

a satisfactory termination of the Austrian and Russian special Missions to Constantinople.

But his Excellency also seems to feel that a permanence of Mahomedan decay will insure to the East a permanence of peril to the peace of Europe,—an opinion in which it would seem difficult not to coincide.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has expressed to me his doubts if even the alliance of England and France could prevent Austria and Russia, were they so disposed, from seizing and holding the Turkish Provinces next to them, though he considers that we could prevent the occupation of Constantinople.

His Excellency has, perhaps, conversed with me the more confidentially, as we were on terms of great intimacy eighteen or nineteen years ago, when colleagues at the Hague as Chargés d'Affaires, and it may be as well to mention that at that time he was in the habit of showing extreme apprehension of Russian designs in the East. It may, however, I presume, be a question if the present attitudes of Russia and of Austria regarding Turkey are not more or less of a nature to justify such apprehension, since, if not menacing actually to pluck the fruit, they would seem calculated to help its fall by shaking the tree.

Having been Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople in 1849, I recollect that the demand for the surrender of the Polish and Hungarian refugees was accompanied by the intimation, that upon the reply to that demand would depend the future relations of Turkey with Austria and Russia. The Porte's refusal was forcibly supported by England and France, but had the support been withheld, would the refusal have been respected? and if not, might not the acts of the two Powers have proved that Russian interference in Hungary had rested on a stipulation connected with Turkey? But such a stipulation, if it ever existed, must exist still.

The alarm of M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears especially directed to the exigent pertinacity of Russia regarding the Holy Places, which he considers to be suspiciously out of proportion to the intrinsic merits of the question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 146.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 1.)

Foreign Office, February 25, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Queen has been pleased to direct that at this critical period of the fate of the Ottoman Empire your Excellency should return to your Embassy for a special purpose, and charged with special instructions.

Your Excellency is aware that the preservation of the independence and integrity of Turkey enters into the general and established system of European policy; that the principle is solemnly declared and sanctioned by the Convention of 1840, and is acknowledged by all the great Powers of Europe.

But while the general principle is acknowledged, the inclination of different Powers is very different, and must be carefully borne in mind.

Great Britain adopts it in all sincerity, without mental reservation; is animated by sincere friendship for Turkey; and has no after-thought on the subject.

France is likewise desirous to maintain it, partly from the traditions of her policy, partly from jealousy of the Powers which, being the nearest neighbours to Turkey, would claim to possess the fairest portion of the inheritance in case of her dissolution.

Austria is likewise disposed, from policy and interest, to maintain the independence of the Porte; but several causes of dissension have arisen of late years, and her passions may lead her to depart widely from the road of her true interest and her conservative policy.

The case of Russia is altogether different. The possession of Constantinople was a favourite dream of the Empress Catherine. The wars which Russia has waged with Turkey, both during her reign and down to the period of the peace of Adrianople, have all ended in the aggrandizement of Russia,

and the depression of the Mahometan Power. The conquest of Constantinople is a favourite object of national ambition. Millions of Christian subjects of the Porte long to reverse the triumphs of the fifteenth century, and to make the Crescent inferior to the Cross.

But the possession of Constantinople by Russia, giving her a commanding position at once on the Baltic and the Mediterranean, would not be seen with complacency by other Powers. The difficulty of arranging this point prevented a cordial alliance between Napoleon the First and the Emperor Alexander. An attempt to cut the knot by Russia would, at this moment, unite against her all the Powers of Europe. The Emperor Nicholas is conscious of this difficulty, and, with a moderation at once magnanimous and wise, is content to forego the prospect of this brilliant prize.

But the weakness of the Turkish Empire, and the presumption of its rulers, may bring on a danger which no one seems willing to invite, and hasten a crisis which no one is anxious to precipitate.

The object, therefore, of your Excellency's mission at this time is to counsel prudence to the Porte, and forbearance to those Powers who are urging her compliance with their demands. You are instructed to use every effort to ward off a Turkish war, and to persuade the Powers interested to look to an amicable termination of existing disputes.

The disputes which more immediately demand attention, are those which relate to Montenegro and the Holy Places.

The defence of Montenegro may be prolonged, or the Mountaineers may submit to the Turkish force; and, in either case, the Sultan may be unwilling to return to the *status quo* that has been peremptorily insisted upon by Austria.

But the question of the Holy Places in Syria offers more danger to the peace of Turkey. However indifferent to their respective merits, the Porte is now unavoidably exposed to the rival pretensions of Russia and France, each animated by a political interest as well as by religious zeal, and both appealing to engagements alleged to have been contracted towards each of them by the Porte. Threatened from both sides, and unable to satisfy one party without displeasing the other, the Sultan is placed in a position of embarrassment and danger, rendered more critical by the internal weakness of the Empire, and the special character of the points at issue.

It is, therefore, to be feared that if the three Governments do not modify their demands, and should continue to maintain towards the Porte the dictatorial, if not menacing, attitude they have lately assumed, they may, without any deliberate intention of departing from those principles of European policy to which I have above alluded, accelerate the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and produce the catastrophe that all are concerned in averting.

England, however, is in a position to neutralize, by her moral influence, these alarming contingencies; for England has the important advantage of having no special interest in the pending questions, and of being viewed by the Porte with less mistrust, and stronger hopes of eventual assistance, than any other Power in Christendom; and the Porte will learn with satisfaction that, even before your arrival at Constantinople, the best efforts of Her Majesty's Government have been directed to restrain encroachment, and to obtain every fair concession calculated to settle the existing differences.

With this object your Excellency is instructed to proceed to Constantinople, by way of Paris and Vienna.

You will inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs that Her Majesty's Government have great satisfaction in believing that the interests of France and England in the East are identical, and that nothing, therefore, need prevent their cordial co-operation in maintaining the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire. In communicating with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, respecting the Holy Places in Syria, your Excellency will govern yourself by the language of the despatches of Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley and Colonel Rose, copies of which are herewith inclosed;* and you will explain to him the fatal embarrassment to which the Sultan may be exposed, if unduly pressed by France upon a question of such vital importance to the Power from which Turkey has most to apprehend.

At Vienna, your Excellency will state to Count Buol, that Her Majesty's

* No. 51, to Lord Cowley.—No. 16, to Colonel Rose.

Government have received with sincere pleasure the assurances that the friendly disposition of Austria towards the Porte was unchanged, and that her conservative policy in the East would be rigidly adhered to; that the increasing tendency to disorder and weakness in the Turkish Empire calls for moderation and forbearance on the part of the Sultan's Allies, and in such a policy the cordial co-operation of Her Majesty's Government may be relied upon by Austria; and that, with reference to Montenegro, you are instructed to support the demands of the Austrian Minister at Constantinople, in as far as they may be consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan.

To the Sultan you will say, that Her Majesty, in directing your Excellency to proceed forthwith to Constantinople, manifests the feelings of friendship by which she is animated towards his Highness, and, at the same time, her opinion of the gravity of the circumstances in which Her Majesty has reason to fear the Ottoman Empire is now placed.

With respect to Montenegro, your Excellency will state that Her Majesty's Government do not dispute the rights of the Porte, but are of opinion that those rights should be asserted with extreme moderation, considering the slight authority that the Sultan can exercise over the wild inhabitants of that distant portion of his dominions; and you will recommend that the force now employed against the Montenegrins, which is maintained at such great cost for no adequate object, shall be withdrawn at the earliest opportunity that is consistent with the honour and dignity of the Sultan.

As regards the Holy Places, Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to give you any special instructions, and prefer to leave your Excellency unfettered in the exercise of your judgment and discretion, as much may depend on your communications with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and upon the state in which you find the negotiation between Russia and the Porte on your arrival at Constantinople.

In using your best endeavours for bringing to a successful termination this unseemly dispute, which reflects so little credit on the two denominations of Christians engaged in it, your Excellency will bear in mind that Her Majesty's Government, without professing to give an opinion on the subject, are not insensible to the superior claims of Russia both as respects the treaty obligations of Turkey, and the loss of moral influence that the Emperor would sustain throughout his dominions, if, as the ecclesiastical head of his Church, he were to yield any privileges it has hitherto enjoyed to the Latin Church of which the Emperor of the French claims to be the protector.

Your Excellency will then, with all the frankness and unreserve that may be consistent with prudence and the dignity of the Sultan, explain the reasons which lead Her Majesty's Government to fear that the Ottoman Empire is now in a position of peculiar danger. The accumulated grievances of foreign nations which the Porte is unable or unwilling to redress, the mal-administration of its own affairs, and the increasing weakness of executive power in Turkey, have caused the Allies of the Porte latterly to assume a tone alike novel and alarming, and which, if persevered in, may lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and prove fatal to the independence and integrity of the Empire,—a catastrophe that would be deeply deplored by Her Majesty's Government, but which it is their duty to represent to the Porte is considered probable and impending by some of the great European Powers.

Your Excellency will explain to the Sultan, that it is with the object of pointing out these dangers and with the hope of averting them, that Her Majesty's Government have now directed you to proceed to Constantinople. You will endeavour to convince the Sultan and his Ministers, that the crisis is one which requires the utmost prudence on their part, and confidence in the sincerity and soundness in the advice they will receive from you, to resolve it favourably for their future peace and independence.

Your Excellency's long residence at the Porte, and intimate knowledge of the affairs of Turkey, will enable you to point out those reforms and improvements which the Sultan, under his present difficulties, may have the means of carrying into effect, and in what manner the Porte may best establish a system of administration, calculated to afford reasonable security for the development of its commercial measures and the maintenance of its independence, recognized by the great Christian Powers on the presumption of its proving a reality and a stable bond of peace in their respective relations with

the Porte, and generally throughout the Levant. Nor will you disguise from the Sultan and his Ministers, that perseverance in their present course must end in alienating the sympathies of the British nation, and making it impossible for Her Majesty's Government to shelter them from the impending danger, or to overlook the exigencies of Christendom, exposed to the natural consequences of their unwise policy and reckless mal-administration.

It remains only for me to say, that in the event, which Her Majesty's Government earnestly hope may not arise, of imminent danger to the existence of the Turkish Government, your Excellency will in such case despatch a messenger at once to Malta, requesting the Admiral to hold himself in readiness, but you will not direct him to approach the Dardanelles without positive instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 147.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 25.)

(No. 29.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 24, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informed me to-day that his last accounts from Constantinople were of the 7th instant, and that the aspect of the pending negotiation between Austria and the Porte was far from satisfactory, both parties appearing determined not to give way.

His Excellency had also learnt that both the Austrian and Russian forces were advancing upon the Turkish frontiers, which evidently caused him considerable alarm; for he added that, were the Turkish Empire to be saved, France and England had perhaps no time to lose.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that Her Majesty's Government placed reliance on the disposition of the Emperor of Russia to take no aggressive step against the integrity of Turkey without consulting his Allies; and that the language of the Austrian Government was of a nature to raise the hope that even the failure of Count Leiningen's mission would not lead to direct hostilities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys complained that the state of the East did not seem to have awakened a commensurate interest in London, but that he had charged Count Walewski to make a communication on the subject.

I replied that I could not but hope that, upon Lord Cowley's return, his Excellency would find that this important question was being adequately attended to by Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 148.

Mr. Jerningham to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 25.)

(No. 31.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 24, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an official paragraph of the "Moniteur," stating that M. de la Cour, French Minister at Vienna, has been named Ambassador to Constantinople, and replaced by Baron de Bourqueney.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

Inclosure in No. 148.

Extract from the "Moniteur."

PAR décret du 17 Février, S. M. l'Empereur a nommé M. de Lacour, Ministre Plénipotentiaire et Envoyé Extraordinaire à Vienne, son Ambassadeur près la Sublime Porte, en remplacement de M. le Marquis de Lavalette, qui revient en France sur sa demande.

Le même décret appelle M. le Baron de Bourqueney à remplir les fonctions d'Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près S. M. l'Empereur d'Autriche.

No. 149.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received February* 28.)

(No. 108.)
My Lord, *Paris, February* 26, 1853.

M. DE LA COUR, French Minister at Vienna, has been named Ambassador to Constantinople, and is succeeded at Vienna by the Baron de Bourqueney, himself formerly Ambassador at the Ottoman Porte.

These two nominations may be viewed with satisfaction. M. de la Cour enjoys the reputation of a conciliatory disposition, and his long residence at the Austrian Court must have given him a full insight into Turkish affairs. He could not be succeeded by a person more fitted to be French Minister at Vienna than is M. de Bourqueney, who, having been in retreat since 1848, is, at his own request, again employed.

M. de Montier is to replace M. de Varennes at Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 150.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 42.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that Mr. Lafontaine, a British merchant established in this place, has informed me that several other merchants have received letters from Odessa, which contain rumours of preparation of the Russian fleet at Sevastopol, and of movements among the Russian troops.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 151.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 2.)

(No. 43.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 6, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Lordship that the French Ambassador has communicated to me the following information which he has received from Odessa, namely:—

That the Russian fleet has received orders to be prepared for going to sea.

That four regiments of infantry have received orders to embark.

That the most severe orders have been issued to keep these preparations a profound secret, and that persons who had ventured to speak of them had been imprisoned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 152.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 80. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, February 17, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED this morning by appointment upon Count Nesselrode, and placed in his hands your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant, marked No. 38 Secret and Confidential, and at the same time I acquainted his Excellency that should it be the Emperor's wish to have a copy of the paper, I was at liberty, as would be seen, to present one to his Imperial Majesty.

The Chancellor read the despatch with the greatest attention, and upon restoring it to me observed that the answer returned by Her Majesty's Government to the Emperor was exactly what he had led his Majesty to expect. "It will," he said, "I am afraid a little disappoint the Emperor, who would not believe what I told him repeatedly, that neither the present English Government nor any other would enter into prospective and contingent arrangements of the nature of those alluded to.

I reminded the Chancellor that your Lordship's answer was very much what I myself had led the Emperor to expect.

His Excellency acquainted me that he should have to transact business with the Emperor on the 19th instant, that he should then report to his Majesty the substance of the despatch, and that he would suggest a copy of it being prepared, as he thought it possible that his Majesty might desire me to wait upon him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 153.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 81.)

St. Petersburgh, February 17, 1853.

My Lord,

AS I am particularly anxious at this moment not only to be upon intimate terms with the French Minister but to let it be known that I am so, I called upon him this day, as I do now about twice a week, for the purpose of hearing what he might have to communicate, and of imparting any information which I might have to offer him.

I found M. de Castelbajac more reassured than I had lately seen him as to coming events, and possessed with the idea that present difficulties would be surmounted.

He did not conceal from me his objections to the gathering of Russian and Austrian troops in the vicinity of Turkey, but professed his belief in the fair intentions of the Emperors of both countries.

With regard to the 5th Corps d'Armée no doubt could, M. de Castelbajac said, exist as to its having received orders to complete its ranks, but no orders had been sent, he was confident, for their advance; neither did he think that any would be issued.

As regards the proposition made by the French Cabinet, General Castelbajac was, he said, ready to admit that he had not been empowered to enter into details—he had not been even enabled to do so by the information afforded him; he could, therefore, understand the expediency of the affair being discussed rather at Constantinople than here, and had written to Paris to say that the question to be decided was simply whether the Firman of last February, confirmed by the Sultan's letter, could be admitted by his Government as the basis of negotiation.

General Castelbajac then desired to read me a long despatch which he had addressed on the 14th and 15th instant to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in which he had endeavoured to lay before his Government his opinions as to the questions pending with Russia.

I am bound to say that a despatch written in a more conciliatory spirit I never listened to, and of its whole tenour the following quotations will enable your Lordship to judge:—

"The French Minister conjures his Government to omit no attempt for bringing the question of the Holy Places to an amicable solution, and states freely that should war break out in the East, there can be no doubt that its events must tend to give the Greeks much greater influence at Jerusalem than they now possess."

He then proceeds in a spirit of religious toleration, which I cannot too warmly commend, to observe that "it would be really deplorable if two Governments such as those of France and Russia were to engage in a quarrel about keys and doors in a manner excusable only in Greek and Latin monks; and that the scandal would be still greater if the scene of the quarrel were laid at the spot where Christ died for man, and in the presence of those unbelievers who would only find matter for laughing at both parties engaged in controversy."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 154.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 6.)

(No. 83.)

St. Petersburgh, February 18, 1853.

My Lord,

THE impression may be erroneous, but I cannot divest myself of the idea of Turkish affairs never having been in so critical a state as at present.

I am willing to believe that Russia may be induced to abstain both from open interference with the Sultan's authority, and from those alarming demonstrations which are calculated to produce the same results; but I should be sorry to conceal from your Lordship my persuasion that if a Russian force were to enter Turkey, the war which would ensue would in all probability be the last which would ever take place upon European soil in the defence of Turkish independence.

The belief, even if unfounded, is at least of a nature to induce me to omit no attempt at arresting a trial the result of which is so plainly before me.

With these ideas I held some conversation with Count Nesselrode yesterday, and omitted no consideration which I could call to mind to impress upon him the immense danger which would be incurred at the present moment by any rash step taken in the affairs of Turkey.

In addition to other considerations, the volcanic state of Italy, as proved by the late insane attempt at Milan, offered me a fresh argument in favour of prudence and caution on the part of those Governments who were more particularly interested in guarding against a renewal of the scenes of 1848.

I found Count Nesselrode less anxious about Eastern affairs than he and others had been three or four days ago; he even expressed his belief that all would yet be settled amicably, now that the Turkish armies were not seen to be advancing to the heart of Montenegro. This pause, he said, looked as if the mission confided to the Count de Leiningen were taking a favourable turn.

What particularly struck me was that upon this occasion Count Nesselrode never advocated Montenegrin independence; he spoke only of a return to the *status quo* hitherto existing in Montenegro. "And now," Count Nesselrode said, "put yourself into our position, and judge what you would have felt if a population looking to you during a century for assistance, your brothers in religious belief, a community whom you had fed when they had not bread to eat, had suddenly been threatened with extermination?" I begged Count Nesselrode to remember that the advice given to the Porte upon this matter by Her Majesty's Government had been of quite as merciful a character as any which he could have tendered; but observed that, although I deprecated contests of words, I should be always ready to prove by evidence that the

struggle which gave us all so much uneasiness had been provoked by the lawless and cruel behaviour of the Montenegrins.

After adverting to the attempts made by a Russian, Budberg by name, to stir up revolt in Bulgaria, I turned to the accounts which had reached me of the naval preparations at Sevastopol, observing that they were of a nature to increase materially the anxiety already felt by Her Majesty's Government.

Count Nesselrode surmised that I had been misinformed, and believed that the only preparation then making was that of a steamer fitting out for the conveyance of Prince Menchikoff.

Upon my assuring the Chancellor that it was hardly possible that any mistake should exist with regard to a point upon which I had received direct intelligence, he replied that he had no knowledge of any such preparations as I had alluded to, but that he should lose no time in speaking upon the subject to the Emperor.

I will not conclude my despatch without repeating that Count Nesselrode inveighed bitterly against the encroachments still carried on, as he asserts, by M. de Lavalette upon the rights of the Greek Church. They, he said, must be put a stop to, and the firm representations, in this sense, of Her Majesty's Government both at Paris and at Constantinople would conduce powerfully towards averting those serious consequences which England and Russia were so desirous of guarding against.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 155.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 9.)

(No. 87. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 21, 1853.

THE Emperor came up to me last night, at a party at the Grand Duchess Hereditary's, and in the most gracious manner took me apart, saying that he desired to speak to me. After expressing, in flattering terms, the confidence which he has in me, and his readiness to speak to me without reserve upon matters of the greatest moment, as, His Majesty observed, he had proved in a late conversation, he said: "And it is well it is so; for what I most desire is, that there should be the greatest intimacy between the two Governments: it never was so necessary as at present. Well," the Emperor continued, "so you have got your answer, and you are to bring it to me to-morrow?"

"I am to have that honour, sir," I answered; "but your Majesty is aware that the nature of the reply is very exactly what I had led you to expect."

"So I was sorry to hear; but I think your Government does not well understand my object. I am not so eager about what shall be done when the Bear dies, as I am to determine with England what shall not be done upon that event taking place."

"But, sir," I replied, "allow me to observe, that we have no reason to think that the Bear (to use your Majesty's expression) is dying. We are as much interested as we believe your Majesty to be in his continuing to live; while for myself, I will venture to remark that experience shows me that countries do not die in such a hurry. I have seen by our archives, both in Turkey and Portugal, that these two countries have for years past been considered in a perishing state, and yet there they remain; and there Turkey will remain for many a year, unless some unforeseen crisis should occur. It is precisely, sir, for the avoidance of all circumstances likely to produce such a crisis, that Her Majesty's Government reckons upon your generous assistance."

"Then," rejoined the Emperor, "I will tell you, that if your Government has been led to believe that Turkey retains any elements of existence, your Government must have received incorrect information. I repeat to you, that the Bear is dying: you may give him musk, but even musk will not long keep him alive; and we can never allow such an event to take us by surprise. We must come to some understanding; and this we should do, I am convinced

if I could hold but ten minutes' conversation with your Ministers—with Lord Aberdeen, for instance, who knows me so well, who has full confidence in me, as I have in him. And remember, I do not ask for a treaty or a protocol; a general understanding is all I require—that between gentlemen is sufficient; and in this case I am certain that the confidence would be as great on the side of the Queen's Ministers as on mine. So no more for the present; you will come to me to-morrow, and you will remember that as often as you think your conversing with me will promote a good understanding upon any point, you will send word that you wish to see me."

I thanked His Majesty very cordially, adding that I could assure him that Her Majesty's Government, I was convinced, considered his word, once given, as good as a bond.

It is hardly necessary that I should observe to your Lordship, that this short conversation, briefly but correctly reported, offers matter for most anxious reflection.

It can hardly be otherwise but that the Sovereign who insists with such pertinacity upon the impending fall of a neighbouring State, must have settled in his own mind that the hour, if not of its dissolution, at all events for its dissolution, must be at hand.

I will only remark to your Lordship, as a point of evidence which goes far towards establishing a settled purpose, that the expression of "musk being insufficient to keep alive the sinking Turk," was used to me ten days ago by one of the Emperor's most confidential servants.

Then, as now, I reflected that this assumption would hardly be ventured upon unless some, perhaps general, but at all events intimate understanding, existed between Russia and Austria.

Supposing my suspicion to be well-founded, the Emperor's object is to engage Her Majesty's Government, in conjunction with his own Cabinet and that of Vienna, in some scheme for the ultimate partition of Turkey, and for the exclusion of France from the arrangement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 156.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 6.)

(No. 88. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, February* 22, 1853.

I HAD the honour of waiting yesterday upon the Emperor, and of holding with His Majesty one of the most interesting conversations in which I ever found myself engaged. My only regret is my inability to report in full detail a dialogue which lasted an hour and twelve minutes.

The Emperor began by desiring me to read to him aloud your Lordship's "Secret and Confidential" despatch, marked No. 38, saying that he should stop me occasionally, either to make an observation, or to call upon me for the translation of a passage.

Upon arriving at the fourth paragraph, the Emperor desired me to pause, and observed, that he was certainly most desirous that some understanding should be entered into with her Majesty's Government, for providing against a contingency so probable as that of the downfall of Turkey; that he was, perhaps, even more interested than England could be in preventing a Turkish catastrophe, but that it was constantly impending; that it might be brought about at any moment, either by an external war, or by a feud between the old Turkish party and that of the "new superficial French reforms," or again, by a rising of the Christians, already known to be very impatient of shaking off the Mussulman yoke ("joug"). As regards the first cause, the Emperor said that he had a good right to advert to it, inasmuch as, if he had not stopped the victorious progress of General Diebitch in 1829, the Sultan's authority would have been at an end.

The Emperor likewise desired me to remember that he, and he only, had

hastened to the assistance of the Sultan, when his dominions were threatened by the Pasha of Egypt.

I proceeded to read, and was again stopped at the sentence beginning, "In these circumstances it would hardly be consistent with the friendly feelings," when the Emperor observed, "that Her Majesty's Government did not appear to be aware that his chief object was to obtain from Her Majesty's Government some declaration, or even opinion, of what ought not to be permitted in the event of the sudden downfall of Turkey." I said, "Perhaps your Majesty would be good enough to explain your own ideas upon this negative policy" This His Majesty for some time declined doing; he ended, however, by saying: "Well, there are several things which I never will tolerate; I will begin by ourselves, I will not tolerate the permanent occupation of Constantinople by the Russians; having said this, I will say that it never shall be held by the English, or French, or any other great nation. Again, I never will permit an attempt at the reconstruction of a Byzantine Empire, or such an extension of Greece as would render her a powerful State; still less will I permit the breaking up of Turkey into little republics, asylums for the Kossuths and Mazzinis, and other revolutionists of Europe; rather than submit to any of these arrangements I would go to war, and as long as I have a man and a musket left would carry it on.

"These," the Emperor said, "are at once some ideas, now give me some in return." I remarked upon the assurance which would be found respecting the English resolution of never attempting to possess Constantinople, and upon the disinclination of Her Majesty's Government to enter into eventual arrangements; but upon being still pressed by His Imperial Majesty, I said: "Well, sir, the idea may not suit your Majesty, may not suit Her Majesty's Government; but what is good between man and man is often a good system between one State and another;—how would it be if in the event of any catastrophe occurring in Turkey, Russia and England were to declare that no Power should be allowed to take possession of its provinces,—that the property should remain, as it were, under seals until amicable arrangements could be made as to its adjudication?"

"I will not say," the Emperor observed, "that such a course would be impossible, but, at least, it would be very difficult; there are no elements of provincial or communal government in Turkey: you would have Turks attacking Christians, Christians falling upon Turks, Christians of different sects quarrelling with each other,; in short, chaos and anarchy."

"Sir," I then observed, "if your Majesty will allow me to speak plainly, I would say that the great difference between us is this, that you continue to dwell upon the fall of Turkey, and the arrangements requisite before and after the fall; and that we, on the contrary, look to Turkey remaining where she is, and to the precautions which are necessary for preventing her condition from becoming worse." "Ah!" replied the Emperor, "that is what the Chancellor is perpetually telling me, but the catastrophe will occur some day and will take us all unawares."

I request your Lordship's attention to the accidental evidence thus obtained, of the wisdom and prudence of Count Nesselrode's views.

His Imperial Majesty spoke of France; "God forbid," he said, "that I should accuse any one wrongfully, but there are circumstances both at Constantinople and Montenegro which are extremely suspicious; it looks very much as if the French Government were endeavouring to embroil us all in the East, hoping in this way the better to arrive at their own objects, one of which, no doubt, is the possession of Tunis."

The Emperor proceeded to say, that for his own part he cared very little what line the French might think proper to take in Eastern affairs, and that little more than a month ago he had apprised the Sultan that if his assistance were required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan!

In a word, the Emperor went on to observe, as I before told you, "All I want is a good understanding with England, and this not as to what shall, but as to what shall not be done; this point arrived at, the English Government and I, I and the English Government, having entire confidence in one another's views, I care nothing about the rest."

I remarked that I felt confident that Her Majesty's Government could be

as little disposed as His Imperial Majesty to tolerate the presence of the French at Constantinople; and being desirous, if possible, of ascertaining whether there were any understanding between the Cabinets of St. Petersburgh and Vienna, I added, "But your Majesty has forgotten Austria; now all these Eastern questions affect her very nearly; she, of course would expect to be consulted."

"Oh!" replied the Emperor, greatly to my surprise, "but you must understand that when I speak of Russia, I speak of Austria as well; what suits the one, suits the other, our interests as regards Turkey are perfectly identical." I should have been glad to have made another inquiry or two upon this subject, but I did not venture to do so.

I ought to have stated that in a preceding part of the conversation, His Majesty, although without any appearance of anger, expressed some surprise at an expression in your Lordship's despatch, "the long cherished ambition of his (the Emperor's) own nation," he would ask what that phrase meant?

It happened that I was prepared for the surprise expressed, and ready to answer any reflection which it might call forth.

"Sir," I said, "Lord John Russell is not speaking of your ambition, he speaks of that entertained by your people."

The Emperor could not at first admit that the phrase was applicable to the Russian nation any more than to himself, when I said, "Your Majesty will permit me to remark that Lord John Russell only repeats what was said thirty years ago by your brother, of glorious memory. In writing confidentially to Lord Castlereagh in the year 1822, the Emperor Alexander spoke of being the only Russian who resisted the views of his subjects upon Turkey, and of the loss of popularity which he had sustained by this antagonism."

This quotation which, by accident, I could make almost in the words of the letter, seemed to change the current of the Emperor's ideas. "You are quite right," he said; "I remember the events to which my late brother alluded; now it is perfectly true that the Empress Catherine indulged in all sorts of visions of ambition, but it is not less so that these ideas are not at all shared by her descendants.

"You see how I am behaving towards the Sultan. This gentleman ('ce Monsieur') breaks his written work to me, and acts in a manner extremely displeasing to me, and I have contented myself with despatching an Ambassador to Constantinople to demand reparation; certainly I could send an army there if I chose, there is nothing to stop them, but I have contented myself with such a show of force as will prove that I have no intention of being trifled with."

"And, sir," I said, "you were quite right in refraining from violence, and I hope upon future occasions you will act with the same moderation; for your Majesty must be sensible that any fresh concession which have been obtained by the Latins are not referable to ill-will towards you, but to the excessive apprehensions of the French entertained by the unfortunate Turks; besides sir," I observed, "the danger I will venture to say, of the present moment is not Turkey, but that revolutionary spirit which broke out four years ago, and which, in many countries, still burns under-ground; there is the danger, and no doubt that a war in Turkey would be the signal for fresh explosions in Italy, Hungary, and elsewhere. We see what is passing at Milan."

The Emperor, to my extreme surprise, after observing that I was right, and that in many countries the soil was mined by revolutionists, remarked that even here the elements of trouble were not wanting, that the same subterranean fire existed in Russia.

I thought it right to express surprise at there being here any danger of revolution, hoping that His Majesty might enter into some particulars; he, however, only added, "Mais certainement ces éléments de révolution ne manquent pas chez nous; si le danger de les voir éclater est moindre, c'est seulement que chez nous les moyens de repression sont plus forts qu'ailleurs."

His Imperial Majesty spoke of Montenegro, observing that he approved of the attitude taken by the Austrian Cabinet, and that in these days it could not be permitted that the Turks should illtreat and even murder a Christian population.

I ventured to remark that upon this point the wrongs were at least divided between the Turks and the Montenegrins, and that I had full reason for believing that the provocation came from the latter. The Emperor, with more impartiality than I had expected, admitted that there had been wrongs

on both sides; that certainly the Mountaineers were rather addicted to brigandage, and that the taking of Djablak had caused him great indignation. "At the same time," His Majesty said, "it is impossible not to feel great interest in a population warmly attached to their religion, who have so long kept their ground against the Turks;" and the Emperor continued, "It may be fair to tell you that if any attempts at exterminating those people should be made by Omer Pasha, and should a general rising of the Christians take place in consequence, the Sultan will in all probability lose his throne; in this case he falls to rise no more. I wish to support his authority, but if he loses it, it is gone for ever. The Turkish Empire is a thing to be tolerated, not to be reconstructed; in such a cause I protest to you I will not allow a pistol to be fired."

The Emperor went on to say that in the event of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, he thought it might be less difficult to arrive at a satisfactory territorial arrangement than was commonly believed. "The Principalities are," he said, "in fact, an independent State under my protection; this might so continue, Servia might receive the same form of Government, so again with Bulgaria, there seems to be no reason why this province should not form an independent State.

"As to Egypt, I quite understand the importance to England of that territory. I can then only say, that if, in the event of a distribution of the Ottoman succession upon the fall of the Empire, you should take possession of Egypt, I shall have no objections to offer. I would say the same thing of Candia; that island might suit you, and I do not know why it should not become an English possession."

As I did not wish that the Emperor should imagine that an English public servant was caught by this sort of overture, I simply answered, that I had always understood that the English views upon Egypt did not go beyond the point of securing a safe and ready communication between British India and the mother country.

The conversation now drawing towards an end, the Emperor expressed his warm attachment to the Queen, our gracious Sovereign, and his respect for Her Majesty's present advisers. The declarations contained in your Lordship's despatch had been, he said, very satisfactory; he could only desire that they should be a little amplified. The terms in which your Lordship had spoken of his conduct, were, the Emperor said, very flattering to him.

In dismissing me, His Imperial Majesty said: "Well, induce your Government to write again upon these subjects—to write more fully, and to do so without hesitation; I have confidence in the English Government. Ce n'est point un engagement, une Convention, que je leur demande; c'est un libre échange d'idées, et au besoin une parole de *gentleman*; entre nous cela suffit."

As sometimes a little concession to the Emperor will produce a greater amount on his part, I would venture to suggest to your Lordship that perhaps Her Majesty's Government might not object to stating any point or points in which their opinion may agree with that of the Emperor as to the course or courses which are not to be pursued at Constantinople. I might venture further to suggest, that some expressions might be used in the despatch to be addressed to me, which might have the effect of putting an end to the further consideration, or, at all events, discussion, of points which it is highly desirable should not be regarded as offering subject for debate.

I may only add, apologetically, that I may possibly have failed in reporting some parts of His Majesty's conversation, and that I am conscious of having forgotten the precise terms employed by him with respect to the commercial policy to be observed at Constantinople when no longer held by the Turks.

The purport of the observation was, that England and Russia had a common interest in providing for the readiest access to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

A copy of your Lordship's despatch was left in the Emperor's hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 157.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 11.)

(No. 151. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, March* 10, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS having sent this morning to express a desire to see me, I waited upon him this afternoon. He read to me extracts of a despatch and private letter, dated the 1st instant, which he had received this morning from St. Petersburgh.

The contents of them are very satisfactory. It appears that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not been pleased with the answer of the Russian Cabinet to the conciliatory overtures which he had made some time back for the settlement of the question of the Holy Places; and that he had, on the 17th of last month (while I was in England), addressed a despatch to M. Castelbajac, in which he had stated, that if the Russian Government replied to the conciliatory overtures of France by recriminations, there would be no hope of establishing an understanding between the two Governments. M. Castelbajac reports, that Count Nesselrode had been much distressed at finding that which he had intended to be a simple statement of facts, looked upon by the French Government in the light of a recrimination. The Count had assured him that the Emperor had received with a lively satisfaction the conciliatory declarations of France, and desired to respond to them in the same terms, and that he had every hope that the question of the Sacred Places would now be settled without any disturbance of the peace of the East. The recall of M. de Lavalette and the appointments of M.M. de la Cour and Bourqueney were looked upon as an earnest of the good intentions of the Emperor of the French.

Count Nesselrode had further expressed to M. de Castelbajac the opinion, that the danger which menaced the East was greatly reduced by the success of Count Leiningen's mission. The intelligence of it had given the Emperor so much pleasure, that he had rushed out of breath to communicate it to the Empress. The Emperor, Count Nesselrode assured M. Castelbajac, would be too happy to act with France to prevent a dissolution of the Turkish Empire. It was the last thing which His Imperial Majesty desired. The movements of troops towards the Turkish frontier were not made with any intention of attacking the Turkish Empire, but were, on the contrary, intended to prevent its dissolution, by acting on the fears of the Turkish Ministers, to force them to give way on points, a persistance in which would bring about the catastrophe all wanted to avoid.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated further, that his reports from Vienna, in regard to Turkey, gave him equal satisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 158.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 12.)

(No. 48.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, February* 15, 1853.

YOUR Lordship will be glad to learn that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on me yesterday, and gave me satisfactory assurances respecting the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Russia towards Turkey.

He informed me also that, the health of Madame de Titow being much improved, M. de Titow would return to Constantinople during the course of the summer, to resume his duties as Russian Envoy here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 159.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 59.)

Constantinople, February 22, 1853.

My Lord,

IN compliance with the instructions in your Lordship's despatch No. 16, I brought, at the earliest moment, the important considerations which it contains before Fuad Effendi, taking care not to furnish his Excellency with a copy of the despatch, or of any of its inclosures.

Fuad Effendi listened with marked attention to the powerful reasoning in your Lordship's despatch, which I translated to him into French, dwelling on, and drawing his Excellency's particular attention to, all those passages which bore on the policy which the Porte ought to follow under existing circumstances.

I endeavoured to induce his Excellency to come into the views of Her Majesty's Government respecting the advantage of the Porte's sanctioning any arrangement about the Holy Places, which might be recommended for its adoption conjointly by the French and Russian Governments.

Fuad Effendi did not seem to approve the plan, alleging that it would be an acknowledgment of the right of Russia to interfere in and protect the Greek interest in Turkey; and he put off further conversation on the subject by saying, that it would be better to await the arrival of M. Brennier.

I have reason to believe that M. de Klezl failed also in inducing the Porte to act in the sense recommended by Her Majesty's, and, as it would appear, by the Emperor of Austria's Government also.

However, on receiving your Lordship's despatch* No. 19, with its important inclosures, I was enabled to renew, with more efficacy, my arguments in favour of the adoption of your Lordship's suggestions.

Your Lordship will be glad to hear that Fuad Effendi yielded; he said that he now viewed the matter much as I did, and that he would recommend the Council to adopt the suggestions of Her Majesty's Government.

I venture to congratulate your Lordship on the favourable manner in which the Governments of France and Russia have received the well-timed advice of Her Majesty's Government, conveyed to them by your Lordship in language as persuasive as it was unanswerable, respecting the settlement of the question of the Holy Places. I anticipate the best result from this mode of proceeding, which I had the honour to recommend in my despatches of last year to the Earl of Malmesbury. The wisdom and influence of Great Britain must ultimately prevail, when she appeals in the name of Christianity, policy and humanity, to France and Russia not to plunge Europe in perhaps interminable war on account of a dispute as to the scenes of the sufferings of Him who died telling mankind to pay evil with good. Such a war would be a great hypocrisy, and an irreparable injury to Christianity. It would be a proclamation to the infidel world that great Christian and civilized Powers sacrificed the heavenly to the worldly part of their religion, its perfect essentials to the puerilities and passions with which man has disfigured it; that Christians, for the sake of an inanimate symbol, or a sectarian triumph of their religion, violate its most important precepts

But having watched this deplorable contention, and the actors in it, so vigilantly and so long, it is my duty to tell your Lordship that I anticipate far more good from the counsels of Her Majesty's Government to France and Russia than from the direct negotiations between those Powers themselves.

If they give due weight to the rights of public opinion, peace, and Christian obligations, the difference will be speedily settled. But if they both strive for political influence in the East, France bringing forward her ill-omened Treaty, and Russia her right to protect Greek Rayas, they will never agree.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

---

* Inclosing copies of correspondence with Lord Cowley, Lord Westmoreland, and Lord Bloomfield.

No. 160.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 62.)

Constantinople, February 25, 1853.

My Lord,

SOME days ago M. de Lavalette told me that a Russian Commissioner would come here.

On the evening of the 23rd instant, M. d'Ozeroff told me at his house that he had heard, by a Russian war-steamer which had arrived that morning, that there was a report at Odessa that a Russian Ambassador would shortly embark at Odessa for Constantinople, but that he had no information whatever on this subject except this report.

Yesterday the usual Russian post-steamer arrived, bringing a Colonel Kohlkoff, who, it was understood, was an aide-de-camp preceding the arrival of a Russian personage, coming here on a mission.

This morning M. d'Ozeroff sent M. Balabine to me to inform me, with his compliments, that Prince Menchikoff would arrive here in the beginning of next week, in a Russian war-steamer, with the rank and title of an Ambassador; he added, that Prince Menchikoff has the title of Altesse Sérénissime, is an Admiral, Governor-General of Finland, and of the same category as Count Nesselrode, Prince Paskevitch, Prince Woronzoff, and Count Orloff.

M. de Balabine's object was evidently to make me understand that a more important person in Russia could not have been selected for this embassy than Prince Menchikoff, who is accompanied by a son of Count Nesselrode.

Your Lordship will be pleased to observe that no mention of this embassy is made in any of the despatches from Russia, lately sent to me by your Lordship, although the circumstance of the Prince being Governor of Finland, looks as if his destination for Constantinople must have been determined some time since; and the analogy of Count Leiningen's being brought from Cracow, of which he is Governor, with Prince Menchikoff's being called from Finland, induces the impression that both emissaries were sent in the manner most likely to preclude observation.

M. de Balabine could give me no information respecting the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission, of which he stated M. d'Ozeroff was wholly ignorant. But he observed that His Highness was a "personne posée," and that I should get on very well with him.

Fuad Effendi supposes that Prince Menchikoff comes about the questions of the Holy Places and Montenegro.

M. d'Ozeroff has lately expressed himself to me with much frankness and good feeling, respecting the question of the Holy Places; he apologised for the reserve which he had observed for a length of time as to this matter, stating as the reason that he had been in the most unfortunate position of being wholly without instructions for upwards of two months.

I replied in the most friendly manner, thanking M. d'Ozeroff for his confidence.

M. d'Ozeroff said, that his merely personal opinion was that the Emperor would not seek to disturb the arrangements lately made by the Porte respecting the Holy Places, but would require satisfactory assurances respecting them for the future.

I have the conviction that M. d'Ozeroff's opinion as to Russia not disturbing the late arrangements as to the Holy Places is perfectly correct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 161.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 64.)

Constantinople, February 26, 1853.

My Lord,

I HEARD last night, from good authority, that Prince Menchikoff's mission would embrace all unsettled claims or differences between Russia and the Porte, including the long-standing one as to the frontier between the Caucasus and Turkey.

Prince Menchikoff's Embassy consists of twelve persons; and from all I hear, I am inclined to think that His Highness's object will rather be to re-establish Russian influence, and settle, favourably to Russia, Russian differences with the Porte by diplomatic, rather than by hostile means, although, of course, the concentration of Russian troops in Bessarabia will be made use of to give weight to her negotiation, if necessary.

However, neither that concentration nor the Embassy of Prince Menchikoff has produced near the same alarm at Constantinople that was caused by Count Leiningen's unexpected appearance.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 162.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 65.)

Constantinople, February 26, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to ask your Lordship's permission to correct a mistake which is contained in the following passage in Sir H. Seymour's despatch, No. 2, of the 6th of January last, to your Lordship.

"Again, if, as Colonel Rose announces in his despatch No. 155, the Porte intends to take upon itself the office of settling conflicting claims, with a view to making a concession to the Latins at the expense of the Greeks, I can hardly doubt that the Sultan, acting as umpire, will lose almost the only advantage which he now enjoys in the affair; and that instead of being considered, as at present, a sufferer from disputes in which he has no concern, he will be regarded by the Russians as the violator of promises, very recently and very solemnly given to the Emperor and his co-religionists."

With reference to this passage, I beg leave to say, that the Porte, that is the Sultan, is the territorial Sovereign of the Holy Places, and that, consequently, the Sultans of Turkey, from the time that Jerusalem fell under their rule, have always acted as sole judges of the differences which have arisen for ages between the Greeks and Latins; there cannot be a better proof of this than the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 16, which directs me to bring to the Porte's notice the advantage, for political reasons, of her consenting to a certain modification of her territorial rights over the Holy Places.

And the Sultan cannot be regarded as the violator of promises, because the decision which His Majesty gave, as to the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem, to the Latins, is in strict conformity with the written promises which the Porte gave to the Latins in her note of the 9th of February 1852, promises which were confirmed by the Firman to the Greeks, mi-Février, as appears from the inclosed copy of a report from the first interpreter of Her Majesty's Embassy. The Russian Legation knew perfectly well, for the reasons stated by M. Pisani, that the Firman to the Greeks granted the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem to the Latins; and it was because they know this, that M. d'Ozeroff endeavoured, by means of a vizirial letter, to nullify the Porte's promise as to the key, formally recorded in an official note to the French Embassy, as well as in the very Firman obtained by M. de Titoff. The late decision of the Porte, I am happy to say, has been justly termed by Her Majesty's Ambassador, an "equitable" one. I have more than

once had the honour to report my conviction that Russia would never, in any written document, impugn or endeavour to prove the injustice of that decision; the cause of my conviction, which the result has proved to be well-founded, was that Russia could not do so. I beg now to register another conviction, that Russia will never go to war on account of that decision. And it is apposite to consider what could have happened, if the Porte had not fulfilled her formal promises contained in the note of the 9th of February, and conceded to France by virtue of treaty. M. de Lavalette has assured me at least eight or nine times lately, on his honour and confidentially, that if the Porte had not fulfilled those promises, France would have made war on her; and he has read, confidentially, despatches and parts of despatches to me from his Government, which induce me to believe that declaration. And another evil must have resulted from the Porte's breach of promise to France; her Emperor would have held the Treaty of 1740 in her hand, and said, "I go to war on account of a broken treaty. The Powers which had great influence with the Porte never used it in favour of the inviolability of treaty, because the Treaty as to the Holy Places was a French one, which did not affect their interests; the day may come when I shall think as little of the treaties which curtail France's Empire."

It will be satisfactory to your Lordship to know that the Russian Legation, and the heads of the Greek interest here, ecclesiastical as well as lay, now acknowledge that the decision of the Porte, as to the Holy Places, is founded on treaty.

In a further despatch, I shall have the honour to submit to your Lordship details respecting the Cupola, the only remaining cause of discussion as to the Sanctuaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 162.

Memorandum by M. E. Pisani.

Constantinople, February 26, 1853.

IT is essential to be remembered that the Russian Envoy, M. de Titoff, was duly informed, through his first interpreter, of the intention, and subsequently of the decision, of the Porte to yield and accede to the arrangement contained in the note which was sent in to the French Embassy on the 9th of February, 1852, touching the Sanctuaries of Jerusalem. When the Porte communicated the contents of the said note to M. de Titoff, and also offered to give him some explanation on the subject, he refused to receive any oral or written declaration, explaining the motives and grounds upon which the Porte was compelled to concede to the Latins the right of officiating at the Holy Virgin's Shrine, and to grant them the key of the principal door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also one of the keys of each of the two doors of the Crib. M. de Titoff fears that the concessions made to the Latins would increase the pretensions of the French, and embolden them to seek for more advantages, induced him to protest against any arrangement which would have for effect to change the *status quo* of actual possession.

In order to dissipate the apprehensions entertained by the Russian Envoy, the Porte proposed to grant a Firman to the Greek community, explaining the arrangement entered into, and giving guarantees for the future. In that Firman it is clearly stated, that the three keys (the grant of which was so long resisted by the Russians) were to be given to the Latins.

Before concluding, I think myself called upon to observe that M. de Titoff was duly apprised of the Porte's intention to give the note, which was presented to M. de Lavalette on the 9th of February last; and that the Firman, which was subsequently given to the Greek Patriarchs of Jerusalem and Constantinople, and in which the three keys are distinctly mentioned, was for several days under the consideration of the Russian Envoy, who amended it according to his wish.

When Afif Bey was sent to Jerusalem to carry into execution the arrange-

ment as contained in the note given to M. de Lavalette, M. d'Ozeroff, who succeeded M. de Titoff, applied to, and obtained from, the Porte a vizirial letter, instructing Afif Bey to endeavour to avoid giving the keys in question to the Latins. But this could not in fairness be executed, and Afif Bey thought it his duty to carry into effect his former instructions.

No. 163.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 66.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, February 26, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a Report which I have just received from M. Pisani at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 163.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

Sublime Porte, February 26, 1853.

Sir,

M. ARGYROPULO waited this morning on Fuad Effendi, to acquaint him with the expected arrival of Prince Menchikoff, as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Czar, and to request him to issue the necessary orders for the ceremonial to be performed on this occasion.

M. Argyropulo said nothing touching the object of the Prince's mission; but only stated that his Highness was of a very conciliatory character, and a very pleasant person. He also stated that he had a very numerous retinue, and that amongst the number were one General and a Vice-Admiral, who will remain here only a few days, and that the Prince himself would in all probability make a stay at Constantinople of three or four months.

Your message, which I have duly delivered to Fuad Effendi and the Grand Vizier, did not fail to produce the desired effect.

Fuad Effendi told me that you can announce to Lord John Russell that ere long the Firman relative to the Armenian Protestants will be promulgated throughout the provinces.

To my great surprise, I am informed that Ahmed Fetkee Pasha has just succeeded Kiamil Pasha in the Board of Commerce.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 164.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 67.)
My Lord,

Constantinople, February 26, 1853.

AFTER the French steamer, which arrived here on the 22nd instant, M. de Lavalette informed the Diplomatic Body that M. Brennier would not come here, on account of indisposition; that he would take his departure by the French steam-packet on the 25th, and that M. Benedetti would succeed him as Chargé d'Affaires. As yet I have heard nothing but surmises as to this unexpected change. But M. de Lavalette is stated to have told some of his countrymen, after the arrival of the French steamer, that he regretted that he had ever had anything to do with the question of the Holy Places, as no one thanked him for the part he had taken in it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 165.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 14.)

(No. 101. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 1, 1853.

I LEARN from one of my diplomatic acquaintances that he overheard by accident a conversation which passed last week at the palace fête between the Emperor and Count Zichy, a visitor, and I believe a casual one, at St. Petersburgh.

His Imperial Majesty, as I had an opportunity of observing, went up to Count Zichy as he sat at supper and spoke with him during some minutes.

It now appears that his Majesty stated "that he had just been writing to the Emperor of Austria," and that he added, "in this letter, which will be conveyed by Baron de Lieven, I have told his Majesty that I approve highly of the threatening attitude which he has taken against the Turks, and that I hope he will not recede from it, as I know well that nothing is to be obtained from that people but under menace. I feel the more strongly upon the subject, as I am convinced that the refugees and renegades in the Turkish service are in communication with the revolutionary committees, and are endeavouring to carry out their objects."

I took the liberty to remark to my informant that what he had heard stated as a fact was, I was disposed to believe, a mere conjecture or assumption, and that I must be allowed to say that it appeared to me extraordinary that advice so well calculated to overthrow the Sultan's authority and to light up a war in Europe should proceed from a monarch who professed his undeviating attachment to Conservative principles.

I will only add that the impression left upon the mind of my acquaintance (who has followed the late transactions in Turkey attentively) is that the hostile disposition manifested by the Emperor of Austria towards the Sultan is the result of the feelings of resentment occasioned by the hospitable reception given by his Highness to the Hungarian exiles.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 166.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 141.)
My Lord,

Paris, March 13, 1853.

SINCE I last wrote to your Lordship the French Government has received the despatches which have been so long expected from Constantinople. They are dated the 14th and 24th ultimo, and had been delayed by bad weather. M. de Lavalette has also reached Paris, and has completed by word of mouth the history of the late events in the Ottoman capital.

As your Lordship will ere this be in possession of the same details from Colonel Rose, it is not necessary that I should say more than that the French Government, although rejoicing that the matter is terminated, are not the less sensible of the humiliation to which the Porte has been subjected by the haughty conduct of Austria.

I understand that M. de Lavalette's language respecting the internal state of Turkey is so far satisfactory, that he does not see any extraordinary signs of an impending dissolution of the Empire, or that it is so depressed as not to be able to make a successful rally.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

No. 167.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 69.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 8, 1853.*

A PAINFUL sensation was caused here by the following incident, which occurred yesterday.

Prince Menchikoff paid his official visit to the Grand Vizier at the Porte, but purposely omitted to pay it to Fuad Effendi, who was ready to receive him.

I have entered into communication on the subject with the Russian Embassy; my representations were received, I am bound in justice to say, in the most friendly manner, and I have hopes that this inauspicious commencement of the Russian Ambassador's mission may not lead to the untoward results which were at first anticipated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 168.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 70.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 6, 1853.*

M. D'OZEROFF had told me that the approaching Russian negotiations with the Porte were to be carried on in conformity with a "parfaite entente entre nos deux Gouvernemens," and that he would consult me as to, and tell me everything respecting them. As everything I heard and saw was entirely opposed to these declarations, and as it was most important that I should be able to acquaint your Lordship either with the tenour of Prince Menchikoff's intended negotiation, or with his refusal to make it known to me, I asked M. d'Ozeroff whether, in consideration of his previous assurances, he would have the goodness to tell me, generally, what Prince Menchikoff intended to demand from the Porte. M. d'Ozeroff was extremely embarrassed and somewhat annoyed, and, after exhibiting much reluctance, told me that as regards Montenegro, Prince Menchikoff would give "des conseilles et des admonitions" to the Porte, but that that matter was over now.

Secondly, as regards the Holy Places, the negotiations, he believed, would refer to the future, and not to the past; that, finally, Prince Menchikoff had a secret mission to the Sultan of the nature of which he, M. d'Ozeroff, was wholly ignorant.

I hear from Greek persons of high mercantile standing, that it is certain that one of Prince Menchikoff's demands will be that the Porte should abstain for the future from taking any part in the election of the Greek Patriarchs, or the affairs of the Greek Church, and that these matters for the future should be left to the Greek Church and the Emperor of Russia; further, that the *status quo* of the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre should be maintained, that is, that the cupola should belong to Russia. This last point, if agreed to by the Porte, would probably cause war with France, as she declares that the treaty of 1740 gives her a right to possess and to repair the cupola, and that she will never yield that right, although she would consent to a modification of it, but which modification would be a breach of the *status quo* of the cupola insisted on by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 169.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 71.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 6, 1853.*

IN my despatch No. 62, I had the honour to inform your Lordship that M. d'Ozeroff had told me, that he had a report from Odessa that a Russian Ambassador would shortly embark at Odessa for Constantinople; but that he had no information whatever on this subject except this report. I have learnt since, from a colleague, that he had told him the same.

Your Lordship will see in that same despatch that M. de Balabine told me that he could give me no information respecting the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission, of which, he stated, M. d'Ozeroff was wholly ignorant.

Your Lordship will then be surprised to hear that, the next day, M. de Kleal dined with me, and told me confidentially that, some days ago, M. d'Ozeroff had told him that Prince Menchikoff was to come here as Ambassador, and that one of the matters which he was to treat with the Porte, was the important question of the disputed Russo-Turkish frontier in the vicinity of Kars, of which I inclose a map.

Therefore, your Lordship will see that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires purposely misled his British colleague as to an important matter which he had confided to his Austrian colleague; and his doing so was the more singular, because when M. d'Ozeroff had told me, a few days before, that he had heard that a "parfaite entente" existed between our Governments as to the approaching negotiations here, I answered him in a manner which entitled me to all his confidence. I also made known to him, and M. de Balabine, such portions of the St. Petersburgh correspondence, sent to me by your Lordship, as I could fitly do, and for which he expressed himself extremely grateful, as he had received no instructions from his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 169.

[Map of the Turkish Frontier near Kars.]

No. 170.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 72.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 6, 1853.*

M. D'OZEROFF made to me an important statement last night.

He said that the meaning of the Firman to the Greeks, of mi-Février, 1852, being rather doubtful as to the key, the Russian Legation had obtained a secret order to the Pasha of Jerusalem, instructing him that the key of the great door of the Church of Bethlehem had been given to the Latins with the view to content them; but that he was to endeavour to avoid giving them the key, and to do his best to "leur fermer la bouche."

In a previous despatch, I have already had the honour to report this fact; the substance of this statement which is now confirmed by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires himself.

Your Lordship is aware that the cession of this key is the main cause of the alleged grievances of the Russian Government as to the question of the Sanctuaries. I beg your Lordship to observe that the Firman of the "mi-Février" was given to the Greeks, at the demand of the Russian Legation, as a sort of set-off against the note of the 9th of February, 1852, given by the Porte to the French Embassy. That note gave the key in question to the Latins.

The Porte gave the Firman of the "mi-Février" to M. de Titoff, in order

that he might alter and correct it to his liking: he had it in his possession for a fortnight. M. de Titoff felt that he could not take so strong a step as to alter the passage in the Firman which gave the key in question to the Latins, in conformity with the Treaty of 1740, and the finding of the decision of the Ulema; he therefore merely inserted in the Firman passages which contradicted, as it were, or threw in doubt the concession to the Latins recorded in the Firman with respect to the key and the Tomb of the Virgin, by inserting that the *status quo* as to the Holy Places was maintained—that nothing as to them was changed.

The Russian Representative so far forgot himself as to try and give a doubtful meaning to the Turkish Sovereign's engagement, registered in an official document bearing his signature; and fearing afterwards, or rather feeling, that the engagement was not shaken by the attempted contradiction, he induces that same Sovereign's *alter ego*, the Grand Vizier, to write secretly a letter to the Porte's Commissioner, urging him to do what he could to break that engagement, and to "fermer la bouche" of those with whom faith had been broken. Thus acts the Russian Envoy in February and the spring of 1852, and on the 5th of March, 1853, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires tells Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires of these acts of his Envoy, with the view to make out that the secret letter, which enjoined the breaking of the Sultan's faith, pledged to the French Envoy in an official note, and announced to the Russian Envoy and the Greek nation in a Firman, gave the Russian Government a right to complain, because the provisions of that dishonourable letter had not been fulfilled.

From the ill-fated time that France revived her Treaty of 1740, and demanded dormant or neglected rights as to the Holy Places, the Porte, in her weakness, has been coerced by France and Russia to give contradictory decisions.

Nor can I give your Lordship a better idea of the humiliating position in which the Turkish Ministers were placed by the conflicting claims and coercive manners of these powerful suitors, than by quoting a recent speech of M. de Lavalette: "Ma foi, Fuad Effendi a dit des mensonges atroces, mais à sa place je crois que j'en aurais fait autant."

Some recent confidential conversations with M. d'Ozeroff and M. de Balabine, convince me that it is the object of Russian policy to engage Her Majesty's Government and their representative here to ignore the validity of the French Treaty of 1740. I told these gentlemen that I thought that it would be wise and politic for Her Majesty's Government, appealing to the civilization, the religion, humanity, and good sense of France, to use all her influence to induce her to be satisfied with what she had already gained by her Treaty, and not to appeal to it again. But that, should all these modes of persuasion prove fruitless, I would never advise that the sacred rights of Treaty, the safeguard of justice and peace throughout the world, should be sacrificed or set aside; and that, as regards policy, we should never forget that if we became parties to a breach of French treaty in Palestine, we could no longer protest against a breach of the treaties which now confine warlike and ambitious France within limits which she once overstepped to make Europe one vast battle-field. And it is here apposite that I should express my regret that Count Nesselrode, as appears by Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatch No. 7 to your Lordship, should have endeavoured to make him believe that the French Convention (should be Capitulations) of 1740 has not all the value of a treaty. By the inclosed report from MM. Frederick and Etienne Pisani, the former and present first interpreters to Her Majesty's Embassy, your Lordship will see that the French Capitulations of 1740, on which France grounds her claims as to the Jerusalem Sanctuaries, and the validity of which the Russian Government attack, are exactly the same as our Capitulations with the Porte, by virtue of which, and by which alone, Great Britain possesses her rights in Turkey.

The attempt of Russia to deprive France's Treaty, or Capitulations of 1740 with the Porte, of its just value, shows that she, knowing that those Capitulations give France rights as to the Holy Places, has nothing left for it but to discredit that Treaty. But this is not just or politic. It is unwise to irritate France by ignoring her Treaty; but appeal should be made to her best

and wisest feelings; she should be asked, for the sake of the world's happiness, to allow that Treaty to moulder, as it has done for so long, in its archives.

Count Nesselrode speaks much of injustice and wrongs done to the Greek Church by the Porte's late decision as to the Sanctuaries.

I admit most fully the deplorable impolicy of reviving the Treaty of 1740; and nobody feels more than I do the necessity of the Porte's conciliating her numerous Greek Rayas, who feel as much hurt in a religious point of view as Russia can do, at any concessions as to the Holy Places made to the Latins. But these very Greek Rayas, and the most powerful and influential of them, have assured me again and again, that they would infinitely prefer that Latin monks should have the key of the Church of Bethlehem, and walk through that church to pray in the Grotto of the Nativity, than that French cruisers should destroy their commerce, and French screw line-of-battle ships bombard their villages and homes on the Bosphorus, &c.

The Russian Government would be astonished if they heard the names of the Greek Rayas who have held this and similar language to me,—who have declared that they abhor the idea of a war, destructive to all their interests, on account of the Holy Places; that even in the important matter of the Cupola, which they acknowledge France has the right by treaty to repair "exclusivement," they, the Greek Rayas would, if left to themselves, come to an equitable arrangement with France and the Porte; that they deplore that Greek Rayas and a religious question are used by Russia as instruments for the sake of upholding her political influence.

As regards the mere matter of abstract right, if French and Russian claims as to the Holy Places were referred to any eminent barrister, he would certainly award eight, and probably many more, sanctuaries to France, instead of the key, and the very limited right to pray in the Tomb of the Virgin, ceded to her by the late arrangement.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem's protest against that arrangement, which certainly looks as if the Latins viewed it rather as a defeat than as a victory.

I also have the honour to inclose copies of the several Articles of the Capitulations of 1740, or as the French official list terms it, "Traité entre la France et la Porte Ottomane," relating to the Holy Places at Jerusalem.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 170.

Messrs. F. and E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

Pera, March 7, 1853.

Sir,

WE have the honour to answer the query contained in your note of yesterday's date.

The French Capitulations of 1740 with the Porte have the same value as Great Britain's Capitulations with the Porte.

We have, &c.
(Signed) FRED. PISANI.
ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 170.

Protest of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem and Guardian of Shrines.

(Translation.) *Jerusalem, December 23, 1852.*

WE, the undersigned, have become acquainted with the resolutions which the Porte has thought fit to adopt in the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, and for the execution of which she has sent thither as her Commissioner Afif Bey.

From the vast interest and sanctity which the cause of these august memorials of the Redemption bear in our eyes, and in those of all Catholics,

we are under the painful necessity of declaring, that the said resolutions are far from meeting our just wishes, or according in the least with the solemnly recognized rights proved by the evidence of the Porte's own declaration; she having at all times proclaimed, and more especially last March, in an official note to the Ambassador of France at Constantinople, that they were to be respected. All things considered, and for the moment resigning ourselves, under the eyes of the protecting Consul, to the painful position in which we are placed by the execution, imperfect and strewed with obstacles, of weak and insufficient arrangements settled at Constantinople, which we would fain view as the beginning of redress, we deem it our duty to adopt all necessary precautions, as a safeguard to the incontestable and authenticatedly established rights of Catholicism in the Holy Land. We therefore protest, by this present document, as in effect we have protested through the medium of Afif Bey to the Porte, and to the Ambassador of France through his Consul at Jerusalem:—

Firstly.—Against any attempt whatever made by the last resolutions of the Porte upon the rights guaranteed solemnly by treaty stipulations between France and Turkey, as also against the usurpations to which the Frank clergy have been subjected from 1740 till the present day, in defiance of pledged faith; and we protest in the same terms and form that the Ambassador of France protested last March at Constantinople.

Secondly.—Against the Porte's pretension to rebuild herself, and at her own expense, the larger dome of our Lord's Sepulchre.

Thirdly.—Against the publication, as took place the 28th November last, at Jerusalem, of the Hatti Sheriff granted to the Greeks in the spring of that year; protesting, firstly, because such a public and official document is derogatory to, and infringes on, the rights as guaranteed to the Frank clergy by the Treaty of 1740; and secondly, because in this note the Porte, which neither is nor can be other than one of the interested parties in this question of the Holy Places, constitutes herself as sole and exclusive judge, without the intervention of the other contracting party; finally, as no one is unaware of the promise made by the Ottoman Cabinet to the French Embassy, that the Hatti Sheriff would neither be read nor published at Jerusalem.

Fourthly.—Against the strange provision adopted by the Ottoman Government, in remitting to the Frank clergy the keys of the gate of the great church at Bethlehem, without at the same time recognizing the fact of their possession, and consequent legitimate use of that possession. This protest becomes more rigorously incumbent on us, in the case of the Porte's having meant to define by that provision that the ancient firmans, in which it is stated repeatedly that the Frank clergy have been at all times possessed of all the keys of the church, should be understood as denoting the possession of the keys only, and not of the use of the church. Does not common sense declare, that whoever has the possession of a spot, naturally enjoys the use of that possession.

Fifthly.—Against the method adopted in replacing the star on the spot of the Nativity in Bethlehem, as executed by the agents of the Porte solely.

Sixthly.—Resigning ourselves with much pain to the condition in which the Latins are placed as regards the exercise of their worship in the Church of the Tomb of the Virgin in Gethsemane, we, the undersigned, reserve to ourselves, in all integrity, the incontestable rights of Catholicism over this sanctuary; and until it please God to reinvest us with the full accomplishment of these rights, we shall not cease to demand that the Latins be placed, provisionally, and till full justice be rendered to them, on perfect equality with the Greeks and other sects, as regards the exercise of worship in this sanctuary, in conformity with the terms contained in the note transmitted to the French Ambassador in Constantinople, wherein it is stated "that the Latins shall be able to exercise their worship in this sanctuary in the same way and manner as the Greeks and Armenians.

(Signed) THE PATRIARCH OF JERUSALEM.
THE GUARDIAN OF THE HOLY PLACES.

Inclosure 3 in No. 170.

Extract of Articles referring to the Holy Places, from the French Treaty of 1740.

ARTICLE I.

L'ON n'inquiétera point les Français qui vont et viendront pour visiter Jérusalem de même que les religieux qui sont dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, dite Kamama.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

Les religieux Francs qui, suivant l'ancienne coutume, sont établis dedans et dehors de la ville de Jérusalem, dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, appelée Kamama, ne seront point inquiétés pour les lieux de visitation qu'ils habitent, et qui sont entre leurs mains, lesquels resteront encore entre leurs mains comme par ci-devant, sans qu'ils puissent être inquiétés à cet égard, non plus que par des prétentions d'impositions; et s'il leur survenait quelque procès qui ne pût être décidé sur les lieux, il sera renvoyé à ma Sublime Porte.

ARTICLE LXXXII.

Lorsque les endroits dont les religieux dépendants de la France ont la possession et la jouissance à Jérusalem, ainsi qu'il en est fait mention dans les Articles précédemment accordés et actuellement renouvelés, auront besoin d'être réparés, pour prévenir la ruine à laquelle ils seraient exposés par la suite des temps, il sera permis d'accorder à la réquisition de l'Ambassadeur de France résidant à ma Porte de félicité, des commandemens, pour que ces réparations soient faites d'une façon conforme aux tolérances de la justice; et les cadis, commandants, et autres officiers, ne pourront mettre aucune sorte d'empêchement aux choses accordées par commandement. Et comme il est arrivé que nos officiers, sous prétexte que l'on avait fait des réparations secrètes dans les susdits lieux, y faisaient plusieurs visites dans l'année, et rançonnaient les religieux, nous voulons que de la part des Pachas, cadis, commandans et autres officiers qui s'y trouvent, il ne soit fait qu'une visite par an dans l'église de l'endroit qu'ils nomment le Sépulcre de Jésus, de même que dans leurs autres églises et lieux de visitation. Les évêques et religieux dépendants de l'Empereur de France, qui se trouvent dans mon Empire, seront protégés tant qu'ils se tiendront dans les bornes de leur état, et personne ne pourra les empêcher d'exercer leur rit suivant leur usage, dans les églises qui sont entre leurs mains, de même que dans les autres lieux où ils habitent; et lorsque nos sujets tributaires et les Français iront et viendront les uns chez les autres, pour ventes, achats et autres affaires, on ne pourra les molester contre les lois sacrées pour cause de cette fréquentation; et comme il est porté par les Articles précédemment stipulés, qu'ils pourront lire l'Evangile dans les bornes de leur devoir dans leur Hôpital de Galata, cependant cela n'ayant pas été exécuté, nous voulons que dans tel endroit où cet hôpital pourra se trouver à l'avenir, dans une forme juridique, ils puissent, conformément aux anciennes capitulations, y lire l'Evangile dans les bornes du devoir, sans être inquiétés à ce sujet.

No. 171.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell:— (Received March 19.)

(No. 76.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 7, 1853.

CIRCUMSTANCES connected with the mission of Prince Menchikoff have gradually come to light, and cause grave apprehensions for the independence, if not the destiny, of Turkey.

No expense or efforts have been spared for the purpose of imparting to the Russian Embassy all the advantages which accrue from personal influence, display, and entertainment.

Prince Menchikoff is an Admiral and Minister of the Marine, and he is

accompanied by the Chancellor's son, Prince Galitzin, the Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, and a large suite. It is stated that 1000*l.* a month, some say double that sum, is allowed to Prince Menchikoff merely for entertainment, and that the secret service money is unlimited.

Whilst then the Russian Government have neglected no means for rendering this Embassy influential, and agreeable to Orientals, they have been equally careful to impart to it the most powerful of influences amongst Turks, intimidation.

The Embassy is perfectly arranged, and is deficient in only one essential, and that is sincerity.

A day or two after the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, another man-of-war steamer arrived here, conveying Vice-Admiral Korniloff, of the Black Sea fleet, Aide-de-Camp and Adjutant-General of the Emperor; and General Nikapotchinski, Chief of the Staff of General Rudiger's two corps d'armée, with other military officers. The presence of these superior officers of the naval and military forces, which are to act against the Porte should she not comply with Russian demands, had its due effect, particularly as it is known that the 5th and 7th corps have been concentrated, and placed on the war footing under the command of General Rudiger, whose head-quarters are at Kiskereff, in Bessarabia. I also had further information that General Danneberg, commanding the cavalry of the 5th corps, had pushed his advance guard as far as Skubery and Areny, up to the very Moldavian frontier, within two hours of Jassy; that large funds had been transmitted to Russian merchants in Wallachia and Moldavia, for the purchase of provisions for the Russian troops; finally that the fleet at Sebastopol was getting ready to sail at the shortest notice.

Unfortunately Prince Menchikoff's first public act evinced entire disregard on his part of the Sultan's dignity and rights, which, combined with the hostile attitude of Russia, created the impression that coercion, rather than conciliatory negotiation, would distinguish his Excellency's mission.

His Excellency transmitted his credentials to Fuad Effendi, and the next day, with his whole Embassy, waited on the Grand Vizier at the Porte; it is an invariable rule that a new ambassador makes the second visit of ceremony to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. But Prince Menchikoff, after leaving the Grand Vizier, although invited by Kiamil Bey, the "Introducteur des Ambassadeurs," to visit Fuad Effendi, whose apartment adjoins those of the Grand Vizier, declined to do so; and Prince Menchikoff, passing by the line of troops and Kavasses, and the very door of Fuad Effendi, which had been opened to receive him, left the Porte.

The affront was the more galling, because great preparations had been made for the purpose of receiving the Russian Ambassador with marked honours, and a great concourse of people, particularly Greeks, had assembled for the purpose of witnessing the ceremony.

The incident made a great and most painful sensation. The Grand Vizier expressed to me his indignation at the premeditated affront which had been offered to his Sovereign; and the Sultan's irritation was excessive.

M. Benedetti and myself at once saw all the bearing and intention of the affront. Prince Menchikoff wished, at his first start, to create an intimidating and commanding influence, to show that any man, even a Cabinet Minister, who had offended Russia, would be humiliated and punished even in the midst of the Sultan's Court, and without previous communication to His Majesty. Prince Menchikoff wished to take the cleverest man out of the Ministry, humiliate it, upset it, and establish in its place a Ministry favourable to his views. If this manœuvre had succeeded, a second treaty like that of Unkiar Skelessi, or something worse, would probably have been the result. I therefore did my best to strengthen the Turkish, and weaken the Russian position.

I perceived, moreover, that in two respects the Russian Government had not acted with good faith towards Her Majesty's Government.

First. That Russia, so far from having made her attitude less warlike, as supposed by your Lordship, in your despatch No. 7 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, had made it more warlike.

Secondly, That the prelude, or the first act of the Russian negotiations with the Porte, which Count Nesselrode, in Sir Hamilton Seymour's despatch

No. 17 to your Lordship, states are to "obtain the approbation of Her Majesty's Government," had been a public affront to the Sovereign of Turkey, gravely affecting his rights, and causing him the deepest personal mortification.

Prince Menchikoff had not yet announced his mission to the Diplomatic Body; I, therefore, sought an explanation respecting the incident with M. d'Ozeroff, who endeavoured to avoid it by saying that he was no longer Chargé d'Affaires, and that Prince Menchikoff was not yet officially Ambassador.

I have the honour to report the explanation and the matter connected with it in a further despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 172.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March 7, 1853.*

M. D'OZEROFF made a second attempt to avoid an explanation with me respecting the affront to Fuad Effendi, saying that he had always considered me "un homme très calme," and doing nothing without reflection; that he had written in this sense to his Government, but that the step I was now taking was "trop empressé." I assured M. d'Ozeroff that it was only because I had reflected well, that I considered an explanation necessary; that when he had heard what I had to say, he would, I thought, be of the same opinion.

I then said that M. d'Ozeroff had voluntarily, only a few days since, assured me that a "parfaite entente" existed between our Governments, respecting the Russian negotiation about to take place at Constantinople; that consequently he wished that the same good understanding should exist between him and me; that he would tell me everything: that I had replied to these assurances in a manner which, he said, was perfectly satisfactory to him; that having read also the assurances which had been made in a similar sense at St. Petersburgh, I had calmed the uneasiness felt at the Porte by the Russian military demonstration and the Mission of Prince Menchikoff; that, under these circumstances, I certainly had been as much pained as surprised by the first act of Prince Menchikoff's Mission, which being an affront to the Ottoman Sovereign in the presence of his people, would be a subject of deep regret to Her Majesty's Government, and give rise to painful apprehensions as to the result of a mission so inauspiciously begun; that in honour of British policy and my own consistency, I had been obliged to tell the Porte that I had no knowledge of, and sincerely regretted the incident.

M. d'Ozeroff said that Fuad Effendi had acted in a manner which rendered it impossible that the Russian Embassy should have anything to do with him. Prince Menchikoff also said subsequently, that Fuad Effendi was a "coquin" and a "menteur," and had told "mensonges" to the Russian Embassy. And both these gentlemen said that the affront was directed against Fuad Effendi, and not in any way against the Sultan; that for a length of time M. d'Ozeroff had not had personal relations with Fuad Effendi.

I replied that if Fuad Effendi had offended the Russian Embassy, it had a perfect right to complain of that offence to the Porte in the usual diplomatic form and obtain a prompt and just reparation; but that to send Fuad Effendi Prince Menchikoff's credentials, allow him to come the next day to the Porte, according to invariable usage, to receive the Ambassador's visit, and then to condemn him unheard at the seat of Government in presence of the Sultan's Ministers and a numerous public, was an act condemned not only by myself, but by an universal public opinion; that all felt for the Sultan, who had not received one word of warning from the Russian Embassy as to its intention to humiliate publicly one of his confidential advisers, which would at least have enabled his Majesty to ward off the affront, and to demand that his Minister should be accused and judged according to the usages of independent Powers; that certainly the Ottoman Minister had deviated from truth in the matter of the Holy Places, but that he had been coerced to do so; that from the time M. de Lavalette threatened to bring up a French fleet to the Dardanelles, and M. de

Titoff menaced to quit instantly Constantinople with every member of his Mission, if their respective and entirely divergent demands were not complied with, the Porte had, under the pressure of that and subsequent coercions, committed a series of lamentable contradictions; but that as a question of abstract morality I would ask M. de Ozeroff whether he would blame most a weak man who erred from truth because he was forced to do so, or the strong man who forced the weak man to do so. M. de Ozeroff was agitated, but would say nothing, except that if the Porte could ask for explanations, the Russian Embassy would make the most satisfactory declarations as to their having had no intention whatever to infringe the Sultan's rights, or hurt his dignity or feelings; that they had not demanded Fuad's dismissal, that he might be present at Prince Menchikoff's audience of the Sultan, but that the Embassy would not negotiate certain questions with him. I am glad to say that next morning Prince Menchikoff sent his first interpreter to express to the Grand Vizier what I have just stated as to the wish of Prince Menchikoff not in any way to offend the Sultan; I therefore obtained at least some satisfaction for his Majesty's wounded dignity.

M. Benedetti and I agreed that the all-important point was to save the present, and prevent the formation of a Russian Ministry, who would at once sacrifice some vital right of Turkey; that Fuad Effendi himself was of comparatively little importance, but that it would be very desirable that, for the sake of the Sultan's and his Ministry's influence, he should not retire in consequence of an illegitimate affront, but retain his office, at any rate for a short time.

The treatment of Fuad Effendi, the unfavourable, I may say the disaffected feeling which Prince Menchikoff's mission had caused amongst the Greek population, who had hitherto shown no feeling of that nature, the concentration and advance of Russian troops to the Turkish frontier, had greatly discouraged the Grand Vizier, his Ministry, and the Turkish party in general.

Under these circumstances, M. Benedetti and myself agreed to make communications in a similar sense to the Grand Vizier. We also waited separately on his Highness, and exhorted him to do his duty by his Sovereign, and sacrifice none of his rights; that we were certain our Governments would support his Majesty in a firm but prudent assertion of them.

The Grand Vizier said that the Russian Government evidently intended to win some important right from Turkey which would destroy her independence, and asked me to request the British Admiral to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay from Malta.

Feeling the intimate conviction that if the Sultan, who always yields to intimidation, were not supported by me on this occasion he would call to his councils a Ministry selected under Russian influence, I informed his Highness that I would tell your Lordship that I felt convinced that the safety of Turkey required the presence of the British squadron in those waters. M. Benedetti said the same as regards the French squadron.

But these assurances did not tranquillize the Grand Vizier's mind; he thought that Turkey would be lost before an answer could arrive from England and France.

The Russian Government had not kept faith with Her Majesty's Government; instead of withdrawing or allowing her troops to be stationary, she had advanced them up to the Turkish territory, ordering provisions for those troops in the Turkish provinces, without having ever declared or stated her cause of complaint against the Porte to the Porte, a thing unheard of amongst, and contrary to the rights of civilized nations; she was taking other warlike measures, maritime as well as military, on a very great scale, unmistakeably with the view of overcoming Turkey's independence, or making war on her.

I took into consideration all the other proofs of Russian bad faith, which I have detailed.

I learnt from Lord John Hay that Admiral Dundas proposed to leave Malta on the 20th instant, on a cruize to Corfu, Athens, and Smyrna. By asking his Excellency to bring his squadron to Vourla immediately, I felt that I only asked him to leave Malta a week earlier than he had intended to do, going first to Vourla, instead of Corfu.

Under these circumstances I acquainted the Grand Vizier, that I would

request the Admiral commanding at Malta to bring up his squadron to Vourla Bay. I have the honour to inclose a copy of his Highness's reply.

I send my despatches to your Lordship and his Excellency by Her Majesty's steamer "Wasp," Lord John Hay, who leaves Constantinople this evening.

Fuad Effendi was requested by the Sultan and the Ministry to resume his office; he declined, but he is the first to acknowledge that the very efficient support which he received prevents his retirement being attributed to any other cause but to his own determination.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 172.

Colonel Rose to Mr. Hughes.

Sir, *Constantinople, March* 4, 1853.

I REQUEST you to wait on the Grand Vizier, and inform him with my compliments, that M. Benedetti and myself have consulted together as to the course which it would be advisable that the Sultan's Ministers should follow in the matter of the slight offered by the Russian Ambassador to the Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs.

We are of opinion that His Imperial Majesty's Ministers should express themselves satisfied with the now repeated excuses and explanations offered by the Russian Embassy on that head; that they should declare at the same time that when the Russian Embassy makes a complaint against the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs in the usual diplomatic form, the Sultan's Government will instantly examine and do justice to that complaint; but that respect for the Sultan's rights and independence, and the justice of which His Majesty is the guardian, will not allow His Majesty's Minister to condemn a man, and that man his Foreign Minister, without his hearing what he has to say in his defence; that the Sultan has sworn to do justice to his subjects, but that were he to condemn or punish one of his Ministers untried or unheard, on the *ex parte* declaration or public mark of disapprobation, viz., a slight offered to that Minister at his Court by a foreign representative, he could not be looked upon by his people as their conscientious ruler and their independent protector.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 172.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

Sir, *Pera, March* 6, 1853.

I LOSE no time in informing you that the Grand Vizier received your message about your intention, in compliance with his Highness's request, to write to the Admiral that the state of affairs here in your opinion requires the presence of the squadron at Vourla, with heartfelt gratitude, and requested me to express to you his sincere thanks, and to apprise you that he will not fail to acquaint His Majesty the Sultan with this good disposition on the part of a representative of a faithful and friendly Power. His Highness entertains strong apprehensions that the mission of Prince Menchikoff, far from being of a conciliatory character as pretended, is on the contrary intended to involve the Porte in serious difficulties, and that the Emperor's object appears to be to trample under foot the rights of the Porte and the dignity and the independence of the Sovereign.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 173.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 103.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 3, 1853.

I HAVE reason to believe that an order has been sent to the 4th Corps d'Armée to make up its reserves to the amount of about 10,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 174.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 105.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 5, 1853.

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC read to me yesterday the despatch, dated the 17th ultimo, which he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys in reply to the communications made to the French Government by M. de Kisseleff respecting the Holy Places.

This despatch, which, in pursuance of orders, has been communicated to the Chancellor, sets forth, rather in serious than in angry terms, that to the very conciliatory overtures of the French Government recriminations have been returned by that of Russia, while the proposal to take the Firman of last March as the basis of negotiation, is in fact to call upon France to give up the fruits of her late diplomatic exertions, and to surrender the inadequate compensation which had been offered for the advantages to the Latin Church which are confirmed by Capitulations and Conventions.

In communicating this despatch to me, General Castelbajac stated that he had observed—and, it appears to me, very properly—to Count Nesselrode, that the moderation, frankness, and desire for conciliation evinced by France in the proceedings respecting the Holy Places, seemed to him to call for some corresponding disposition on the part of the Emperor's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 175.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 106. Confidential.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 6, 1853.

THE French Minister acquaints me that he has questioned Count Nesselrode both as to the naval armaments which he believes to be making at Sevastopol, and as to the orders which he believes to have been sent to the 4th corps d'armée to advance to the frontiers of Turkey. To these inquiries, as he states, Count Nesselrode replied evasively; not going the length of contradicting the reports, but observing that he had no information which led him to admit their correctness.

From what I learn from a person likely to be well informed, I believe the truth to be that (as stated in my cyphered despatch, No. 103) orders have been sent to the 4th corps d'armée to complete its reserves, and, further, to purchase the requisite number of horses. This last order I am all but confident has subsequently been recalled, upon the success of Count Leiningen's mission being known here.

The 5th corps I believe to be already complete in numbers, and, according to the best information which I can obtain, neither the 4th or 5th corps d'armée have received orders for marching upon the Turkish frontier.

Since the preceding part of this despatch was written, General Castelbajac has read to me a private letter, written in terms of friendly but grave expostulation, which he has this day addressed to Count Nesselrode.

He represents that accounts have reached him of two corps d'armée being in a course of preparation for active service. He complains of such military operations taking place at the moment of negotiations being entered upon at Constantinople; and, with respect to the arrangements to be there concluded as to the Holy Places, he observes that none can be satisfactory or desirable which shall assign the whole of the advantages contended for to one of the parties in dispute.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 176.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 115. Confidential.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1853.

A PERSON who is upon friendly and confidential terms with Baron Meyendorff, has inquired of him, how he explained the remarkable accordance of views exhibited by the two Governments of Austria and Russia, in the questions which just at present excite such absorbing interest.

Baron Meyendorff, under injunction of secresy, replied that the explanation was more simple than appeared possible; that the Emperor of Russia had been deeply wounded at the conduct of his brother monarch with regard to the style of address employed towards Louis Napoleon ("Mon Frère"), and that with a view to dispelling unpleasant feeling, His Imperial Majesty had resolved to place himself as much as possible under Russian guidance with regard to the questions afloat in Turkey.

I can affirm with certainty, that this explanation has been given by Baron Meyendorff; and I am not prepared to express doubt in its correctness up to a certain point.

It may be the truth, but I question whether it be the whole truth, as I suspect that it will some day be proved that a certain understanding with regard to the affairs of Turkey existed between the two Imperial Courts previously to the recognition of the French Empire.

I will entreat your Lordship to consider this communication as strictly confidential.

To be able to report with any correctness the proceedings of this Court, it is most essential that the attention of the Russian Government should not be drawn towards the reporter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 177.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 116.)
My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1853.

WHEN calling upon Count Nesselrode on the 7th instant, I stated that it was highly desirable that I should be informed what credit was to be attached to the rumours which reached me from so many quarters as to military preparations in the course of being made.

Count Nesselrode said, that he believed he might state that I had not been correctly informed.

"Does your Excellency," I inquired, "authorize me to assert that you are not arming, or am I only to report that you believe you are not arming?"

After some hesitation, the Chancellor said that he would not assert, but

that he believed (croire), that he had reason for believing (lieu de croire), that the tendency was to slacken (ralentir), rather than to urge on, military preparation, since the successful termination of Count Leiningen's mission had been learned.

I apprehend this relaxation of preparation to allude to the order for the purchase of horses, which has been rescinded.

A somewhat desultory conversation ensued. We spoke of General Leiningen's mission, and I took an opportunity of observing that the pressure lately applied to the Porte was such as, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, could not be safely carried on.

The Chancellor replied, that, to use my own expression, great part of the pressure would now cease; that, as regarded Montenegro, there had been "periculum in morâ" (sic); that hours were of importance when Christians were being massacred,—when there was question of the extermination of whole Christian populations! But this was not the case with the question of the Holy Places, about this there was no immediate hurry; that Prince Menchikoff had been provided with very extensive powers, and that (he would add in confidence) the Prince had been made the bearer of a letter from the Emperor to the Sultan, drawn up in more friendly terms than had been employed in his letter by the Emperor of Austria.

I may here observe that intelligence has been received of Prince Menchikoff's having embarked at Odessa on the $\frac{1}{13}$ ultimo. He will, therefore, probably have reached Constantinople two days later.

Before dismissing the subject of Montenegro, I remarked to Count Nesselrode, that I thought very unnecessary importance had been attached to the circumstance of some of the Hungarian and Polish refugees having been employed in Omar Pasha's army.

The Chancellor appealed to me whether it were not very natural that danger should be apprehended by a Government, who found that men of this description were serving in a military capacity near its own frontiers. I replied that I had no wish to cast reflections upon the Austrian Government, but that I begged attention to one point:—"If," I said, "there is danger to a powerful and well-established monarchy like that of Austria, from the neighbourhood of a handful of refugees, may there not be danger, and very extreme danger, to a weak Government like that of Turkey, in the approach to its frontiers of large foreign armies?"

I proceeded to speak of Constantinople, and of the promising aspect of affairs there, as described in Colonel Rose's despatch No. 30, of the 28th January.

I observed that I was about to be guilty of the irregularity of reading to his Excellency a report not intended for communication.

I read out accordingly the whole of the despatch, with the exception of the sentence beginning, "I cordially concurred." I did so for the reasons, 1st, that I might exhibit the extremely conciliatory and impartial part taken by Colonel Rose, in affairs in which he has most unjustly been accused of siding unduly with the French Embassy, and 2nd, because I thought it of great importance to establish that Prince Menchikoff must have found affairs, upon his arrival in Turkey, in a train of amicable arrangement, and, therefore, that if not carried on in the same spirit, the blame would attach to the new-comer.

Count Nesselrode expressed his warm satisfaction at the honourable and important testimony borne by Colonel Rose to the good conduct of the Greek clergy, and took notes of some of the facts which are reported in Colonel Rose's despatch.

We proceeded to speak of the Holy Places question, and Count Nesselrode remarked, that he had heard with real pleasure from Baron Brunnow of the excellent instruction addressed by Lord John Russell to Lord Cowley upon this matter.

With respect to the Emperor's views, Count Nesselrode again observed, that it was impossible that his Imperial Majesty should recede from the position secured to the Greeks by the Firman of last February, confirmed as it had been by the Sultan's letter.

That this very Firman was, in fact, a concession to the Latins, who in virtue thereof, obtained two favours in lieu of the one granted to the Greek Church.

This was subsequently explained to me by M. de Sèniavine as alluding to the grotto of Gethsemane, an admission to which, as well as the right to officiate in the Church of Bethlehem, was secured to the Roman Catholics by last year's Firman, while the only new favour conferred upon the Greeks by that instrument was the right to celebrate service, and that once a year, in the Church of the Ascension upon the Mount of Olives.

Upon reading over my despatch I find that I have omitted to mention that Count Nesselrode stated that the French complained without just cause of the despatch of Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, after the overtures made by them at direct negotiation with the Russian Government, inasmuch as Prince Menchikoff's mission had long before been determined upon, and had been deferred only in consequence of the infirm state of his health.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 178.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 19.)

(A. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1853.*

WHEN I waited upon Count Nesselrode, on the 7th instant, his Excellency said, that in pursuance of orders which he had received from the Emperor, he had to place in my hands a very confidential memorandum, which his Imperial Majesty had caused to be drawn up, and which was intended as an answer to, or a comment upon, the communication which I had made to his Imperial Majesty on the 21st ultimo.

At first Count Nesselrode invited me to read the paper; he subsequently observed that if, instead of reading it at the time, I chose to take it away I was at liberty to do so—that, in fact, the paper was intended for my use (*sic*).

Very little conversation upon the subject passed between the Chancellor and me. He observed that I should find in the memorandum indications of the Emperor's wish to be further informed of the feelings of her Majesty's Government as to what should not be permitted to take place in the event of any great catastrophe in Turkey; and I, on my side, remarked that, as there is danger in handling hot coals, it appeared to me desirable that communications upon a subject so delicate should not be long kept up.

I have the honour of inclosing to your Lordship a copy of what, under the circumstances which have attended its drawing up and delivery, cannot fail of being considered as one of the most remarkable papers which have been issued, I do not say from the Russian "Chancellerie," but from the Emperor's secret cabinet.

It would not be difficult either to controvert some of the facts which the memorandum advances, or to show that the impression under which it has been framed is an incorrect one, that impression being evidently that, in the disputes carried on between Russia and France, Her Majesty's Government has leant partially to the latter Power.

Three points appear to me to be fully established by the Imperial memorandum—the existence of some distinct understanding between the two Imperial Courts upon the subject of Turkey, and the engagement taken by the Emperor Nicholas neither to possess or establish himself at Constantinople, or to enter into arrangements respecting the measures to be taken in the event of the fall of the Ottoman Empire without previous concert with Her Majesty's Government.

The wording of this engagement, coupled with the conversation which I had the honour of holding with the Emperor, leaves upon my mind the impression that, whilst willing to undertake not to make himself the permanent master of Constantinople, his Majesty is intentionally inexplicit as to its temporary occupation.

Assuming as a certain and now acknowledged fact, the existence of an understanding or compact between the two Emperors as to Turkish affairs, it becomes of the deepest importance to know the extent of the engagements

entered into between them. As to the manner in which it has been concluded, I conjecture that little doubt is to be entertained.

Its basis was, no doubt, laid at some of the meetings between the Sovereigns which took place in the autumn; and the scheme has probably been worked out since under the management of Baron Meyendorff, the Russian Envoy at the Austrian Court, who has been passing the winter at St. Petersburgh, and is still here.

For such subterraneous negotiation Baron Meyendorff is admirably qualified by his acuteness, by his Jesuitical qualities, and by the circumstance of his being the brother-in-law and intimate friend of Count Buol.

By degrees it becomes more intelligible why the assistance of Russia has been afforded to Austria in proceedings, for the justification of which it has been necessary to resort to the current fables respecting the persecution and massacre of Christians by the infidels; and why, in her turn, Russia is receiving the full support of a Government as Roman Catholic and as much under the influence of priests and Jesuits as that of Austria, towards obtaining objects to be carried by the Greek against the Latin Church.

With whatever view the overtures made by the Emperor to Her Majesty's Envoy may have been resolved upon, I can hardly doubt that the advantage obtained has been for Her Majesty's Government, who are now in possession of some knowledge of obscure transactions, and some recorded security against eventual dangers.

The evils of a close alliance between the Emperors of Russia and Austria, upon the basis of advantages to be wrung from a weak neighbour, are certainly very great; but it may be that time may assist us in this matter, and that, as experience and wisdom are gained, the Emperor Francis may perceive that too high a price may be paid for the acquisition of a Turkish province.

Supposing the schemes, which may now with some fairness be attributed to Russia and Austria, really to exist, it may be conjectured that the next stage in the transaction will be to prepare Prussia for coming events, and, it may be, to give her an interest in their arrival.

In conclusion, I will venture to observe, that I am convinced that very serious offence would be taken by the Emperor of Russia, if he should ever ascertain that the inclosed most secret paper, or the report of the communications by which it was preceded, had been brought to the knowledge of any foreign Cabinet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 178.

Memorandum by Count Nesselrode.

21 *Février*, 1853.

L'EMPEREUR a pris connaissance avec le plus vif intérêt et une véritable satisfaction de la dépêche secrète et confidentielle que lui a communiquée Sir Hamilton Seymour. Il apprécie dûment la franchise qui l'a dictée. Il y a trouvé une nouvelle preuve des sentiments d'amitié que lui porte Sa Majesté la Reine.

En s'entretenant familièrement avec l'Envoyé Britannique, sur les causes qui d'un jour à l'autre peuvent amener la chute de l'Empire Ottoman, il n'était point entré dans la pensée de l'Empereur de proposer pour cette éventualité un plan par lequel la Russie et l'Angleterre disposeraient d'avance des provinces régies par le Sultan; un système tout fait; encore moins une transaction formelle à conclure entre les deux Cabinets. Dans l'idée de l'Empereur il s'est agi purement et simplement de se dire confidentiellement des deux parts, moins ce qu'on veut, que ce qu'on ne veut pas; ce qui serait contraire aux intérêts Anglais, ce qui le serait aux intérêts Russes; afin que, le cas échéant, on évitât d'agir en contradiction des uns ou des autres.

Il n'y a là ni projets de partage, ni Convention à rendre obligatoire aux autres Cours. C'est un simple échange d'opinions, et l'Empereur ne voit point qu'il soit nécessaire d'en parler avant le tems. C'est précisément pour cela

qu'il s'était bien gardé d'en vouloir faire l'objet d'une communication officielle de Cabinet à Cabinet. En se bornant à en parler lui-même, sous forme de conversation familière, au Représentant de la Reine, il a choisi le mode le plus intime et le plus confidentiel de s'ouvrir franchement à Sa Majesté Britannique, désirant que le résultat quelconque de ces pourparlers demeurât ce qu'il doit être, un secret entre les deux Souverains.

Dès lors tombent les objections qu'élève Lord John Russell contre toute réticence qui serait faite aux autres Puissances pour le cas d'une transaction formelle, dont il n'est nullement question pour le moment; et dès lors aussi disparaissent les inconvéniens qu'il signale comme pouvant servir à accélérer l'événement même que la Russie et l'Angleterre ont à cœur de prévenir, si l'existence d'une transaction pareille venait à être connue prématurément de l'Europe, et des sujets du Sultan.

Quant à l'objet même de cet échange d'opinions tout intime—la chute possible de l'Empire Ottoman—ce n'est là sans doute qu'une éventualité incertaine et lointaine. On n'en saurait à coup sur fixer l'époque, et aucune crise réelle n'est survenue qui en rende imminente la réalisation. Mais enfin elle peut arriver, arriver même inopinément. Sans parler des causes toujours croissantes de dissolution que présente l'état moral, financier, administratif de la Porte, elle peut sortir progressivement de l'une au moins des deux questions mentionnées par le Ministère Anglais dans sa dépêche secrète. A la vérité, il n'y voit que de simples disputes qui ne dépasseraient pas la portée des difficultiés dont s'occupe d'ordinaire la diplomatie. Mais ce genre de disputes là peut néanmoins amener la guerre, et avec la guerre les conséquences qu'en appréhende l'Empereur, si, par exemple, dans l'affaire des Lieux-Saints l'amour-propre et les menaces de la France, continuant à peser sur la Porte, obligent celle-ci à nous refuser toute satisfaction, et si, d'un autre côté, le sentiment religieux des Grecs Orthodoxes, outragé par les concessions faites aux Latins, soulève contre le Sultan l'immense majorité de ses sujets. Quant à l'affaire du Monténégro, on peut heureusement aujourd'hui, d'après les dernières nouvelles, la regarder comme arrangée. Mais au moment où l'Empereur a eu son entretien avec Sir Hamilton Seymour, on pouvait craindre que la question ne prît une tournure des plus graves. Ni nous ni l'Autriche n'aurions pu permettre la dévastation prolongée ou la soumission forcée du Monténégro, pays resté jusqu'ici dans une indépendance effective de la Porte, pays auquel notre protection s'étend depuis plus d'un siècle. Les horreurs qui s'y commettent, celles que le fanatisme Ottoman à étendues, il y a peu de tems, sur la Bulgarie, la Bosnie, et la Herzégovine, ne faisaient que trop prévoir aux autres provinces Chrétiennes de la Porte que le même sort les attendait. Elles étaient de nature à provoquer le soulèvement général des Chrétiens qui vivent sous le sceptre de l'Empire Turc, et à précipiter sa ruine. Ce n'est donc pas, tant s'en faut, une question oiseuse et imaginaire, une éventualité trop lointaine, que les préoccupations de l'Empereur ont signalée à l'attention de la Reine, son alliée.

En présence de l'incertitude et de la caducité de l'état actuel des choses en Turquie, le Cabinet Anglais exprime le désir qu'il soit fait usage envers la Porte de la plus grade longanimité. L'Empereur a la conscience de n'avoir jamais agi autrement. Le Cabinet Anglais en convient lui-même. Il adresse à l'Empereur sur les nombreuses preuves de modération qu'il a données jusqu'à ce jour, des éloges que Sa Majesté n'acceptera point, parcequ'elle n'a fait qu'obéir en cela à ses convictions impérieuses. Mais, pour que l'Empereur puisse continuer à concourir à ce même système de longanimité, s'abstenir de toutes démonstrations, de tout langage péremptoire, il faudrait que ce système fût suivi également par toutes les Puissances à la fois. La France en a adopté un autre. C'est par la menace qu'elle a obtenu, contre la lettre des traités, l'admission d'un vaisseau de guerre dans les Dardanelles. C'est à la bouche du canon qu'elle a présenté par deux fois ses réclamations et demandes d'indemnités à Tripoli, puis à Constantinople. C'est encore par l'intimidation que, dans la contestation des Lieux Saints elle a amené l'annulation du Firman et celle des promesses solennelles que le Sultan avait données à l'Empereur. Devant tous ces actes de prépotence l'Angleterre a gardé un silence complet. Elle n'a fait ni offres d'appui à la Porte, ni remontrances au Gouvernment Français. La conséquence en est toute claire. La Porte a dû nécessairement en conclure que de la France seule elle a tout à espérer, comme à craindre, et qu'elle peut impunément éluder les réclamations de l'Autriche et de la Russie.

C'est ainsi que la Russie et l'Autriche, afin d'obtenir justice, se sont vues à leur tour, contre leur gré, obligées d'agir par l'intimidation, puisqu'elles ont affaire à un Gouvernement qui ne cède que devant une attitude péremptoire; et c'est ainsi que par sa faute, ou, plutôt par celle de ceux qui l'ont d'avance affaiblie, la Porte est poussée dans une voie qui l'affaiblit encore davantage. Que l'Angleterre s'emploie donc à lui faire entendre raison. Qu'au lieu de s'unir à la France contre les justes réclamations de la Russie, elle se garde d'appuyer, ou même de paraître appuyer, les résistances du Gouvernement Ottoman. Qu'elle soit la première à inviter celui-ci, comme elle-même le juge essentiel, à traiter ses sujets Chrétiens avec plus d'équité et d'humanité. Ce sera le plus sûr moyen d'épargner à l'Empereur l'obligation de se prévaloir en Turquie de ces droits de protection traditionnelle dont il n'use que malgré lui, et de reculer indéfiniment la crise que l'Empereur et Sa Majesté la Reine tiennent également à prévenir.

En somme l'Empereur ne peut que se féliciter d'avoir provoqué entre elle et lui cet échange intime de confidences. Il y a trouvé de précieuses assurances, dont il prend acte avec une vive satisfaction. Les deux Souverains se sont dit franchement ce que, dans l'hypothèse extrême dont ils traitent, leurs intérêts respectifs ne sauraient comporter. L'Angleterre comprend que la Russie ne saurait permettre à Constantinople l'établissement d'une Puissance Chrétienne assez forte pour la contrôler et l'inquiéter. Elle déclare que, pour elle-même, elle renonce à toute intention ou désir de posséder Constantinople. L'Empereur désavoue également tout désir ou dessein de s'y établir. L'Angleterre promet qu'elle n'entrera dans aucun arrangement tendant à statuer sur les dispositions à prendre dans le cas de la chûte de l'Empire Turc sans s'en être préalablement concerté avec l'Empereur. L'Empereur, de son côté, contracte volontiers le même engagement. Comme il sait qu'en pareille occurrence, il peut également compter sur l'Autriche, engagée par ses promesses à se concerter avec lui, il envisage avec moins de crainte la catastrophe que son désir sera toujours de conjurer et d'éloigner autant qu'il pourra dépendre de lui.

Non moins précieux lui ont été les témoignages d'amitié et de confiance personelle de la part de Sa Majesté la Reine, dont Sir Hamilton Seymour a été chargé à cette occasion de se rendre l'organe auprès de lui. Il y voit la garantie la plus sûre contre l'avenir que sa prévoyance avait cru devoir signaler à celle du Gouvernement Anglais.

No. 179.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 19.)

(B. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 9, 1853.

My Lord,

AS it appears very evident that the secret memorial which, by a despatch of this day, I have the honour of bringing to your Lordship's knowledge, has been drawn up under a complete misapprehension (real or assumed) of the part taken by Her Majesty's Government in the late Turkish affairs, I have thought it my duty to address to Count Nesselrode the private and confidential letter, of which I beg to inclose a copy to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 179.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, [illegible], 1853.

My dear Count Nesselrode,

THERE is an observation respecting the very important memorandum placed yesterday by your Excellency in my hands, which I feel obliged to make. I am most anxious to observe that this paper must have been drawn up

under the impression of English policy at Constantinople having been very different from what in reality it has been.

I can affirm, conscientiously and distinctly, that the object proposed to themselves, as well by the late as by Her Majesty's present Government, has been to act as a common friend in the contests between the allied Governments, and that far from having inclined, as has been stated, to France in the course of the late critical transactions, it has been the desire of the Queen's advisers (to the full extent permitted to a Government compelled to observe a neutral attitude) that ample satisfaction should be given to the demands which His Imperial Majesty's Government were justified in making.

This assertion I should have no difficulty in substantiating by written evidence; and I will add, that in any just demand which England may have to make upon a Foreign Cabinet, I only desire that the conduct of a friendly Power towards us may be that which quietly and unostentatiously the English Government has pursued in the complicated question of the Holy Places with regard to the claims of Russia.

I request your Excellency's good offices for causing this, the real state of the case, to be rightly understood; at all events, for preventing a contrary belief from being adopted until it shall be clearly ascertained whether or no my statement is correct.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 180.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received March* 19.)

(C. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 10, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE just had a very amicable and satisfactory conversation with the Chancellor, who, under the impression of my letter of the 8th instant having originated in a misconception with regard to the Emperor's memorandum, had desired to see me.

We read over the memorandum together, and Count Nesselrode observed that all that was desired here was, that while appealing to the Emperor's magnanimity and feelings of justice, Her Majesty's Government should employ some efforts towards opening the eyes of the French Ministers as to the false course into which they have been led by M. de Lavalette.

To this, I replied, that such had been the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government, not on one occasion, but on various occasions; and that as a specimen of the language held by your Lordship's predecessor to the French Government, I would beg to read to him an extract from one of Lord John Russell's despatches.

I read accordingly the five or six lines of Lord John Russell's despatch to Lord Cowley, No. 51, beginning: "But Her Majesty's Government cannot avoid perceiving," and concluding with, "the relations of friendly Powers," which passage I had copied out and taken with me.

Count Nesselrode expressed his warm satisfaction at finding that Her Majesty's Government had given such excellent advice to the French Government; and only regretted that he had not been long ago put in possession of evidence so conclusive, as to the part taken upon the question of the Holy Places, by Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

In conclusion, the Chancellor requested that I would consider the passage in the Imperial memorandum commencing with the words, "Que l'Angleterre s'emploie donc," as expressing a hope, and not as implying a reproach,—as referable to the course which it was desired should be taken by Her Majesty's Government, and not as alluding to that which had been pursued.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H SEYMOUR.

No. 181.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 77.)

Constantinople, March 8, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a most confidential statement which I have just received from M. E. Pisani.

I have only time to add, that it tends to confirm the opinions which I have expressed in my previous despatches to your Lordship, respecting the threatening attitude assumed by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 181.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

March 8, 1853.

A FRIEND of mine, closely connected with the Russian Embassy, informed me this morning, in the most confidential manner, of a conversation he had with one of the aides-de-camp of Prince Menchikoff, at which M. de Balabine was present. He said that the Prince was not sent here to negotiate, but to make some peremptory demands; that the Emperor of Russia was ready for all emergencies; that this time the scene will be at Constantinople; that the Latins had no right to interfere with the Sanctuaries of Jerusalem; that the Cupola shall belong exclusively to the Greeks; that the Prince Menchikoff gave the most positive assurances to the Greek Patriarch that the Emperor had taken up the affair, and they may stay quiet, and not make any representations to the Porte. He also said that the treaty between the Porte and France was of no value in the Emperor's eyes, in comparison with the political exigencies of the Emperor, which were of far greater weight; that he suspected that the English fleet would probably come to assist the Turks, but that before it could arrive, "le coup serait porté;" that England and France were not yet acquainted with the policy of Russia; and that Russia could excite all the Christian populations to revolt.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 182.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 19.)

(No. 80.)

Constantinople, March 8, 1853.

My Lord,

M. BENEDETTI has placed in my hands a précis of despatches in the archives of the French Embassy respecting Turkish events in connection with Russian policy in 1833, and they seem so analogous with events now occurring here, especially as regards the faith of Russian engagements, that I venture to inclose it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 182.

Précis of Despatches furnished by M. Benedetti.

LE 9 Mai, 1833, au moment où la cession du territoire d'Adana venait de mettre un terme aux dernières difficultés qui, malgré les efforts réunis de la France et de l'Angleterre, s'opposaient encore à la conclusion de la paix entre l'Empire Ottoman et l'Egypte, le Général Comte Orloff, aide-de-camp de l'Empereur Nicolas, qui, à une époque peu éloignée, avait déjà rempli une mission en Turquie et y avait laissé de bons souvenirs, arrive à Constantinople avec le double titre d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et de Commandant-en-chef des forces Russes qui occupent le Bosphore.

Dans les premiers temps de son séjour, les efforts du Comte Orloff, malgré ses protestations réitérées aux Ambassadeurs de France et de l'Angleterre, tendirent à provoquer la reprise des hostilités, en conseillant au Sultan la résistance, et en lui promettant l'appui de la Russie; mais les mouvemens des troupes Russes, qui vont camper vis-à-vis les îles des Princes, un plan d'occupation des Dardanelles, déjà repoussé par la Porte, et reproduit avec plus d'insistence, ne laissent que trop prévoir de quel prix la Turquie paierait les secours qu'on veut lui imposer. C'est, dit-on, en s'efforçant de faire renoncer le Grand Seigneur à la cession d'Adana que le Comte Orloff espère arriver au but qu'il se propose, ou que du moins l'arrivée incessante de nouvelles troupes Russes dans le Bosphore autorise à lui supposer.

Cependant, vers la fin du mois de Mai, la retraite d'Ibrahim Pasha commence à s'effectuer, et en même tems certaines ouvertures, faites à la Porte par l'Ambassade de Russie, donnent à penser que le Comte Orloff, contraint par les efforts réunis de la France et de l'Angleterre, de respecter la paix qu'il a trouvé faite à son arrivée, cherche, en désespoir de cause, à conclure avec le Sultan un traité offensif et défensif, qui permettra aux Russes d'exercer sur la Turquie une influence exclusive, leur donnera le droit d'intervenir sans être obligés d'en prévenir qui que ce soit, et en un mot, les autorisera à commander dans le Bosphore au moindre symptôme de refroidissement dans les rélations de la Turquie avec quelqu'autre Puissance.

Ces bruits deviennent au bout de quelques jours une certitude; le Comte Orloff, qui rencontre chez la plupart des membres du Ministère une vive résistance, veut agir sur le Sultan lui-même, et c'est au palais qu'il cherche des alliés: Ahmed Pasha, Mushir du Mabein du Sultan Mahmoud, et dévoué à la Russie, lui prête le concours le plus actif; des revues, des fêtes auxquelles le Sultan est invité à assister, l'entretiennent dans les dispositions qu'on a su lui suggérer, et le 8 Juillet le traité, qui doit porter le nom d'Unkiar Skelessi, est signé par le Seraskier Ahmed Pasha et le Reis Effendi, sans avoir été délibéré en Conseil.

Peu de jours après, les troupes Russes se rembarquent; le Comte Orloff part pour Odessa sur le vaisseau le "Tchesme," et pendant dix ans la Turquie s'est trouvée unie à la Russie par des liens qui ont entravé sa liberté d'action dans toutes les questions, qui lui ont aliéné les sympathies des Puissances Occidentales, qui ont failli enfin amener les plus graves complications.

No. 183.

Colonel Rose to the Foreign Office.—(Received March 20.)

(Extract.)

Constantinople, March 8, 1853.

I INCLOSE you a copy of a report which M. Pisani has just brought.

Inclosure in No. 183.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

Pera, March 8, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Prince Menchikoff, accompanied by all the persons attached to his Embassy, was received in audience to-day by the Sultan. After he had presented his credentials, he said that he had been particularly desired by his august master, the Emperor, to present his friendly compliments to His Majesty the Sultan, and to assure him how anxious he (the Emperor) was to see the coolness which had latterly existed between the two Governments give place to more friendly relations.

Subsequently, all the attachés, and M. d'Ozeroff himself, withdrew, and the Prince remained alone with M. Argyropulo, in private converse with the Sultan, in the presence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the first Interpreter of the Divan.

It would appear that the presence of the latter was not very agreeable to the Prince, who cast furious glances at M. Argyropulo. He did not enter into any details touching the object of his mission; but only spoke in general terms of several matters that required settlement, without specifying their nature, and added, that it was his intention to communicate thereon with His Majesty's Ministers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 184.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 161.) *Paris, March* 19, 1853.

My Lord,

THE despatches addressed to the French Government from Constantinople, on the 5th and 6th instant, conveyed by the regular packet to Marseilles, and those transmitted on the 8th, brought by an English steamer to the same port, reached Paris—the former yesterday, the latter this morning. The telegraphic notice already received, respecting the nature of the intelligence contained in them, had created considerable anxiety in the Government, an anxiety which had been shared by the public at large.

M. Benedetti's despatches give an account of the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople, of his visit to the Porte, and of the change in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Your Lordship will have received ample intelligence on these matters, and I do not pursue them further. Beyond this, the statement of the French Chargé d'Affaires is confined to surmises as to the nature and scope of Prince Menchikoff's mission; for it appears that, up to the 8th instant, nothing was distinctly known as to the demands which he was to make upon the Porte. M. Benedetti, however, seems to have no doubt that they included a summons to restore the *status quo* at Jerusalem,—a recognition by the Sultan of the Protectorate of Russia over the Greek Religion in Turkey, —the election of the Greek Patriarch for the future by the Greek subjects of the Porte, such election to be confirmed at St. Petersburgh,—the liquidation of various claims pending between the Russian Legation and the Divan,—and the settlement of the frontier separating the two empires in Asia Minor. It was also rumoured that the Russian Envoy was to ask of the Porte a treaty which should give her some such rights as those she obtained under that known by the title of "Unkiar Skelessi." To conclude the summary thus furnished me of M. Benedetti's despatches, Colonel Rose had thought that matters had taken so serious a turn, that he had requested Admiral Dundas to approach the Dardanelles with the fleet under his command.

To the anxiety felt by the French Government, as mentioned in the beginning of this despatch, has now been superadded irritation and impatience. The conquest of Turkey is looked upon as decided on, and even undertaken by

the Emperor of Russia; and the hasty imagination of some of the Ministers already sees a Russian army in possession of the Principalities, and a Russian fleet before Constantinople, although the French Government does not in fact yet know what are the real demands of Prince Menchikoff, and whether they can be reasonably granted by Turkey or not.

I had long conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, both yesterday and to-day. He expressed surprise this morning at not having received any answer to a despatch which he had addressed, the day before yesterday, to Count Walewski, and in which, it appears, he expressed the hope that some joint course of action might be decided upon by the Governments of Great Britain and France. I observed upon the impossibility of coming to a decision upon facts that were not yet known.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued the conversation with great irritation of manner. He said that what he had always predicted had come true,—that while Russia was cajoling us at St. Petersburgh with assurances of a friendly disposition towards Turkey, she was preparing the vast resources at her disposal for crushing the Ottoman Empire,—that the question of the Sacred Places was a pretext, the humiliation and finally the subjugation of Turkey, the intention, —that Turkey could not be attacked without violating the Treaty of 1841,— that it behoved the Powers, parties to that Treaty, to oppose that violation, and that France would do so, even if she stood alone,—that the French fleet had been ordered to the coast of Greece, not with any immediate hostile intention, but to be prepared for any eventuality.

My reply to M. Drouyn de Lhuys was to the following purport:—That Her Majesty's Government was as anxious as could be that of the Emperor for the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire. If, however, that integrity and independence were menaced, whose fault was it? Conscientiously I must say that it was the fault of France and of Austria,—of France, in raising without consideration the question of the Holy Places, which had given Russia the pretext for her present proceedings,—of Austria in setting the example of menace and intimidation. Even now, I said, unless events had marched with a rapidity hitherto unknown in Turkish negotiations, the projects of Russia, such as were imputed to her by France, might be baffled. If Russia had demanded the *status quo* in Jerusalem, it was more than probable that she had done so under the conviction that France would refuse her consent, and that she (Russia) would consequently be justified in asking an equivalent for what had been granted to France; that equivalent might be the Protectorate of the Greek religion, or, in other words, the supremacy of Russia in the European provinces of Turkey. Let France, however, accept the *status quo* at Jerusalem, the Russian scheme would probably be defeated.

Nothing could be more fair and honourable than the way in which M. Drouyn de Lhuys admitted, as far as his personal opinion was concerned, the error committed by the French Government, not only in the matter of the Sacred Buildings, but in the naval demonstration undertaken last year against Tripoli. "But," he said, "France has already expiated her faults; for what has she obtained in comparison to what she demanded, and to what she is entitled by treaty? She cannot make greater concessions; this is not my opinion only; the Emperor would rather be pounded in a mortar ('broyé dans un mortier') than yield to the dictation of Russia. The honour of France would not permit it."

I rejoined that there was no question of yielding to the dictation of Russia; that Russia, in proposing the re-establishment of the *status quo*, gave up the Firman which she had obtained, and which secured to her advantages equivalent, at the least, to those which France enjoyed; and that, for my part, I could see nothing dishonourable in two great countries making mutual concessions for maintaining the peace of the world.

I could obtain nothing more from M. Drouyn de Lhuys than this—that there was nothing in the concessions made to the French which, in his opinion, rendered impossible the execution of the Firman given to the Greeks; in other words, that France could not openly give up what had been conceded to her, but would not look too closely into any arrangement made with Russia, whether it militated against her interests at Jerusalem, or not.

I have been more particular in giving your Lordship these short details of two very long conversations, because it is impossible not to see that the French

Government may make this matter very dangerous. Irritated at their own want of foresight, in raising a question which has given Russia her present advantages in the East, they are endeavouring to make it appear that it is not the settlement of a religious dispute which Russia meditates, but that it is her supremacy in Turkey which she asserts. I shall, as occasion offers, continue the language which I have never ceased to hold on this question,—that we have no right to doubt the peaceable intentions of the Emperor of Russia, or of his desire to maintain the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, assurances to that effect having been so repeatedly given both to Great Britain and France at St. Petersburgh, until we have proofs to the contrary; and I shall endeavour to calm, as far as depends on me, that irritable humour which leads the French so constantly to act upon the spur of the moment, and, consequently, with a rashness of which they have often to repent in the sequel of events.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 185.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 21.)

(No. 75.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March 7, 1853.*

I REGRET to state to your Lordship that all the circumstances connected with the mission of Prince Menchikoff, which I shall transmit to-morrow by H. M. S. "Wasp" to Malta to be forwarded to your Lordship without any delay, have assumed a serious and threatening appearance. It is true, that the declarations of the Russian Ambassador are pacific; but facts, unfortunately, do not bear out those declarations.

I have used all the exertions in my power to protect the rights and independence of the Porte; but it is my duty to submit my conviction, unfortunately a general one, that if the Porte do not receive prompt and energetic assistance from Her Majesty's Government, her independence and rights, and with them the balance of power, will be dangerously compromised by the mission of Prince Menchikoff.

I inclose copies of three reports respecting the threatening attitude of the Russian troops towards Turkey; another which I have received states that General Daemberg has advanced his cavalry outposts to within six miles of the Moldavian frontier. Your Lordship will be pleased to observe that all these threatening movements are quite opposed to the tenour of the assurances which elicited your Lordship's despatch, No. 18, to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

The Sultan has accepted Fuad Effendi's resignation, and appointed Rifaat Pasha, not a bad man, in his place. Fuad Effendi persisted in refusing to return to office; he is not very popular with some of his colleagues or the Sultan; and to these circumstances, rather than to Russian intimidation, may be ascribed the Sultan's final acceptance of his resignation. I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Sultan's Hatti-Sheriff; it is very remarkable, because, for the first time in the annals of Turkey, the Sultan declares that he accepts a Minister's resignation: an exception to the invariable rule was made on this occasion, for the purpose of showing that Fuad Effendi's own will, and not foreign intervention, was the cause of his resignation. Hitherto, it was not supposed possible that any Turkish Minister could possess a will in any matter connected with the Sovereign's prerogative.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 185.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Colonel Rose.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Galatz, February 25, 1853.*

FOR some months past, there have been rumours that a large Russian force was to be collected in Bessarabia, and even that these provinces were to be occupied. From the information I have obtained, I consider it certain that the inhabitants of Bessarabia, in the districts around Ismail and Reni, have received orders to prepare quarters for sixty thousand troops.

I will be attentive to obtain any authentic information, and communicate it to you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHARLES CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 185.

Extract from a Report of the French Consul at Jassy to M. Benedetti.

Février 14, 1853.

TOUTES les personnes et toutes les lettres qui arrivent de Bessarabie s'accordent à dire qu'il s'y fait de très-sérieux préparatifs de guerre. D'immenses approvisionnemens de biscuits sont déjà faits, et les troupes ont reçu l'ordre de se tenir prêtes à marcher au premier signal.

Inclosure 3 in No. 185.

Consul Yeames to Colonel Rose.

Sir, *Odessa, March 4, 1853.*

I HAVE not hitherto communicated to you the military movements and preparations that have of late taken place on this frontier, not feeling assured that such correspondence was desired by you: but I now think that I should fail in my duty were I not to inform you of the arrival of a courier from the capital on Tuesday night, bringing very unexpected orders for the immediate concentration of the troops; the 15th Division of Infantry at Leovo on the Pruth, the 14th at Odessa, and the 13th at Sevastopol, to be ready for embarkation. The Artillery of the 5th Corps d'Armée, always stationed on the left bank of the Dnieper, is without delay to join the respective divisions. Rye biscuits, a war provision, has been baked, and a large quantity is stored in Kichenell, likewise a great supply of boots. Considerable delay will be caused by the state of the roads, which, in consequence of a rainy season, are scarcely passable.

No judgment can be formed here by the natives for these precipitate measures, excepting it be the question of the Holy Places, supposed generally to be the object of Prince Menchikoff's embassy. No other grievance is here known to exist since the success of Count Leiningen's negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

Inclosure 4 in No. 185.

Hatti Sherriff.

(Traduction.)
Mon Illustre Vizir, *25 Djemaziul-evvel, 1269 (6 Mars, 1853).*

ETANT devenu nécessaire de remplacer Fuad Effendi, qui vient de nous prier d'accepter sa démission du poste de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de notre Sublime Porte, et Rifaat Pacha qui a la connaissance des affaires qui sont

du ressort de ce Ministère, ayant des talents et de la capacité, il a été mandé auprès de nous, et après avoir été revêtu du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, il a été envoyé à notre Sublime Porte.

Que notre Dieu, le Très-Saint, soit propice à tous par le mérites du coryphée des Prophètes, ainsi soit-il.

No. 186.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, March* 22, 1853.

YOUR Excellency's despatches, to No. 164 inclusive, have been received and laid before the Queen, and I have the satisfaction to inform you that Her Majesty entirely approves of the language held by you to M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the events that have recently taken place at Constantinople.

I had yesterday a long interview with Count Walewski upon the same subject. The information received by the French Government appears to correspond precisely with that which has reached Her Majesty's Government, and Count Walewski gave me the same report as is contained in your Excellency's despatch No. 161, of the views and feelings of his Government.

I told his Excellency that when the intelligence from Constantinople was analysed, and divested of the colouring imparted to it by local excitement, it would be found to consist chiefly of street rumours, Russian gossip, Turkish alarm, and diplomatic zeal; and that there was but one fact to deal with, viz., that General Menchikoff, in pursuance of the orders of the Emperor of Russia, announced nearly two months ago, had declined to hold official intercourse with Fuad Effendi, because that Minister, in the opinion of His Imperial Majesty, had acted with bad faith to Russia. Fuad Effendi had accordingly resigned; but Prince Menchikoff had not required this, and he had declared that no disrespect was intended to the Sultan by the omission of the customary visit to his Minister.

Under these circumstances, I said Her Majesty's Government had not thought Colonel Rose justified in requesting that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they had learnt, with much satisfaction, that Admiral Dundas had considered it his duty to remain at Malta until he received instructions from England.

For similar reasons, I told Count Walewski that Her Majesty's Government regretted the order given to the French fleet to sail for the Greek waters, as the delay of a few hours would have put the French Government in possession of information that might have led to the same conclusions that Her Majesty's Government have arrived at on the subject; and I ventured to remark to His Excellency, that a policy of suspicion was neither wise nor safe, and often led to hasty determinations.

Her Majesty's Government, I added, were disposed to place reliance on the Emperor of Russia, from whom they had often received the most solemn assurances that it was both his interest and his intention to uphold the Turkish Empire, and that if any change in this policy were contemplated by His Imperial Majesty, the intention should be communicated without hesitation or reserve.

No such communication having been made, Her Majesty's Government were bound to believe, until they had proofs to the contrary, that the mission of Prince Menchikoff was not of a character menacing to the independence and integrity of Turkey.

I further informed Count Walewski that I had just had a conversation with Baron Brunnow, to whom I had unreservedly communicated the reports that had reached us from Constantinople respecting the objects of General Menchikoff's mission, and that Baron Brunnow had assured me, of his own knowledge, that no frontier question would be mooted; that no change in the mode of appointing the Greek Patriarch would be proposed; and that there was no intention of depriving the Latins of advantages they possessed in the Holy Places, though the Emperor would insist upon the promises made to him in favour of the Greek Church being fulfilled.

Baron Brunnow likewise showed to me, confidentially, the letter of the Emperor to the Sultan, which was written in a most friendly spirit, and exhibited much respect for the authority of his Highness.

Count Walewski appeared to be satisfied with this communication, and to agree with me that it would ill become the dignity of France to make a naval demonstration without having any definite object in view; that if General Menchikoff's mission was of a friendly nature, the arrival of a fleet at Constantinople or the neighbourhood would be useless, or, possibly, worse than useless, as it might give a hostile character to the Russian policy; and that if, contrary to our expectations, the independence of Turkey were really in danger, the blow would be struck long before the fleet could arrive, and no instructions, as to the mode in which it should act, could be given beforehand with the precision which the gravity of such an event would demand, or the concert with other Powers which its European importance would render necessary. Count Walewski also agreed with me that the proper course for the Governments of England and France would be to come to no decision at present, but to wait for the intelligence that must in a few days arrive from Constantinople.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 187.

The Earl of Clarendon to Colonel Rose.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1853.

YOUR despatches, from No. 70 to No. 81 inclusive, the last of the 8th instant, have been received, and laid before the Queen.

The circumstances reported in those despatches did not, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, render it necessary for you to request that the British fleet should come to Vourla, and they have entirely approved of the conduct of Admiral Dundas in not complying with your request, and not leaving Malta without specific instructions from Her Majesty's Government.

Admiral Dundas has been ordered to remain at Malta.

I do not think it necessary to send you further instructions at present, as you will of course have governed your conduct by those contained in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 27 of the 19th ultimo, which will have reached your hands a few days after the date of your last despatches.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 188.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 23. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March* 23, 1853.

YOUR despatches Nos. 87 and 88 of the 21st and 22nd ultimo have been laid before the Queen, and I am commanded to express Her Majesty's entire approval of the discretion and judgment displayed by you in the conversations which you had the honour to hold with the Emperor.

I need not assure you that the opinions of His Imperial Majesty have received from Her Majesty's Government the anxious and deliberate consideration that their importance demands; and although Her Majesty's Government feel compelled to adhere to the principles and the policy laid down in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 38 of the 9th of February, yet they gladly comply with the Emperor's wish that the subject should be further and frankly discussed. The generous confidence exhibited by the Emperor, entitles His Imperial Majesty to the most cordial declaration of opinion on the part of Her Majesty's Government, who are fully aware that, in the event of any understanding with reference to future contingencies being expedient, or,

indeed, possible, the word of His Imperial Majesty would be preferable to any Convention that could be framed.

Her Majesty's Government persevere in the belief that Turkey still possesses the elements of existence, and they consider that recent events have proved the correctness of the opinion expressed in the despatch of my predecessor, that there was no sufficient cause for intimating to the Sultan that he cannot keep peace at home, or preserve friendly relations with his neighbours.

Her Majesty's Government have accordingly learnt with sincere satisfaction that the Emperor considers himself even more interested than England in preventing a Turkish catastrophe; because they are convinced that upon the policy pursued by His Imperial Majesty towards Turkey, will mainly depend the hastening or the indefinite postponement of an event which every Power in Europe is concerned in averting. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that nothing is more calculated to precipitate that event than the constant prediction of its being near at hand; that nothing can be more fatal to the vitality of Turkey than the assumption of its rapid and inevitable decay; and that if the opinion of the Emperor, that the days of the Turkish Empire were numbered, became notorious, its downfall must occur even sooner than His Imperial Majesty now appears to expect.

But on the supposition that, from unavoidable causes, the catastrophe did take place, Her Majesty's Government entirely share the opinion of the Emperor, that the occupation of Constantinople by either of the great Powers would be incompatible with the present balance of power and the maintenance of peace in Europe, and must at once be regarded as impossible; that there are no elements for the reconstruction of a Byzantine Empire; that the systematic misgovernment of Greece offers no encouragement to extend its territorial dominion; and that as there are no materials for provincial or commercial government, anarchy would be the result of leaving the provinces of Turkey to themselves, or permitting them to form separate republics.

The Emperor has announced that sooner than permit a settlement of the question by any one of these methods, he will be prepared for war at every hazard; and however much Her Majesty's Government may be disposed to agree in the soundness of the views taken by His Imperial Majesty, yet they consider that the simple predetermination of what shall not be tolerated, does little towards solving the real difficulties, or settling in what manner it would be practicable, or even desirable, to deal with the heterogeneous materials of which the Turkish Empire is composed.

England desires no territorial aggrandizement, and could be no party to a previous arrangement from which she was to derive any such benefit. England could be no party to any understanding, however general, that was to be kept secret from other Powers; but Her Majesty's Government believe that no arrangements could control events, and that no understanding could be kept secret. They would, in the opinion of her Majesty's Government, be the signal for preparation for intrigues of every description, and for revolts among the Christian subjects of the Porte. Each Power and each party would endeavour to secure its future interests, and the dissolution of the Turkish Empire would be preceded by a state of anarchy which must aggravate every difficulty, if it did not render a peaceful solution of the question impossible.

The only mode by which such a solution could be attempted would be that of an European Congress but that only affords an additional reason for desiring that the present order of things in Turkey should be maintained, as Her Majesty's Government cannot without alarm reflect on the jealousies that would then be evoked, the impossibility of reconciling the different ambitions and the divergent interests that would be called into play, and the certainty that the treaties of 1815 must then be open to revision, when France would be prepared to risk the chances of an European war to get rid of the obligations which she considers injurious to her national honour, and which, having been imposed by victorious enemies, are a constant source of irritation to her.

The main object of Her Majesty's Government, that to which their efforts have been and always will be directed, is the preservation of peace; and they desire to uphold the Turkish Empire, from their conviction that no great question can be agitated in the East without becoming a source of discord in the West, and that every great question in the West will assume a revolutionary

character, and embrace a revision of the entire social system, for which the continental Governments are certainly in no state of preparation.

The Emperor is fully cognizant of the materials that are in constant fermentation beneath the surface of society, and their readiness to burst forth even in times of peace; and His Imperial Majesty will probably, therefore, not dissent from the opinion that the first cannon-shot may be the signal for a state of things more disastrous even than those calamities that war inevitably brings in its train.

But such a war would be the result of the dissolution and dismemberment of the Turkish Empire; and hence the anxiety of Her Majesty's Government to avert the catastrophe. Nor can they admit that the signs of Turkish decay are now either more evident or more rapid than of late years; there is still great energy and great wealth in Turkey; a disposition to improve the system of government is not wanting; corruption, though unfortunately great, is still not of a character, nor carried to an extent, that threatens the existence of the State; the treatment of Christians is not harsh, and the toleration exhibited by the Porte towards this portion of its subjects might serve as an example to some Governments who look with contempt upon Turkey as a barbarous Power.

Her Majesty's Government believe that Turkey only requires forbearance on the part of its allies, and a determination not to press their claims in a manner humiliating to the dignity and independence of the Sultan,—that friendly support, in short, that, with States as with individuals, the weak are entitled to expect from the strong,—in order not only to prolong its existence, but to remove all cause of alarm respecting its dissolution.

It is in this work of benevolence and of sound European policy that Her Majesty's Government are desirous of co-operating with the Emperor; they feel entire confidence in the rectitude of His Imperial Majesty's intentions, and as they have the satisfaction of thinking that the interests of Russia and England in the East are completely identical, they entertain an earnest hope that a similar policy there will prevail, and tend to strengthen the alliance between the two countries, which it is alike the object of Her Majesty and Her Majesty's Government to promote.

You will give a copy of this despatch to the Chancellor, or to the Emperor, in the event of your again having the honour to be received by His Imperial Majesty.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 189.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, March 23, 1853.*

THE copies of Colonel Rose's despatches which are this day forwarded to you, will place you in possession of the latest intelligence received by Her Majesty's Government from Constantinople.

I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government do not think that Colonel Rose was justified in requesting that the British fleet should be brought to Vourla, and they have entirely approved the conduct of Admiral Dundas, who, in the exercise of a sound discretion, declined to comply with the request of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires, or to leave Malta without instructions to that effect from Her Majesty's Government.

The reports current in Constantinople with respect to the real objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, the alarm of the Divan and the resignation of Fuad Effendi, the rumoured advance of a large Russian force to the Turkish frontier, the request made for the approach of the British fleet, and the orders given for the sailing of the French fleet, have naturally excited great alarm, both in

England and France, with respect to the fate of Turkey, and the events of European importance that might, at any moment, occur in the East.

Her Majesty's Government have felt no alarm, and have shared in none of the apprehensions which the rumours and facts above alluded to might appear to justify; for, on more than one occasion, they have received the personal assurances of the Emperor of Russia that it was his determination to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire, and that should the views of His Imperial Majesty undergo any change upon that important question, they should frankly be made known to Her Majesty's Government. No such communication having been received, Her Majesty's Government felt perfectly secure that, whatever might be the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, neither the authority of the Sultan, nor the integrity of his dominions, were exposed to danger.

I communicated, without reserve, to Baron Brunnow all the reports that had reached Her Majesty's Government respecting the approach of the Russian army to within one day's march of Jassy; the vast naval preparations at Sevastopol; the excitement of the Greek population at Constantinople on the arrival of Prince Menchikoff; the language, hostile to the Porte, attributed to the Russian Embassy; the changes to be made in the frontier; and the future appointment of the Greek Patriarch by the Emperor of Russia, which would reduce the Sultan to a mere nominal possessor of his throne.

Upon all these points the assurances of Baron Brunnow were, as I fully expected, satisfactory and conclusive, and they served to confirm the judgment respecting them which had already and without hesitation been formed by Her Majesty's Government.

The despatches of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, and mine to Lord Cowley, will make you acquainted with the communications that have passed between the English and French Governments on this subject.

Her Majesty's Government regret that the alarm and irritation which prevail at Paris should have induced the French Government to order their fleet to sail for the waters of Greece; but they are disposed to make great allowance for the position in which the French Government stands, and which, in many respects, is different from that of Her Majesty's Government. They have not, to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government, received assurances from the Emperor as to the policy he was determined to pursue towards Turkey; the misdirected zeal of their late Ambassador at Constantinople is still the cause of much embarrassment to the French Government; and the national honour of France is concerned in not losing all the advantages obtained for the Latins at the Holy Places. Under these circumstances, therefore, and believing, erroneously, that the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire was at hand, it is not very surprising that an ill-considered determination should have been taken.

Indeed, the position for some time past occupied by France with respect to the Holy Places, and the interest as well as political feeling embarked in the question, are the only grounds for now apprehending embarrassment in the East; but Her Majesty's Government entertain a hope that the Emperor, animated by an unvarying desire for the peaceful solution of all difficult questions, will direct Prince Menchikoff to take care, in his negotiations with the Porte for securing the rights of the Greek Church, that no conditions are imposed on the Latins which would be hurtful to the honour or to the interests of France.

You will read this despatch to the Chancellor and give him a copy of it should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 100.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 172. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 24, 1853.*

I REPORTED to your Lordship on Saturday afternoon last the 19th instant the resolution to which a Council, over which the Emperor had presided in the morning, had come, of ordering the fleet at Toulon to proceed to the coast of Greece. I was somewhat surprised by this decision, because I had no reason to believe that it was in contemplation. The despatches received the day before from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople had discouraged any such demonstration, and an indirect inquiry, which I had made of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, had led me to suppose that he was likewise opposed to it. On asking why it had been judged necessary to take this serious step, I was told that it had not been done with any hostile intention; that it was evident from Colonel Rose having sent for the English fleet, that he considered the crisis at Constantinople as one of great gravity, and that the French Government had resolved to be prepared for any eventuality. But we were, at this time, without any information as to the reasons which had induced Colonel Rose to take the step in question. It appeared to me, therefore, that however necessary and advisable the presence of the French fleet in the Archipelago might eventually become, the decision to send it had been taken prematurely. The French Government had no precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the demands to be made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte; Her Majesty's Government had not yet received their despatches from Colonel Rose; and it was most desirable that no false move should be made, which might prove a source of future embarrassment. I took, therefore, such steps as I thought might induce the Emperor to pause, until His Majesty had a thorough knowledge of all that had occurred at Constantinople. It seemed to me that no disadvantage could ensue from a short delay, for one of two things would probably have happened at Constantinople: either Prince Menchikoff would have insisted upon the acceptance of his demands, with an energy which would have accomplished his ends before an English or French fleet could have been near Constantinople, or he would have entered into a course of negociation with the Porte, which would allow time for England and France to interfere, if the two Governments judged it necessary.

My overtures were ill received on all sides. An attempt which I made to see the Emperor himself, failed from unwillingness, I believe, on his part to enter into any discussion of the matter, and the "Moniteur" of Sunday morning had announced officially that orders had been sent to the fleet to sail for the coast of Greece. Nevertheless, on Sunday evening it was intimated to me, I cannot help thinking with the Emperor's concurrence, that the orders for the French fleet to sail had not then been sent, because the instructions for the Admiral had not been completed. I was at the same time given to understand, that if Her Majesty's Government would assure that of the Emperor that Great Britain would co-operate with France to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, and would promise at the same time that "les bons offices" of Her Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople should be employed for the settlement of the question of the Holy Places in a way which should not be dishonouring to France, the French fleet might be sent to some port in the Mediterranean for the present rather than into the Archipelago.

The communications which I have at various times received from Her Majesty's Government, enabled me to assure my informant that no Government could be more desirous for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire than was that of Her Majesty, and that Lord Stratford's instructions already enabled that Ambassador to employ in the manner suggested his great talents and his efforts for the settlement of the question of the Sacred Buildings.

I called the next day on M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the expectation of finding him willing to abide by the declaration made to me the previous evening. Unfortunately a Council had been held in the morning, at which less conciliatory advice had prevailed, and I was informed that it was too late to make any alteration in the destination of the fleet. It was impossible, M. Drouyn de Lhuys said, to recall orders which had been published in the "Moniteur." His manner was greatly irritated when speaking of Russia. He was surprised, he said, that England was so little alive to the character of Prince Menchikoff's mission. This officer had arrived at Constantinople with an immense staff, after reviewing the Russian army and fleet at Sevastopol, had treated the Sultan's Ministers with extreme disrespect, and was currently reported to be about to make demands of the Porte, the acceptance of which would annihilate the independence of Turkey. This state of things had seriously alarmed the English Chargé d'Affaires at the Porte, and he had informed his French colleague that he had summoned the British fleet to Constantinople. Was it extraordinary that France should not wish to remain inactive where the independence of Turkey was in danger, and the Treaty of 1841 threatened, perhaps, with violation?

M. Drouyn de Lhuys continued in this strain for some time, contrasting the apathy of the British Government now with its alacrity when the Porte was threatened by Austria and Russia in the question of the refugees, and hinting that it suggested the idea of a change of policy on our part in regard to Eastern affairs.

I assured M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that he was quite mistaken in his latter supposition; that I would answer that Her Majesty's Government were as anxious as any of their predecessors for the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire; but that if I remonstrated against the departure of the French fleet, it was because neither Government had any facts before them on which to found a concerted action, and that until facts proved the contrary, we were bound to trust to the solemn assurances made by the Emperor of Russia of his pacific intentions.

I will not, however, weary your Lordship with a more detailed report of the arguments which I employed on this and other occasions, first, to prevent the departure of the fleet, and finding that impossible, to prevail on the French Government to give a less hostile and menacing appearance to its arrival at Salamis, whither it is bound, by sending orders that it should anchor for a few days at Naples and other ports between Toulon and the coast of Greece. M. Drouyn de Lhuys would do no more than promise to submit my observations to the Emperor. He informed me subsequently, that they had not induced His Majesty to alter the orders already given, and that the fleet would sail on the morning of the 22nd. He repeated at the same time, that there was no hostile meaning in the movement of the fleet; it was a simple measure of precaution.

I have received a confidential confirmation of this latter assertion from a person who has read Admiral de la Susse's orders. He is instructed not on any account to leave the waters of Greece, unless under a written demand from the French Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have thought it necessary to trouble your Lordship with a summary of my proceedings during the last three or four days, in order that Her Majesty's Government may be assured that I have left no means untried to prevent the consummation of an act conceived in ignorance and haste, and carried out with petulance and obstinacy.

It only remains for me to state, in a few words, the motives which have actuated the Emperor and his Ministers on this occasion. In the first place, it is a common saying with them, that Louis Philippe fell in 1840, and not in 1848; meaning, that the conduct of Louis Philippe, in permitting the settlement of Eastern affairs in 1840 without the participation of France, caused the eventual fall of the Orleans family. The Emperor is determined not to commit any such mistake

Secondly.—The vanity of the nation is flattered by the announcement that the French fleet is sent towards troubled waters—though the nation neither knows nor cares what the fleet is to do.

Thirdly.—There is jealousy, and perhaps a little mistrust, of England. The idea that our fleet should alone be summoned to Constantinople excited irritation and a sentiment of rivalry.

Fourthly.—The question of the Sacred Buildings at Jerusalem is not yet settled, and the French Government, without having any definite object in view, thinks, no doubt, that the approach of the French fleet towards Turkey may be useful in the ensuing negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 191.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 175. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 24, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction to acquaint your Lordship that the tone of the French Government in regard to its relations with Russia is much calmer, and more conciliatory.

M. de Kisseleff received despatches yesterday from St. Petersburgh, dated the 15th instant, which he communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys in the course of the day.

In them Count Nesselrode reiterates the sincere desire of the Emperor to terminate the question of the Holy Buildings amicably. In reply to an observation made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, through M. de Catelbajac, that he sees no reason why the Porte's note of the 8th of February, 1852 to M. de Lavalette, together with the instructions given to Afif Bey, the Porte's Commissioner at Jerusalem, in which documents are contained the concessions granted to the Latins, are not reconcilable with the Firman obtained by M. de Titoff for the Greeks. Count Nesselrode says that he has no knowledge of the two former documents; that they have never been communicated either by the Porte or by the French Government to him, and that he can consequently give no opinion about them; that if they are communicated to him now, he will take them into consideration, and instruct Prince Menchikoff accordingly. The Count remarks, "That if the communication had been made frankly at the time, all that has since taken place might have been avoided." To a proposition which appears to have been made by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, that a conference of French, Russian, and Turkish Commissioners should be established at Constantinople, for the purpose of regulating the claims of the contending parties, Count Nesselrode answers, "That it would be better that the French and Russian Representatives should understand each other before addressing themselves to the Porte." Assurances are given that there is no intention on the part of Russia to disturb any arrangements made between France and the Porte in regard to the Sacred Buildings; but it is laid down, that if concessions have been made to the Latins, an equivalent will be required for the Greeks. The whole tenour of the correspondence shows further, that the Emperor of Russia has no hostile feeling towards Turkey, and is anxious for the maintenance of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

Prince Menchikoff, Count Nesselrode says, will meet whoever may be the French Representative at Constantinople with the utmost frankness and cordiality.

M. de Kisseleff's interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys terminated very amicably; but the Russian Envoy does not appear to have refrained from pointing out to the French Minister the folly of the proceedings of the French, from the commencement of this business, and more particularly in their last act—of ordering the fleet to leave Toulon. M. Drouyn de Lhuys excused himself, on the plea of the Russian armaments near Odessa; to which M. de Kisseleff replied, that the reports about them had been exaggerated, and that there was no truth in Prince Menchikoff's having passed reviews, &c.

I found M. Drouyn de Lhuys much reassured this afternoon. He had

received letters from M. de Castelbajac by M. de Kisseleff's courier, which confirmed all M. de Kisseleff's statement. Indeed, General Castelbajac had gone so far as to ask M. de Nesselrode, whether he considered the settlement of the question of the Sacred Buildings a *casus belli*, and had been assured by the Russian Chancellor, that the Emperor only looked to its amicable settlement.

In order to lose no time, M. Drouyn de Lhuys sent the substance of these communications to M. Benedetti by an Ottoman courier just starting for Constantinople. He read me his letter to M. Benedetti; but I have not time to say more than that M. Benedetti is enjoined to meet Prince Menchikoff with the same spirit of frankness and cordiality that is offered from the other side. "La France ne veut ni escamoter un succès, ni subir une humiliation," is the pith of M. Drouyn de Lhuys's letter.

M. de la Cour left Paris on Monday last for Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 102.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 176.) *Paris, March 24, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE French Government has received a telegraphic despatch from Vienna, with news from Constantinople up to the 10th instant. Prince Menchikoff had been received by the Sultan on the 9th, and had assured his Highness of the friendly sentiments entertained for him by the Emperor of Russia. The Prince had not touched upon the objects of his mission, except by saying that he had come to Constantinople with the hopes of arranging certain claims which Russia had on the Porte.

Negotiations were opened between the Prince and the Porte on the 10th instant, but on what subject is not said.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 103.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 25.)

(No. 127. Confidential.) *St. Petersburgh, March 16, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE most honest and sagacious of the Emperor's advisers hold a language respecting the dissolution of the Turkish Empire which corresponds very closely with that employed by Her Majesty's Ministers in the late parliamentary discussions in which allusions have been made to this eventuality.

It is not long since I had the satisfaction of hearing Count Nesselrode enlarge upon the expediency of taking as the point of departure in the consideration of Turkish affairs, not the dissolution, but the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, while he expressed his belief that a disruption of the Sultan's dominions might very well give rise to a war of which half a century would not see the conclusion.

On the other hand, there are certainly not wanting those here who argue that a crisis in Eastern affairs is inevitable and close at hand.

The arguments of the Russians who maintain this opinion cannot be reported more perfectly than they are in the "Times" newspaper of the 7th

instant, in which I read:—"That the Turkish population is everywhere declining; that it is almost impossible to find men of integrity to carry on the Government; that the old Mussulman party has come back to power with all its prejudices; that their first act was to destroy the credit needed to replenish an exhausted treasury, and their second to engage in a costly and mischievous military expedition; that the Christian population throughout the Empire is on the brink of revolt," &c., &c.

All this may possibly be true; I do not possess the means of gainsaying the "Times's" sinister assertions; but as similar forebodings have, to my knowledge been expressed with equal assurance for the last thirty years, I am little disposed to place confidence in their correctness. I will, however, venture to assert that if the public press of England is to accredit and support these views, a very great step will be taken towards the accomplishment of the predicted catastrophe; and equally clear it is that the most daring of the Russian spirits will have found a powerful advocate in the very quarter from whence they, no doubt, themselves anticipated the stoutest opposition.

It is to be hoped, then, that English feeling may exert itself for the purpose of discouraging attempts at familiarizing the public mind with schemes by which England cannot profit, and by which she may be so great a loser. At the same time I do not for a moment doubt that as regards this country the number is very considerable of those who believe, or who assert, "That the power of the Turks over their Christian subjects and their European territories is ebbing as steadily as the tide," and who consider themselves "bound by every consideration of humanity, civilization, and justice to trust that it may be the will of Providence to restore these Provinces to a purer faith and a milder sway!"

My own aspirations are of a more humble nature, and only go to this point, that when a country, long the faithful and useful ally of England, requires a little support, it may not be of that description which the "Times" appears willing to afford to the cause of Turkey.

Upon Turkish questions the language and the wishes of a judicious Englishman should hardly be that of the most ardent among the Russians.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 194.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 26.)

(No. 180. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March 25, 1853.*

I HAVE been informed confidentially that the Emperor signed a decree last night, authorising the Minister of Marine to put four new ships into commission at Toulon. My informant believes them to be line-of-battle ships.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 195.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received March 26.)

(D. Secret and Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 12, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Chancellor sent for me this morning, when he placed in my hands a copy of the Memorandum which was brought to your Lordship's knowledge by my despatch, marked A, of the 9th instant.

Upon this copy the Emperor had written in pencil, that he was sorry to find that Sir Hamilton Seymour had considered a passage in the paper as reflecting upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Government; that no reproach had been intended, and that the Chancellor would do well to see me and to state that if it should be my wish, the paper might be taken back and altered.

After a few moments' reflection it occurred to me that the explanations which I had received were sufficient, so that a record could be obtained of the Emperor's amicable intentions, and that the paper, if taken back, might be altered in more than one of its passages; I therefore stated that instead of changing the Memorandum, I would suggest that his Excellency should write me a few lines explanatory of the purport of the passage which I had considered objectionable.

To this the Chancellor at once acceded, and it only remained for me to request that his Excellency would be kind enough to express to the Emperor how sensibly I felt his gracious solicitude to efface a disagreeable impression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 196.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 60.)

Foreign Office, March 29, 1853.

My Lord,

ON the 25th instant Count Walewski informed me, by the direction of his Government, that the French fleet had orders to proceed to Salamis, and that communications of a satisfactory nature (as reported in your Excellency's despatch No. 175) had been received from Russia with respect to the instructions given to Prince Menchikoff concerning the Holy Places.

Count Walewski said that the French Admiral was directed not to proceed further than Salamis, and that the fleet was sent there not as a menace to Russia, but as a measure of precaution; that serious events might arise in the East, for which it was incumbent on France to be prepared, and that it was thought necessary to send the French fleet to Salamis in order that it might be on the same line as the English fleet at Malta, which, otherwise, would have been nearer to the theatre of events; but that, should the necessity for it arise, the French Government hoped the two fleets would act together in support of the common interests of both countries in the East.

I told Count Walewski that I saw no reason for altering the opinion I had more than once expressed to him, and that I still thought the orders for the sailing of the fleet were given hastily and without sufficient reason; and that, although I hoped the two Governments would always act together when their policy and their interests were identical, yet I must frankly say that the recent proceedings of the French Government were not the best calculated to secure that desirable result; for the fleet had been ordered to sail without consultation or communication with us, at a moment, too, when the French Government were either in possession of their despatches from Constantinople, or were hourly expecting their arrival, and when, moreover, they knew from him (Count Walewski) that Her Majesty's Government hoped and believed that the Admiral

at Malta would not comply with the request addressed to him by Colonel Rose; and that, notwithstanding the earnest request of your Excellency, no delay in the departure of the fleet nor change of its destination could be procured.

I added further, that coldness and suspicion all at once appeared to exist towards us, in the place of previous cordiality; that we were thought to be taking part with Russia against France, and placing undue confidence in the former, while we looked with unaccountable indifference at the approaching destruction of the Turkish Empire; whereas, I said, the French Government must know that we had acted with perfect sincerity towards them; that in their differences with Russia we had endeavoured, without expressing any opinion upon the claims of either party, to bring about an amicable arrangement; that we had stated our reasons for thinking the Emperor of Russia entitled to confidence, and that I had informed him (Count Walewski) of the assurances which had been given to me by Baron Brunnow, and which had been fully confirmed by the communications made by M. Kisseleff to M. Drouyn de Lhuys; and, lastly, that the French Government were well aware that it always had been and would be the policy of this country to maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I assured Count Walewski, however, that I had not adverted to these points of difference by way of remonstrance or complaint; but that, with Governments as with individuals, I thought it best, when any disagreement arose, frankly to seek and to give explanations, and that I was sure such a course would tend to promote those friendly relations between the two countries to which Her Majesty's Government attached so much value.

Count Walewski received these remarks in the same spirit of cordiality and good humour with which they were offered; he said, that any suspicion of the good faith of Her Majesty's Government would be most unfounded, and he admitted (though, of course, in confidence) that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been unnecessarily disturbed and precipitate; but he assured me that the views of the Emperor were not those of his Minister.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 197.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 83.)

Constantinople, March 10, 1853.

My Lord,

I THINK that affairs here wear a more pacific appearance than they did two days ago; and I hear that the cause of this favourable change, if it really exists, is the attitude of Her Majesty's Embassy, as I have represented it in my late despatches.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 198.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 86. Most Confidential.)

Constantinople, March 10, 1853.

My Lord,

M. D'OZEROFF visited me a few evenings ago, and commenced a very confidential conversation with me respecting the question of the Holy Places, the gist of which was, that as the French Government dwelt so much on the use of force in the discussion respecting them, it would be advisable that England should join with Russia in showing her that she could not in reality employ that

force with success. In short, the object of M. d'Ozeroff's arguments was that Great Britain should, together with Russia, oppose, if necessary, by force France if she endeavours by force to support her claims to any further change of the *status quo* of the Holy Places, such as the repair of the Cupola, which the architect says must take place ere long.

On a previous evening M. d'Ozeroff had represented to me, with great earnestness, the impossibility of Russia making any concessions as to the question of the repair of the Cupola; that the Greek Patriarchs and clergy considered it "their life and their all; that having always prayed under this cupola, which covered the Holy Sepulchre, they prized the right more than their existence, and would not surrender it."

The question of the Cupola is of far more importance and danger than that of the key. It is considered the chief emblem of Christianity at Jerusalem; and if the friendly exercise of the influence and counsels of Her Majesty's Government can induce the French Government to allow the *status quo* as to the Cupola to be maintained, the European misfortune of war between France and Russia and the Porte will have been averted; for it is vain to hope that the Porte will not be dragged into such a war. France never wished to negotiate directly with Russia a settlement of the question of the Holy Places, because, by doing so, she acknowledges in a manner what she must dread—Russia's right to protect the Greek Church. M. d'Ozeroff also, latterly, has evinced a distaste to Russia's negotiating the question directly with the Porte [France?], on the ground that it would be a misprision of the Porte's territorial rights. But this is not, I think, the real reason; because Russia once wished to settle directly with France the question of the Holy Places. France, at that time, refused. Russia, now, would not wish to exclude the Porte from those negotiations, because she knows that, with her diplomacy and influence here, she can gain more from the Porte than she could from France, who would, besides, put forward her treaty as the basis of her negotiations. She knows that if she can induce the Porte to give a decision favourable to her, she will have the Porte on her side against France, and that, moreover, the Powers, who support the Porte as being essential to peace and the balance of power, will be inclined, more or less, to support the Porte's decision. The important mission of Prince Menchikoff justifies, in a measure, this view of the case, which is still further confirmed by a communication I had with the Grand Vizier.

He was talking to me about Fuad Effendi's retirement. He said, "Myself and the whole Ministry, not Fuad Effendi alone, are responsible for the delivery of the key to the Latins. We did not do so from fear of M. de Lavalette's menaces, but from regard to the Porte's Treaty with France; if that Treaty be not binding, our other treaties are not binding; the Porte has many disagreeable treaties with foreign Powers, and we should be most happy to have an excuse for tearing them up. As regards the Cupola, France has the right, by treaty, to repair it; but she has consented that the Sultan should repair it; the Porte will repair it according to the *status quo*, that is, with Greek, and not Latin, saints and inscriptions." It remains to be seen whether France will accept this solution. To judge from M. de Lavalette and M. Benedetti's language, she will not. They are reserved about the Cupola, because they wish it to be believed that France, out of deference to the counsels of her allies, has "enterré" the question of the Holy Places. But neither of these gentlemen are quite sincere as to this matter. They state that France will allow the Porte to repair the Cupola, without saints and inscriptions, or with one general inscription, in Armenian, Arabic, Latin, and Greek; or that the alternate saints shall be Greek and Latin. But I fear, that if Russia demands a strict execution of the *status quo* as to the Cupola, that is, that all the saints and inscriptions be Greek, France will claim that they shall not be so, and that the Cupola belongs to her by virtue of the Capitulations of 1740.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 199.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 88.)

Constantinople, March 10, 1853.

My Lord,

I MADE inquiries of Prince Menchikoff, respecting the military movements of the Russian troops, which have caused so much apprehension to the Porte; and I read to his Excellency M. Consul Yeames's letter to me on that subject.

Prince Menchikoff said to me in reply, that the Russian force had been advanced to the Turkish frontier, because the first report at St. Petersburgh of the result of Count Leiningen's mission was not satisfactory; but that he did not know of any intention to embark troops at Sevastopol.

I then asked Prince Menchikoff whether the Russian troops could not return to their original quarters, since Count Leiningen's mission had received a satisfactory solution, adding, that I was certain that so peaceful a demonstration would afford the greatest satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government and the Porte. Prince Menchikoff said that the troops would remain in their present quarters, which were their usual cantonments.

I observed, that General Danneberg's force had advanced from its usual quarters up to the Moldavian frontier; that the 5th and 7th corps had been united, and placed on the war establishment under General Rudiger. I detailed also other unusual military Russsian movements.

Prince Menchikoff then took up another ground of argument, and said that the military movements of Omar Pasha had caused suspicion to the Russian Government, who thought that he might carry war and Mazzini's doctrines into the Austrian territory and the Danubian Provinces.

I told Prince Menchikoff that I could safely give his Excellency the most positive assurances that the Porte had never even had an idea of carrying into execution so great a project of conquest and revolutionary propagandism, which would be ruinous to her interests and incompatible with her means; that Omar Pasha had the most stringent orders to keep quite clear of the Austrian frontier. And I asked his Excellency how it was possible that that general, with his small, imperfect force, could move, through hostile Slave populations, against the armies of Russia in his front, those of Austria on his left flank, and the warlike Montenegrins in his rear.

Of all the excuses given by Russia for her threatening military demonstrations, this last one is certainly the least valid.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 200.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(*Received March* 30.)

(No. 89.)

Constantinople, March 10, 1853.

My Lord,

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF has informed me that the Russian Government intend to require from the Porte the execution of the terms of the Firman to the Greeks, and a reparation to the Emperor of Russia; but his Excellency says, that the retirement of Fuad Effendi formed a part of that reparation; and I think from his manner and what he let drop, that if France would not further disturb the actual *status quo*, including of course the important matter of the Cupola, which he says is Russian, the Russian Government would not ask for any further reparation.

The French Chargé d'Affaires, although reserved about the question of the Cupola, because he knows all its gravity, still occasionally speaks as to it in a manner which shows that, so far from acknowledg ng Russia's right to it, he shares M. de Lavalette's opinion, that it is France's by treaty. He told me

that the French Government had not accepted M. de Kisseleff's proposal, which of course is known to your Lordship. He said that it was impossible that France could accept the Firman to the Greeks as a solution of the question of the Holy Places, even if Russia consented not to disturb the arrangement as to the key. He said that France would not consent to the establishment of a *status quo* which deprived her of her rights as to the Cupola. He added, I beg to say quite confidentially, "What a spectacle it would be for Europe—a French squadron under sail with the broken treaty of 1740 on her mainmast-head, and the Porte's unexecuted notes of February and September on her fore and mizen masts!"

There is a temporary solution of the question, of which I venture strongly to recommend the adoption.

The Cupola can last three, perhaps five years.

Passions have been unduly excited as to the question of the Holy Places; it would be better to let the question slumber till its repair becomes necessary; perhaps, by that time the feelings excited by the discussion of this dangerous question may have become calmer; at any rate, the danger of further discussion would be averted for a time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 201.

Colonel Rose to Lord John Russell.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 11, 1853.

THE Servian agent called on me yesterday and told me, in some agitation, that Prince Menchikoff had told him, a few days ago, that he must acquaint the Prince of Servia that he demanded that his Highness should dismiss Mr. Garashanin, whom he accused of being a disciple of Messrs. Kossuth and Mazzini, without any delay. He added that a member of the Russian Embassy had told him directly afterwards that if the Prince did not give effect to this demand, Russia would effect a revolt or some great catastrophe in Servia.

M. Nicolaievitch declared that M. Garaschanin was entirely innocent of the charge.

After reflecting on this information, I requested M. Nicolaievitch to come to me the next day, when I advised him to write to the Prince of Servia, and suggest to him that it would be well if he replied to the demand in terms of respect and perfect civility, that, by the constitution of Servia, which was guaranteed by Russia and the Porte, no public servant could be dismissed without a trial; and that the Porte, as Suzerain of Servia, would of course take umbrage if the Prince of Servia dismissed a Minister on the official demand of Russia, without even her knowledge; that, under these circumstances, the Prince hoped that Prince Menchikoff would communicate with the Porte on the subject, and that he engaged himself to do prompt and ample justice to any complaint which might be addressed to him against M. Garaschanin, in conformity with the rights of Russia, the Porte, and the institutions of Servia.

I observed, that Her Majesty's Ambassador was expected here immediately, and that his Excellency would, I was sure, aid with his powerful influence the Prince of Servia in obtaining justice for a Minister who has always manifested a sincere and effectual sympathy for the rights of the Porte and British interests.

The demand in question of Prince Menchikoff, and the threat which accompanied it, show how varied are the real objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission; how different they are from those which were announced; and how unscrupulous are the means employed for carrying them out.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 201*a*.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 190. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, March* 30, 1853.

AT the ball given by the Corps Législatif to the Emperor on Monday last, His Majesty came up to me as soon as he saw me, and said that he hoped that the misunderstanding which I had had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys concerning the departure of the French fleet had passed over. I replied that I had had no misunderstanding with the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, though I had certainly differed in opinion with him, both as to the necessity for and the prudence of the French fleet leaving Toulon; and I had felt that the act was at variance with the assurances so constantly given me of the desire of the French Government to consult with that of Her Majesty in all questions concerning the affairs of the East. The Emperor observed that he did not know whether M. Drouyn de Lhuys had explained to me correctly the reasons which had induced His Majesty to consent to the immediate departure of the fleet, or the manner in which His Majesty viewed the duties and obligations of France in the East. Although he had every wish of acting generally in concert with England in Eastern affairs, there was at this moment a shade ("nuance") of difference between the interests of the two Governments in Turkey. There was the general question of the integrity and independence of Turkey, on which he should be always most ready and desirous to act in unison with the British Government, and there was the question of the Sacred Places, which concerned France more particularly, and in which she must consult her own interests. Now those interests appeared to him to require that France should shew that she was not indifferent to what was passing at Constantinople.

The place in which this conversation occurred was not favourable to discussion. The Emperor spoke with some warmth and animation of manner, and he had already, I observed, attracted the notice of bystanders. Without, therefore, remarking, as I might have done, upon the inconsistency of vindicating the departure of the French fleet by the present state of the question of the holy places, instead of attributing it to the true motive, namely, the proceedings of Colonel Rose in regard to the English fleet, I said, (as your Lordship's despatch No. 25 to Sir Hamilton Seymour had enabled me to do,) that Her Majesty's Government, although they had not disguised from the French Government the concern with which they had viewed the departure of the fleet, were yet disposed to make every allowance for the peculiar position of France in regard to the holy places, and had used all the influence which they possessed at St. Petersburgh, in order to induce the Russian Government to respect the natural susceptibility of the French nation on this point. I remarked, however, that it was a mistake to suppose that any question of importance regarding Turkey could long be kept a separate question. The Turks themselves, by asking advice, first on one side, and then on the other, would soon render it European, and when armies and fleets were put in motion, all Europe took the alarm.

The Emperor replied, that he had some reason to complain that the Russian Government had never given him the same pacific assurances which they had given to the Queen's Government. Had they done so the French fleet would never have left Toulon.

I said that His Majesty, at all events, ought to see in the regret which Her Majesty's Government had evinced at the single action of France at this moment, the sincerity of the oft-repeated assertions of their desire that a common understanding should prevail between the two Governments in all questions where their policy was identical; that it was as a mere matter of fact very immaterial to us where the French fleet was stationed, but that it was of great importance that other Powers should not imagine that a difference of opinion had sprung up where unity of principle was asserted; that I trusted that for the time all danger of complications in the East was at an end, and that we should for the future act as if these incidents had not occurred, assuring His Majesty that it had made no difference in the friendly feelings of Her Majesty's Government towards himself.

The Emperor replied in the same terms, and thus the conversation ended.

I must not, however, omit to mention that in the course of it His Majesty seemed anxious to show that he had never felt any distrust of England, and he said that the Porte had equally applied for the presence of the French fleet near the Dardanelles, which, from what I had heard of M. Benedetti's despatches, I had not understood to be the case.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 202.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 194.)
Paris, March 31, 1853.

My Lord,

THE French mail from Constantinople, due on the 28th instant, only reached Paris last night.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys has had the goodness to communicate to me the substance of M. Benedetti's despatches dated the 14th and 15th instant. They may be summed up as follows:

Prince Menchikoff had not broken the silence which he had observed from his first arrival at Constantinople with respect to the object of his mission, but he was to have an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 16th, at which he intended stating some of the points which he wished to see arranged. He had, in the meantime, demanded in his quality of Ambassador to be admitted to a private audience of the Sultan, whensoever he might require it. No answer had been returned to this demand.

In an interview which the Prince had had with M. Benedetti, the latter had at once commenced on the question of the holy buildings. The Prince, though he listened with urbanity to all the observations made by the French Chargé d'Affaires, into which I have not time to enter, but which refer to the generalities rather than to the details of the question, replied that the settlement of that question was but a secondary object of his mission; that he had been sent in consequence of the affair of Montenegro, and he did not wish to conceal that, if he had not found it settled, he should have employed all the means at his disposal to force the Porte to desist from its invasion of that country; that, as to the question of the Sacred Places, he did not yet understand it; that no doubt he should in a short time be master of it, and that he hoped it might be settled satisfactorily, but that he must at once state that his instructions did not permit him to negotiate with the French Embassy on that question.

M. Benedetti appears to have used the same arguments as Colonel Rose reports himself, in his despatch No. 88, to have employed to induce Prince Menchikoff to cause the Russian troops to retire now that the affair of Montenegro was terminated, but with no better result.

M. Benedetti continues to draw conclusions adverse to the good faith of Russia from what is passing at Constantinople, but he cites no facts to prove his case. A visit paid by Prince Menchikoff to Khosrew Pasha, who signed the Treaty of Unkiar Skélessi, bribes said to have been sent to the Sultana Valide, intrigues within the interior of the Sultan's palace, are the only evidence which he offers in support of his suspicions.

I was glad to find that neither the doubts evinced by M. Benedetti, nor the language of Prince Menchikoff respecting the question of the holy buildings, which is so completely at variance with that held at St. Petersburgh, had made any bad effect upon M. Drouyn de Lhuys' mind. He said that after the positive assurances given by the Russian Government that there was no intention on their part to procure any retractation of the concessions made to France, the French Government was perfectly satisfied. The latter, moreover, had no pretension to interfere with any concessions which the Porte might think fit to accord in compensation to the Greeks, unless the independence of Turkey should thereby be threatened; and even then it would be a case for the consideration of the great Powers of Europe collectively, and not of France individually.

Nothing could be more explicit than M. Drouyn de Lhuys' declaration (as far as it is of any value) upon this very important point.

In a postscript of the 15th instant, M. Benedetti states that Colonel Rose appeared to have regretted the step which he had taken in sending for the fleet, that he had sought an interview with the Grand Vizier, for the purpose of asking whether that functionary still thought the presence of the English fleet desirable; and upon being informed that the fears of the Porte of any immediate danger had passed by, he had written by the French steamer to Admiral Dundas to inform him of the altered tone of the Turkish Government.

I have to apologise to your Lordship for the haste in which this despatch is written, to enable me to forward it by the present messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 203.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 81. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, April 1, 1853.*

ON Tuesday last, Count Walewski informed me that he had that morning received letters from Paris which left no doubt on his mind that the Emperor had to a certain extent been deceived with respect to the recent intelligence from Constantinople, as precedents had been quoted to him which were not applicable; and that in fact he had given a decision without having completely examined the whole question, and in error as to the course that Her Majesty's Government would pursue.

The Emperor, however, having discovered his mistake (in consequence, as I inferred, of Count Walewski's representations), had declared that, if the sailing orders had not been improperly published in the "Moniteur," the French fleet should not have left Toulon; and he would not listen to the persons who had advised him ill, and who, finding their views unsupported by facts, had sought to cast blame upon Her Majesty's Government for abandoning France and preferring Russia, which was the cause, Count Walewski said, of that absence of cordiality respecting which I had spoken to him on a previous occasion.

Count Walewski renewed his assurances that the fleet would not proceed further than Salamis, and said he was charged to express the earnest hope of the Emperor that this incident would not alter the relations between the two countries, nor, should it become necessary, prevent their cordial cooperation in the East where the interests of both were so entirely identified; and, added Count Walewski, "I can give no better proof of how much the Emperor has the English alliance at heart than the fact that in order to preserve it he would be ready to sacrifice even the holy places."

The conversation, of which I have now given you the substance, was of considerable length, and as much of it was of a confidential character, and interspersed with messages from the Emperor, and expressions not altogether friendly to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, no doubt was left on my mind that Count Walewski spoke from the direct instructions of the Emperor; and your Excellency will therefore consider this despatch as strictly for your own information.

Alluding to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, Count Walewski said, "I have been reproached for not having sufficiently defended the order for the sailing of the fleet, and my answer was that I could not defend a course which I considered to be unjustifiable."

Count Walewski more than once pressed upon me that whenever a question of difficulty arose, it was most desirable that your Excellency should communicate with the Emperor, to whom he knew it would always be agreeable.

The communication of the French Ambassador was of course received by me in the most friendly spirit, and I said I never entertained a doubt that frank explanations would remove the momentary difference that had arisen. I admitted that the sailing order having been published in the "Moniteur," it could

not be revoked without injury to the Government in public opinion; and I requested his Excellency to assure the Emperor of the great value attached by Her Majesty's Government to the alliance with France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 204.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 95.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 15, 1853.

M. BENEDETTI had a long and pacific conversation with Prince Menchikoff yesterday respecting the holy places; the ambassador told him that he considered that question secondary, that he was now studying it. M. Benedetti says that Prince Menchikoff may speak of the question lightly with a view not to alarm him.

Neither M. Benedetti nor myself consider the explanations of his Excellency respecting the concentration of Russian troops or their presence on the Turkish frontier satisfactory, although they are more so than M. d'Ozéroff made me; but, everything considered, we do not think that Russia will now make any violent or categorical demand of the Porte, or support it by a *coup de main* against Constantinople.

Prince Menchikoff assured both M. Benedetti and myself of Russia's wish to support the Porte; he told me that "he was a negotiator and not, like Count Leiningen, the bearer of a peremptory demand;" he also said that if Omar Pasha had attacked the Austrians, Russia would have made war on the Porte.

The Grand Vizier and his Ministry feel stronger, and not so apprehensive as they were of Russian aggression. Under these circumstances I have addressed a letter to Vice-Admiral Dundas, of which a copy is inclosed.

Prince Menchikoff told both M. Benedetti and myself that he had heard that M. de Lavalette and myself had excited the Porte to attack Montenegro. M. Benedetti gave this statement a formal denial, and I told his Excellency that so far from having done so I had advised the Porte not to attack Montenegro, and that an approval of my having done so was in the Archives.

I questioned the Seraskier respecting Zabliach; he states that the Turkish troops cannonaded it for thirty-two days, that they were about to storm it when the garrison evacuated it, firing a mine which wounded several Turkish soldiers. This version is different from the first Turkish account, which stated Zabliach was taken by storm.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 204.

Colonel Rose to Vice-Admiral Dundas.

Constantinople, March 15, 1853.

Sir,

THE aspect of affairs here having become more peaceful, I consulted the Grand Vizier and the Seraskier whether it would not be advisable that I should suggest to your Excellency that it would be better that you should not visit Smyrna at present, but proceed, as Lord John Hay informed me that you originally intended to do, to Corfu and Athens, visiting Smyrna on your return to Malta.

The Grand Vizier and the Seraskier concurring in this suggestion, I have the honour to submit to your Excellency the propriety of your adopting it.

The immediate departure of the French steamer prevents my entering into further details.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 205.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(Secret and Confidential, E.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March* 16, 1853.

WITH reference to the despatch marked secret and confidential D, which I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship on the 12th instant, I beg to transmit in original the letter which Count Nesselrode undertook to write to me expressive of the Emperor's willingness to change the passage in his memorandum which I had considered open to some misinterpretation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 205.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

$\frac{15}{27}$ *Mars*, 1853.

A L'EXPLICATION que j'ai eu l'honneur de vous offrir verbalement, mon cher Sir Hamilton, je me fais un plaisir d'ajouter, qu'ayant porté vos doutes à la connaissance de l'Empereur, Sa Majesté m'a autorisé à modifier le passage qui les a fait naître dans votre esprit, si toutefois vous le jugiez nécessaire. L'Empereur desire avant tout écarter d'une communication toute personnelle et amicale avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine,—ce qui pourrait donner lieu à une interpretation même erronnée, qui serait contraire aux intentions qui l'ont dictée, comme au but que Sa Majesté se propose.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 206.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 129. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March* 20, 1853.

HAVING been confined to my room for the last three or four days, I have been spared the anxiety which appears to have been occasioned to my French colleagues at learning that two young officers, Prince Labanoff and Prince Paskewitch (the son of the Marshal) had been suddenly despatched to the 4th corps d'armée. General Castelbajac, who called upon me yesterday night, stated that his apprehensions had been calmed upon learning that ten other aide-de-camps or officers had been sent off to the different corps d'armée, and that their departure was referable to the Emperor's usual wish of being exactly informed as to the state of his forces.

The French Minister admitted that his anxiety ought perhaps to have given way to the consideration of Count Nesselrode having previously acceded to the proposal of the religious differences between the Russians and the French being settled if possible at Constantinople, in the first instance, by negotiation between the French and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and, upon their coming to an understanding, between them and a Turkish Commissioner.

It appeared from General Castelbajac's report, that before coming to the agreement of which he spoke with Count Nesselrode, he had freely stated to his Excellency that if any further demur took place as to the acceptation of the very conciliatory overtures made by his Cabinet, he should be compelled to infer, either that the Russian Government meditated a war, or that they were intent upon bringing about the downfall of the Turkish Empire.

Upon both points he received very quieting assurances from the Chancellor.

General Castelbajac has come to the conclusion that these assurances are

given in good faith; he has convinced himself, moreover, that a great crisis in Turkish affairs is deprecated by the Emperor; but he believes His Majesty to be so possessed with the idea of the fall of Turkey being at hand, that he does not feel entirely confident that such measures may not be taken by His Majesty as may run the risk of bringing about the dreaded catastrophe.

In this opinion of the impending fall of the Turkish Empire, General Castelbajac believes the Emperor to have been confirmed by some late deplorable articles in the "Times."

This effect, as your Lordship is aware, I had contemplated. General Castelbajac believes that neither the 4th or 5th corps d'armée have yet moved; and I hear the same statement from another quarter: my informant, however, acquaints me, that as regards men, both corps are "au grand complet," the only preparation for war yet wanting being the purchase of horses.

General Castelbajac had hardly left me, when a friendly message was sent to me by an agent employed about the Court, to say that the messenger from Constantinople had just arrived, that Fuad Pasha had resigned, that Prince Menchikoff had been received with marked honour, that his reception by the Sultan had been most gracious, and that judging from the few words which had fallen from the Emperor, His Imperial Majesty appeared to consider the intelligence which he had received satisfactory, and of a nature to lead to the expectation that peace would be preserved.

This intelligence I at once sent on to my French colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I ought to have stated to your Lordship, that Count Nesselrode alluded to some late articles in the "Times," and to the effect which they had produced in confirming the Emperor in the opinions which he holds with regard to Turkey.

G. H. S.

No. 207.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 134.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 24, 1853.*

ACCORDING to the reports received from Constantinople, Prince Menchikoff, after his more formal audience, was admitted to a private interview of the Sultan, at which he had the honour of presenting the letter of which he was the bearer from the Emperor.

At this meeting considerable agitation was manifested by the Sultan, whilst Prince Menchikoff said all that was necessary to quiet his Highness's apprehensions. At a previous conference with the Grand Vizier, Prince Menchikoff had requested that some commissioner might be named to negotiate with him, and that the person selected might not be Fuad Effendi.

Fuad Effendi, upon learning this demand, had immediately sent in his resignation.

Such has been the account given me by Count Nesselrode. I enquired whether Prince Menchikoff had made a specific demand for Fuad Effendi's dismissal; his Excellency replied that he had not, but that his withdrawal from office was considered by the Emperor's Government as an acceptable concession (réparation); that indeed it could not be otherwise, from the notorious devotion of Fuad Effendi to French interests.

Count Nesselrode having expressed himself very hopefully as to the turn which affairs would now take at Constantinople, I observed that I took for granted the course which was to be followed, would be that the Russian and French Plenipotentiaries would meet and concert a settlement of differences.

His Excellency replied that he did not know how that might be, that he was not even aware whether M. de la Cour had reached Constantinople; but that at all events the settlement of the questions afloat could not be displeasing to the French Government, as there was (as I had been made aware) no intention

on the part of the Emperor of demanding a relinquishment of the favours obtained by France. The meaning of this appears to me to be this—that as France obtained certain privileges without the sanction of Russia, Russia in her turn is obtain a certain favour or favours without French concurrence.

I told Count Nesselrode that I should be very anxious to know whether an adjustment of the difficulties respecting the holy places would settle all matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte; or whether Prince Menchikoff had any other grievances to bring forward. The Chancellor was not aware that any such existed; there might be, he said, some outstanding private claims, but that he knew of no other demands.

In short, no other, I replied (inquiringly, and with a view to prevent misapprehension), than may exist between any two friendly Governments? Precisely so, his Excellency answered; the demands which form part of the current business of every "Chancellerie."

This admission appears to me very satisfactory, and equally so is the Chancellor's impression of the late differences being in a train of amicable adjustment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 208.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 137. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 24, 1853.*

IN the course of the conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 21st instant, I stated that there were few points of general policy upon which Her Majesty's Government laid greater stress than upon the preservation of the Turkish Empire, and that a matter of great importance at all times became doubly momentous in times like the present, when it was impossible to calculate the extent of conflagration which might ensue, were once a fire to be lighted in Turkey. Her Majesty's Government, I added, are convinced, M. le Comte, that you share these views, and they reckon upon your assistance for causing them to be acted upon.

And now, I said, permit me to speak to you confidentially and frankly; you tell me that you are as much interested as we can be in the preservation of the Ottoman Empire. The Emperor made me the same statement. What follows? Why, that I feel to have a right to urge upon you the necessity of adopting such measures as will ensure the attainment of our common object. Were the Russians interested in the fall of Turkey, and we alone intent upon her preservation, there might be a question how far we should be authorized in calling upon you to abandon your system to adopt ours; but it is very different when we desire the same thing.

Count Nesselrode admitted that the observation was just, and said moreover that it was one which upon occasion it would be very well to urge upon the Emperor.

His Majesty's "*idée fixe*," his Excellency continued, is that Turkey is about to fall, and hence his wish to take measures of precaution; the "nuance" between us (by which I understand the more prudent of the Emperor's advisers) and His Majesty is, that we see no reason why Turkey should not continue to exist, and desire that measures should be taken accordingly.

I begged his Excellency would excuse me, if I observed that I really believed the essential and only precaution was that of leaving the Turks a little to themselves; but that if every time any Power had a demand or a complaint to make, it was to be enforced by threats of violence, it was evident that the Turkish Empire must totter or fall.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H SEYMOUR.

No. 209.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 4.)

(No. 145.)

St. Petersburgh, March 26, 1853.

My Lord,

THE French and German newspapers which arrived here yesterday afternoon contain the alarming intelligence from Constantinople which is stated to have been brought to Marseilles by the "Caradoc" steamer, and to have been sent on to Paris by telegraph.

Long before this despatch reaches your Lordship, the truth or falsehood of these sinister rumours will be established, but in the meantime I am desirous of stating my firm conviction of their proving to be incorrect.

It is impossible that I should arrive at any other conclusion, after having received the amicable explanations which it has been my duty to transmit to Her Majesty's Government, and having witnessed the disposition so plainly manifested by the French Cabinet to compensate, by conciliatory measures, for the former hastiness and imprudence of the conduct of a diplomatic Agent.

The reports to which I am alluding appear to me to bear upon their very face proofs of their want of foundation. It may be assumed that, if any member of the Turkish Cabinet was more particularly obnoxious to the Imperial Government it was Fuad Effendi, and yet, as your Lordship will have learned from one of my late despatches, the dismissal even of this Minister was not demanded by Prince Menchikoff.

The Prince asked that a Plenipotentiary might be named with whom he might treat, and that this Plenipotentiary should not be Fuad Effendi. His demands, however, in this respect did not go further; and whilst the resignation of Fuad was considered by the Imperial Government (as evidently it was intended to be) in the light of a reparation, everything appears to denote that the other demands which it may have been considered necessary to make of the Porte are not of a nature to excite much opposition on the part of the Turkish Government, or to call in any way for the employment of a naval demonstration on the part of the Russian Negotiator.

In a word then, my Lord (always supposing that no unforeseen and serious complication should have arisen at Constantinople), when I weigh the calm and conciliatory assurances given to me here, by authorities so worthy of confidence, against the words of a telegraphic message transmitted from Marseilles, I am bound to infer that the reports which have given me momentary uneasiness are to be entirely mistrusted.

We know, upon certain authority, that the Russian Government are as desirous as the Government of Her Majesty can be that no serious misfortune should befall the Turkish Empire; we are therefore fully warranted in assuming that no measures of force will be employed by which the danger of such a crisis would be unnecessarily incurred.

I will only add that, since the foregoing sentences have been written, I am enabled to state, as I do with great satisfaction, that the opinion which I have expressed to your Lordship respecting the accounts from Constantinople is fully shared by the Imperial Government.

The last despatches received by this Government from Constantinople are under date the 9th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 210.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 35.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1853.

Sir,

BARON BRUNNOW yesterday communicated to me a despatch in which Count Nesselrode expresses his satisfaction at the entire confidence placed by Her Majesty's Government in the policy and intentions of the Emperor with respect to Turkey.

I assured Baron Brunnow, and you will repeat the assurance to Count Nesselrode, that that confidence remains unabated.

I at the same time informed Baron Brunnow that, from various quarters, reports reached Her Majesty's Government of vast military armaments and preparations in the Southern Provinces of Russia, which, if true, hardly appeared consistent with the pacific determinations of the Emperor; and I asked him if he could give me an explanation of those statements, which, being published in the newspapers, had, as he was aware, created considerable uneasiness.

Baron Brunnow was unable to give me any information on that subject, or upon the mission of Admiral Korniloff to Athens, where, as you will see by the inclosed copy of a despatch from Mr. Wyse, he had arrived, and where his presence had caused some excitement.

You will therefore ask for information on these points from the Chancellor, and you will at the same time make known to him that Prince Menchikoff appears to have told M. Benedetti that Montenegro was the real object of his mission, and that the holy places were a secondary question upon which he was about to inform himself.

With respect to the latter part of Count Nesselrode's despatch, which complains of the conduct of Colonel Rose, I have to inform you that, as there was no opportunity for forwarding the instructions of Lord John Russell before the 24th of February, they could not have reached Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the 9th ultimo; but you will long since have been aware that the conduct of Colonel Rose, in requesting that the British fleet should come to Vourla, was not approved by Her Majesty's Government. He appears to have participated in the alarm of the Turkish Government, and the great excitement of the Greek population, caused by the arrival and first proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, together with the rumours that obtained general credit at Constantinople of the advancing army and fleet of Russia; but Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that, on the part of Colonel Rose, there existed any design to thwart the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, or to encourage the Turkish Government in opposition to the just demands of the Emperor.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 211.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 36. Secret and Confidential.)

Foreign Office, April 5, 1853.

Sir,

YOUR despatches of the 9th, 10th, and 12th ultimo, marked Secret and Confidential, A, B, C, D, have been laid before the Queen.

My despatch No. 23, will have furnished you with answers upon all the principal points alluded to in the memorandum which Count Nesselrode placed in your hands; but it is my duty to inform you that that important and remarkable document was received by Her Majesty's Government with feelings of sincere satisfaction, as a renewed proof of the Emperor's confidence and friendly feelings; and Her Majesty's Government desire to convey their acknowledgments to His Imperial Majesty for having thus placed on record the opinions he expressed at the interview with which you were honoured by His Imperial Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government do not consider that any useful purpose would be served by prolonging a correspondence upon a question with respect to which a complete understanding has been established, and I have only, therefore, further to state, that Her Majesty's Government observe with pleasure that in the opinion of the Emperor, the fall of the Turkish Empire is looked upon as an uncertain and distant contingency, and that no real crisis has occurred to render its realisation imminent.

Her Majesty's Government have never any wish to disguise their policy, which they trust is honest and straightforward towards all other countries; but on such a question they would particularly regret that any misapprehension existed on the mind of the Emperor, and they accordingly approve of the confi-

dential note which you addressed to Count Nesselrode, for the purpose of rectifying some ideas which reflected upon the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government.

On the subject of the "Charlemagne" coming up to the Bosphorus, a correspondence took place between the English and French Governments, and although the Porte gave its sanction unconditionally, the eventual solution of the question was in conformity with the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, and it was settled that the "Charlemagne" should convey M. de Lavalette to Constantinople, under which circumstances it was stated that the passage of the French ship of war would not be further remonstrated against by Her Majesty's Government, but that it must not be drawn into a precedent.

As regards the holy places, you are aware of the instructions given to Colonel Rose for his guidance at the Porte, and of the despatch addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, which was communicated to the French Government, and I have further to inform you that Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed to bear in mind that Her Majesty's Government, without professing to give an opinion on the subject, were not insensible to the superior claims of Russia, both as respected the treaty obligations of Turkey, and the loss of moral influence that the Emperor would sustain throughout his dominions, if, in the position occupied by His Imperial Majesty with reference to the Greek Church, he was to yield any privileges it had hitherto enjoyed to the Latin Church, of which the Emperor of the French claimed to be the protector.

With respect to the advice which the Emperor recommends should be given to the Porte by Her Majesty's Government, you will inform the Chancellor that Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe was directed to return to his post, and a special character was given to his mission by an autograph letter from Her Majesty, under the impression that the Porte would be better disposed to listen to moderate counsels, when offered by one of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's high position and great knowledge and experience of Turkish affairs; and he was particularly desired to advise the Porte to treat its Christian subjects with the utmost leniency.

Upon this latter point Her Majesty's Government are inclined to believe that the Turkish Government are at length awakened to a sense of their own true interests. At the beginning of this year we know that orders were sent to Kiamil Pasha to proceed instantly to Bosnia in order to redress Christian grievances, and to empower the Christian communities to build churches. About the same time also the Porte sent the strongest instructions to Omar Pasha, to act with unvaried moderation and humanity towards his enemies (the Montenegrins); and the English Vice-Consul at Scutari confirmed all the previous statements that the inhabitants of Montenegro committed an unprovoked attack on the troops and subjects of the Porte; while the accounts that have reached Her Majesty's Government respecting the atrocities said to have been committed by the Turks in Bosnia, Herzegovine, and Montenegro, are extracted from Austrian newspapers, and must necessarily therefore be received with caution.

I have only in conclusion to add that as Her Majesty and the Emperor have now mutually renewed the assurances of their intention to uphold the independence and integrity of the Turkish Empire, it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that the representatives of the two Powers may henceforward cooperate together in carrying out this intention by giving similar advice in the same friendly spirit to the Porte.

You are instructed to read this despatch to the Chancellor, and to furnish him with a copy should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 212.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 9.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 8, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS is much pleased with the assurances which M. de Bourquenay has received since he has been at Vienna, of the desire of the Austrian Government to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. These assurances appear to have been even more categorical than those given to Lord Stratford; Count Buol having declared to M. de Bourqueney that Turkey must live, and that Austria would neither act alone, nor with one or two, but always with the five Powers, on all questions relating to the existence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 213.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 148. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 27, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE sent me, this afternoon, the despatch from M. de Kisseleff, of which I beg to inclose your Lordship a copy; at the same time requesting that I would call upon him to-morrow at the Foreign Office.

Your Lordship will perhaps have the goodness to consider the inclosed paper as a confidential one. The contents are by no means secret; but at the same time, the Russian Chancelleries are very little apt to afford an opportunity for copies being taken of their correspondence, and upon any slight grounds would refrain altogether from such a practice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 213.

M. de Kisseleff to Count Nesselrode.

M. le Chancelier, *Paris, 9/21 Mars, 1853.*

LE Gouvernement a reçu hier au soir une dépêche télégraphique de Marseilles, qui l'informe qu'un bateau-à-vapeur, "Le Wasp," y était arrivé la veille dans la soirée de Constantinople, apportant des dépêches urgentes en date du 8 Mars pour le Gouvernement Anglais et le Gouvernement Français; le même bateau était porteur de la nouvelle que le 5 M. Rose avait transmis l'ordre à l'escadre de Malte de venir dans l'Archipel, que le 6 il avait donné contre-ordre, et qu'enfin le 8 il avait renouvelé cet ordre.

C'est avec cette nouvelle que le bateau Anglais est arrivé à Marseilles et c'est à elle que doivent se rapporter les dépêches aux deux Gouvernements. Les dépêches Françaises ne peuvent être ici que ce soir ou demain matin.

En attendant, la nouvelle s'est repandu dans la soirée d'hier, et aujourd'hui elle a circulé avec des exagérations ou des commentaires qui ne font jamais défaut aux nouvellistes oisifs et ignorans, ou au joueurs ou speculateurs de la Bourse.

Lord Cowley, qui sort à l'instant de chez moi, m'a confirmé la nouvelle arrivée de Marseilles, en ajoutant que c'était-là tout ce que M. D. de Lhuys avait reçu jusqu'ici, et que pour sa part il n'avait rien appris directement de plus que le contenu de la dépêche télégraphique d'hier.

Ni lui, ni Lord Stratford, qui était encore ici à l'arrivée de la nouvelle, mais qui devait quitter Paris hier avant minuit (ce que Lord Cowley supposait qu'il a

fait), ne se rendaient compte du motif qui a pu déterminer M. Rose à prendre un tel parti, qui n'était pas du tout prévu par le Gouvernement, et auquel, selon eux, le Chargé d'Affaires n'était nullement autorisé par les instructions dont il était muni.

En attendant les éclaircissements que doivent contenir les dépêches annoncées comme urgentes des Ambassades de France et de l'Angleterre à Constantinople, on se perd en conjectures sur une pareille détermination de M. Rose, et l'on en parle comme d'ordinaire avec plus d'agitation que de calme et de raison avant de savoir encore au juste à quoi s'en tenir et de connaître la véritable portée de cet appel à l'escadre par le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre.

Depuis plus de dix jours une grippe violente et compliquée me tient hors d'état de m'occuper d'affaires, et c'est aujourd'hui la première fois que je me trouve à même de reprendre la plume pour tracer ce court rapport.

(Signed) KISSELEFF.

No. 214.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 150. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 29, 1853.

My Lord,

WERE it not for the acknowledged truth of the well-known observation of the Chancellor Oxenstiern, it would be somewhat difficult to account for the policy pursued of late by the Russian Cabinet.

It appears tolerably certain that even Russian statesmen are aware that probably no arrangement could be made which would be so favourable to Russia as that which leaves the present Ottoman dominions in the hands of a race from whom she has nothing to fear; that they recognize the dangers of such an extension of territory as might alter the character of this Government, impelling it to lean more upon the southern than upon its natural Sclavonic elements, and that their own interests are therefore concerned in not further impairing the already-weakened authority of the Sultan.

Beyond this it is obvious that the Russian Government are much interested in preventing any close alliance between England and France—this combination arraying in fact the west against the east of Europe, civilization against comparative barbarism, light against darkness. The hostility of England alone would offer great dangers to Russia, that of England and France united would be immense; a certain exposure to very severe blows would be incurred, and the possibility of returning them would at all events remain remote.

These truths being, as I believe them to be, recognized here, it may be naturally asked how it is possible that Russia with such perceptions should have ventured upon a policy so rash and reckless as that of which tolerably strong indications have lately been given. The answer would be found, I apprehend, little flattering to autocratic Governments.

It would be necessary to explain that in the measures lately taken with regard to Turkey, the opinions of the oldest and the wisest of the counsellors of the Russian Crown had been disregarded.

That the Emperor having possibly in the first instance endeavoured to impress others with the belief, is now himself possessed with the notion of the downfall of Turkey being inevitable and fast approaching, and that the close and ill-omened alliance of Russia and Austria has had the effect of increasing the arrogance of the former Power, leading, as it appears to do, to such an assumption of suzerain rights over Turkey as to cause any independent action on the part of that Government to be considered almost as rebellious.

At the same time, the attitude lately taken by Russia may have been intended as an experiment as to the extent of endurance which she may reckon upon on the part of England and France; and as indications have not been wanting of those limits having been nearly reached, I am willing to believe that a dangerous crisis is almost got over, and that a little respite will be afforded to the Turkish Empire. If so, lessons of experience will have been learned from which many of the European Powers may derive considerable benefit.

Russia may learn that unlimited authority, although current within her own broad borders, is not to be practised with impunity beyond her frontiers.

Austria, that the alliance of an overgrown military State, although affording great powers of repression against her own subjects, would not be a full security against the hostility of foreign countries.

France, that too great a price may be paid for the petty advantages extorted by diplomacy from a weak ally; and Turkey, that there is less danger in the refusal of a foreign demand, than in the attempt to reconcile contrary interests, and in playing off one powerful foreign ally against another.

There is another Power in Europe by which a very useful lesson may be learned from recent events; I allude to the public press of England.

What has lately occurred may, it is to be hoped, have the effect of satisfying a very influential portion of that press, that there is no great wisdom in encouraging the ambitious views of Russia, and at the same time in alienating from us that Government, whose goodwill, at all times of the utmost importance, becomes indispensable when circumstances render it necessary that a check should be given to Russian encroachment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 215.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 151.)

St. Petersburgh, March 29, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED yesterday at his desire upon the Chancellor, who was desirous of learning, if possible, the truth of the intelligence reported from Paris as to Colonel Rose having sent for the English squadron.

It was of course out of my power to give any information upon the subject, and it was my object to point out that, even should the intelligence prove correct, there was no reason why that incident or accident should give rise to any difficulties.

I represented that Colonel Rose might have been influenced by incorrect reports as to naval or military movements on the part of the Russian forces: that there would probably be ample time for sending counter-orders, supposing them to be called for, and that even in the extreme case of the English squadron approaching the Dardanelles, they would only be in waters which they are more usually in the habit of visiting in the course of the winter or spring.

Count Nesselrode inquired what degree of responsibility an English Chargé d'Affaires was at liberty to incur? To which I replied, that when only private risk was to be weighed against public advantage, I thought it difficult to assign any limits to the responsibility of an English diplomatic agent of whatever rank.

I should have been glad to have remarked to the Chancellor, that if the menacing attitude taken by the Russians of late had given rise to any extreme and unusual naval precautions on the part of Her Majesty's Naval Forces, there would have been no ground for surprise. My object, however, was to abstain from any irritating remark, and rather to assume that a conclusion of all differences with Turkey must be so near at hand, that incidents at other moments of suspicious appearance are not to be regarded.

Count Nesselrode placed in my hands a despatch dated the 4/16th of February, which he had received a fortnight since from Baron Brunnow, and to which I only allude in consequence of the honourable testimony which the Russian Envoy bears to the conciliatory conduct of Her Majesty's Government, and to the confidence which, notwithstanding the representations made from Paris, Her Majesty's Government were disposed to place in the peaceable intentions of the Russian and Austrian Cabinets.

Baron Brunnow, however, did not attempt to conceal the anxiety which was still felt by Her Majesty's Government as to the course which affairs might take at Constantinople, and, as appeared to me, rather left it to be

inferred that this very confidence afforded an additional motive for a peaceable solution of difficulties being that which ought to be adopted.

Count Nesselrode remarked that the only moment during the late transactions at which he had felt apprehension was that at which the urgency of affairs at Montenegro had called for the mission of Count Leiningen; that he had never contemplated the chances of the Holy Places' question leading to a war; and that his anticipation of a speedy conclusion of all matters in dispute had been confirmed by his last despatches from Prince Menchikoff: these, of as late a date as the 17th, represented affairs as going on satisfactorily, and made no allusion either to the summons now said to have been given to the English squadron, or to any circumstance of a nature to render such a summons probable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S. –The Chancellor begged me to read the two despatches which he had before him—M. D. de Lhuys' despatch to General Castelbajac of the 28th ultimo, and that addressed by the Russian Chancellerie to M. Kisseleff on the 7/19th instant: the former of the papers has, I believe, been received by your Lordship, the latter was I know sent some days ago to Baron Brunnow for the purpose of being communicated to you.

G. H. S.

No. 216.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 153.)

St. Petersburgh, March 30, 1853.

My Lord,

IT is but an act of justice to acquaint your Lordship that it is impossible to have shown more eagerness than my French colleague has done during the late crisis in Oriental affairs to place himself upon a confidential footing with Her Majesty's Mission. He has communicated to me as well all the late despatches which he has received, as those which he has addressed to his Government, and has been most desirous that at a moment when it was supposed that the English and French flags were flying alongside of one another, there should be no divergence in the language of the two Missions at St. Petersburgh.

The last despatch received by the Marquis de Castelbajac under date of the 21st instant, and which was sent, probably not by accident, through the common post, is written in very strong language.

General Castelbajac is informed that the French fleet is upon the point of sailing for the Levant; great complaints are made of the conduct of the Imperial Government in taking upon itself to act in so decisive and imperious a manner in a question of general interest, and one with regard to which negotiation had been commenced with France, without concert with the great Powers; and the evil consequences are pointed out of the example set by Russia of a position of "isolement" and "prepotence" in an affair of this magnitude.

Such a departure from the system invariably followed in Europe for the last thirty years, would, it is observed, justify France or any other great Power in acting solely with reference to their own views and interests.

At the conclusion of the despatch, which General Castelbajac is desired to read to Count Nesselrode, he is informed that the time is come when the veil of mystery in which the proceedings of Russian diplomacy has wrapped itself must be cast aside, and that it will be his duty to ascertain distinctly from Count Nesselrode whether Russia proposes to herself to dictate the terms of existence to Turkey.

In return to the inquiry which General Castelbajac addressed to me respecting the course which it would be advisable for him to pursue, I recommended him not to communicate his despatch, officially at least, to the Chancellor, until he should have some fresh conversation with his Excellency.

My opinion, as I stated, was founded upon the following considerations:

1. That the despatch was written, in some measure, to explain the sailing of the French fleet for the Levant, its departure being now a matter of doubt; 2. That M. Drouyn de Lhuys asserted a fact which we were led to disbelieve, that of Prince Menchikoff having sent in an ultimatum to the Porte; and 3. That should it prove, as we had every right to assume, that matters were about to be brought to an amicable conclusion at Constantinople, that very desirable object might be defeated by the communication of a despatch some of the terms of which might give offence.

I begged General Castelbajac not to think it necessary to act upon my judgment, but only to feel sure that, if my opinion were asked, it would be given honestly.

I apprehend then that, at all events, no official communication of the French despatch will be made to the Chancellor until a clearer view of the Oriental question shall be obtained from your Lordship's despatches, which may be looked for to-morrow.

Should your Lordship approve of such a step being taken, it would be very agreeable to me that M. Drouyn de Lhuys should be informed how much I appreciate the proofs of goodwill and confidence which I have received at a moment of difficulty from my French colleague.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 217.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 154. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, March 31, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE had the kindness to write me yesterday a private note, inclosing the despatch from Baron Brunnow, to which he alluded in his communication of yesterday.

I have the honour of transmitting to your Lordship copies, as well of the note as of its inclosure, only requesting that these papers may be considered as perfectly confidential.

Your Lordship will observe that Count Nesselrode gives it to be understood that the difficulties which may remain to be solved at Constantinople will, in all probability, be settled by diplomatic proceedings. These words refer to the hope which I had expressed to him on the previous day, that there would be no longer question of any demonstration, military or naval, in the South.

Count Nesselrode's assurances are satisfactory; what is perhaps equally so is the circumstance which has come to my knowledge, of a certain number of diamond rings and snuff-boxes, intended as diplomatic presents, having been ordered by an employé of the Foreign Department for the purpose of being sent off to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 217.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Particulier.)

Le 11/30 Mars, 1853.

VOICI, mon cher Sir Hamilton, la dépêche même d'où j'ai tiré la bonne nouvelle que je vous ai donnée hier. J'y joins une seconde dépêche de Brunnow, où vous trouverez des détails sur l'incendie de Windsor qui pourront vous intéresser.

On m'écrit aujourd'hui de Paris en date du 12/24 Mars, que le Gouvernement Français paraît disposé à envoyer un contre-ordre à sa flotte.

Ce sera donc, comme vous m'en avez exprimé l'autre jour l'espoir, la diplomatie, et non la marine, qui nous fera sortir pacifiquement de cette crise nouvelle.

Tout à vous, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 217.

Baron Brunnow to Count Nesselrode.

Londres, le $\frac{9}{21}$ Mars, 1853.

M. le Chancelier,

MA dépêche du $\frac{7}{19}$ Mars, No. 53, en rendant compte des explications échangées entre Lord Clarendon et moi, a constaté que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, loin d'approuver l'appel fait par le Colonel Rose au Commandeur de l'escadre Anglaise à Malte, espérait que l'Amiral Dundas n'aurait pas obtempéré à la requisition du Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre à Constantinople.

Cette attente a été justifiée; l'Amiral Dundas a jugé nécessaire de suspendre le mouvement de son escadre.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique approuve cette détermination; il continue à espérer que la négociation actuellement ouverte à Constantinople arrivera à un dénouement pacifique dans les vois diplomatiques.

Il regrette la résolution prise à Paris de faire partir la flotte Française de Toulon. Cette nouvelle, si elle se confirme, donnera lieu à des explications avec le Gouvernement Français destinées à modérer une impatience qui tendrait à agraver la situation en la compliquant.

Le Cabinet Britannique persiste à la juger avec calme bien qu'il ne méconnaisse point l'aspect sérieux sous lequel elle se présenterait si les négociations venaient à échouer.

Il continue à employer des soins afin de les amener à un arrangement à l'amiable.

Je me suis persuadé de ce désir par un entretien confidentiel que j'ai eu hier avec le premier Ministre. J'aurai aujourd'hui un entretien avec le Premier Secrétaire d'Etat.

Sous peu j'expédierai un courier pour rendre compte au Cabinet Impérial de l'ensemble de mes déliberations.

Dans l'intervalle je me permet de signaler à votre Excellence l'article du "Times" publié ce matin. Il resume l'état de la situation telle qu'elle se présente jusqu'à ce moment au point de vue Anglais.

(Signed) BRUNNOW.

No. 218.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 155. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, March 31, 1853.

My Lord,

SEVERAL indications lead me to infer that the Russian Government have not been insensible of the dangers which they were incurring by their hostile demonstration against Turkey.

I learn upon uncertain authority that an unusual military movement is observable at Toula, and from a source which I consider worthy of entire confidence, that during the latter months above 30,000 shrapnel shells have been sent from hence to Odessa and Sevastopol.

This is not all; a person who has never yet given me incorrect intelligence, when he took upon himself to state with confidence, assures me that within the last fortnight as many as 240 young army surgeons have been sent off to the armies of the South of Russia; whilst, as I learn from the French Minister, an application has been made to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of this place for the appointment by him of a Vicar-General, destined to take the direction of the Roman Catholic chaplains employed on board the fleets and in the armies of Russia.

The Archbishop hastened to bring this fact to the knowledge of my French colleague, at the same time requesting him to keep it secret, as his position would become a painful one were it to become known that he had been in communication with a Foreign Mission. His Eminency stated to the Russian Government that he was unable to comply with their demand without taking the orders of the Pope.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since this despatch was written, I have received from Mr. Consul Yeames the letter of which I have the honour of inclosing to your Lordship the accompanying extract.

G. H. S.

Inclosure in No. 218.

Consul Yeames to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Extract.)

March 20, 1853.

YESTERDAY a steamer arrived from Constantinople with letters of the 16th instant.

On the preceding day Prince Menchikoff had his first interview with the new Reis Effendi.

Nothing had transpired respecting the course of pending negotiations.

In the meantime the military movements here have of late been precipitated, and before the end of the present month (old style) the three divisions of the 5th corps are to be concentrated; the 15th division of infantry at Leovo on the Pruth, the 14th at Odessa, and the 13th at Sevastopol.

The troops of the two last are to be lightly equipped for embarkation and a descent.

The movements in the rear are less precisely known, and it was said that the 4th corps was to be soon in motion in order to concentrate in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division (the 10th) at Liptkani on the Pruth.

Under such circumstances it is natural for the trade of these ports, now embarrassed by great engagements abroad, to be in consternation.

There is, nevertheless, much hope entertained for a peaceable adjustment, founded on confidence in the wisdom and magnanimity of the Emperor, and on the present disposition of the Turks to concede to all just claims.

No. 219.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 99.)

Constantinople, March 17, 1853.

My Lord,

IT is important to notice Russian inconsistencies, and the pretexts which Russia has assigned for her hostile demonstration against the Porte.

The first reason assigned was the injustice which Russia said had been done to her in the matter of the sanctuaries, and the violence of M. de Lavalette's language; but Russia has never been able to prove that injustice, and if armies and fleets are to be prepared for war every time that French Agents make foolish menaces, peace will rest on a frail basis. But the most ample reparation was given to Russia for M. de Lavalette's language; it was disapproved by all the Powers, and he himself was recalled. Besides this, further reparation was given to Russia by the resignation of Fuad Effendi.

Notwithstanding such universal satisfaction, two corps d'armée push their advanced guards up to the Turkish frontier, provisions are made for a campaign, and large bodies of troops are ordered to embark on board the Russian fleet.

When I ask Prince Menchikoff the cause of these menacing movements, he forgets the grief of the holy places, which he now calls a "question tout à fait

secondaire et une dispute de moines," and M. de Lavalette; and ascribes them to the dread of Omar Pasha and his little army introducing a Mazzini propogandism into Austria and Russia. And although Russia evinces such dread of incursions into her and Austria's territories, she, by force, establishes the principle that, although the Montenegrins commenced war by making a barbarous incursion into Turkey, Turkey must not make an incursion into Montenegro in order to subdue an inveterate enemy. And this misprision of all national law is justified on the ground that the savages of Montenegro are Christians and "protégés par la Russie." Shortly afterwards the Prince of Servia is threatened that, if he does not dismiss his Minister, Russia will overthrow the Prince and his Government by means of a revolt.

When, two days ago, I represented to Prince Menchikoff how much satisfaction it would afford Her Majesty's Government could I announce to them that the Russian troops had left the Turkish frontier, his Excellency said: "Our troops, after all, are only in their usual cantonments;" as if a hostile position of of troops on the Turkish frontier, and on board the ships of war at Sevastopol, were usual cantonments.

I did not like to inform your Lordship of a report that reached me that a a Russian man-of-war steamer had gone to the Dardanelles for the purpose of reconnoitring them, lest it should turn out to be groundless.

I now inclose the copy of a report from Mr. Consul Calvert, by which you will see that, whilst Russia is ready to attack Turkey by land and by sea, one of her men-of-war is probably ascertaining how close an attacking squadron can approach the batteries of the Porte's most important fortress. And whilst Russia is acting towards the Porte as if she were an enemy whom she is about to overrun, her Representatives here assure me that Russia is most anxious to cooperate with England in protecting the Porte's rights, and even her dignity. The same, and still more assuring language, is held by Russia to the Porte itself.

The truth is, that Russia did not make her present formidable demonstration on account of the causes hitherto put forward; but because she, since the accession to power of Reshid Pasha's Administration, and the question of the refugees, has lost gradually her commanding influence here, and now wishes to regain it. All Russia's acts prove this. Members of her own and of the Austrian Embassy do not scruple to declare it.

The means she has recourse to are a warlike demonstration, and, for the present, the fairest words.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 219.

Consul Calvert to Colonel Rose.

Sir, *Dardanelles, March* 19, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to report, that the Russian war steamer "Bessarabie," which passed through these straits outward bound, on the 13th instant, has just returned from her cruize, and is now occupied in sounding various anchoring grounds in the straits and chiefly in Maitos Bay.

(Signed) J. CALVERT.

No. 220.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 101.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 18, 1853.

THE mission of Prince Menchikoff has caused a display of sympathy on the part of Turkish Greeks for Russia. The day his Excellency arrived crowds of them flocked to the landing-place to meet him, receiving him with blessings, the deferential salute of orientals for their superiors.

Soon after the report was current amongst the Greek population that the Russian ambassador had come to take back the key of the Church of Bethlehem from France, and that a Greek mass would be said in St. Sophia at Easter.

Such is the credulity of the lower orders, and such their belief in the efficacy of Prince Menchikoff's mission, that they declare that an old woman at Buyukdéré, who had been lame all her life, became all of a sudden quite sound on merely seeing the steamer pass which conveyed his Excellency to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 221.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 19, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Lord John Russell's despatch, No. 27, confidential, and to say that I have executed the instructions which it contains.

Rifaat Pasha, Prince Menchikoff, and M. Benedetti, received the communications which I made to them, in obedience to those instructions, in the following manner.

Rifaat Pasha said, that Prince Menchikoff had told him that I had received instructions from my Government respecting the holy places, and asked him whether I had communicated them to him. His Excellency then asked my opinion as to the cupola, saying, that according to his information, which he considered correct, it would last without repair for four or five years more, and that his intention was, if the question was mooted by the Russians, to let it remain for the present in the *status quo*. I replied that I could not express an opinion on the subject, as I had no instructions respecting the cupola. Rifaat Pasha requested me to let him have a memorandum of what I had said to him. I replied, I would think about it; but as the instruction is a confidential one, and Rifaat Pasha has said nothing more about it, I thought it more prudent not to give him the memorandum.

Baron Menchikoff approved the communication of my instructions, but dwelt upon the firman to the Greeks as the basis of the solution of the question of the holy places, saying, however, that the Emperor, in a concessional spirit, would not come back on the past, that is, would not demand back the key of the Church of Bethlehem.

M. Benedetti said, on my holding language to him in the sense of Lord John Russell's instructions, "that he desired nothing better than to adhere to the position of the holy places of February in the last year."

As this declaration was ostensibly very satisfactory, I thought it advisable to say no more, as any further conversation might have carried M. Benedetti into an assertion of M. de Lavalette's protest in favour of the Treaty of 1740, which also forms part of the position of the question in February 1852, and from the protest to the ominous matter of the cupola; the right to repair the cupola being, in the opinion of the French Embassy, secured to France by that Treaty and the protest.

On the other hand, Prince Menchikoff told me on a previous occasion, that the cupola, and the right to repair it, belonged to Russia.

The position of the question of the sanctuaries in February 1852, is one of contradictions, because the note of the 9th of February, and more particularly the French protest of that same month, are contradicted in some essential respects by the firman to the Greeks of that month, which has beside a double meaning.

France has always hitherto declared that she considers that firman as an affront to her dignity, and an attack on her Treaty rights.

When, therefore, Prince Menchikoff and M. Benedetti say that they agree to the position of the question of the sanctuaries in 1852, they probably make mental reservations that they only agree to so much of that position as suits their views.

But it is very satisfactory if *de facto* France and Russia, from motives of prudence and conciliation, accept the position of February 1852, even allowing that their mutual reservations will come into operation when the cupola must be repaired, a few years hence. At any rate, the dangerous question will be as the French Government says, "enterré," and rendered harmless for a few years, by the end of which time the parties interested in it may have become cooler and wiser, or political events may have altered their positions.

Prince Menchikoff was indisposed; I therefore communicated M. Benedetti's adhesion to the position of the Sanctuaries Question in 1852 to Count Nesselrode, whom Prince Menchikoff sent to me; he expressed much satisfaction at the communication.

Of course the Porte will be only too happy to escape out of the dangerous labyrinth in which the peremptory and contradictory demands of the two powerful rivals in this great suit have placed her; she will hasten to ratify the position of February, 1852.

Prince Menchikoff's language about the holy places is much more satisfactory and moderate than that of M. d'Ozeroff; he says that it is a question for monks more than statesmen; that it should from the first have been treated as a matter of secondary importance.

M. Pisani reports to me that M. Argyropulo has changed his tone, and uses the same language to the Porte, having said only yesterday that the Sanctuary Question was "Papasishee"—matter of monks.

M. Benedetti now talks less and more moderately about the question than he did. I think that the wise counsels of Her Majesty's Government have induced both France and Russia to wish to back out of the question.

Under these circumstances I really hope that I may congratulate your Lordship on the settlement of this dangerous question.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 222.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 21, 1853.

IN execution of the instructions in Lord John Russell's despatch No. 22, I abstained from giving my advice or opinion in the matter of the Holy Places till I received his Lordship's despatch No. 27, and I confined myself to recommending moderation and caution in any step taken as to that matter by any of the Foreign Ministers here.

The detail as to the holy places, as to which the French and Russian Representatives evinced the least moderation, is that of the cupola; and although I cannot say that I have modified their determination to yield nothing of their supposed rights as to possession of it, yet I think that I have diminished their wish to enter into a discussion of the subject. I think that both are inclined to shut their eyes, for the present, and allow the cupola to be a dormant question till the repair of it become necessary. Nor do I think it impossible that the French Government would not object, were the Greeks, very unostentatiously, to make such repairs in the cupola as may become necessary for the purpose of preventing its fall. For I said one day to M. de Lavalette, "After all, you have been so moderate as to say that you consider the question of the Holy Places definitively settled; but if, as you now state, the repair of the cupola is to revive the question, it is not settled. Surely you would not object to the Greeks quietly putting in a beam now and then to keep the cupola together. Do not let a beam give the world as much trouble as the key did."

M. de Lavalette laughed, said nothing, but seemed pleased with the idea.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 223.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 21, 1853.

I HAVE again had a curious proof of the unwillingness of Turkish Greeks that there should be a war between Russia and France, even on account of the cupola. The chief man of the nation, although a most active Russian agent, and now all devotion to Prince Menchikoff, said to me, the other day, in a long and confidential conversation, that he was willing to make concessions as to the cupola; that even if it were necessary he would consent that the Sultan should repair it, without any inscription, except the following: "The Sultan gives this cupola to the Christian world;" he added that I might tell the Porte that if she thought proper to ask for this opinion in writing he would give it. He said emphatically that neither he nor his nation wished that a war with France should ensue about the sanctuaries. I asked him if he thought that the Russian Government were of the same opinion. He reflected a little, and said, Russia does not wish to go to war with France.

The fact is that if Russia, even aided by Turkey, went to war with France she would be a loser, unless indeed Russia occupied and fortified the Dardanelles. That is in all probability the secret aim of Russia. She wishes to establish a Turkish Ministry favourable to Russian views, prevail on that Ministry to make a favourable treaty, perhaps an offensive and defensive one, with Russia, and then give some decision in favour of some great Russian political object, such as Montenegro or the holy places.

If the Western Powers resisted such a decision, Russia would throw off the mask, and then Europe would understand that it was neither the ill-judged language of M. de Lavalette, nor the key of the Church of Bethlehem, nor Omar Pasha's supposed propagandism, which had caused the warlike attitude of a Russian fleet and of three corps d'armée, and the transmission, a couple of months ago, of 700,000*l.* in gold imperials from England to Russia.

If Russia once possesses and fortifies the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus (she will tell Turkey that she does so in her defence), then she will have a key which she values more than that of Bethlehem; she will have the key of the East.

Russia has assumed a warlike position menacing to Turkey, and the commercial interests of the world—a position which enables her to place, in a few days, with ease 15,000 or 20,000 men in the Dardanelles; she has assigned no legitimate reason for this most grave act, which is in no way justified by France's attitude, which I believe is pacific.

Under these circumstances I venture to think that either Russia should be moved to resume a pacific position; or that Great Britain, singly or in concert with other Powers, should take such steps as would protect the balance of power and vast commercial interests from any sudden aggression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 224.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 113.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 23, 1853.

WITH reference to Mr. Consul Finn's despatch No. 16, political, of last year to your Lordship, I have the honour to inclose a report from M. E. Pisani rectifying some errors in that despatch respecting the question of the sanctuaries.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 224.

Report of M. E. Pisani.

IT would appear that Mr. Finn is under a mistake when he asserts that the Silver Star arrived from Jaffa with much pomp, and that some of the Effendis went down to Jaffa to escort it, &c. Afif Bey, who at that time was at Jerusalem, assures me that the Star was sent to him by the Pasha of Saida in a box sealed up with the seal of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that it was accompanied by only one officer of the Pasha's household. The Star remained sealed as it was, for upwards of twenty days in Afif Bey's room, and nobody knew of its arrival until the moment it was brought into the Church of Bethlehem to be fixed in the place of the stolen one, in the presence of the Pasha of Jerusalem, the Patriarch of the Latins, and the Members of the Municipal Council.

The keys, as Mr. Finn states, were not taken from the Greeks to be given to the Latins, but three new keys were made by the Pasha's orders, and delivered to the Latins, the day the Star was fixed.

Afif Bey is not aware of any houses having been bought by the Austrian Consul to be appropriated to the Archbishop of Vienna.

Pera, March 18, 1853.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 225.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 116.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1853.

ON the 17th instant Prince Menchikoff accompanied by his Embassy made an official visit to Rifaat Pasha. This Minister assured me that the visit was more a formal openining of negotiations than anything else; that Prince Menchikoff had confined himself to stating, in general terms that the object of his mission was to settle, not to embarrass matters, and to do away with the coldness existing between the two Governments; he added also, that he hoped to find the Sultan animated by the same sentiments as his father, alluding, it was supposed, to the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelesi.

Shortly afterwards I learnt that Prince Menchikoff had left, on the 17th instant, a "note verbale" with Rifaat Pasha, containing the Russian demand of the Porte; this Rifaat Pasha denied. More urgent inquiries on my part extracted from the Grand Vizier the suspicious statements in the inclosed report. The Turkish authorities were still less communicative to my French colleague.

I saw that, acting under the influence of fear or of dissimulation, the Porte knew, but concealed from me the object of the secret mission which M. d'Ozéroff unguardedly had told me Prince Menchikoff was charged with.

A Russian report, industriously circulated, that Great Britain was following exactly the same line of policy as Russia with respect to Turkey, and approved Prince Menchikoff's mission, had done harm to British and good to Russian influence. Prince Menchikoff's intimation to Rifaat Pasha respecting the instructions which I had received as to the holy places, gave an air of truth to this report. The Seraskier, one of the best of the Ministers, was particularly pained by the articles in the "Times," and by the idea that England took a Russian view of Turkish affairs. "If that is the case," he said, "we are all lost." My earnest assurance that Great Britain adhered faithfully to its ancient policy respecting Turkey, and the arrival of Lord John Russell's speech respecting this country, set matters right.

Prince Menchikoff had another interview with Rifaat Pasha on the 22nd instant.

An energetic instruction from me to M. Pisani for Rifaat Pasha, and a request to see his Excellency, elicited from him a promise to tell me all to-day.

M. Benedetti, during a two hours' interview yesterday with the Grand

Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, in vain endeavoured, as he told me himself, to elicit anything from them respecting the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission.

The important revelations made to me by Rifaat Pasha and the Grand Vizier, form the subject of a further despatch. Many usually well-informed persons supposed that Prince Menchikoff had merely made general declarations as to the nature of his demands respecting the holy places, the Turco-Russian frontier, and Montenegro; and that he was endeavouring to carry out his views in those respects by reorganizing a Russian party, and by influencing, through their means, the Sultan and the Valideh in his favour. The extreme activity and intrigues of Hussein Bey, the Secretary of the Valideh, Iahseen Bey, and other known Russian agents, rendered this report probable.

The great object of Prince Menchikoff is to overthrow the present ministry, which he considers opposed to him. In order to second his views, the Russian party, Ahmet Fethi Namick and Heir-ed-deen Pashas, Hussein and Iahseen Beys, have endeavoured openly in the Council and secretly in the palace, to effect the failure of the proposed new Constantinople Bank. The present ministry have very much identified themselves with that measure, which they consider to be one of great national benefit. The Grand Council, with the exception of the Russian party, has approved the contract for the new bank; it was sent to the Sultan yesterday for his Iradeh, but so powerful are the influences brought to bear on His Majesty and so susceptible is he to them, that I should not be surprised were he at the last to put aside the very plan which he, more than any one else, has favoured and developed.

If Russian presents, which are most freely given, shall have converted the Valideh into an opponent of the bank, nothing is more likely than that the Sultan, who is devoted to his mother, should refuse his sanction to it.

Hosrew and Ahmet Fethi Pashas would probably be at the head, Namik and Sarim Pashas, Chekib Effendi, and Hussein Bey, being members of the new, that is, a Russian ministry. All of them are of the retrograde party.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 225.

M. E. Pisani to Colonel Rose.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Pera, March* 19, 1853.

I COMMUNICATED respectively to the Grand Vizier, and Rifaat Pasha, your instruction of this day's date, respecting the report universally talked of that the Russians are endeavouring to enter into a secret treaty or arrangement with the Porte. His Highness requested me to say in reply, that so long as he continues to be at the head of the ministry, you can reckon upon the non-accomplishment of the wishes of Russia; but if he is dismissed from office, of course he does not know what line of policy might be adopted by his successor, especially if Ahmed Fethi Pasha were to be entrusted with the seals of the Vizierat.

His Highness told me that the language now held by Prince Menchikoff is exceedingly mild and very friendly, and gives to understand that the Emperor entertains no intention to recede from what was done in the question of the holy places. But on the other hand, he got information from good authority, that this moderate behaviour on the part of the Russian Ambassador is calculated to deceive the Porte and let her fall into the snare, and induce her to assent to the conclusion of a secret compact. His Highness is perfectly aware of all the the means resorted to by the Russian Embassy, for the attainment of the object in view.

Rifaat Pasha seems to be unacquainted with the true intention of Prince Menchikoff to propose a secret treaty, yet he suspects it, and gave me the most formal and unequivocal assurances that were such a proposal to be made to him, he would lose no time in informing Her Majesty's Embassy of it.

What Prince Menchikoff and M. de Klezl told you about what happened in Herzegovine is perfectly correct, says the Grand Vizier; but the atrocities said

to have been perpetrated, were not committed on the part of the Turks, as these gentlemen state, but on that of the Montenegrins against their own co-religionists, subjects of the Porte. The Grand Vizier declared to-day to M. Argyropulo, that if an immediate step were not put to such barbarous and cruel acts, the Porte will be compelled to transmit orders to Omar Pasha to resume hostilities and march against the brigands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 226.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 118.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 24, 1853.

YESTERDAY M. de Klezl called on me, and said, "Je dois vous énoncer une idée importante. It is not Montenegro, nor the holy places, which were the causes of Count Leiningen's and Prince Menchikoff's missions—not at all; they are quite secondary affairs; the cause of them was the determination of Austria and Russia that Turkey shall not any longer be a focus for revolutionary principles, nor the stage on which the Powers who support her shall advocate antagonistic influences and opinions; nor must Turkey, which owes her existence to the five Powers, again espouse opinions which are opposed to the principles of government of any of those Powers. It was too absurd in Reshid Pasha, the Prime Minister of one of the most despotic States in Europe, to affect to encourage ultra-liberal and democratic opinions. Each State has a peculiar interest in Turkey, geographical or religious; and it would be fair that each of the five Powers should respect such an interest. Then Turkey may reckon on effective and general support, and may exist—otherwise not." M. de Klezl's communication was, in reality, a renewed sort of protest against the refugee question.

M. de Klezl then proceeded to tell me, most confidentially, that M. d'Ozéroff had told him, in strict secrecy, that the Porte had yielded to Prince Menchikoff's demand respecting the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, that is, that the Sultan might repair it at his expense, but that it was to be repaired under the superintendence of the Greek Patriarch, as an orthodox Greek cupola, with Greek saints and inscriptions.

M. de Klezl added, that the affair was very serious, because M. Blondel, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires, had told him that the Porte has given an assurance this last February to M. de Lavalette, that no repair or change of the present state of the cupola should take place without the consent of the French Embassy; that M. Benedetti had spoken indirectly in the same sense to him.

The position of Austria and Russia towards each other affords matter for deep consideration; and it is of the utmost importance to find out what that position exactly is.

There is the political and the religious position.

As regards the political position, both Austria and Russia are united in one policy, and that is, to put down revolutionary principles, and to re-establish in Turkey the influence of their countries. But then the traditional policy of Austria is favourable to Turkey, and consequently different from that of Russia. The question then is, has Austria given up her historical and adopted a Russian policy, or is she undecided till she obtain some assurances from the western Powers that, for the future, only the preservation of Turkey shall be the sole and joint object of the five Powers, and that, for the future, each Power shall respect what may be called the geographical and religious influences and interests of the respective Powers in Turkey; Russian in Wallachia and Moldavia; Austro-Russian in Servia; Austrian in Bosnia and Herzogovina; French in Tunis, and so on. Such at least is the tendency of M. de Klezl's language to me on this as well as on previous occasions.

As regards the religious position of Austria, she of course sympathizes with the Latins as to the Sanctuary Question, but she does not choose to acknowledge the Protectorate of France over non-Turkish Roman Catholics in Turkey. She

appears to act also in apparent unison with Russia in all questions of general policy. For these reasons Austria assists Russia, it appears, against her co-religionists in the great religious question of the sanctuaries. M. de Lavalette complained more of the opposition of the Austrian Consul at Jerusalem in that matter than even of the Russian.

On the other hand, the Russian Embassy has expressed much annoyance at Count Leiningen having terminated his mission before Russia could take any part in the object of it. I hear also that M. de Klezl is hurt at the little confidence which Prince Menchikoff shows him. M. de Klezl himself told me, "although we and the Russians are such friends, I never can understand in the least from Prince Menchikoff what his intentions are as to the holy places."

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 227.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 11.)

(No. 119.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 25, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a report of what passed at my interview yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha.

Your Lordship will see that in spite of Prince Menchikoff's denunciations against the Turkish authorities, should they reveal his secret demands, they, in consideration of the danger which would ensue from a compliance with them, determined to make them known to me, that is, to Her Majesty's Government.

The Grand Vizier informs me also that in the projected Treaty there is a clause which could be interpreted into protection by Russia of the Turkish Greek Church.

The Treaty also creates a position as to the holy places quite different from the one stated by your Lordship in your despatch No. 27 to me, nor can it be supposed that France will be passive should the Porte make a secret Treaty with Russia which nullifies her Treaty of 1740.

This projected Treaty is fraught with ill to Turkey, upsets the balance of power, and would give Russia the same position in the Turkish Empire which she now only holds in the Danubian provinces; and not the least untoward feature of this Treaty is the proof of bad faith which it exhibits on the part of the Russian Government towards Great Britain. In contradiction to all the professions of goodwill and confidence which Russia, as I see in the St. Petersburgh despatches, declares animates her towards Great Britain, yet her Ambassador here, in a note verbale given most secretly to another Power, a Mahometan one, qualifies Her Majesty's Government as an "ill-disposed one," and that too after they had taken a view of the holy places which ought to have excited Russia's gratitude, not her blame.

The matter is one of extreme delicacy, because your Lordship will perceive that till the Porte release the British Representative from the promise which he made not to divulge the information which the Porte gave him respecting the secret Treaty, the Porte's confidence must be strictly respected.

If grave doubts were caused by the proofs of Russian bad faith now brought to light, they are still more increased by a report which I have received from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa. That report, unless only intimidation be the object of Prince Menchikoff, would lead me to suppose that the Russian Government are determined to quarrel and go to war with the Porte, and meditate a descent at Bourgas, on the Black Sea, two days' march from Constantinople, or at Buyukderé. Prince Menchikoff makes a free use of intimidation for the purpose of facilitating his negotiations; and indirect Russian agents constantly inform the Turkish Minister that three hundred thousand Russian troops, and an equally powerful fleet, are quite ready to support Russian demands.

But still although the Russian Government may contemplate nothing but the employment of intimidation towards Turkey, I venture to think that nothing would justify our abstaining from considering the present hostile attitude of Russia as a most serious reality, and acting accordingly.

The safety of our vast commercial interests and of European policy, as well as the maintenance of peace, are compromised by Russia's present military and naval position.

To judge of the Porte's present disposition, she will not give way either to intimidation or unprovoked aggression.

I venture to think that the only certain and safe means of preserving all these great interests, would be the presence of a British squadron, or of British and French squadrons, in Besika Bay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 227.

Memorandum by M. E. Pisani.

(Secret and Confidential.) *Constantinople, March* 25, 1853.

RIFAAT PASHA, in the interview which we had yesterday with him, stated that Prince Menchikoff had left him on the 17th instant a "note verbale." The note began by stating that the Emperor was very angry about what the Porte had done respecting the holy places, and that he would have receded from that arrangement, but that desirous not to involve the Porte in new difficulties with another Power, he would have no objection to accept the arrangement of February last, provided the Porte would give unequivocal assurances that she would maintain the *status quo* of the sanctuaries in future; that as the Emperor could not rely upon verbal assurances after all the contradictions which had taken place in the question at issue, he was very anxious that a Treaty should be entered into between the Porte and Russia respecting that matter. Rifaat Pasha observed that he suspects that the object of the Treaty would be the exclusive protectorate by Russia of the Greeks and the Armenians throughout the Sultan's dominions; that Prince Menchikoff does not make any objection to the cupola being repaired by the Sultan at His Majesty's expense, on condition that it will be so repaired under the superintendence of the Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem. Prince Menchikoff demands permission to build a hospital and a church for the Russian priests at Jerusalem; he demands that the two houses next to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, which are Tékés, or Turkish convents, should be pulled down. They give to understand that the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople should be entirely independent of the Porte. Rifaat Pasha said that the Treaty proposed by Prince Menchikoff is more than the Treaty of Hunkiar Skelessi. The Grand Vizier, whom we subsequently saw, was more frank and communicative than Rifaat Pasha. His Excellency said that, in the "note verbale" presented by Prince Menchikoff, it is stated that since some time the Porte was misled by the advice of ill-disposed Powers; that in the end of the note France was mentioned, separately, as being one of these Powers: that Prince Menchikoff does not at all approve the interference of Foreign Embassies concerning the Patriarchate, and highly disapproves Lord Ponsonby's behaviour in the matter of the dismissal of the Patriarch Gregorius, whom they wish to have reinstated; and he expresses a wish that the Patriarch should be appointed for life. With respect to the Treaty, the Grand Vizier repeated again what he said to me on the 19th instant,—that as long as he was at the head of the Ministry, no such Treaty shall be signed, as he considers it ruinous to the country.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 227.

Consul-General Yeames to Colonel Rose.

Odessa, March 23, 1853.

Sir,

I BEG leave to refer to my letter of the 4th instant; and I have now to inform you that the movements of the 5th Corps have of late been hastened, so that the three divisions of infantry are to be assembled in the positions described before the end of the present month (old style). It is in particular to be observed

that the 14th Division, as well as the 13th, is prepared for an expedition by sea. The troops, including the officers, are to carry rations for four days, and knapsacks for the officers are now made for that purpose. I hear there is to be no baggage further than can be thus carried, and no horses will be embarked. I can say nothing respecting artillery, for as yet only half a battery is arrived here. Considering the very light equipment, I am at a loss to imagine the place intended for a descent, as far as regards the 14th Division, if not the mouth of the Danube, for the purpose of cooperating with the 15th Division in the occupation merely of the two Principalities.

The same precipitation is not apparent in the movements of the 4th corps d'armée, the head-quarters of which are still in Kremenetz. This corps was to be concentrated in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division at Lapkani on the Pruth. The heavy roads of Volhynia and Podolia are at this season almost impassable, and these troops cannot possibly be in position before the middle of May.

Great exertions continue to be made by the Admiralty at Nicolayeff and Sevastopol to have everything that can swim ready for sea.

I do not scruple to send this letter by the steamer, supposing that publicity, in present circumstances, will not be obnoxious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 228.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 125.) *Constantinople, March* 28, 1853.

My Lord,

MUCH has been said in late French despatches as to Russian endeavours to create amongst the Turkish Greeks disaffection towards their Mahommedan Governors, and of their organization against the Porte; the only mistake is the supposition that such efforts and organization are of a recent date.

Since the time of Empress Catherine it has been the unvarying object of Russian policy to make Turkish Greeks believe that the Emperor of Russia is their merciful protector against the fanaticism and injustice of their Turkish rulers. But an anomaly has always distinguished this policy, this sympathy for Christians, which is, that Russia, neither collectively nor individually, has ever urged on the Porte the adoption of any benevolent measure of sound policy which would have reconciled the Christians to Turkish rule; on the contrary, the tendency of Russian policy has ever been to keep alive the causes of grievance which estrange Christians from the Porte, and thereby to draw them to Russia. Russian policy is amputation, not cure; amputation, which enables a province of the Porte, injured by her misrule, to revive under semi-Russian rule or influence; witness Moldavia, Wallachia, Montenegro, and Servia.

Greece was severed, but not reconciled.

Russia, it is true, has often resisted the dismemberment of Turkey, but that was when she feared lest Egypt or Syria might fall under non-Russian power and influence.

The benevolent and successful efforts of Her Majesty's Ambassador in favour of Turkish Christians were, I believe, generally single-handed. Russian cooperation was not given, I believe, at Constantinople, certainly not in Syria, in support of one of the greatest benefits granted to Christians in the East—the recognition of the validity of a Christian oath against a Mussulman oppressor. If this great principle of justice be only very partially carried out, still it has received birth, and is in slow but certain progress.

M. Basily, who is under the direct patronage of the Synod of St. Petersburgh, always decried reform, of which the main feature was the amelioration of the position of Turkish Christians. His language to me, invariably, was, "Ces bons vieux Turcs qui donnaient des coups de baton et coupaient des têtes, valaient mille fois mieux que les Turcs civilizés de Reschid." Russians of higher position than M. Basily have said the same.

It is not that these gentlemen really approved these barbarous acts; but

that they saw with alarm the birth of civilization in Turkey, which introduced liberal principles, and threatened to win back the stray allegiance of Turkish Christians from Russia to the Porte.

The liberal administration of Reschid Pasha indisposed Austria and Russia. The question of the refugees completed their estrangement from the Porte.

Russia affected to pardon; Austria declared, more frankly, that she never would forgive the wrong. But the Emperor of Russia said, "Elle me la payera;" and those few words were of more omen than Austria's denunciations.

Since the time of the refugees, Austria and Russia have secretly made the Christians of European Turkey instruments of their policy and of their ill-will towards the Porte; only with this difference, that Russia has merely had to revive, to recall into action her historical mode of doing so, whereas Austria has had to learn her lesson how to do so.

Daniel Petrovich in Montenegro only acts over again the part which "Little Father Stefano" played there in former days.

Russia appealing to the Sclavism, common language, origin, and religion of the Bulgarians, Bosnians, Servians, and Montenegrins, prepares them and the Greeks for the moment when she shall proclaim to them the anti-Turkish denunciation contained in the Sclave prayer-book, published in 1851 by the Bishop of Kief, "avec la bénédiction du Saint Synode," and industriously circulated by Russian agents. I have this prayer-book in my possession, and inclosed is a copy of this remarkable passage.

I have also a curious proof of the endeavours to make the Bulgarians as Russian as possible. The Russian Embassy here, in opposition to the wishes of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople, insists that the Bulgarian liturgy in the Sclave, that is a Russian dialect, should take the place of the Greek liturgy hitherto used; and further, that Sclave, and not Greek, should be taught in the Bulgarian schools. The intention is that Bulgaria, so important by its position, fertility, and manly race, should become as Russian as possible.

Both Austria and Russia for the last three or four years have, by means of secret agents and the local clergy, striven to revive and increase an anti-Mahomedan feeling in the bigoted populations of European Turkey; in short, to organize a sort of Christian militia, ready to be called out at the appointed time.

The Porte has unfortunately by her misrule always played the game of Russia. Her Administration, it is true, is now more humane than formerly, but it is also weaker. She is consequently less disliked but less feared than she was by the Christians.

The Porte is certainly in a critical state; but in a further despatch I shall have the honour to show how she can extricate herself from it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure in No. 228.

Extract from the Bulgarian Prayer-Book.

(Traduction.)

Page 1.—Au nom de la Sainte Trinité, par ordre de Sa Majesté Impériale l'Empereur Nicolas Pavlovitz, &c.

Page 4.—Et avec la bénédiction du St. Synode, de l'Evêque de Kiov Phylarite, et de l'Archimandrite du Saint Monastère de Kiov, le présent livre des Psaumes y a été imprimé le 9 Août, 1851.

A l'avant dernière page se trouve le passage suivant:

L'infâme et detesté de Dieu, Empire d'Ayar, détruisez vite et livrez-le à l'Empereur orthodoxe, &c.

No. 229.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 28, 1853.

I HEAR that one of the chief Russian agents here stated that Prince Menchikoff, besides being Ambassador, is Commander-in-chief of the Russian Naval and Military Forces which are to act against Turkey should she not comply with his demands. The Grand Vizier told me to-day that Prince Menchikoff stated the same when he first came here, but that he has not heard him repeat it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 230.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, March* 31, 1853.

SINCE the date of my late despatches to your Lordship, I have had interviews on the state of affairs here with the Grand Vizier, the Seraskier, Rifaat and Namick Pashas.

It results from the confidential statements made to me on these occasions by the Turkish Ministers, that Prince Menchikoff has not as yet made any distinct demand with respect to Russian complaints, except as to the question of the holy places. The same remarkable vagueness or indecision marks his Excellency's negotiations as has been the case from the first.

It is not that Prince Menchikoff does not know what to demand from the Porte; but that before doing so, his Excellency wished to have the conviction that what he asks will be granted.

But he could not have this conviction so long as the present Ministry, which he considers anti-Russian, and favourable to the British and French connection, is in office. His Excellency felt certain that the retirement of Fuad Effendi, and the intimidation caused by the menacing movements of Russia, would have long since effected the dismissal of the present, and the appointment of a Russian Ministry.

But the success of the Government in the matter of the new bank made Prince Menchikoff understand that all his endeavours, although aided by a perfect system of intrigue and an expenditure of 48,000*l.* secret-service money, could not upset the Ministry, which relies chiefly on British support. His Excellency therefore now endeavours to make the best of the present Ministry; and he begins, as I learnt yesterday from the Grand Vizier, by trying to exact a promise from Rifaat Pasha, before he makes known to him the nature of his mission and of his demands, that the Porte shall make a formal promise that she will not reveal them to the British or French Representatives. Rifaat Pasha declined, and at once Prince Menchikoff became angry, declaring also that if the object of his mission were not promptly settled, he must leave Constantinople, as he was far too old a man to engage in a long and arduous negotiation; but he modified this declaration by declaring that he did not mean thereby to imply that his retirement would be the signal for war.

Rifaat Pasha asked Prince Menchikoff for explanations respecting the menacing movements and attitude of the military and naval forces of Russia.

The inclosed copy of a report of M. Chabert will give your Lordship full information as to the explanations which took place between Rifaat Pasha and Prince Menchikoff on the subject.

I also inclose the copy of a previous report of the Grand Vizier's conversation with me on the 28th instant.

These documents will give your Lordship full information as to the latest proceedings of Prince Menchikoff. Your Lordship will see, with much regret, that Count Nesselrode's and Baron Brunnow's assurances that Russian negotiations at Constantinople were to be carried on in conformity with the views of Her Majesty's Government, and in cooperation with their servants, have not

only not been made good, but that the chief aim of Prince Menchikoff's mission seems to have been to shake the confidence of the Porte in Great Britain, and to withdraw her from the influence of her counsels.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 230.

M. R. Chabert to Colonel Rose.

Péra, le 30 Mars, 1853.

M. le Colonel,

J'AI l'honneur de vous rapporter ci-après ce que Rifaat Pasha vous a dit ce matin au sujet des troupes Russes que se trouvent près des frontières Turques.

"J'ai demandé," a dit son Excellence, "au Prince Menchikoff, pourquoi l'armée Russe se trouvait près de nos frontières; et il m'a repondu que comme il y avait une armée Autrichienne pour 'l'affaire de Montenegro, le Gouvernement Russe avait jugé à propos d'y envoyer aussi une force armée pour toute éventualité.'

"J'ai observé au Prince que cette affaire ayant eu une solution, les troupes devraient par conséquent se retirer, mais il a répliqué qu'elles doivent y rester encore. Alors je lui ai dit que si la Russie a l'intention de les faire marcher contre la Turquie, il devrait nous le dire afin que nous prenions nos mesures en conséquence et que nous fassions aussi nos préparatifs de défense. A cela le Prince a repondu que la Russie n'a pas l'intention de faire la guerre, et que la Porte pouvait être tranquille."

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

Inclosure 2 in No. 230.

Report of a Conversation between Colonel Rose and the Grand Vizier.

LE Prince Menchikoff ne nous a pas encore déclaré quelles sont les demandes de son Gouvernement, ni les a-t-il spécifiées. Il parle toujours dans des termes généraux et vagues de la question des lieux saints, de l'affaire des refugiés, mais il n'a encore rien précisé. Nous savons cependant que la mission est de faire avec nous un Traité secret d'alliance. Il ne l'a pas demandé officiellement, mais il a dit à quelques personnes de sa confiance et qu'il sait qu'ils communiquent avec nous, que nous avons tort de nous fier aux Gouvernements Anglais et Français, car l'expérience devrait enfin nous prouver que nous avons beaucoup perdu et rien gagné en suivant leur politique et leur conseils. C'est par ce langage qu'il cherche à gagner leur appui, et s'assurer de leur concours dans l'œuvre de Traité secret qu'il cherche à faire. Sa politique est très confuse. Tantôt il veut nous faire aller vers la Russie par la douceur en faisant répandre le bruit que les intentions de son Gouvernement sont pacifiques. Tantôt il cherche à nous attirer en signalant les désavantages et l'inutilité de notre confiance en l'Angleterre et la France, et combien nous avons eu tort de suivre les conseils de ces deux Puissances, auxquelles nous ne devrions pas être attachés, surtout si nous considérons que la nature de leur Constitution différe de la nature de la notre, qui est au contraire comme celle de la Russie et de l'Autriche.

Le Prince Menchikoff a eu une conférence avec Rifaat Pasha il y a deux jours. Dans cette conférence il lui a dit qu'avant de faire connaître à la Sublime Porte la nature de sa mission et les demandes de son Gouvernement, et avant de s'expliquer, il demandait à Rifaat Pasha la promesse formelle de la Porte qu'elle ne communiquera ni au Répresentant de l'Angleterre ni à celui de la France absolument rien de ce qu'il a à lui demander ou à lui proposer; qu'il voulait que cela eût à se passer sous le sceau du plus grand secret, sans quoi il ne voulait pas entrer en matière. Rifaat Pasha lui a répondu qu'il lui est impossible de garder le secret vis-à-vis les Representants de ces deux Puissances, les plus amies de la Porte, dans une question si importante. Qu'au contraire, il considère comme un devoir de la Porte de tenir ces deux Puissances au courant de ce qui intéresse la Turquie—cet Empire auquel ces Puissances se sont toujours intéressées,

et qu'elles ont toujours protégé. Cette réponse de Rifaat Pasha a beaucoup fâché Menchikoff, qui le quitta sans lui rien dire. Mais cet état de choses, cette mystification, cette politique confuse, ne peuvent pas continuer. Menchikoff aura dans le courant de cette semaine une autre conférence avec Rifaat Pasha, et je crois que les véritables prétensions de la Russie y seront déclarées et mises au jour.

Quant aux préparatifs de guerre que la Russie fait, nous avons lieu de les considérer commes des simples menaces et des marques d'intimidation; car à moins que l'Empereur n'ait perdu la tête et qu'il ne soit décidé à faire la guerre avec presque toute l'Europe, il ne peut pas faire contre nous la moindre agression, et toucher à notre intégrité, quand il n'y a eu de notre part aucune infraction des Traités que nous avons avec lui.

Quant à une attaque ou coup-de-main que les Russes voudraient faire à notre capitale, soit par terre soit par mer, toutes les mesures de défense sont prises de notre part depuis dix ans. Déjà notre plan est formé pour ce qui concerne la flotte Russe qui viendrait de la Mer Noire dans le Bosphore.

Les points où des batteries plongeantes seront placées sont fixés ainsi que le nombre et le calibre des canons, et je puis vous assurer que dans l'espace de deux heures nous pouvons être prêts à une bonne défense. Mais pour le moment je ne crois pas que nous serons dans ce cas.

Dans une note verbale qu'il a donnée à Rifaat Pasha, Menchikoff s'exprime dans les termes très vagues et en faisant rouler toutes ses phrases sur la question des lieux saints; et dans une partie de cette note il dit en parlant de l'Angleterre et de la France, les Puissances "bed hah," c'est-à-dire, mal-disposées.

Nous avons pensé que tout en faisant connaître aux Russes que nous n'ignorons pas leurs préparatifs de guerre, il vaut mieux ne pas leur faire entrevoir que nous craignons qu'ils ne soient faits pour nous intimider ou pour nous attaquer; car cela les porterait à augmenter leurs prétentions, et à les soutenir avec plus de persistence. Nous n'en parlons donc pas comme une chose qui nous regarde et nous attendons qu'ils s'expliquent.

L'affaire de la Banque est une affaire définitivement conclu. Le Sultan l'a sanctionnée par son "Iradé." Les Russes en sont très fâchés, et ils mettent en mouvement tous les ressorts en leur pouvoir, et font mille intrigues pour la gâter; mais personne n'en fait aucun cas et encore moins Sa Hautesse.

Mars 28, 1853.

(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

No. 231.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 130.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April 1*, 1853.

AFTER midnight this morning the French Chargé d'Affaires called on me for the purpose of communicating to me very important written information which he had just received, that at a conference, which took place yesterday between Prince Menchikoff and Rifaat Pasha, and which lasted five hours, the Ottoman Minister had consented that three Plenipotentiaries should be named on the part of the Ottoman Government for the purpose of holding conferences with the Russian Ambassador.

M. Benedetti expressed great alarm, and his conviction that a secret Treaty would be the certain result of these conferences; and he earnestly begged me to use all my endeavours at the Porte to avert so great a disaster.

Although I doubted, after the disclosures which the Porte had made to me of Russian designs, that she would venture to enter into a secret Treaty, I thought it safe, in such critical times as the present, to neglect no precaution. Notwithstanding the character given to me by gentlemen of the Embassy of Rifaat Pasha, I was in possession of information of his corruption, of his having been in very long conferences with the first Russian dragoman and Russian agents for three days previous to his appointment as Foreign Minister, and further that his son and interpreter had paid last night two long visits to the Russian Embassy.

One of the most experienced of Russian statesmen, who has at his disposal a menacing army and fleet, a perfect Embassy, the sympathy of co-religionist

populations, no end to secret agents, and who has already spent in a few weeks 48,000*l.*, secret service money, uses all the skill of Russian diplomacy to obtain a secret Treaty from a Turkish Ministry, of which the Foreign Minister probably, and the Minister of Commerce certainly, is a Russian partizan.

Under these circumstances, I deemed it necessary to take prompt measures for averting the fatality which the French Chargé d'Affaires considered imminent. This morning early I despatched M. Chabert with an energetic instruction to the Foreign Minister; Mr. Hughes with a similar one to the Seraskier; I myself, accompanied by Mr. Doria, proceeded to the Grand Vizier at his country-house on the Bosphorus. Besides making an immediate impression on the Turkish authorities, I wished to see whether the three leading Turkish Ministers would make similar statements as to the nature of Prince Menchikoff's conference yesterday with Rifaat Pasha. The result of this combined movement has been satisfactory. The replies of the three Turkish Ministers to the several demands I addressed to them, agree in denying the correctness of M. Benedetti's information. Inclosed are copies of Mr. Doria's and Mr. Chabert's reports.

But your Lordship will learn from Mr. Doria's report, the fresh proofs which the Grand Vizier this day gave me of the bad faith of the Russian Government. They offer to defend the Porte with 400,000 men against the Western Powers, of which England is one, if the Porte will make a concession to her which will make the Emperor of Russia a sort of co-Sultan of Turkey, by making him sole protector of the Church of the Greek Christians, who form nearly half of the population of the Ottoman Empire. And I venture to direct your Lordship's particular direction to the anti-English feeling which, by the Grand Vizier's revelations to me, appears to characterize the policy of Prince Menchikoff. His Excellency, talking to me, introduced quite unnecessarily, the subject of the refugees, and said: "The English protected Kossuth, but hanged the Cephalonians." I replied that the cases were quite different; that the Cephalonians had burnt British-protected subjects in their houses, murdered men, and violated women—crimes to which all well-regulated States applied capital punishment.

It would be dangerous not to contemplate present Russian, and I may say, Austrian policy also, as to Turkey in all its very serious reality.

These two countries are determined to induce the Porte, by force or persuasion, to conform to their policy, and to give up the Western influences which acted on her in the refugee question.

If Austria and Russia gain over the Porte by diplomacy, then, with Russian garrisons on the Bosphorus and in the Dardanelles, it may be doubtful whether England and France would think it worth while to engage in the great war which would be necessary for the recovery of the lost balance of power.

If Austria and Russia cannot so gain over the Porte, then arises the question—Will they try force?

There are those who think that Russia never would have gone so far as she has done, if she had intended to recede without a struggle.

But it is certain that if Russia and Austria go to war with England, France, and the Porte, they go to certain defeat, unless, indeed, we allow the Russians to surprise the Dardanelles. Then with the Turkish fleet captured, a Russian fleet off the Dardanelles, the rear of those forts protected and fortified, like the front and flank faces, with Paixhaus guns, English and French forces would meet with an obstinate resistance—perhaps a defeat.

Under all these circumstances, I earnestly venture to suggest, that Her Majesty's Government should, without any loss of time, play the game which she now has in her hands. Notwithstanding all obstacles and difficulties, the Porte is still true to us; she wishes us to protect her; she invites us to approach and protect the keys of her possessions and of the East. She tells us State secrets as to Russia, which if known to Russia, will cause that Power at once to go to war with her. But if the Porte sees that Great Britain hesitates to avail herself of her confidence and friendship, and of her geographical strength, she must unwillingly throw herself into the arms of her historical and geographical enemy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 231.

Mr. Doria to Colonel Rose.

Constantinople, April 1, 1853.

Sir,

YOUR conversation this morning with the Grand Vizier, elicited the following information:—

With regard to the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, Prince Menchikoff was satisfied that it should be repaired by the Sultan, with the proviso that it should be restored to its present state, that of the Greek rite, and not to the state it was in previous to its being burnt fifty years ago, that is, the Latin rite, which point, however, the French Chargé d'Affaires still insists on; that the question was still undecided, and under the consideration of the Grand Council; Prince Menchikoff had also expressed his satisfaction that this point should be submitted for the approval of the French Government, but remarked England had nothing whatever to do with it; this his Highness stated was the subject of Prince Menchikoff's, Rifaat Pasha's, and Hajee Arif Effendi's meeting yesterday, and not as you had been informed, for the nomination of three Turkish Plenipotentiaries, for the purpose of conferring with Prince Menchikoff relative to the secret Treaty.

Prince Menchikoff had verbally expressed the Emperor's wish to enter into a secret Treaty with Turkey, putting a fleet and 400,000 men at her disposal, if she ever needed aid against any Western Power whatever. That Russia further secretly demanded as addition to the Treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church should be placed entirely under Russian protection, without reference to Turkey, which was to be the equivalent for the proffered aid above mentioned. Prince Menchikoff had stated the greatest secrecy must be maintained relative to this proposition, and that should Turkey allow it to be made known to England, he and his mission would instantly quit Constantinople.

His Highness gave his repeated assurances that nothing whatever should be added to the Treaty of Kainardji; that he would ask to retire from office rather than agree to either of the two propositions made by Prince Menchikoff, which would be fatal to Turkey. All possible preparations had been made to enable Turkey to withstand an attack should her refusal to comply with Prince Menchikoff's demands lead Russia to make war upon her. His Highness added there was at present no cause for uneasiness, but rather than submit they were prepared for the worst. The Grand Vizier particularly requested you to inform Her Majesty's Government, with as little delay as possible, of the secret object of Prince Menchikoff's mission, as he believed them to have been deceived by the language held to England, which was perfectly opposed to that held by Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople.

His Highness further said, Russia having obtained a hold upon Austria for assistance given against the Hungarians, wished Turkey also to be on the same relations, that they all three might act against any other Power who made an aggression on either of them.

His Highness in requesting you to use your influence with M. Benedetti to induce him to yield to the present proposition relative to the cupola, also requested you to guard a strict silence relative to the other parts of your conversation, as he could not trust the French discretion in keeping it secret.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WM. DORIA.

Inclosure 2 in No. 231.

M. Chabert to Colonel Rose.

Péra, le 1 *Avril*, 1853.

M. le Colonel,

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que je me suis dûment acquitté ce matin de vos instructions auprès de Rifaat Pasha, et je vous transmets ci-après le résultat de mon entrevue avec son Excellence.

Rifaat Pasha m'a dit qu'il a eu hier avec le Prince Menchikoff une conférence qui a duré environ cinq heures, et à laquelle ont assistés M. d'Ozeroff, le

premier drogman de Russie, M. Argyropulo, Arif Effendi, Mufti du Conseil Suprême, et M. Aristarchi, Logothète.

Qu'il n'y avait à cette conférence ni Reschid Pasha ni le Seraskier, et que l'information qui nous a été donnée que le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse a nommé trois Plénipotentiaires pour conférer avec le Prince Russe, est aussi gratuite que la supposition que l'objet de leur réunion était de faire un Traité secret à l'instar de celui de Unkiar Skelessi. Rifaat Pasha m'a dit que le Prince Menchikoff avait annoncé que le sujet de son entrevue serait la question des lieux saints; et que comme cette question est très bien connue à Arif Effendi, parcequ'il était au Conseil Suprême toutes les fois qu'elle y avait été débattue, c'est lui (Rifaat) qui a désiré qu'Arifo Effendi fût présent à la conférence, et qu'il l'y a fait assister après en avoir obtenu le consentement du Grand Vizier.

Rifaat Pasha m'a assuré que toute l'entrevue du Prince n'a, en effet, eu trait qu'à la question des lieux saints; qu'il a demandé que l'arrangement de cette question soit fait par écrit en forme de Convention, afin qu'il puisse être considérée définitivement terminée et pour que l'on n'ait plus à revenir par la suite; mais qu'il n'a pas du tout parlé d'un Traité secret qu'il voudrait faire entre son Gouvernement et la Porte. Son Excellence m'a donné en même temps les assurances les plus formelles qu'il ne fera jamais avec le Prince aucun accord, aucun Traité, aucune concession qui puissent toucher directement ou indirectement aux Traités et aux rapports qu'existent entre la Sublime Porte et l'Angleterre et la France, sans en informer leur Représentants au préalable et sans leur pleine adhésion.

"Il est possible," a-t-il ajouté, "que la circonstance de la destitution de Fuad Effendi et de ma nomination au poste de Ministre des Affaires Etrangères peu de jours après l'arrivée du Prince Menchikoff, ait fait penser à M. Colonel Rose, que je suis Russe; mais je vous prie de déclarer formellement de ma part que je ne suis ni Russe, ni Anglais, ni Français, mais que je suis Turc; que je n'ai en vue que l'intérêt de mon Gouvernement et ses devoirs envers les Gouvernements qui le soutiennent et qui le protégent. Je ne suis pas un enfant—je suis un vieux Ministre, connaissant très bien les Traités qui lient la Sublime Porte avec les Puissances amies, et je comprends, Dieu en soit loué, trop bien toute l'importance de nos bons rapports avec l'Angleterre et la France, tout le poids de l'obligation à maintenir les Traités, toute l'étendue du mal qui résulterait pour mon Gouvernement s'il s'en écarte ou s'il les enfreint, pour hésiter un seul instant d'informer leurs Représentants respectifs de toute demande ou proposition que voudrait nous imposer la Russie et qui ne serait pas en harmonie avec les droits consacrées par ces Traités. Vous pouvez donner toutes ces assurances de ma part à M. le Chargé d'Affaires, et dites-lui, je vous prie, que comme j'aurai le plaisir de le voir demain au soir au dîner du Prince Menchikoff, je les lui donnerai aussi en personne au palais même de la Russie.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) ROBERT CHABERT.

No. 232.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 132.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 1, 1853.

TWO days ago the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires told me, most confidentially, that Prince Menchikoff had shown him a despatch from his Government in which he was instructed that should the Porte reject Count Leiningen's proposals, and Austria in consequence proceed to "voies de fait," Russia also, in that case, was to be considered at war with the Porte.

This fact proves the intimate union between Austria and Russia, of which I had the same day another proof. M. de Klezl was talking about the holy places. He said, as a Catholic Power, Austria ought to be against Russia in that question. But in spite of this declaration, so strong was M. de Klezl's leaning for Russia, that he argued that the French Treaty of 1740 might be twisted into giving Russia, and not France, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.

The Turks think that there is a secret offensive and defensive alliance between Austria and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 233.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 15.)

(No. 135.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 2, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship a copy of Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham's report No. 4, of the 28th ultimo, to me. I do not send a copy of No. 1, inclosure in that report, because it was dispatched long since to your Lordship's office, and because its contents are contradicted by No. 2 inclosure.

The tenor of this report, taken in consideration with that of Mr. Consul Yeames' last report from Odessa, can leave, I think, no doubt as to the hostile nature of the intentions of the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 233.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Colonel Rose.

Sir, *Galatz, March* 28, 1853.

IN my No. 3, of the 25th ultimo, I mentioned that orders had been given in Bessarabia to prepare quarters for a large number of troops; I now beg to wait on you with the inclosed copies of my letters to Lord John Russell of the 7th instant, and to the Earl of Clarendon of this day, on the same subject.

Further I have the honour to inclose a despatch from Mr. Consul Gardner of Jassy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. CUNNINGHAM.

Inclosure 2 in No. 233.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to the Earl of Clarendon.

My Lord, *Galatz, March* 28, 1853.

MY No. 7 of the 7th instant, stated that in Bessarabia all preparation for the passage of troops had been suspended; I have now to inform your Lordship that fresh orders have been received in that province to prepare for the passage of troops, and to get waggons ready for the transport of baggage.

It is said, and such appears to be the case from the amount of preparation ordered, that two corps d'armée, upwards of 120,000 men, will pass, and waggons are ordered to be ready for the 10th of May, o. s.

Whenever orders are given to make preparations, the greatest secrecy is enjoined.

Hitherto no troops, in addition to the five battalions mentioned in my last, have entered Bessarabia, but it is understood they are marching forward from all directions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) C. CUNNINGHAM.

No. 234.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, April 15).

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{26 \text{ Mars}}{7 \text{ Avril}}$, 1853.

M. le Baron,

JE m'acquitte avec empressement du devoir de faire connaître à votre Excellence la vive satisfaction avec laquelle l'Empereur a pris lecture de vos dépêches du $\frac{14}{26}$ courant. Elles nous annoncent que le Gouvernement Britannique a non seulement approuvé le refus de l'Amiral Dundas de délérer, sans un ordre exprès de Londres, à l'invitation que lui avait faite le Chargé d'Affaires d'Angleterre à Constantinople, de se rendre avec la flotte Anglaise à Vourla, mais pris la résolution de laisser cette flotte à Malte et d'attendre avec confiance le développement des négociations entamées par le Prince Menchikoff avec la Porte Ottomane, sans les compliquer en s'associant à la démonstration hâtive qu'a cru devoir prescrire à son escadre le Gouvernement Français.

De son côté Sir H. Seymour est venu ces jours-ci me communiquer la dépêche que lui a adressée sur le même sujet le nouveau Principal Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Etrangères, Lord Clarendon. Elle confirme de tout point des nouvelles que vous nous donnez.

Il nous a été bien agréable, M. le Baron, de voir par cette pièce comme par le résumé de vos entretiens avec les Ministres Britanniques, que tous les faux bruits répandus à Constantinople à l'égard de nos intentions n'avaient causé aucune alarme ou appréhension au Cabinet de Londres, convaincu par les assurances personnelles qu'il a reçues à ce sujet de l'Empereur, que le désir et la résolution de Sa Majesté sont de respecter l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc, et que si ses vues à cet égard venaient à subir un changement quelconque, notre Auguste Maître serait le premier à en avertir le Gouvernement Anglais.

Veuillez assurer les Ministres de la Reine, dans les termes les plus positifs, que les intentions de l'Empereur sont toujours les mêmes, et que toutes les vaines rumeurs auxquelles a donné lieu dans la capitale Ottomane l'arrivée du Prince Menchikoff—occupation des Principautés, agrandissement de territoire du côté de nos frontières Asiatiques, prétention de nous assurer la nomination du Patriarche Grec de Constantinople, langage hostile et comminatoire tenu à la Porte par notre Ambassadeur, sont non seulement exagérées, mais dénuées même de toute espèce de fondement; qu'en un mot la mission du Prince Menchikoff n'a jamais eu, et n'a encore, d'autre but que celui dont votre Excellence a été chargé de faire part au Gouvernement Britannique.

Quant à la recommandation qui nous est faite de ménager autant que possible l'amour propre de la France dans la question délicate des lieux saints, et, tout en revendiquant les droits de l'Eglise Grecque, de chercher à ne rien imposer aux Latins qui pût blesser trop directement l'honneur et les intérêts de cette Puissance, vous pouvez assurer également les Ministres Anglais que dans l'arrangement à négocier il n'est point question de faire révoquer ou ôter aux Latins les dernières concessions qu'ils ont obtenues par la note Ottomane du 8 Février de l'an passé, mais simplement de faire concorder ces concessions avec les dispositions du hatti-chérif, en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices.

En général, nous ne demandons pas mieux que de nous entendre à l'amiable avec le Gouvernement Français, en ayant égard à la position aventureuse où il s'est lui-même placé, quoique toutes les concessions qu'on peut faire à sa susceptibilité n'aient presque toujours pour effet que de le rendre plus exigeant, en ce qu'il en prend acte comme d'un succès qui l'autorise à en chercher d'autres. Mais il faut qu'il se prête lui-même à nous en faciliter les moyens au lieu d'agir en sens contraire, comme il vient de le faire si précipitamment par une démonstration dont les conséquences peuvent mettre en opposition nos désirs de conciliation et le soin de notre dignité. Le Gouvernement Anglais doit voir lui-même que la France n'est pas toujours accessible aux conseils de la modération, puisque les sages représentations qu'il lui a fait faire par Lord Cowley, n'ont pu empêcher le depart de l'escadre Française.

L'Empereur vous charge, M. le Baron, de remercier très particulièrement, en son nom, Lord Aberdeen et Lord Clarendon, de la salutaire impulsion qu'ils viennent de donner aux résolutions du Cabinet Britannique. Le premier nous a offert en cette occasion un nouveau témoignage de confiance, auquel notre Auguste Maître est infiniment sensible. Le second, avec lequel nos relations viennent à peine de se nouer, les ouvre ainsi sous des auspices qui nous autorisent à espérer qu'elles seront des plus satisfaisantes. En se fiant à nos assurances, en refusant de suivre la France dans une mesure, si non hostile, au moins empreinte de défiance envers nous, l'Angleterre dans les circonstances actuelles a fait œuvre de bonne politique. Rien n'eût été plus à regretter que de voir les deux Puissances maritimes s'associer, ne fût-ce qu'un moment, et d'apparence plutôt que de fait, sur la question d'orient, telle qu'elle est posée à cette heure. Quoique leurs vues à cet égard diffèrent au fond *toto cœlo*, cependant comme le public Européen n'est guère en état d'en faire la distinction, leur identité ostensible n'aurait pu manquer de les présenter sous l'aspect d'une alliance intime. L'ardeur Française se fût hatée d'exagérer, en les exploitant dans son intérêt, ces nouveaux semblans d'entente cordiale, et toutes les situations en Europe en auraient été à l'instant faussées. L'apparition simultanée des deux flottes rendait la question insoluble à Constantinople. Elle nous plaçait dans une position que nous n'aurions pu accepter, et qui n'eût plus permis à l'Empereur, se trouvant ainsi sous le coup d'une démonstration comminatoire, de suivre librement ses inspirations conservatrices et pacifiques.

De la part de la France isolée, la mesure perd beaucoup de ses inconvéniens, quoiqu'elle soit encore loin d'en être exempte. Aussi l'Empereur ne s'en préoccupe-t-il que peu, et Sa Majesté n'y voit point de raison pour rien changer pour le moment à ses dispositions et vues antérieures. L'attitude de l'Angleterre suffira pour neutraliser celles qui, de la part des Français ou des Turcs—si ceux-ci se sentaient encouragés par la présence de la flotte Française—pourraient entraver ou reculer trop longtemps la solution favorable du litige. Sous ce rapport Lord Aberdeen nous semble avoir parfaitement compris le beau rôle qu'avait à y jouer l'Angleterre, et nous aimons à l'en féliciter, persuadés d'avance de l'impartialité qu'il mettra à le remplir.

Pour ce qui est de vous, M. le Baron, vous avez su en cette occasion ne rien négliger pour servir les grands intérêts que vous a confiés notre Auguste Maître. Son plein suffrage a honoré les efforts que vous avez faits et les raisonnements que vous avez employés pour confirmer et fixer les Ministres Anglais dans la juste opinion qu'ils se sont formée de nos intentions politiques.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 235.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Aberdeen.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 238.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 14, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read me this afternoon a despatch, dated the 31st ultimo, which he had this morning received from the French Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople.

The intelligence supplied by it coincides very much with that contained in Colonel Rose's despatches of the 24th, with copies of which your Lordship has been good enough to furnish me. One fact, however, mentioned by M. Benedetti, and not alluded to by Colonel Rose, deserves repetition. The Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs appear both of them to have promised M. Benedetti, that no decision in regard to the sacred places should be taken before the arrival of M. de la Cour. On Prince Menchikoff pressing the Porte for an early solution of the question (in what sense or in what terms M. Benedetti does not say), an answer was returned to the effect that the Porte could decide nothing before the arrival of the French Ambassador, which answer had caused considerable vexation to Prince Menchikoff, and elicited from him a threat, that if the negotiations met with unnecessary delay, he should return with his Embassy to Odessa. M. Benedetti appears to think that the pressure upon the Sultan may be so great, that, if his present Ministers are not inclined

to come into the views of Russia, whatever they may be, His Highness may be inclined to change.

I was anxious to find out whether the French Government would be satisfied to allow the cupola of the Holy Sepulchre to be repaired by the Sultan with paintings of Greek saints, and Greek inscriptions; and while with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I turned the subject on this point. "Nous désirons y voir tous les Saints du Paradis, qu'ils soient Grecs, Catholiques, or Arméniens. La Russie ne peut faire, il me semble, aucune objection à cela." More he would not say.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 236.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 5*, 1853.

IN obedience to your Lordship's orders I have placed in the Chancellor's hands a copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 23rd ultimo, marked No. 25, which has given him the warmest satisfaction. His Imperial Majesty, he observed, would not be less well pleased with the additional proof thus afforded of the confidence in his intentions entertained by Her Majesty's Government.

Her Majesty's Government had, his Excellency said, come to a very wise resolution, in not allowing the English fleet to sail for the Levant; and although he regretted the departure of the French squadron, it was a decision to which he had no desire of attaching an over-due importance.

I will here observe that the Chancellor had been apprized by Baron Brunnow of the purport of the despatch which was about to be addressed to me by your Lordship, but if I am not mistaken the despatch proved to be even more satisfactory than had been anticipated; before its arrival I had heard of the warm approbation expressed by the Emperor of the feelings and attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

The Chancellor spoke (as I found casually that Baron Brunnow had done) with kindness of Colonel Rose. It was, he said, certain that Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires had acted upon incorrect impressions; but it was certain that a very practised diplomatist might have been misled by the false statements so constantly current at Pera, and doubly so at moments of great excitement.

He begged however to state that there had been no sort of demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi, no ultimatum, no demand for extension of territory, no attempt at procuring for Russia the nomination of the Greek Patriarch.

I then spoke of the question of the holy places, and expressed the ardent wish felt by Her Majesty's Government, that all matters relating to this affair should be settled speedily, and in a manner calculated to make the arrangement durable. Her Majesty's Government were not, I observed, less desirous that the honour and honourable susceptibility of the French Government should be carefully attended to, that attention being in fact requisite to the performance of the settlement of difficulties.

Count Nesselrode would only again observe that no wish was entertained to call upon France for the restitution of any rights which she had obtained; that it had never been in contemplation to ask for the key of the church, or to object to the star in the cupola.

I stated to Count Nesselrode that one point remained, that I would not conceal from him that I received from various quarters accounts of military preparation, which appeared a little inconsistent with the pacific declarations which had been made to me, and with the tranquillizing aspect of affairs at Constantinople.

The Chancellor replied that he thought he might assure me that the Emperor was only waiting for a confirmation of the peaceful intelligence which he had received from the south, when orders would be issued for the discontinuance of all warlike preparations.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 237.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 161.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 5*, 1853.

I HAVE heard from several persons belonging to the Court, and as well from three or four of my colleagues, of the warm approbation which has been expressed repeatedly by the Emperor of the attitude of Her Majesty's Government during a crisis which gave rise to so much anxiety at Paris; an anxiety, I may remark, which I must confess myself to have fully shared.

This indirect testimony is, perhaps, more valuable than any expression addressed to a servant of Her Majesty's Government.

The last report of the kind which reached me was from the Bavarian Minister who, having been accredited to the Court of Sweden as well as to this, is upon the point of setting off for Stockholm.

Count de Bray had the honour of an audience of the Emperor on the 3rd instant, when His Majesty, after immediately observing that the conduct of the English Government on a late occasion had been all that he could have desired, added, In fact our relations with England are now of the most friendly nature, the only point of difference between us is that relating to the Refugees, and upon that we must suppose that there is little to be expected.

His Majesty's expressions upon this occasion were the more satisfactory, as he had received only a few hours previously a telegraphic message bringing intelligence of the arrests which have taken place at Berlin. Were the Emperor's feelings towards Her Majesty's Government and our country otherwise than very friendly, it is certain that no time would have been lost in conforming to the common continental practice, of attributing to the agency of the foreign revolutionists in London every fresh attempt at seditious movements which takes place in any part of Europe.

It remains to be seen whether any proofs can be adduced in support of the assertion, at first very confidently made here and elsewhere, as to the Vienna assassin having been the instrument of the London Committee.

I may here mention, which I omitted to do at the time, that I took the precaution of stating to Count Nesselrode, and to many other persons, that there was *primâ facie* evidence of the falsehood of this assertion, inasmuch as it was not very probable that an association, as was stated, disposing of considerable funds, should have sent forth a desperado upon an attempt of such importance provided with no more effective weapon than a kitchen knife, so ground down that it remained curled up upon one murderous blow having been struck.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 238.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 162. Secret and Confidental.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 5*, 1853.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's very important despatch of the 23rd ultimo, marked secret and confidential, No. 23, and beg to express to your Lordship my gratitude for the approbation which Her Majesty has been pleased to bestow upon the language which I held to the Emperor, in the conversations which I had the honour of holding with His Imperial Majesty.

It appeared to me that I could not do better than to read your Lordship's despatch in the first instance to the Chancellor, with a view to hearing any observations which he had to make upon it.

After considering it very deliberately, the Chancellor expressed his warm approval of the paper, with the exception of the passage commencing "and

however much Her Majesty's Government may be disposed to agree," and ending with "which the Turkish Empire is composed."

"You will," Count Nesselrode said, "at once perceive the nature of my objection, which rests not upon the Russian but upon the English view of the subject; your Government, I believe, thinks that there is inconvenience in the prolonged discussion of a matter of so much delicacy as that upon which the Emperor has spoken to you. Such, I will remark in great confidence, is the opinion which I myself entertain, and you will see that the passage in question appears to invite further debate."

The Chancellor in a manner the most friendly proceeded to discuss the expediency either of referring his doubts to your Lordship, or of omitting the passage in question in the copy to be presented to the Emperor, finally deciding that delay would be inconvenient, and omission barely justifiable, and that it would be better that he should be furnished with an exact copy of the despatch. He would, he said, undertake to speak to the Emperor before the paper was placed in his hands, and would make such observations as would be calculated to close the correspondence.

Count Nesselrode was anxious to ascertain whether I was desirous of presenting the paper myself to His Majesty; to which I replied that I certainly very much appreciated the honour of being allowed to approach the Emperor, but that, under the circumstances of the case, I thought it advisable that I should forego that advantage, the long interviews which the Emperor had been pleased to grant me, having attracted the attention both of the French and Prussian diplomacy.

I waited accordingly upon the Chancellor on the following day, and placed a copy of your Lordship's dispatch in his hands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 239.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 16.)

(No. 163. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, April 6, 1853.

My Lord,

IT may be right that I should call your Lordship's attention to one of the evil consequences of that policy towards Turkey which has been pursued with such recklessness by the Russian, and with such stolid infatuation by the Austrian Cabinet. I allude to the unnatural excitement given to the Russian army, and more particularly to the younger officers who, having their way to make in the world, are of course deeply interested in striking into the path which leads to military command, honours, and emoluments.

The Emperor is so accustomed to assume that a positive order implies close obedience to it, that, having given directions that no one should speak of a war with Turkey, he imagined no doubt that the subject was banished from conversation. If so His Majesty has been strangely mistaken, for I know for certain that even among the cadets the subject has been one of engrossing interest.

His Imperial Majesty is very apt to call out a regiment suddenly, in the dead of night for instance, and is much displeased if any delay takes place in the execution of the order; it may be that he has been desirous of giving these military alarms upon a larger scale, and that in hurrying two or three armies to the Turkish frontier, he may have secretly purposed to dismiss them quietly to their usual quarters.

The experiment is a dangerous one, not only for the safety of the country immediately menaced, but for those other States who possess the very questionable advantage of being situated on the Russian borders.

From her northern neighbour, Austria has probably more to fear than any other civilized state of Europe, and the danger has not been diminished by the late war in Hungary, from which the Russian officers returned generally with a feeling of great contempt for those of Austria.

I would here observe that I am very far from asserting that the feeling is justified. I believe it not to be. I am assured that it is not by a Russian officer of acknowledged merit who served in the Hungarian campaign; but I take note of a fact which Austria may have cause to regret.

Another point is worthy of attention. Until lately the Austrian Government had a certain security against the encroachments of a powerful neighbour in the sacred obligations of Treaties, but the value of these has been put an end to by the new Conservative principles laid down by Count Buol and his colleagues. When it is once established that legality means self-murder, and that Conventions are to be regarded as poison, an appeal to international law can be nothing more than a comparison of the number of bayonets which the respective States hold at their command.

According to this new code, the legal rights which Austria possesses over Sardinia, Sardinia over Parma, and Parma over the Republic of San Marino, may some day be invoked by Russia against Austria herself; Russia having at her command above a million of bayonets, and the common Conservative policy pursued by the two Imperial Cabinets having singularly increased the inclination felt for making use of them.

I observed in a preceding part of my despatch upon the military turn which the events passing in Turkey had given to the ideas of boys and striplings here; but the observation is not applicable to them alone. I heard from a Russian acquaintance the details of a conversation which passed some days since among some of the generals, and in which that very cautious soldier and courtier Marshal Paskewitch took part.

The conversation turned upon the readiness with which Turkey might be occupied. After some discussion, it was decided that no serious obstacle existed on the part of the Turkish army, and that as for England and France, if one Power sent 10,000 and the other 40,000 men to the assistance of the Sultan, it was the utmost that could be expected; while as for Russia, she might pour in 100,000 men, or 200,000, or as many more as might be required.

I mentioned Marshal Paskewitch as having been present at the conversation, and his conclusions, as I understand, were quite in favour of the ready means of execution of the plan under discussion. I have, however, reason for believing that such influence as he has exerted here has been favourable to temperate measures and a policy of peace.

Unfortunately his fear of incurring an Imperial frown is so great as rarely to permit his putting forward any opinion which is not entirely conformable to those of his master.

As your Lordship is aware, the ostensible object of the Marshal's prolonged visit to St. Petersburgh, has been the duty imposed upon him of presiding over the court of enquiry into the robbery committed upon the Invalid Fund. I have, however, reason to believe that a better reason existed in the wish entertained by the Emperor of having at his side a man whose military experience would make his opinions of great value in the event (according to the Russian phrase) of war with Turkey becoming inevitable, or (as it might more properly be expressed) in the event of its being considered expedient to declare war against Turkey.

Reverting to Count Buol and his colleagues, I would only venture to remark that it appears to me that Prince Metternich's friends can desire no better justification of his policy than that afforded by the contrast which it offers to that of his successors.

Whatever may have been his errors, I believe Prince Metternich to have been as incapable of handing over his country to the tutelage of Russia, and of sneering down the value of an international engagement, as he would have been of placing a Russian body-guard about the person of his Sovereign, or of inviting France to tear up the Treaties of the year 1815.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 240.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 164. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1853.*

THE Chancellor, when I called upon him yesterday, observed that he could not do better than to place in my hands a despatch, not yet dated, which he had just addressed to Baron Brunnow, and which is to be forwarded by a Russian courier who will set off this day for London.

The whole language and purport of this paper (which I perceived with regret Baron Brunnow has no order to communicate to your Lordship) gave me very great pleasure.

Count Nesselrode expresses the warmest satisfaction at the despatch No. 25, which I had been ordered to communicate to him, and in general at the confiding, noble, and at the same time politic attitude taken by Her Majesty's Government at a moment of unnecessary alarm.

The departure of the English and French fleets for the Levant would, it is observed, have been a demonstration so closely resembling a menace that it would have rendered it impossible for the Emperor to act as he desired to do in Turkish affairs: the presence of a French fleet in the Levant had its inconveniences, but such as the attitude of Her Majesty's Government was sufficient to neutralize; it would be the same with regard to any unforeseen difficulties which might arise at Constantinople.

With regard to the objects sought by Russia, they were precisely those which had from the outset been professed; all the ambitious schemes imputed to her were not exaggerated rumours, but rumours devoid of all foundation.

The Emperor was desirous of attending to your Lordship's recommendations, and was prepared to "ménager" even the susceptibility of the French, although he had learned that concessions in that quarter led only to further demands; but that to these attempts at settling affairs amicably the Cabinet of Paris must lend its assistance.

There was no question of taking back from the Latins any one advantage which had been granted to them. "Il s'agissait simplement de faire concorder ces concessions (to the Latins) avec les dispositions du hatti-chérif, en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices."

A preceding passage of the despatch, and one which makes it very desirable that Her Majesty's Government should be placed in possession of the document from which I was permitted to copy the above lines, is that in which the Emperor is made to declare his constant desire for the maintenance of the independence of Turkey, and to renew his promise of duly apprizing Her Majesty's Government, should his intention in this respect undergo any change.

At the close of the despatch, Baron Brunnow is informed that his conduct has been highly approved of by the Emperor.

The three points which appear to me to be established by the paper of which I have offered your Lordship a summary, are: first, the satisfaction felt by the Emperor at the proof of confidence in his word manifested by Her Majesty's Government—this is expressed in plain words; second, which is plainly to be seen, the apprehensions entertained by the Russian Cabinet of an alliance, having for its object a joint action upon the affairs of Turkey, between England and France; and third, the almost equally evident desire of proving that such an alliance must, from the opposing interests of the two parties, exist more in appearance than in reality.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 241.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 165. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1853.*

I FOUND the Chancellor yesterday very much pleased with the accounts which had reached him under date of the 24th ultimo, from Constantinople, and with those of different dates which he had received from Vienna and Paris. "Vous me trouvez," he said, "in the highest spirits."

We spoke of the differences which required settlement between the nominally conflicting pretensions of the Greek and Latin Churches, and Count Nesselrode was eager to admit that they were very slight. He had, he said, now had an opportunity of comparing the Porte's note to the French Ambassador dated the 8th February of last year, with the firman communicated to Russia on the 10th of the same month, and the difference was so inconsiderable as to render it extraordinary how the French Cabinet should have raised a question upon a point so little deserving of serious notice.

I observed that with the peaceful prospects which were now opening on us, I flattered myself his Excellency could now give me the assurance that military preparations were laid aside; at all events, that there was some commencement of discontinuance of military preparation.

Count Nesselrode replied that he did not feel at liberty to give me that assurance, but that he did not hesitate to express to me his conviction that the negotiation at Constantinople would be brought, and speedily, to a happy conclusion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 242.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 166. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1853.*

IN addressing Her Majesty's Government I observe one constant rule, which is, to express plainly my opinions both of men and of affairs; I hold it to be my duty to have no concealments with those under whose orders I have the honour of serving, and feel sure that when concealment is required, your Lordship will provide that no publicity shall be given to my reports.

It is frequently my business to express disapprobation of what I witness, but it is infinitely more agreeable to me to bestow praise, and this a recent circumstance connected with the alarm lately experienced at Constantinople enables me to do at present.

Some private letters which have passed lately between Baron Brunnow and the Chancellor, and which the latter has allowed me to read, show that the Russian Government are in fact well aware that in writing to Admiral Dundas, Colonel Rose was acting in conformity with the expressed wishes of the Porte.

Baron Brunnow, however, being aware that an official knowledge of this fact might tend to complicate the Turkish difficulties, appears to have been careful to avoid such explanations as would have confirmed what he had learned privately upon the subject, and, as I had an opportunity of hearing, this reserve has met with Count Nesselrode's complete approbation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 243.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 7, 1853.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC acquaints me that, after due consideration, he determined upon not communicating to the Russian Government the some

what peremptory demand for explanation which, as I had the honour of informing your Lordship in my despatch No. 153, he had received from M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The French Minister has, however, questioned Count Nesselrode very closely as to the policy which the Russian Cabinet is pursuing at Constantinople, his inquiries being directed principally to these two points.

Do the Russian Government, after the negotiation opened with the French Mission here, contemplate conducting the arrangements respecting the Holy Shrines at Constantinople without the concurrence and approbation of the French Ambassador?

Can the Russian Government, after all the pacific assurances which have been so repeatedly given, offer any reasonable explanation of these continued military armaments and preparations, for which there exists such slight ostensible reason?

Upon neither of these points does General Castelbajac appear to have received such explanations as he would be warranted in considering as perfectly satisfactory. He looks, as he is justified in doing, with great disapprobation upon the intimidation employed for diplomatic purposes in Turkey, and with some mistrust both upon the arrangements to be made with regard to the holy places, and to the large gathering of troops on the Turkish frontiers.

General Castelbajac spoke with some warmth of the manner in which, by some perversion of language, Count Nesselrode still represents the assemblage of these large Russian armies as made in the interest of the Sultan, and with a view to a demonstration which is to render war unnecessary. As regards Count Nesselrode's views, General Castelbajac is disposed to consider them as agreeing with his own, and as differing from those of the Emperor, whose personal agency he traces in the direction given to these critical affairs.

Having learned upon certain authority, that the French Mission have been taught to believe that Her Majesty's Government have acted a double part by France on a late occasion, I have endeavoured, and I believe with some success, to combat such a notion. As regards Constantinople, I have shown that nothing can be less like an abandonment of France than our policy has been; that from the first moment, as now, Her Majesty's Government deplored the forward zeal of the Marquis de Lavalette upon a question of no interest to England, and which was certain to arouse the susceptibility of Russia; that as regards the despatch of the two fleets, no concert upon the subject existed, the plan having appeared at once to Her Majesty's Government very injudicious; but that Her Majesty's Government, far from seeking to place itself by contrast with France in an advantageous point of view to Russia, had carefully pointed out why it was that an English Minister had been enabled to have greater confidence in the intentions of the Emperor than could be expected from a Minister of France; in fine, that Her Majesty's Government never ceased feeling and expressing the greatest anxiety that the honour and rights of France should be carefully kept in view in the arrangements to be made about the holy shrines, a point which I had been directed to press constantly upon the Chancellor's attention.

In a word, my object has been, and continues to be, to prove to my French colleague, that the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards France has been of a perfectly friendly nature, and at the same time to avoid all such appearance of concert with the French Mission as might injure the position of Her Majesty's Mission, without offering corresponding advantage to that of France.

Under the supposition of some great event having taken place at Constantinople, as was suggested by the first news of the summons sent to the English and French fleets, the case was different; I was then desirous of showing every readiness to act heartily with my French colleague.

According to Count Nesselrode's expression already quoted to your Lordship, in these uncertain times it is difficult to say in what quarter, at the end of a few days, a Government is to look for its allies.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 244.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 14.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 18, 1853.

IT appears that the Prince of Servia has dismissed M. Garaschanin from his service, on the peremptory demand of Prince Menchikoff, and that the Russian Consul at Belgrade has subsequently, in threatening terms, required the removal of several other official persons.

This interference with the internal government of the province, has excited much discontent among the Servian people; and your Excellency is instructed to state to Prince Menchikoff, that in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government a perseverance in this course will be productive of mischievous results.

The French Ambassador informs me that M. de la Cour has been instructed to use his best efforts to prevent the extension of Russian influence in Servia; and your Excellency will take such steps in furtherance of that object as may appear to you expedient.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 245.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 114.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, April* 18, 1853.

COUNT WALEWSKI has read to me a despatch from M. de Benedetti, which appears to have given some uneasiness to the French Government, and particularly as regards a secret Treaty, similar to that of the 8th July, 1833, which is said to have been pressed upon the acceptance of the Porte by Prince Menchikoff.

I told Count Walewski that the same information had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government by Colonel Rose, but I had reason to believe that the Treaty in question would be nothing more than a written agreement with respect to the holy places, and the mode of conducting divine worship and religious ceremonies there by the Greek and Latin communities.

I then read to Count Walewski some extracts from the last despatches of Sir H. Seymour, which fully confirmed the assurances given by Baron Brunnow of the pacific intentions of the Emperor of Russia towards Turkey.

These extracts seemed to be quite satisfactory to Count Walewski, but his Excellency said that as things were not yet settled, and as Russia might still invade Turkey, he wished to know whether, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would not be prudent now to announce to the Emperor of Russia that all questions involving the fate of the Turkish Empire must in future be settled, not by one Power singly, but by the five Powers acting together.

I replied that such a course would be doing either too much or too little; too much, if France and England still meant to confide in the honour of the Emperor of Russia, which events had hitherto justified; too little, if the Emperor violated all his engagements, and, for the gratification of his ambition, ran the risk of an European war.

I therefore considered that such a declaration at this moment might do some harm, but could be productive of no good result.

Count Walewski appeared to agree in this opinion, and did not press the matter further. His Excellency did not say whether the proposal originated with himself, or whether he had been instructed to make it by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 246.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 136.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 3, 1853.

I THOUGHT it my duty again to ask explanations of Prince Menchikoff respecting the late warlike movements of Russia. I commenced the conversation by reading to his Excellency Mr. Vice-Consul Cunningham's report to your Lordship of the 28th of March, as well as the substance of Mr. Consul Yeames' last report. I read also, as I had done before to M. d'Ozéroff, Lord John Russell's despatch No. 18 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and the memorandum in his confidential despatch No. 10 to his Lordship. On a previous occasion, I had read to his Highness Mr. Consul Yeames's report to me of the 4th of March.

On all these occasions I have dwelt on the difference of the assurances made at St. Petersburgh and London respecting the pacific intentions of Russia in the East, and the unceasing warlike movements and preparations made by her in all parts of her territory from which an attack could be directed against Turkey. I thought also that I could not do better than use on these occasions the excellent arguments employed by Sir Hamilton Seymour in his memorandum of the 8th of January last.

I have urged also, that if Russia had cause to complain of the language of M. de Lavalette, the sympathy shown for her in that matter by her allies, by the recall of M. de Lavalette, and the retirement of Fuad Effendi, must be considered a satisfactory reparation; that Montenegro had been evacuated; that in short, none of the causes alleged by Russia as causes for a hostile attitude existed any longer; but, that notwithstanding this, Russia increased her warlike preparations, and that with a mystery which only increased their very serious gravity; that yesterday the Nestor of the British merchants came to me and expressed a just alarm at the menacing aspect of affairs; that the hostile and unexplained attitude of Russia had placed a responsibility on the British Representative here which he had no right to bear; that if he told his countrymen of his suspicions, and his ignorance as to the objects of Russia's armament, he might, perhaps, needlessly create alarm, and check or stop enterprizes in which they were engaging; that if he did not tell them, they considered his silence as a guarantee that they had no cause of apprehension, and might safely embark their capital in peaceful commerce; that for these and other reasons, agents had a right to ask for explanations from the Representatives of a Power who assumed, without assigning a valid cause, a hostile position; that his Excellency had stated that the reports of the Consuls were exaggerated; that they had made a fuss because a few troops had been embarked, and a little biscuit baked; that waggons could not have been pressed for the troops, because they had their own waggons; that he had told me before that the troops were only in their cantonments; that only a few troops could be embarked on board ten sail-of-the-line, which constituted the whole effective Russian navy in the Black Sea; that General Rüdiger had not been placed in command of two corps, that only one corps had been put in a state of preparation, and that he really knew very little about the number or position of the Russian troops.

I replied, that I had good information that large and very unusual quantities of biscuit had been ordered to be got ready for large bodies of troops, and what was remarkable, to be consumed by Russian troops in Turkish provinces; that besides the ten sail-of-the-line, there were other numerous transports at Nicolaieff and Sevastopol, all of which had been ordered to be ready for sea; that two divisions, that is, a whole corps d'armée, had embarked or was about to do so; that the fact that only one corps had been put on a war footing, was different from the accounts I had seen from Petersburgh and elsewhere; that I concluded that his Excellency would be able to give me information as to the troops, because I had heard that he was commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces which supported his Excellency's negotiations.

Prince Menchikoff made a reply to this last observation, which was so confused that I could not understand it.

I have also urged that the Porte's independence, guaranteed by all the Powers, required that she should negotiate, uninfluenced by a formidable military demonstration, more especially as Russia had never even given her notice of it.

Prince Menchikoff is a very clever diplomatist, and always endeavours to shift the discussion from the Russian armaments, which is very disagreeable to him, to the refugee question, respecting which he is very discursive. That is the grievance which he and M. de Klezl cannot forget, and which they always bring forward as a sort of justification for every illegitimate position which Austria and Russia take up in Turkey; and it is remarkable how completely what these two gentlemen say to me on this subject, tallies with the menace which they urge on the Porte to induce her to abandon England and France, and give her hand to Austria and Russia.

In reply to an observation of his Excellency, that England always encouraged Socialists and Revolutionists, I answered that Russia ought not to complain of our institutions, which had so often preserved the peace of Europe; that England was a medium between democracy and despotism, which had frequently prevented a conflict between their antagonistic principles; that by not opposing too violently democracy in 1848, we had acquired an influence over France which we had used for the benefit of other States; that England had, by such means, prevented the march of a French Republican army into Italy for the purpose of constituting Italy an united Republic. I asked his Excellency whether he did not approve that result of British policy. Prince Menchikoff replied that he had not heard of it before, and that it was an excellent result.

I concluded by telling Prince Menchikoff that I trusted that he would be able to give me pacific assurances. He replied, "I cannot promise you that we will disarm." I said, "But if the Russian troops could retire;" he reflected and said, "All I can tell you is, that I have the most pacific intentions."

My impression from all Prince Menchikoff said was, that he made light of Russia's hostile position for the purpose of retiring from it with as good a grace as possible.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 247.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 19.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 4, 1853.

I HAVE very great satisfaction in stating to your Lordship that I have just received a letter from Mr. Black, the senior British merchant here, of which I inclose a copy, giving the most gratifying intelligence that in consequence of orders from St. Petersburgh the Russian naval and military preparations have been suspended.

I have equal pleasure in stating that yesterday and to-day I had very satisfactory conversations with Prince Menchikoff and M. Benedetti respecting the holy places, and that all three of us anticipate a favourable result of that important question.

Neither time nor the mode of conveyance permit me to enter into further details. I trust that your Lordship will agree with me that such good news makes up for scanty details.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

P.S.—I have since writing this despatch received from Rifaat Pasha so unfavourable a report as to a renewed demand of Prince Menchikoff respecting protection of the Greek interest, that I have serious doubts whether the peaceful news from Odessa may not have been fabricated.

H. R.

Inclosure in No. 247.

Mr. Black to Colonel Rose.

Galata, April 4, 1853.

Sir,

THE pacific news from Odessa has been received by four or five very respectable Greek houses, some as postscripts to their letters, and others in private communications, to the following effect:

That advice had just been received from St. Petersburgh, to the effect that the negotiations at Constantinople were proceeding so satisfactorily as to induce the Government to intimate to the public, in order to tranquillize their fears, that there was no longer any cause of apprehension as to the state of affairs, and that the military and naval preparations would be suspended.

I have, &c.

(Signed) T. N. BLACK.

No. 248.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 6.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 5, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I arrived here this morning in Her Majesty's steam-ship "Fury."

The day has necessarily passed in messages and visits of courtesy; but I have found time to ascertain that according to all appearance nothing is yet definitively settled between the Porte and Prince Menchikoff respecting the holy places in Palestine. I have only to add, that while the Turkish Ministers intimate a strong sense of anxiety and alarm as to the eventual intentions of Russia, the impressions of the Austrian Legation, founded on the language of the Russian Ambassador, are favourable to the existence of moderate views on the part of that Power, and to a friendly solution of the pending question. The latest advices received from Odessa by the channel of commercial houses are said to be in harmony with this expectation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 249.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 253.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 21, 1853.

DURING a conversation which I had yesterday with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, I endeavoured to ascertain whether the proposition mentioned in your Lordship's despatch No. 114, as made to you by Count Walewski, to the effect that the two Governments should announce to the Emperor of Russia that all questions involving the fate of the Turkish Empire must in future be settled by the five Powers, originated with that Ambassador, or whether he had been instructed to make it.

The language of M. Drouyn de Lhuys was so guarded that I was unable to satisfy myself on this point. He said that Count Walewski had reported the substance of the conversation which he had had with your Lordship, and to which I alluded, and that the French Government was quite satisfied with the assurances given by your Lordship, that whenever any real danger menaced Turkey, England would be ready to cooperate with France to prevent it.

He stated further, that he had accounts from Constantinople up to the 5th instant, which showed a greater desire on the part of Prince Menchikoff to treat the question of the holy places in a way which would lead to its

termination, but he still expressed apprehensions of endeavours on the part o Russia to obtain a Treaty from Turkey, which should resemble that of Unkiar Skelessi.

M. de Kisselelf has also by order of his Government given further assurances to M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the conciliatory disposition of Russia. Count Nesselrode, now that he has knowledge of the note addressed on the 8th of February, 1852, by the Porte to the French Ambassador, conveying the concessions made to the Latins in regard to the holy places, sees, as Sir Hamilton Seymour's reports have already informed your Lordship, but little difficulty in reconciling its provisions with those contained in the firman given in favour of the Greeks.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 250.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 254.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 21, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me yesterday that he had received the report of a conversation which Count Walewski had had with your Lordship relative to the movements of Her Majesty's fleet stationed in the Mediterranean.

The Emperor, he said, as well as himself had been much gratified by your Lordship's assurances that the fleet should not leave Malta until the questions relating to the East were settled.

The French Government appears to have been under some apprehension lest the fleet on leaving Malta for its usual summer cruize, should have taken a westerly course, a circumstance which might have induced Russia to suppose that Her Majesty's Government were indifferent to the questions pending at Constantinople.

It would, I presume, have pleased the French Government more, had the fleet received orders to approach the Archipelago, but seeing that Her Majesty's Government objects to taking such a course, the readiness with which your Lordship has adopted the suggestion that the fleet should remain for the present at Malta, has created great satisfaction.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 251.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 255.)

My Lord, *Paris, April* 21, 1853.

TELEGRAPHIC despatches, dated Constantinople the 11th and 12th instant, received from various quarters, represent that great fermentation prevailed in the Turkish capital at those dates, that a general rising of the Mussulman population was apprehended, that the Turkish vessels of war were disposed so as to overawe the quays, and that the troops occupy the streets. Other despatches mention a rising at Broussa, in which ten or twelve Christians were massacred. Others again that Prince Menchikoff had sent in an ultimatum, and threatened to leave Constantinople if his demands were not complied with.

I found M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon much pre-occupied with this news. As usual, he jumped at once to the conclusion that all these reports were true, and he observed that he had always said that one of two things was inevitable in consequence of the attitude assumed by Prince Menchikoff—either that the Turks would rise against the Christians, or the Christians against the Turks. Whichever might happen, the ends of Russia were attained.

M. de Bourquency represents the Austrian Government to be seriously alarmed respecting the state of affairs in the East, and he says that he has obtained the conviction that Count Buol would willingly renounce all the advantages obtained by Count Leiningen's mission, if by so doing he could prevent the consequences likely to ensue from that of Prince Menchikoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 252.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 259. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, April 22, 1853.*

M. DE KISSELEFF has been kind enough to read to me the despatches, dated the 6th instant, which he communicated lately to M. Drouyn de Lhuys with respect to the question of the Holy Places, and to which reference is made in my despatch No. 253.

As your Lordship will no doubt have been made acquainted with these papers through the agency of M. de Brunnow, I will not refer to them further than to say that although Count Nesselrode, after examination of the notes (they are three in number) addressed by the Porte to the French Ambassador on the 8th of February, 1852, finds that the concessions made to the Latins are greater than he was aware of (he mentions particularly certain houses purchased by the Sultan for the use of the Latin monks at Jerusalem), he is still satisfied to abide by them, and he thinks that the Porte may find means to reconcile the promises made by the Sultan's hatti-sheriff of the 10th February, with the concessions given to the Latins on the 8th.

M. de Kisseleff gave me further some details of the conversation which he had had with M. Drouyn de Lhuys. He had requested that Minister, if he believed in Count Nesselrode's words, to have a little patience and not to trust to every report which might reach him from Constantinople, and act upon it directly.

Prince Menchikoff was fulfilling his mission regularly. He could not put himself in communication with the French Embassy at Constantinople until he had come to some arrangement with the Porte. He was but following the course marked for him by M. de Lavalette, who had obtained concessions for the Latins, not only without communicating with the Russian Mission on the subject, but without even informing the Russian Government of the nature of the concessions after they had been obtained. Prince Menchikoff was charged with a mission to the Porte: as soon as its object should be accomplished, as it concerned also the French Government, he would communicate with the French Embassy, and it would then be the business of the two Ambassadors to assist each other to smooth any difficulties which might remain. Until this was done, M. de Kisseleff entreated the French Government to be patient. They had already done harm by sending the French fleet to Salamis. Its departure from Toulon had, he knew from the language held both at Constantinople and by the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, raised the hopes of the Ottoman Government to be enabled, as was their policy, to play off one Power against another. Demonstrations of this kind, or promises of support, would only delay the settlement which the Russian Government was sincerely desirous of obtaining.

M. de Kisseleff expresses himself satisfied with the tone employed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys in his reply.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 253.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 260.)
My Lord, *Paris, April 22, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received advices from Berlin by telegraph that M. de Manteuffel had stated to the French Chargé d'Affaires, that the Porte, unable to control the movement which had manifested itself at Constantinople, had put herself under the protection of Russia.

I presume that this is a mere amplification of the reports to which I had the honour to call your Lordship's attention yesterday.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 254.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 174.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 13, 1853.*

GENERAL CASTELBAJAC has read to me a long despatch, dated the 1st instant, which he has received from his Government, and in which was inclosed the last report which had reached Paris from M. Benedetti.

The chief points of interest which I noticed in M. D. de Lhuys' despatch were first, an indication of the hope entertained of a satisfactory settlement of the question of the Holy Places; second, the observation of the difference of the position assumed by Her Majesty's Government and that of France being more ostensible than real, the presence of an English squadron at Malta answering very closely to that of the French fleet now at sea in the Mediterranean; third, an intimation that events may take a turn in Turkey, which would bring the Governments of France and England into closer connection, and an assurance that the contingency of such events is looked to by France, not from mistrust in the Emperor of Russia's intentions, but from a consideration of the consequences which the military demonstrations of his armies may possibly involve; fourth, a mention of the orders given to the Queen's minister at St. Petersburgh, to endeavour to impress upon the Russian Government a due consideration of the dignity of France in the arrangements about to be made at Constantinople.

These orders, as General Castelbajac is well aware, met with the immediate attention of Her Majesty's Mission.

M. Benedetti reports in his despatch a conversation which he had held with Prince Menchikoff.

He represents the Prince as accounting for the military preparations of Russia by the necessity which existed for being in a position to act energetically in the affair of Montenegro, and as having stated that he had up to that time (M. Benedetti's despatch is dated the 14th ultimo) received no orders for entering into negotiation with the French Embassy.

With respect to the Prince's explanation, it may be observed that what might have been a valid reason before the result of Count Leiningen's mission, cannot be admitted as such from the moment that the Porte gave way to the wishes or injunctions of Austria.

With regard to the fact stated by Prince Menchikoff, it appears from a reference to dates, that the instructions respecting which M. Benedetti had made inquiries ought (after the assurances which had been given to General Castelbajac), to have reached the Russian Plenipotentiary before the middle of March.

As bearing upon this latter point, my French colleague read to me a note, and one it appeared to me very judiciously drawn up, which he had addressed on the 6th instant to the Chancellor, and in which, referring to various communications, the precise dates of which are given, he insists strongly upon the

obligation contracted by the Russian Government, not to conclude any arrangement regarding the holy places without the concurrence of the French ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—I saw the Chancellor this morning, and learnt from his Excellency that no fresh despatches have been received from Prince Menchikoff, whose correspondence only comes down to the 24th ultimo.

G. H. S

No. 255.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 25.)

(No. 177.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 14, 1853.

AS I should have been wanting in ordinary observation and vigilance if I had failed to call the attention of Her Majesty's Government to the dangers which might arise from the questions respecting the holy places of Jerusalem, so unfortunately raised by the French Cabinet, I take the liberty of requesting that your Lordship will read my despatches, Nos. 267 and 274, of last September, and Nos. 280 and 455 of the 1st October and 31st December of last year, which are, I believe, sufficient to establish that I had not been insensible of the evil consequences which have since manifested themselves.

The despatch No. 289, if I am not mistaken, will satisfy your Lordship that I had not failed to take note of the results which were to be apprehended from the intimate alliance of the two Imperial Courts, and that I was possessed with apprehensions which have been in some measure justified by the armed diplomatic movements of Austria and Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 256.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 8.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 6, 1853.

I HAD an interview at the Porte to-day with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

After some complimentary expressions, they entered at once on the subject of the pending discussions with Russia. They informed me that since the arrival of Prince Menchikoff, the language held by the Russian Embassy to them had been a mixture of angry complaints and friendly assurances, accompanied with positive requisitions as to the holy places in Palestine, indications of some ulterior views, and a general tone of insistance bordering at times on intimidation.

The points of complaint were, that the Sultan had not responded like his father to the Emperor's offers and acts of friendship, that he was too much influenced by Governments and individuals ill-disposed towards Russia, and that he had more particularly of late displayed a marked disregard of the consideration due to that Power.

The assurances were those of a willingness to promote the continued existence of the Turkish Empire, and to renew those cordial relations which had been attended on former occasions with so much benefit to the Porte.

The requisitions as to the holy places were that the Porte, after giving satisfaction for a vacillation of conduct offensive to Russia, should adhere with steadiness to the arrangement proclaimed by the Sultan's firman, and pledge itself to a complete and undisturbed maintenance of the *status quo* in future by some form of written engagement. A disposition was at the same time expressed to acquiesce in the privileges already obtained for the Latins, and also a determination to have the cupola of the Church of the Nativity at Jerusalem repaired according to the actual, that is, the Greek forms.

With respect to indications of ulterior views, there was still some uncertainty in the language of Prince Menchikoff. In the beginning he had sounded the sentiments of the Porte as to a defensive alliance with Russia, but, receiving no encouragement, had desisted from the overture. His intimations were now rather directed to a remodelling of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, so as to make the election of the Patriarch henceforward an appointment for life, independent of the Porte; to a more clear and comprehensive definition of Russian right under Treaty to protect the Greek and Armenian subjects of the Porte in religious matters; and to the conclusion of a formal agreement, comprising those points between the two Governments.

The tone of intimidation adopted by the Russian Embassy was explained to consist in a peremptory demand of reparation for an alleged offence, in an unrelaxing insistance on the Porte's coming to an early and almost immediate decision, in repeated intimations of the Emperor's displeasure in the menace of interrupting diplomatic relations should any part of the pending negotiations transpire, and of retiring to Odessa should the Porte continue much longer to protract its hesitation. All this might justly be said to take a deeper colouring from the advanced positions taken up by considerable portions of the Russian army, and from Prince Menchikoff's official connection as well with them as with the Russian fleet at Sevastopol.

The Ottoman Ministers informed me that nothing had yet been settled between the Porte and the Russian Embassy; that the *note verbale* containing Prince Menchikoff's propositions respecting the holy places, and modified at their suggestion, would probably be laid before the Council in three days, or, it might be, on the following day; that they had insisted on being at liberty to communicate its contents to the French Embassy, whose opinions must necessarily depend on the Ambassador newly arrived from the seat of Government. Their impressions seemed to be favourable to the probability of a friendly solution, and their anxiety was principally directed to the remaining proposals expected from Prince Menchikoff, and to the difficulty of dealing with them so as not to compromise either the independence or the tranquillity of the Empire.

Their anxiety took the form of numerous conjectural inquiries as to what was to be done in certain cases, whether supposed altogether or founded on communications more positive than they chose to avow, did not exactly appear.

The sum of what I said in reply is this: Endeavour to keep the affair of the holy places separate from the ulterior proposals, whatever they may be, of Russia. The course which you appear to have taken under the former head was probably the best; and I am glad to find that there is a fair prospect of its success to the satisfaction of France, as well as of Russia. Whenever Prince Menchikoff comes forward with further propositions, you are at perfect liberty to decline entering into negotiation without a full statement of their nature, extent, and reasons. Should he ground them on any existing Treaty, it would be equally incumbent on him to afford a full explanatory statement in the first instance. Should they be found, on examination, to carry with them that degree of influence over the Christian subjects of the Porte in favour of a foreign Power, which might eventually prove dangerous or seriously inconvenient to the exercise of the Sultan's legitimate authority, His Majesty's Ministers cannot be denied the right of declining them, which would not prevent the removal, by direct sovereign authority, of any existing abuse, or the more strict execution, by the Porte itself, of any treaty engagement, affording to Russia a fair ground of remonstrance.

The personal character of the Emperor Nicholas, his obligations, in common with the other great Powers of Christendom, and his frequent declarations of respect for the independence of the Turkish Empire, exclude the suspicion of any attempt to carry his point by mere arbitrary force. He lies under the restraint of moral as well as political considerations. He could not throw off the mask and compel the Porte to accept, on no distinct grounds of Treaty, propositions materially affecting the Sultan's relations with a large portion of his subjects; and, consequently, to a certain degree, his position in the general scale of power, without exposing himself to severe censure, and risking interests of the most important description. Were it, however, to turn out, contrary to

all reasonable calculation, that his Ambassador was authorized to proceed to extremities, the Porte would still have the resource of reserving its compliance until it had consulted with those of its allies who, together with Russia, were parties to the Treaty of 1841.

In making these remarks, I took care to give them the same hypothetical colour which characterized the inquiries of the Turkish Ministers; and I expressed an opinion that it would not be reasonable or prudent for them to disoblige the Emperor of Russia in matters which might be conceded without any serious objection, especially as the latest advices from Odessa gave reason to hope that milder counsels were prevailing in His Majesty's Cabinet.

In the course of our interview I took occasion to explain the grounds on which it had been deemed advisable, under present circumstances, to keep Her Majesty's squadron at Malta; and the Grand Vizier had every appearance of understanding that the interests of the Porte had been more judiciously consulted by its detention than by its appearance in the waters of the Archipelago. He seemed inclined to entertain some regret as to the advance of the French squadron from Toulon.

I had opened the conversation by stating that the Queen had directed me to return at once to Constantinople, in proof of the friendly interest which Her Majesty took in the embarrassments of the Porte; and when the Grand Vizier had expressed his acknowledgments, and assured me of the reliance which he placed on British counsels conveyed to the Porte through me, I urged the necessity of giving a character of unreserved confidence to our mutual communications, and reminded him of those mistaken courses, by following which the Porte had lately incurred so much blame and discredit throughout Europe. I said that to such errors were mainly attributable the embarrassments which Turkey had experienced within the last few months; and I exhorted his Highness to retrieve them, if possible, by adopting forthwith and enforcing measures of real improvement on a scale commensurate with the wants and resources of this extensive Empire. In reply, the Grand Vizier gave me a distinct assurance that such were the intentions of the Porte; and that as soon as the present embarrassing difficulties were removed, I should find him prepared to redeem his pledge, and to carry out such measures of improvement as were best calculated to promote the prosperity of the Empire, and to increase its hold on European, and particularly on British sympathy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 257.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 9.) *Constantinople, April 7, 1853.*

My Lord,

I HAD my first audience of the Sultan this morning. Nothing could be more gracious and flattering than His Majesty's reception of me. His language expressed a cordial desire to maintain the most friendly relations between the two Empires and their respective Governments, together with a full reliance on British sympathy and support. He noticed with much affability the officers and other gentlemen who accompanied me into the presence-chamber. He declared his satisfaction with Colonel Rose; he recognized Mr. Alison with an expression of kindness; and he complimented Mr. Layard on the services which he had rendered to archæology and the arts.

After the formal audience, I had the honour of a private interview with the Sultan. Rifaat Pasha alone remained in the room with Mr. Stephen Pisani, who acted as interpreter. I delivered the Queen's letter. His Majesty, who was already apprized of its contents, appeared to be deeply sensible of the kind and cordial feelings of which it was significant both in its terms and in its form. He charged me particularly to convey to Her Majesty the expression of his pleasure on receiving it, and his affectionate acknowledgments.

In the conversation which ensued, I took occasion to touch upon the principal points of your Lordship's instructions; and I had the satisfaction to find the Sultan disposed to enter upon these with apparent frankness and confidence in Her Majesty's Representative.

Referring to Count Leiningen's mission, I explained the circumstances which had made it impossible for me to arrive here at that time, and expressed a hope that, however to be regretted in some respects, the manner in which the negotiations had terminated, would have the advantage of placing Austria in a more natural position towards the Porte, and reviving those friendly sentiments which had heretofore prevailed between the two Governments. I said, that the language of the Austrian Government, when I passed through Vienna, went far to warrant this hope. The Sultan spoke to me of Montenegro, and assured me that the sole objects of his expedition against that country had been the protection of his peaceable subjects, and the vindication of his just authority. I replied, that unfortunately right and sound policy did not always go together. The Sultan, while assenting to this remark, and agreeing with me that good might in future result from the settlement of his differences with Austria, appeared to retain a remnant of the painful impressions which must necessarily have accompanied a transaction so vexatious and disparaging to him.

The question of the holy places came next into view. I expressed the gratification which I had derived from learning that it bid fair to be settled in a manner satisfactory to all parties. I assured His Majesty that we took no interest in the affair except in so far as it was a cause of embarrassment and eventual danger to him; that language calculated to moderate the pretensions of France and Russia had been employed by the Queen's Representatives at Paris and St. Petersburgh; and that without presuming to volunteer any interference, I was prepared to afford my good offices whenever they were deemed available for purposes of conciliation and friendly arrangement. His Majesty said that he placed the fullest confidence in me.

Alluding to the secret demands as brought forward by Prince Menchikoff, I expressed my conviction that the Sultan, in making every reasonable concession for the sake of peace and good neighbourhood, would be careful to admit no innovation dangerous to his independence.

These questions, I added, if properly managed, would soon in all likelihood pass away, or be amicably settled; but there were other matters of deeper and more lasting importance, which depended entirely upon the Turkish Government, and affected interests bearing on its very existence. I explained my meaning to the Sultan, by reminding him of incidents which, having occurred in this country during the last few months, had produced throughout Europe impressions singularly unfavourable to the credit and prospects of the Ottoman Empire. I urged the necessity of striving to remove these impressions by the early adoption of comprehensive and effectual improvements in the administration of the Empire, and the management of its vast resources. His Majesty declared, in general terms, his willingness to act in this sense, and gave credit to the English Government and nation for the friendly sentiments which induced them to desire the adoption of such measures. He maintained, nevertheless, with some warmth of manner, the justice and expediency of his conduct in refusing to ratify the loan contracted at Paris without his sanction. I admitted the right, and was proceeding to intimate a doubt of the policy, when His Majesty mentioned the new bank which he was about to authorize, and which he described as fraught with much eventual benefit to the State, affording the advantage without the inconveniences of a loan, and relieving his Government from several burthens which had long pressed heavily on its interests. He said, that if the plan succeeded, its operations might be extended, so as to lead to the introduction of railways and other useful enterprizes.

His Majesty's language was so far promising, and I have no reason to question its sincerity. But more communications must take place upon the same subject before I can venture to entertain a sanguine expectation of such changes in the spirit and mode of proceeding, as may constitute a real system of improvement entitled to the confidence of Europe.

That His Majesty had every appearance of being inclined to listen to me is, meanwhile, an encouraging circumstance; and I hope to find an early opportunity of submitting to your Lordship a report of such further steps as I may

think it desirable to adopt, with the view of confirming the Sultan in his good intentions, and of helping to embody them in measures of a practical and effective character.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 258.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 26.)

(No. 10.)
Constantinople, April 9, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE already stated that I arrived here on the 5th instant. My embarkation at Trieste was preceded by more detention than I had expected on my way thither, owing partly to obstructions from weather, the trains and the post having been unable at times to pass on; and partly to the desire of making myself thoroughly acquainted with the views of the French and Austrian Governments. The exertion of travelling day and night was counteracted by the state of the roads and railway incidents. Fortunately the voyage by sea was more favourable, and, by giving up my previous intention of communicating with Corfu and Athens for objects of public interest, I was able to complete the passage from port to port in less than six days. On reaching my destination, I learned that the French Ambassador had not yet arrived, and that the Russian negotiations were still pending.

On the day after my arrival I visited the Turkish Ministers, and on the following day I had my first audience of the Sultan. The substance of what passed on each of those occasions is reported to your Lordship in other despatches. Yesterday and to-day I have had further communications with the Grand Vizier and Secretary of State. I have also had some conversation, reported elsewhere, with the Russian, French, and Austrian Representatives.

I now proceed to offer your Lordship a succinct and, I hope, a clear view of the present state of the discussions concerning the holy places, and certain ulterior questions raised by Russia, premising, with respect to military or naval movements relating thereto, that the French squadron is supposed to be at Salamis, that the advance of the Russian forces in Bessarabia appears to have been suspended, and that such defensive preparations as were ordered by the Porte in its first alarm continue without excitement or augmentation.

The question of the holy places, as between Rifaat Pasha and Prince Menchikoff, is so far brought towards a mutual understanding that terms of arrangement desired by Russia have, with certain modifications and reserves, been favourably received by the Porte and communicated to the French Embassy. Inclosed herewith is an authentic statement of these terms, separated into Articles, accompanied with the Porte's amendments, and exhibiting the reserved passages.

Your Lordship will perceive that the Russian Ambassador does not object, by his demands, to such privileges as are known to have been obtained latterly by France in favour of the Latins, and that his principal aim is to fix and secure the present state of possession and usage by that kind of formal and explicit agreement which may preclude all further pretensions on the side of France, and make the Porte directly responsible to Russia for any future innovation respecting the holy places.

This is fair and reasonable enough in the view of an impartial observer. It is even desirable in the interest of the Porte that the pending arrangement should be final. The difficulty lies in reconciling France to a virtual abandonment of its claims under the Treaty of 1740, accompanied, as it would be, with a permanent acquiescence with some striking practices of the Greek rite extremely distasteful to the Latin clergy in Palestine.

Comparing the amended with the original Articles, it would seem that the former are fairly calculated to satisfy the claims of Russia. What relates to the porter of the church at Bethlehem, and to the repairs of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, is the part most likely to meet with

serious opposition from France. The Article relating to this matter, and two others, are still reserved for consideration by the Porte.

But the anxiety of the Turkish Government is not confined to the one ostensible object for which Prince Menchikoff was understood to have been sent to Constantinople. His Excellency has addressed secretly to Rifaat Pasha a new set of propositions, far more important and comprehensive than those which are already known to your Lordship. Although the Turkish Ministers were the first to speak to me on this subject, and to solicit my opinion respecting it, I have found much difficulty in obtaining an unreserved statement of the particulars. This combination, of alarm seeking for advice, and of reluctance to entrust me frankly with the whole case, is attributable to the threatening language of Prince Menchikoff, and to the character of his proposals. Rifaat Pasha has been emphatically warned of the danger which he would be sure to incur if any of those proposals were to transpire; and the earnestness with which the Russian Ambassador insists on an early reply, increases the embarrassment and apprehension of the Porte.

All the proposals or demands in question, with two or three exceptions, refer to the Greek clergy and churches in Turkey. They amount, in substance, to the conclusion of a Treaty, stipulating that Russia shall enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all members of the Greek Church and of the interests of the churches themselves; that the privileges of the four Greek patriarchs shall be effectually confirmed, and the patriarchs shall hold their preferment for life, independently of the Porte's approval.

The exceptions are, the protection of Greek pilgrims in Palestine, the construction of a Russian church at Jerusalem, and the confirmation, with due enforcement, of all Imperial rescripts granted to Russia from time to time. The whole is put forward as an explanation of the Treaty of Kainardji, necessary for its complete execution.

As the Treaty thus evoked to serve as the basis of another more stringent and comprehensive one is doubtless within your Lordship's reach, I will only observe with reference to it that, of the four Articles, which alone, as I am assured, have any bearing upon this subject, the VIIth allows of a limited Russian interference only for one particular church and its ministers, and of no direct protection at all; the VIIIth relates exclusively to pilgrims; the XIVth accords to Russia the right of protecting one specified church in this neighbourhood; and the XVIth applies exclusively to Wallachia and other provinces restored to Turkey by the Treaty.

The advice which I have given to the Turkish Ministers, at their repeated solicitation, is to endeavour to keep the terms of arrangement touching the holy places separate from the propositions which relate to the Greek clergy and churches in general, and to avoid, if possible, entering upon the merits of the latter until the former are disposed of by a suitable understanding.

The Russian Government would, in all probability, be more or less discontented, if not offended, by the Porte's rejection of the proposed Treaty; but they would not find it easy to justify any overt act of resentment on that account; and the repeated declarations of the Emperor Nicholas are so many guarantees of his adherence to the principles of justice and moderation in his present transactions with the Porte.

It may be presumed that the immediate objects of the Court of St. Petersburgh are to acquire a broader and more effective influence over the Greek population in this Empire, and to throw a heavier yoke of responsibility on the Sultan's Government when seeking to evade the natural consequences of such a Protectorate. There are also, no doubt, the less questionable motives of wishing to simplify relations of delicacy subsisting between two Empires which border upon each other, and to afford a more efficient protection to those who naturally claim the sympathy of Russia on grounds of humanity and religion.

Regarding the question from an European point of view, I venture to think that your Lordship will not be surprised at the Porte's repugnance to proposals of such a nature, when coming from such a quarter. Though here and there an individual Minister may be found ready, for private reasons, to take the proposals of Russia on trust, I have reason to believe that all parties agree in viewing them with suspicion and alarm. The opinion expressed by one Turkish Minister, to the effect that an acceptance of the proffered Treaty would be a virtual partition of the Empire, may be exaggerated, but it must, nevertheless, be taken as repre-

senting a very prevalent impression, and showing a degree of foresight which it might be dangerous to disregard.

In communicating with the Turkish Government or with any of my colleagues on so delicate a subject, I shall not lose sight of the important interests which may be affected by it; nor, while sensibly alive to the objections involved in its principle, be unprepared for the eventual introduction of amendments calculated to disarm it of evil in the application.

The prospect in this direction would be more promising if Russia were to show signs of being disposed to act on Christian rather than on sectarian principles. But it appears that the protection which her Government wish to exercise with so little control or limitation, is of a strictly exclusive character; and it has reached me, from more quarters than one, that, among the motives for increasing their influence in this country, is the desire of repressing Protestantism wherever it appears.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 258.

Russian Proposals and Turkish Modifications respecting the Holy Places.

(Traduction.)

Demandes faites par le Prince Menchikoff.

ARTICLE I.

COMME le sens et la teneur de l'Article qui concerne l'Eglise de Bethléem, et qui se trouve inséré dans le firman Impérial émané dernièrement, relativement aux lieux saints, ont donné et pourraient, à l'avenir aussi, donner lieu à de fausses interprétations, la Sublime Porte fournira des explications claires et précises à cet égard, dans un acte formel qui devra servir également pour les Chrétiens de toutes les religions, dont l'entrée dans la susdite église est admise.

Il sera déclaré et publié par l'acte dont il s'agit, que la remise de la clef qui a été donnée dernièrement aux prêtres Catholiques aussi, ne suppose aucune espèce de droit de propriété et de possession sur le maître-autel de cette église, et qu'il ne sera fait aucun changement au système et à la règle qui existent quant à l'exercice des cérémonies religieuses, aux heures des fonctions, et à la garde de la grande porte; garde qui, conformément à l'ancien usage, sera toujours confiée à un prêtre Grec.

ARTICLE II.

Quand-même il serait affirmé et confirmé dans l'acte formel dont il est question que l'étoile nouvelle qui a été

Modifications faites par Rifaat Pasha.

ARTICLE I.

SI une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem a été donné aux Latins, on leur a donné par là le droit du passage de cette église comme par le passé. On ne leur a pas donné le droit d'y officier ni d'en avoir l'administration conjointement avec les Grecs; on ne leur a pas donné par là l'autorisation de changer le *status quo* actuel de l'église; on n'a pas autorisé les Latins à exercer leurs rits, ni enfin à changer le système qui a toujours été et qui est présentement encore en vigueur, en faisant quelque innovation, soit par rapport au passage pour aller à la grotte, soit sous quelque autre rapport. Et comme le portier de cette église a été de tout temps un prêtre Grec, sujet de la Sublime Porte, et qu'il n'a pas le droit de défendre l'entrée aux nations qui ont *ab antiquo* le droit du passage, désormais aussi les choses iront comme par le passé.

ARTICLE II.

L'étoile placée dans la grotte qui est située dans l'Eglise de Bethléem, est conforme à celle qui s'est perdue

placée à l'Eglise de Bethléem est tout-à-fait pareille à celle qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, il sera déclaré que cette étoile sera regardée comme un don provenant de la munificence de Sa Majesté de Sultan, don qui ne confère aucune espèce de droits nouveaux.

ARTICLE III.

Les droits de prééminence des Grecs au Tombeau de la Sainte Vierge Marie seront maintenus et respectés. Un arrangement dont copie est ci-jointe, sur les cérémonies religieuses qui doivent se faire, d'après les règles renfermant les conseils conciliants du ci-devant Patriarche de Jérusalem, sera maintenu et respecté dans toutes ces dispositions.

ARTICLE IV.

Les jardins de l'Eglise de Bethléem resteront, en vertu de firmans qui sont basés sur d'anciens et de nouveaux documents authentiques, sous la garde des deux parties, tout-à-fait conformément aux dispositions contenues dans ces documents; et il ne sera conféré aux Latins aucune espèce de prérogative.

ARTICLE V.

Si, indépendamment de tout cela, il y a encore d'autres choses que nous ignorons, ou s'il y a des concessions faites aux Latins, on les retirera sans délai.

ARTICLE VI.

Les promesses qui ont été faites par la Porte de faire abattre certains édifices profanes qui gênent les terrasses de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, doivent être mises à exécution. Et il sera déclaré que leur site ne pouvant pas devenir la propriété d'aucune nation, on bâtira un mur tout à l'entour, ou bien on le fermera par un grillage, devant être regardé comme un endroit neutre.

ARTICLE VII.

Attendu que les droits anciens des Grecs de réparer la grande coupole et l'Eglise de Jérusalem n'ont pas été

l'année 1847. Cette étoile, faite à neuf, à été offerte par Sa Majesté le Sultan à la nation Chrétienne pour mettre fin aux disputes et comme une marque publique de sa bienveillance souveraine. L'étoile ne confère aucune espèce de nouveaux droits particuliers à aucune des nations Chrétiennes.

ARTICLE III.

On délibérera là-dessus.

ARTICLE IV.

Les deux jardins contigus au couvent Franc seront, comme par le passé, sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine sans aucune prérogative pour qui que ce soit; il en sera fait usage comme autrefois.

ARTICLE V.

On en délibérera.

ARTICLE VI.

Il n'est pas convenable de prendre et de détruire les maisons de l'hospice et de l'oratoire (Musulmanes) qui sont attenantes à l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Mais on fermera celles de leurs fenêtres qui donnent sur l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre par un mur.

S'il y a des égouts ou autres choses nuisibles de ce genre, on les ôtera de là.

ARTICLE VII.

Considérant que la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre a besoin de réparation, et que cette réparation

abolis par quelque acte postérieur au firman Impérial daté des premiers jours de Shaban de l'année de l'Hégire 1257, c'est-à-dire, du mois de Septembre de l'année 1841; attendu, au contraire, qu'ils ont été confirmés aussi par le khatti-chérif de la mi-Rebiul-akhir 1268, c'est-à-dire, des derniers jours de Janvier de l'année 1852, il faut les reconnaître et les confirmer formellement. Et comme un don généreux de la part de sa Hautesse pour servir de secours à ses sujets Grecs pour la réparation dont il s'agit, sanctionnera et confirmera de plus en plus leurs privilèges sus-énoncés, il faut absolument que le Patriarche de Jérusalem ou ses agents soit chargé de la réparation de la coupole susmentionnée.

ARTICLE VIII.

La Sublime Porte a fait preuve d'une sage prévoyance dans le dernier firman qui a été donné en énumérant les principaux lieux saints, au mode d'administration desquels il ne faut pas toucher. Maintenant il faut que dans l'acte formel qui va être donné, cette énumération soit encore plus complète. Et afin que cet acte serve de pièce fondamentale et décisive dans les différens qui pourront surgir, à l'avenir, entre les différentes nations, et à laquelle on doive avoir recours pour les aplanir, il faut qu'il renferme généralement par rapport à l'état actuel de ces lieux saints tous les détails et toutes les explications nécessaires.

a essuyé de retards à cause de quelques dissensions, Sa Majesté le Sultan, pour faire une attention aux nations Chrétiennes, nommera un Commissaire pour bâtir la coupole, aux frais du Gouvernement, sur le même modèle sur lequel elle se trouve actuellement. Le Patriarche Grec sera autorisé à donner ses conseils sur la réparation de la coupole dans ses formes actuelles.

ARTICLE VIII.

On délibérera sur cela:

Ceux des lieux saints qui sont dans ce moment-ci en la possession des Grecs, resteront en leur possession.

No. 259.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 12. Secret and most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 11, 1853.

THE day before yesterday M. de la Cour paid his first visit to the Ministers of the Porte, and Prince Menchikoff had subsequently a conference with Rifaat Pasha, who called upon me yesterday and gave me, in strict confidence, an account of what had passed.

I have time at present only to state that, according to his Excellency's version, the French Ambassador made some strong objections to the proposed arrangement of the question of the holy places, reserving a fuller explanation of his views till after his audience of the Sultan; and Prince Menchikoff confining himself to the same question, and observing, *en passant*, that he hoped the other questions would soon be attended to, urged those points respecting which, as I have explained elsewhere, opposition is most to be expected from France.

I learnt on this occasion that the Council of Ministers had resolved on rejecting the Russian proposals respecting the Greek Patriarchs and the protection of the Greek churches, that there was every disposition to concede the minor points, and that the question whether it would be preferable to reject

the proposed Treaty by a simple refusal, or by a refusal grounded on its not being required by the existing Treaties, was still under consideration.

I avail myself of this opportunity to inclose for your Lordship's information, a copy, at least in substance, of the "Projet" given in by Prince Menchikoff, and translated from the Turkish received at the Porte from him.

I request that your Lordship will consider it for the present as a secret paper confided in the strictest sense to my honour.

I have to add in few words that the several conversations which I have held since my arrival here with Prince Menchikoff, M. de la Cour, and M. de Klezl, have left on my mind the following impressions with regard to the instructions under which they are now respectively acting.

First as to the Russian ambassador. His tone is considerably softened; his object is to reinstate Russian influence in Turkey on an exclusive basis, and in a commanding and stringent form; there is no question of a defensive Treaty, and, unless as a consequence of the late naval movement from Toulon, no thought of military intimidation for the present, but at the same time a fixed intention as to carrying certain points of his plan for settling the question of the holy places.

The French Ambassador is prepared, I conceive, to make the best bargain he can on that subject; but after some increase of pretension, he appears to have prepared himself for concession, provided appearances be saved, as indeed they are in the principal matters, for the satisfaction of French feelings of honour. I am given to understand that he reckons upon my good offices, and that the squadron at Salamis will make but a short stay there, and give to its visit the appearance of an evolutionary movement, proceeding in turn to other stations in the Levant.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires is evidently instructed to communicate confidentially with me on the subject of the pending discussions. He tells me that his Government was pleased with the language which I held at Vienna, and although there is still a leaning towards Russia, I am under an impression that he will not support Prince Menchikoff in any proposals tending to increase the influence of that Power at the expense of Turkish independence.

Upon the whole there is reason to hope that the clouds which have hung over Turkey of late, will finally disperse without a storm, though not, perhaps, without some further causes for anxiety, and the interference of friendly counsels.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 259.

Project of Secret Treaty proposed to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff.

(Traduction.)

SA Majesté le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies désirant sincèrement maintenir et conserver la paix et la bonne intelligence qui existent heureusement entre les deux Empires, ont résolu de conclure une Convention particulière, qui doit avoir la force et l'effet d'un Traité destinée à resserrer de plus en plus les liens de l'amitié parfaite et à augmenter la confiance et la sécurité qui existent entre eux, et à mieux expliquer le Traité conclu l'année de l'Ère Chrétienne 1777, et les Traités postérieurs, ainsi que les Articles 7, 8, 14, et 16 du Traité de Kainardji, lequel a été confirmé par celui de Andrinople:

En conséquence, Sa Majesté le Sultan et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie ayant fait choix de pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, ceux-ci après avoir exhibé et s'être communiqué réciproquement leurs pleins-pouvoirs et après l'échange de ces pleins-pouvoirs, qu'ils ont trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des Articles suivants:

ARTICLE I.

Dans le but désiré de faire cesser à jamais toutes les causes de dissensions, tous les doutes et tous les différens relativement aux immunités, aux droits, et

aux privilèges qui ont été accordés et assurés par les anciens Empereurs Ottomans aux habitans de la Moldavie, de la Valachie, et de la Servie, qui de même que différentes autres nations Chrétiennes dans l'Empire Turc, professent la religion Greco-Russe, on est convenu par la présente Convention des conditions suivants; savoir, la religion Grecque sera toujours protégée dans toutes les églises; les représentans de la Cour Impériale auront le droit, comme par le passé, de donner des ordres aux églises tant à Constantinople que dans d'autres endroits et villes, ainsi qu'aux ecclésiastiques; et comme ces conseils viennent de la part d'un Gouvernement ami et voisin, ils seront bien accueillis.

ARTICLE II.

Comme les quatre vénérables Patriarches, savoir, celui de Constantinople, celui d'Antioche, celui d'Alexandrie, et celui de Jérusalem, ainsi que les archevêques, les évêques, et autres prélats, doivent être élus librement, et conformément aux lois, aux règles, et aux usages de l'Eglise Orientale, et confirmés et honorablement traités suivant leur rang, ils auront à jouir complétement des privilèges et des avantages temporels que la Sublime Porte a toujours eu l'usage et pour principe de leur accorder et de leur assurer par les Bérats qu'elle leur délivre lors de leur nomination. Leurs attributions spirituelles leur seront assignées séparément, et ils les exerceront sans empêchement.

ARTICLE III.

Attendu que le Patriarche de Constantinople, ainsi que les trois autres Patriarches, c'est-à-dire, celui d'Antioche, celui d'Alexandrie, et celui de Jérusalem, qui sont élus par le synode librement, sont, conformément aux lois et aux commandements de l'Eglise, nommés à vie; et attendu que la Sublime Porte reconnait et confirme par les firmans d'investiture qu'elle leur donne, d'après l'ancien usage, leur nomination à vie, il n'y aura aucun changement à cet égard; et tant que les cas prévus par les firmans d'investiture n'arrivent pas, dorénavant aucun Patriarche ne pourra être deposé et changé. Et même dans les firmans d'investiture il est dit que tant qu'il n'y a pas de preuve que le Patriarche opprime les Rayas, qu'il viole les lois de l'Eglise, ou qu'il est traître au Padishah, il ne doit pas être déposé, mais rester dans son poste pendant toute sa vie.

ARTICLE IV.

L'histoire atteste, et plusieurs actes aussi attestent et prouvent que l'Eglise de Jérusalem, le Patriarche de Jérusalem, et les évêques ses suffragants, ont depuis les temps des Califs, et pendant le règne successif de tous les Sultans, été singulièrement protégés et honorés dans tous les temps; et que leurs droits et leurs privilèges ont toujours été confirmés.

La Sublime Porte s'engage conséquemment envers la Cour Impériale de Russie de maintenir ces droits et ces privilèges tant dans la ville de Jérusalem que hors de-là, sans porter la moindre atteinte aux droits des autres nations Chrétiennes, composées de Rayas indigènes et d'étrangers qui ont été admises à faire leurs dévotions dans l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, et dans d'autres lieux saints, soit dans les oratoires qu'elles ont en commun avec les Grecs, soit dans les oratoires qu'elles ont en propre.

ARTICLE V.

Il a été jugé nécessaire et juste de confirmer pleinement, par un nouveau firman orné d'un khatti-chérif, portant la date de , tous les firmans qui ont été donnés par les prédécesseurs de Sa Majesté le Sultan heureusement régnant, en faveur du patriarcat de Jérusalem, et qui énumèrent et expliquent les lieux saints que ceux qui professent la religion Grecque ont en propre en vertu de leurs anciens droits, et les autres lieux saints qui viennent d'être ouverts aux prêtres Catholiques pour y exercer leur culté. Par conséquent, la Sublime Porte promet et prend l'engagement que le firman et le khatti-chérif susmentionnés lesquels ont été remis formellement à la Cour Impériale, resteront tels quels, qu'ils seront mis à exécution à la lettre, et qu'ils seront maintenus à l'avenir avec bonne foi.

ARTICLE VI.

Etant nécessaire que les sujets Russes, prêtres ou autres, qui ont, conformément aux Traités existants, la permission et la faculté d'aller visiter la ville de Jérusalem et les lieux saints de cette ville, soient traités sur un pied égal avec les nations les plus favorisées, et, attendu que les Catholiques et les Protestants ont des prélats particuliers à eux, et des endroits respectés et affectés aux affaires religieuses, si la Cour Impériale de Russie en fait la demande, la Sublime Porte dans ce cas s'engage à désigner un site convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou aux environs, pour la construction d'une église à l'exercice du culte par des prêtres Russes, et d'un hôpital destiné aux pélerins malades ou pauvres. Cette église et cet hôpital seront sous l'inspection spéciale du Consul-Général de Russie en Palestine et en Syrie.

ARTICLE VII.

Comme cette Convention doit être ratifiée par les deux Hautes Cours Contractantes, dans un délai de six semaines, ou plutôt si faire se peut, les ratifications seront échangées à

C'est pourquoi les Plénipotentiaires des deux Parties ont mis leurs signatures à la présente Convention, et ils y ont apposé leurs cachets.

No. 260.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 269.)

My Lord, *Paris, April 25, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received advices from St. Petersburgh of the 14th instant, from which it would appear that M. de Castelbajac, alarmed at the news received from Constantinople, had put a *note verbale* into Count Nesselrode's hands, recapitulating what had passed between the Russian Chancellor and himself respecting the question of the Holy Places, and intended therefore to show that Prince Menchikoff's conduct was not in unison with the language held at St. Petersburgh.

M. de Castelbajac at the above date had received no answer to this note, and he describes Count Nesselrode as being embarrassed in his demeanour towards him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 261.

Colonel Rose to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received April 28.)

My Lord, *"Fury," April 11, 1853.*

MR. DORIA omitted to insert in his report of my last conversation with the Grand Vizier, an important communication made to me by His Highness respecting the visit of Vice-Admiral Korniloff to Athens. By my desire Mr. Doria afterwards made a report of that communication, which on account of my departure, I had not time to inclose to your Lordship in a despatch. The tenor of it was, that the French Chargé d'Affaires at Athens had reported to his Government that Admiral Korniloff had arrived at Athens in a Russian man-of-war steamer; that whilst at Athens he had made assurances to the Greeks

respecting the ample protection which Russia would give her co-religionists in all matters relating to their religion; that Admiral Korniloff had besides secretly endeavoured to induce the Greek Government to send armed bands, or banditti, from Greece into the neighbouring Turkish provinces, for the purpose of exciting troubles and revolt amongst their Greek inhabitants.

Rifaat Pasha also informed me that the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had gone to Mr. Wyse, and the French Minister at Athens, to ask them to make representations to the Greek Government respecting Admiral Korniloff's proceedings; that he could not see Mr. Wyse because he was ill in bed; that the French Minister had promised to comply with his request, but that he did not think that he had done so very effectually.

By Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe's directions, I requested Mr. Wyse to transmit his Excellency information on this subject.

The Russian steamer with Admiral Korniloff on board, was the same which took soundings off the Dardanelles.

Admiral Korniloff is a Greek by birth, who took a Russian name; he is a very good officer, second in command of the Black Sea fleet, and accompanied Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople.

The proceedings of Admiral Korniloff are another link of the long chain of proof which shows that the policy of Russia with respect to Turkey is dangerous.

A short review of the principal features of that mass of proof is instructive.

An Ambassador Extraordinary, in a time of profound peace, Commander-in-Chief of and supported by a vast army and fleet, prepared for immediate war, for a four days' expedition as well as a naval and military campaign, having at his disposal 300,000*l.* secret-service money, negotiates with the Porte for the purpose of inducing her to throw off her connection with England and France, and to become for the future an instrument of Russian policy. The Russian Embassy offers to protect the Porte, should she accept her proposal, with 400,000 men and a fleet, telling the Sultan's Ministers that England and France are "ill-disposed powers."

The day before I ceased to act as Chargé d'Affaires, the Porte's Foreign Minister informed me confidentially, as Mr. Chabert reported "with some indignation," that Prince Menchikoff had just made a demand, of which the purport was, that the Emperor of Russia should take charge of the affairs of the Greek, and the Sultan those of the Mussulman subjects of the Porte; the result of which arrangement would be that His Imperial Majesty would be a Co-Sultan of Turkey, in violation of the spirit and of the conditions of the Convention of 1841, to which the Five Powers were parties.

Prince Menchikoff premises negotiations so prejudicial to British interests and the balance of power, by threatening the Porte formally, that if she reveal them to England, he will instantly break off relations with her, the Porte.

But besides armies, and some sixty or seventy pennants hovering over Turkey, Russia has prepared other aggressors, who duly wait for the signal of attack—the Christian garrison of Montenegro, and the able-bodied men of some 12,000,000 of Turkish Greeks, who have been taught by Russian traditions and their Russian prayer-books, that they are "to destroy impious Turkish rule," and substitute for it that of "the Orthodox Emperor." And as if all this were not enough, Russian agents bring to bear against the Porte the decrees of an avenging Providence and unerring prophecy; they circulate a pamphlet amongst fanatical populations which, after stating that England and Protestantism are Satanic, declares that a saint has prophesied that this very Turkey is to be destroyed, and her Greek subjects set free, after having undergone 400 years of Turkish oppression and tyranny. And it is remarkable that it is in this very year that Russia appears to have let loose Pandora's box on Turkey. She has even succeeded in inducing the "Times," which sets itself up as the protector of British commercial interests, to advocate a partition of Turkey, which would not only be the ruin of those interests, but the destruction also of our Indian power and of our influence as a nation. The possession of European Turkey, and of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, would enable Russia to increase the sixteen sail-of-the-line which she now has in the Black Sea, to twice that number; Malta and Egypt could not stand before such maritime strength.

I have the honour to conclude, by reporting that Prince Menchikoff, notwithstanding the great resources at his disposal, has not succeeded in obtaining

from the Porte any concession which compromises British interests, the Porte's independence, or the Convention of 1841.

The manner in which Prince Menchikoff effected the dismissal of the Minister of the Prince of Servia, was certainly an infraction of Servia's and of the Porte's rights; but still that incident is not of a permanent nature, and is as nothing in comparison with the concessions which his Excellency has in vain endeavoured to obtain from the Porte—concessions involving the peace and interests of the civilized world.

It would be a source of general satisfaction were the pacific intelligence from Odessa, communicated in my last despatch, confirmed. The circumstances which made it doubtful, were the fresh demand made by Prince Menchikoff, and the non-confirmation of the pacific reports of Mr. Black's Odessa correspondents, who were all Greeks, by Her Majesty's Consul in that city.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HUGH ROSE.

No. 262.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received April* 30.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 16, 1853.

I HAVE had some further conversation with Prince Menchikoff this morning on the subject of his discussions with the Porte. I have not time, nor is it necessary for me, to go into the particulars of what passed between us; but two or three of the leading points may be found not altogether unworthy of your Lordship's attention.

The Russian Ambassador, though he spoke favourably of our French colleague's personal qualities and character, complained a little of the manner in which he had met the concessions spontaneously made by the Prince himself. He saw in M. de la Cour's insistance a proof of the encroaching spirit of that Church which proclaims itself universal, and looked for its real cause in the unceasing desire of the same Church to extend the sphere of its action and influence at every favourable opportunity. On that account alone it had become necessary for Russia to fix some limit to so objectionable a tendency, and also to obtain a positive security in some conventional form, no matter which, provided it had the force of treaty, against the vacillations and bad faith of the Porte.

In addition to this essential point, he described the same difficulties as those presented to M. de la Cour, observing that he did not despair of coming to an understanding with the French Ambassador on a portion of them.

He quoted several instances of bad faith on the part of the Turkish Ministers, whether correctly or not I can hardly presume to say, and enforced thereby the justice of his claim to a precise and durable guarantee.

According to his statement, the much-talked-of cupola is of wood, unmarked with religious symbols of any kind; and it would seem that the masonry beneath, which bears the figures of the four Evangelists, is not in want of repair. The difficulty made by the French Ambassador, relates to the introduction of the Greek Patriarch as charged with superintending the repairs; and there is reason to think that M. de la Cour, at all events, will not abstain from reserving the rights of his Government on that point.

I sounded Prince Menchikoff as to his being disposed to wait for a reference to Paris, but without refusing categorically, he showed no willingness to extend his patience so far.

We did not close our conversation without touching upon the ulterior demands of Russia relative to the whole Greek Church and priesthood in Turkey. He again sought to attenuate their extent and effect; but I drew a clear line of distinction between the confirmation of special points already stipulated by Treaty, and an extension of influence having the virtual force of a protectorate to be exercised exclusively by a single foreign Power over the most important and numerous class of the Sultan's tributary subjects. We both avoided entering into a discussion, which might have proved irritating, on this question; and I was glad to learn from Prince Menchikoff, that notwithstand-

ing the great importance attached to it by his Government, there was no danger of any hostile aggression as the result of its failure, but at most, an estrangement between the two Courts, and perhaps, though it was not so said, an interruption of diplomatic relations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 263.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 179.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 19, 1853.

THE messenger Ridgway arrived here on the night of the 14th instant, although the state of the roads and rivers has been such that for two previous days no mail had been received here from Germany.

I am now in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 38 inclusive.

With reference to the orders contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 35 of the 5th instant, I have made inquiries of the Chancellor respecting the object of Admiral Korniloff's visit to Greece, and with regard to the continued armaments of Russia.

As to the first point the Chancellor replied, without hesitation, that Admiral Korniloff had not been charged with any mission; that he had proceeded to Greece upon an ordinary excursion (une simple promenade); and that he must have returned to Constantinople before the intelligence of his departure had reached Her Majesty's Government.

With respect to the armaments, the subject was one upon which it was manifest that the Chancellor was unwilling to be questioned, and that, as I really believe, because he was unable to return a satisfactory answer.

He replied, that he believed that the armaments were not in progress, but that certainly he could not take upon himself to say that orders had been given for their abandonment. Such orders as he had before stated, would not be issued until a certainty should be obtained of a pacific solution of the question of the holy places pending at Constantinople.

With reference to the conversation of Prince Menchikoff with M. Benedetti, Count Nesselrode observed, that the Prince had stated correctly that Montenegro was the chief object of his mission; that the question was, as it happened, decided before his arrival, but that it must be in my recollection (which is perfectly true), that he, the Chancellor, had on more than one occasion remarked to me, that Montenegro alone had caused him serious anxieties; that he had ever been of opinion that the question of the holy places was one which would be settled without much danger of war.

Count Nesselrode maintains that Prince Menchikoff's arrival at Constantinople has given rise to much excitement among the Greek population of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 264.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 185. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 20, 1853.

I HAVE taken an opportunity of stating to the Chancellor that one of my private correspondents, usually very well informed as to passing events, had written me word that he could affirm that a Treaty of Alliance, offensive and defensive, was in course of being negotiated, if it had not been already, between Russia and Turkey.

Count Nesselrode denied the correctness of the statement, and after some little hesitation said, that he did not know what objects could be derived from an offensive alliance with Turkey. Having then changed the form of my inquiry, the Chancellor replied, that he would again state that the report was incorrect, but that it was true that the Emperor had caused it to be intimated to the Sultan, that he might count upon the protection and aid of Russia in case an attack should be made against Turkey by France, in consequence of any concession made in favour of the Greek Church by his Highness in the affair of the Holy Places.

This overture probably explains much of what has appeared so little intelligible in the warlike attitude assumed by the Imperial Government.

It is however to be observed, that upon this point a clue had in fact been furnished by the Emperor himself. His Majesty, in the conversation which was reported in my secret and confidential despatch, No. 38, of the 22nd February, having stated "that he had apprized the Sultan, that if his assistance were required for resisting the menaces of the French, it was entirely at the service of the Sultan."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 265.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 187. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 20, 1853.

A PERSON immediately about the person of the Emperor remarked to me upon the great difficulty of reconciling the continued warlike preparations observable in Russia with His Majesty's known disposition and believed intentions. I will tell you, my informant said, a conversation in which I took part the other day at the palace. One of the party was abusing the French for their susceptibility and their belief in war, when another said: "Let us be fair; we believe that the Emperor is not going to war, because we know him to be addicted to peace, and to be fond of military parade; but how is it possible, with all the military preparation which is going on, that a Frenchman, a foreigner in short, should arrive at any other conclusion than that war is imminent?—and why, in heaven's name?—and against whom?"

The truth is, my informant continued, the whole thing is absurd, when one knows beforehand that it is to end in a *reculade*.

This conversation, and what follows, is so far worthy of notice, that it exemplifies that freedom of speech which not unfrequently breaks through the reserve supposed to prevail, not only throughout Russia, but especially at the Winter Palace.

My informant completed his indiscretion by remarking, that this last folly was a most costly one; that enormous sums had been expended; that the men and horses which had been brought to distant points had suffered much from the inclemency of the season and the badness of the roads; and that in particular, the injury inflicted upon the Cossacks of the Don had been most severe.

In explanation of this assertion, he stated that a certain body of these Cossacks are attached to every corps d'armée when in readiness to take the field; that among them there is a large proportion who live by their agricultural pursuits; and that, having been summoned from very remote districts, even if now immediately dismissed, they would be unable to reach their homes before the sowing time is over. But, my informant said, what does the Emperor know of all this? It is so easy to give an order, and he never thinks of the consequences.

I will take this opportunity of stating to your Lordship, that in a late conversation which I held with Count Orloff, his Excellency, although expressing his belief that peace would be maintained, observed: "Mais je ne vous cacherai point que nos armemens du midi sont au grand complet. Nous sommes tout prêts à entrer en campagne demain; nous ferons la guerre s'il le faut—mon Dieu, oui! une guerre à mort au besoin."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 266.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 189. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 20, 1853.

THE Emperor on rising from table when I had the honour of dining at the Palace on the 18th instant, desired me to follow him into the next room.

His Majesty then said that he had wished to state to me the real and sincere satisfaction which he had received from your Lordship's despatch marked Secret and Confidential, No. 23, of the 23rd ultimo.

It had been, His Majesty said, most agreeable to him to find that the overtures which he had addressed to Her Majesty's Government had been responded to in the same friendly spirit in which they were made; that, to use a former expression, there was nothing in which he placed so much reliance as "la parole d'un gentilhomme;" that he felt that the relations of the two Courts stood upon a better basis now that a clear understanding had been obtained as to points which, if left in doubt, might have been productive of misintelligence, and, as His Majesty was pleased to add, he felt obliged to me for having contributed towards bringing about this friendly *entente*.

And His Majesty said, "I beg you to understand that what I have pledged myself to will be equally binding upon my successor; there now exist memorandums of my intentions, and whatever I have promised, my son, if the changes alluded to should occur in his time, will be as ready to perform as his father would have been."

The Emperor proceeded to state that he would very frankly offer an observation or two—it might be a criticism, on your Lordship's despatch.

The despatch spoke of the fall of the Turkish Empire as an uncertain and distant event: he would remark that the one term excluded the other; uncertain it was certainly, but for that reason not necessarily remote: he desired it might be; but he was not sure that it might so prove.

His Majesty desired further to observe that he could not doubt that Her Majesty's Government had taken too favourable a view of the state of the Christian population in Turkey; the Sultan might have intended to better their condition, might have given orders in that sense; but he was quite certain that his commands had not been attended to.

Upon my remarking that Her Majesty's Government were understood to receive very accurate reports of what passes in Turkey, the Emperor replied with considerable animation that he called this fact in question; that he believed on the contrary that some of the English Consular Agents were incorrect (His Majesty made use of a stronger expression) in their reports: he would only refer to Bulgaria; the greatest discontent prevailed there, and His Majesty would affirm that were it not for his continued efforts to repress the manifestation of feelings of the sort, the Bulgarians would some time since have been in insurrection.

His Majesty proceeded to contrast the threatening attitude which had been assumed by Count Leiningen with the peaceable character of Count Menchikoff's mission, "not, however, that he desired to blame the Emperor of Austria, a noble Prince whom he loved sincerely, and all of whose acts he approved; the difference existed in circumstances, and when Montenegro was threatened with utter devastation, the Emperor of Austria was obliged to act with energy; His Majesty's would, he said, have acted in the same manner."

I am desirous of remarking here, that part of the Emperor's observations were, it was obvious, addressed to me personally, and were intended as a reply as well to an allusion which I had made as to religious intolerance in Tuscany, as to my comments to the Chancellor upon the conduct of the Austrian Cabinet with regard to the late confiscatory measures in Lombardy.

By this time His Majesty had become still more animated, and after observing that according to the accounts just received (those of the 29th ultimo) little or no progress had been made towards an adjustment of difficulties at Constantinople, said that as yet he had not moved a ship or a battalion; that he had not done so from motives of consideration for the Sultan and from

economical motives; but that he would repeat that he had no intention of being trifled with, and that if the Turks did not yield to reason, they would have to give way to an approach of danger.

I ventured to remark to the Emperor, that it was only by the despatches just arrived that he had received intelligence of the landing at Pera of the French Ambassador, who was understood to be a party to the arrangements about to be concluded; the indirect answer, however, returned to me by His Majesty, and the expressions which he used as to the vanity and uncertainty of the French nation, lead me to apprehend that this consideration did not receive the attention of which in fairness it appears to me deserving.

Before going to the Palace I had been informed that the Emperor was not well satisfied with Prince Menchikoff; and the impression left upon my mind by the conversation of which I have given an abstract, is that His Majesty is as little pleased with the state of affairs in Turkey as with the conduct of his Ambassador.

It only remains for me to observe that the Emperor, having learned that I had some intention of requesting your Lordship to grant me a short leave of absence, remarked that he would suggest that I should remain for the present at my post. Affairs were, His Imperial Majesty said, not yet settled in Turkey, difficulties might yet arise, and he should be glad that no precaution were omitted to prevent their assuming a serious character.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 267.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 190. Secret and Cofidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 21, 1853.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch marked Secret and Confidential, No. 36, of the 5th instant, which, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, I communicated to Count Nesselrode on the 15th instant.

His Excellency, before the arrival of this messenger, had desired to see me for the purpose of communicating to me a paper which had been drawn up by the Emperor's desire, and which was to be considered as an answer to your Lordship's despatch No. 23, of the 23rd ultimo.

This document, which I beg to transmit in original, was accordingly placed in my hands by the Chancellor, who observed that he had previously thought that it would close the correspondence, but that it was possible that the fresh despatch which I had brought to his knowledge might, upon being laid before the Emperor, call for some fresh observations on the part of His Majesty.

The only passage in the inclosed paper to which Count Nesselrode was desirous of drawing my attention, was that which I have marked in pencil, in which an observation is made respecting the treatment of the Christian population as described by English, or by Russian, agents.

I remarked in reply that the point was the less material, Her Majesty's Government being (as his Excellency had been made aware) as desirous as the Imperial Cabinet could be that no effort should be wanting on the part of the Porte to remove any and every cause of complaint which could be made in justice by the Sultan's Christian subjects.

Your Lordship will perhaps allow me to observe, that supposing the present crisis in Turkish affairs to pass over, an intimation is made in the inclosed paper which, if taken up and embodied in a joint resolution by all the Great Powers, might possibly be the means of long averting a catastrophe which, happen when it may, will probably have disastrous consequences even to those to whom it may be considered the most profitable.

Since the preceding part of this despatch was written, the Chancellor has intimated to me that the Emperor, being of opinion that the paper which I now inclose, followed up by the conversation which I had the honour of holding with His Majesty on the 18th, may be considered as replying to any points touched upon in your Lordship's despatch, does not propose to offer any fresh

observation upon the subjects which have been under discussion. His Excellency does not conceal from me his satisfaction at this resolution, these subjects being, as he remarked, of so delicate a nature, that there are always objections to their being brought under discussion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 267.

Memorandum by the Emperor of Russia.

L'EMPEREUR a pris connaissance avec une vive satisfaction de la dépêche de Lord Clarendon du 23 Mars. Sa Majesté se félicite de voir que ses vues et celles du Cabinet Anglais coincident entièrement au sujet des combinaisons politiques qu'il faudrait principalement éviter pour le cas extrême où viendrait à s'accomplir en Orient l'éventualité que la Russie et l'Angleterre ont également à cœur de prévenir, ou au moins de reculer dans l'avenir le plus lointain possible. Partageant en général les opinions émises par Lord Clarendon sur la nécessité du maintien prolongé en Turquie de l'état de choses actuel, l'Empereur ne saurait cependant se dispenser de relever ici un point de détail, qui lui fait supposer que les informations reçues par le Gouvernement Britannique ne sont pas tout-à-fait d'accord avec les nôtres. Il s'agit de l'humanité et de la tolérance dont la Turquie ferait preuve dans sa manière de traiter ses sujets Chrétiens.

Abstraction faite de bien d'autres exemples antérieurs du contraire, il est pourtant de notoriété qu'en dernier lieu les cruautés commises par les Turcs en Bosnie ont forcé des centaines de familles Chrétiennes à chercher refuge en Autriche. Au reste, sans vouloir entrer ici en discussion sur les symptomes plus ou moins palpables de décadence que présente la Puissance Ottomane, ou le plus ou moins de vitalité que peut conserver sa constitution intérieure, l'Empereur conviendra volontiers que la meilleur moyen de soutenir la durée du Gouvernement Turc, est de ne point le fatiguer par des exigences impérieuses appuyées d'une manière humiliante pour son indépendance et sa dignité. Sa Majesté est disposée, comme elle l'a été constamment, à agir dans ce système, bien entendu toutefois que la même règle de conduite sera observée indistinctement et unanimement par chacune des Grandes Puissances, et qu'aucune d'elles n'abusera de la faiblesse de la Porte pour en obtenir des concessions qui tourneraient au détriment des autres. Ceci posé, l'Empereur se déclare prêt à travailler de concert avec l'Angleterre à l'œuvre commune de prolonger l'existence de l'Empire Turc, en écartant toute cause d'alarmes au sujet de sa dissolution. Il accueille avec empressement les témoignages que lui offre le Cabinet Britannique d'une pleine confiance dans la droiture de ses sentiments, et l'espoir que, sur cette base, son alliance avec l'Angleterre ne pourra que se fortifier.

St. Pétersbourg, Avril $\frac{9}{21}$, 1853.

No. 268.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 191.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 21, 1853.

A COPY of the *note verbale*, dated the $\frac{4}{16}$th of March, which has been presented by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, will be forwarded to Baron Brunnow by the messenger who conveys these despatches to Berlin, for the purpose of being communicated to Her Majesty's Government.

As far as a hasty perusal enables me to form an opinion, no exception, I should say, can be taken to the language of this document. It is written in language of remonstrance, rather than of menace, and contains a temperate, although serious enunciation of the grievances of which the Emperor has to complain, in consequence of the concessions made to the Latin Church at the expense of those interests which the Emperor is especially bound to protect.

The only passage in the paper which appeared to me to require explanation

is that in one of the concluding paragraphs, in which Prince Menchikoff calls upon the Porte for an atonement for the offence which has been given to the Emperor of Russia, and which he demands should be offered by an "acte de confiance." As the term appeared to me a little ambiguous, I begged the Chancellor to be good enough to explain to me the precise sense which it was intended to bear.

His Excellency replied, that it was intended that the Porte should redress the grievances which had been set forth in the preceding passages of the note, and that it was desired that the recognition of the rights to be secured to the Greek Church should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of an international engagement betwen Russia and Turkey; that the old capitulations which were quoted by the French in support of various pretensions were represented as having the value of Treaties; that it was therefore desired that an arrangement, which it was intended should be permanent, should possess an unquestionable character of this description.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to remark upon the proofs of moderation which the Russian demands upon the Porte, as explained by Prince Menchikoff's note, exhibited, and contrasted them with the threatening messages and formidable ultimatum of which the Prince had been represented to be the bearer.

As regards the two parties with whom the Porte has to deal,—one, his Excellency observed, represented a very extensive, the other a very tolerant religion. On one side was a solitary convent, and some eighty travellers, attracted chiefly by motives of curiosity; on the other ten millions of subjects of the Sultan, and great crowds of foreign pilgrims, animated by fervid religious feelings.

Count Nesselrode proceeded to speak of the last accounts which he had received from Constantinople, and which, although inconclusive, were, as far as they went, satisfactory.

Prince Menchikoff's interview with Rifaat Effendi led to the belief that the dispositions of the Porte were conciliatory: the same report had been made of the language held by the English and French Ambassadors.

The greatest difficulties apprehended by the Chancellor are those connected with the repairs of the Church of Bethlehem; and these, his Excellency conceived, might be the more readily avoided as, if necessary, the repairs might be deferred for a few years.

I was careful to remark, that this suggestion had been made originally by Colonel Rose, whose conduct had nevertheless been on some occasions considered as unconciliatory. Count Nesselrode's language gave me to understand that if the rights of the Greek Church were once solemnly recognized and secured, every disposition would exist on the part of that church to enter into such arrangements as would be found acceptable to the Sultan.

On the whole, I collect that Count Nesselrode anticipates a satisfactory solution of church difficulties; and supposing such an adjustment to be made, I cannot doubt that few weeks will elapse before reasonable men of all creeds will look back with astonishment upon the stir which has been made about objects of such trifling importance.

My conversation with his Excellency took place on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 269.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 193.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 25, 1853.

INTELLIGENCE reached St. Petersburgh yesterday, by telegraph from Warsaw, of a revolution having broken out at Constantinople, and of the assistance of the Russian forces having been applied for by the Sultan, and granted by Prince Menchikoff.

I have not had an opportunity of conversing with the Chancellor since the

receipt of this telegraphic, and therefore brief, message; but I have a full conviction that I shall hear from his Excellency that the untoward event which is stated to have occurred will in no wise affect the intentions of the Imperial Cabinet, as made known to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 270.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May 3.*)

(No. 280.) *Paris, April 29, 1853.*

My Lord,

THE French Mail of the 15th instant from Constantinople reached Paris this morning, and M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to send for me this afternoon, in order to communicate to me the substance of the reports which he had received from M. de la Cour. The intelligence which they afford is not satisfactory to the French Government.

Of the reception given to him by the Sultan and the Turkish Ministers, M. de la Cour had nothing to complain, but his attempts to enter into confidential communication with Prince Menchikoff respecting the question of the holy places had, up to the moment when he wrote, been met with a decided, though a polite reserve.

Prince Menchikoff however had assured M. de la Cour that he had no intention of inducing the Porte to retract anything which had been conceded to the Latins, but that he was come to complain of the bad faith displayed by the Sultan and his Government in the affair of the holy places, and to endeavour to place the Greek religion upon a surer basis for the future.

M. de la Cour appears immediately on his arrival at Constantinople to have been furnished by the Ottoman Ministers with a project of Convention put forward by Russia for this purpose, and it seems to have been his aim, during the first interview which he had with Prince Menchikoff, to bring this project under discussion, and to state the objections he entertained, and consequently the opposition he must make to parts of it.

It may be convenient that I should detail the principal points of the Convention, specifying more particularly those to which M. de la Cour demurs.

The Convention contains eight Articles.

The first relates to the key of the Church of Bethlehem, lately given to the Latins, and is intended to prevent the use of that key leading to further innovations.

M. de la Cour does not appear to object to this Article.

The second asserts that the silver star, lately restored by the Sultan, confers no particular right on any Christian nation. This Article is not objected to.

The third is intended to settle the question of precedence between the Greek and Latin worshippers, and refers to an arrangement, which does not seem to have been definitively concluded, as no copy of it has been sent to Paris.

I infer however from M. de la Cour's remarks, that precedence is given to the Greeks, as he insists on keeping precedence for the Latins in those places where they have always enjoyed it; and in those places where Greeks and Latins meet for the first time, or I should rather say from which the Latins have until now been excluded, he wishes, in order to avoid the discussion of the question, that the buildings or altars should be made over on alternate days for the service of the different communities.

The fourth Article maintaining the *status quo* in the gardens of the sacred buildings is not objected to.

The fifth, reserving the rights of the Greeks in case any further concessions than are now known have been made to the Latins, does not appear to have excited opposition.

The sixth Article is introduced in order to prevent the Latins building on the ground in the vicinity of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, now occupied by Turkish houses, which the Porte had promised the French Embassy to pull down, giving the ground on which they stood to the Latins. M. de la Cour objects to this Article.

The seventh will cause the greatest difficulty. It relates to the repairs of the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre, and provides that it shall be repaired at the Sultan's expense, but under consultation with the Greek Patriarch. On this point M. de la Cour appears determined not to yield.

Although he maintains the right of France under Treaty to effect the necessary repairs, he is willing that they should be carried into execution by the Sultan, as Sovereign; but he will not hear of the intervention of the Greek Patriarch, and he wishes to stipulate that in carrying out the internal decorations, either the images and inscriptions shall be mixed, or that there shall be none at all.

The eighth and last Article declares that those places which are now in possession of the Greeks shall remain in their possession. M. de la Cour remarks that this Article is too vague, and may give rise to future disputes.

In the interview which M. de la Cour had with Prince Menchikoff, these observations were brought forward, but all discussion of them was prevented by the Prince's declaration that his instructions were peremptory on the points most objected to by the French Ambassador.

In giving me this information, M. Drouyn de Lhuys added that he participated in the objections raised by M. de la Cour. He again contrasted the conduct and language of Prince Menchikoff with the conciliatory assurances given to the French Minister at St. Petersburgh.

As the discussion of these matters at Paris could now be of little use, and as it may be hoped that the good offices of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople have already reconciled the differences existing between his French and Russian colleagues, I thought it prudent to confine my observations to M. Drouyn de Lhuys to exhortations to forbearance and moderation, expressing my conviction that Lord Stratford, if met by both parties with loyalty and good faith, would have found means to conciliate their conflicting claims.

Notwithstanding that M. Drouyn de Lhuys' language was throughout this interview positive as to not admitting certain of the pretensions of Russia, I am under the impression that the French Government will accept any arrangement that M. de la Cour may make, even if he admits all that Russia asks for in the Convention of which I have given the analysis.

If I have not mistaken the real feeling of the French Government, it is that M. de la Cour should take upon himself the responsibility of settling the question, no matter how, that they may be able to say at Rome, the affair is settled, and although we regret the arrangement, we cannot consent to open the question again. M. de la Cour would be sacrificed, but there would be an end to the matter.

Unfortunately M. de la Cour either does not or will not understand what is required of him, and appears just as anxious that the responsibility of any arrangement should rest with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys is desirous that it should remain with M. de la Cour.

I have only to add, that M. de la Cour mentions in his despatches that Lord Stratford was not without suspicions that Russia had secretly asked of the Porte the protectorate of the Greek religion, and a Treaty in the sense of that of Unkiar Skelessi. Lord Stratford had therefore strongly urged on M. de la Cour the policy of making concessions in order to get rid of the question of the sacred places, and enable the two Embassies to act more positively in concert should the Porte in consequence of the exigencies of Russia require their joint support.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assented to the prudence of this policy.

M. de la Cour reports also that the Russian armaments in preparation and at Odessa were continuing.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 271.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 289.)

Paris, May 2, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE writing my despatch No. 280, reporting the substance of the last despatches which have reached the French Government from Constantinople, I have received through your Lordship's kindness copies of the latest reports addressed to you by Lord Stratford.

In comparing them with those written by M. de la Cour, I observe that the Porte has been much more frank and unreserved in its communications with Lord Stratford than it has been in its relations with the French Ambassador.

I have further to remark, that the draft of Convention proposed by Russia for the settlement of the question of the holy places has not been communicated in its original form to M. de la Cour, but with the modifications introduced into it by the Turkish Ministers, and M. de la Cour appears to have no knowledge of the original text. On the other hand, Articles III, V, and VIII, which in the copy given to Lord Stratford had been reserved for further deliberation, are filled up in the copy furnished to M. de la Cour. The substance of them is much the same as that proposed by Russia, but the words employed are, as in the other amended Articles, less positive, and consequently less likely to meet with opposition from France.

I endeavoured to obtain, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the Convention as submitted for the consideration of M. de la Cour, but M. Drouyn de Lhuys would not consent to give it me. I did not of course allow him to know that Her Majesty's Government was in possession of the original Russian project.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 272.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated by Baron Brunnow, May 4.)

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{9}{21}$ Avril, 1853.

M. le Baron,

AYANT reçu depuis peu de la part du Prince Menchikoff la note verbale qu'il a remise au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte le $\frac{4}{16}$ Mars passé, et qui contient l'exposé des griefs dont nous demandons le redressement, ce n'est qu'aujourd'hui que je me trouve à même de la transmettre en copie à votre Excellence. Elle jugera sans doute utile d'en donner confidentiellement connaissance au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat Britannique. Mieux que toute chose, cet exposé pourra servir à constater la sincérité des sentiments conciliants qui animent le Cabinet Impérial. Il prouvera aussi combien étaient peu fondées les nouvelles parvenues de Constantinople sur le caractère impérieux des demandes que notre Ambassadeur aurait adressées à la Porte Ottomane.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure in No. 272.

Copie d'une Note Verbale remise au Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte le $\frac{4}{16}$ Mars, 1853.

LE Prince Menchikoff, Ambassadeur de Russie, a l'honneur d'exposer à la Sublime Porte ce qui suit.

Sa Majesté le Sultan, par sa lettre du $\frac{9}{21}$ Janvier, 1853, a annoncé à l'Empereur la solution définitive de la question des saints lieux, soulevée par l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople. Cette lettre renfermait les promesses les plus

solennelles sur le maintien des anciens droits octroyés de la part de la Sublime Porte aux communautés Grecques. Elle établissait, comme seul changement au *statu quo*, l'admission des Latins à Gethsémanie, et comme compensation, l'accès des Grecs à Koublet-ul-Messad.

Un firman fut promulgué à la même époque pour confirmer cet arrangement. Un khatti-chérif mis en tête du firman reconnaissait et consacrait de la manière la plus positive les actes antérieurs accordés aux Grecs à différentes époques, renouvelés par le Sultan Mahmoud de glorieuse mémoire, et confirmés par Sa Majesté le Sultan actuel.

Nous en prîmes acte de manière à leur donner la valeur d'une transaction solennelle et définitive. Quoique conçues dans un esprit et dans des termes qui s'écartaient du *statu quo*, que nous nous étions toujours attachés à maintenir, ces pièces nous ont paru satisfaire jusqu'à un certain point à la juste sollicitude du Gouvernement Impérial, pour les intérêts de la religion orthodoxe et les immunités de l'Eglise Patriarcale de Jérusalem.

Il a été, il est vrai, inséré dans le dernier firman un seul Article qui, en dehors de l'arrangement convenu, s'y trouvait ajouté en faveur des Latins. Il leur confirmait, ainsi qu'aux Grecs et aux Arméniens, la possession d'une clef des portes sud, est, et nord de la grotte, et de l'une des portes de la Grande Eglise de Bethléem, dont la porte principale est exclusivement confiée à la garde des Grecs. Mais notre Représentant à Constantinople eut soin d'apporter à la rédaction de cet Article toutes les précautions nécessaires pour qu'il ne portât aucune atteinte au *statu quo* existant. Et non seulement la Porte s'était prêtée à ces réserves et les avait confirmés dans un projet d'instruction au Pacha de Jérusalem, mais encore dans une lettre Vizirielle secrète à ce fonctionnaire, et qui nous avait été également communiquée officiellement, elle lui avait enjoint de ne pas donner aux Latins la clef dont il s'agit.

En conclusion, le nouvel arrangement reçut l'adhésion du Gouvernement Impérial, sous réserve formelle des conditions que la Porte s'était elle-même engagée à observer.

Nous basant de plus sur les promesses de maintenir intacts les privilèges séculaires accordés aux Grecs dès les premiers temps de la domination Musulmane et consacrés par les khatti-chérifs des successeurs des premiers Califes, nous exigions, comme condition *sine qua non* de l'exécution du dernier firman :

1. Une entente préalable du Gouvernement Ottoman avec le Patriarche sur tous les arrangements de détail nécessaires pour régulariser et préciser l'admission du clergé Grec dans le sanctuaire de l'Ascension et celle du clergé Latin dans la grotte de Gethsémanie.

2. L'autorisation aux Grecs de reconstruire la coupole et l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, faveur qui leur avait été accordée dès 1841, et que le nouveau khatti-chérif confirmait avec tous leurs autres droits. Nous invoquions la communication officielle qui nous avait été dans le temps faite à ce sujet par le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Porte.

Nous tombâmes entièrement d'accord sur le premier point, et l'envoi du Patriarche de Jérusalem sur les lieux, pour veiller à la mise à exécution du firman selon ses prérogatives, fut convenu entre la Porte et la Légation Impériale.

Le second point dut subir des modifications pour éviter de nouvelles complications. Sa Majesté le Sultan décida que la coupole serait réparée à ses frais. La Cour Impériale y donna son adhésion, mais obtint, qu'en conformité aux précédents et à la justice, toutes les dispositions locales et la direction immédiate des travaux de réparation fussent confiées au Patriarche de Jérusalem et à ses délégués.

Ces conditions furent exposées dans une note officielle, remise à la Porte au mois de Mai 1852, par la Légation Impériale. Elles rencontrèrent les dispositions les plus empressées du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et furent scellées par les engagements les plus formels.

Pendant les délais que subit l'envoi du Patriarche et d'un Commissaire exécuteur du firman, les promesses les plus explicites furent réitérées par les Ministres de la Porte, sur la stricte application du khatti-chérif.

Un projet d'instruction dérogatoire à cet acte fut même annulé à la suite des représentations du notre Légation. A ces interpellations itératives au sujet des différents bruits qui lui parvenaient sur de nouvelles concessions accordées

aux Latins, on répondait par les dénégations les plus absolues. Dans le cours de ces pourparlers, les exhortations bienveillantes du Gouvernement Impérial vinrent constamment en aide à la faiblesse de la Porte; ses avertissements la prémunissaient contre les futures conséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

Les réticences et les délais de la Porte, son embarras à nous communiquer avec toute la sincérité qu'elle nous devait les instructions expédiées à son Commissaire à Jérusalem, nous inspiraient, il est vrai, de justes soupçons. Mais l'Empereur mettait une entière confiance en la loyauté de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Des renseignements positifs de Jérusalem ne tardèrent pas à prouver jusqu'à quel point les conseillers de son Auguste Allié avaient réussi à surprendre sa religion, tant au détriment de ses propres sujets qu'en contravention aux égards auxquels il avait le droit de prétendre.

Bientôt, réellement les faits vinrent confirmer nos prévisions, et nous fûmes constater que l'auguste parole donnée à l'Empereur avait été méconnue; qu'un acte emané de la volonté souveraine du Sultan avait été traité d'illusoire.

Au lieu de procéder à la réparation immédiate de la coupole avec le concours exclusif des Grecs, les autorités Ottomanes de Jérusalem se livrèrent à des délibérations insolites avec les délegués des différents cultes, pour les tenter par une participation à cette œuvre, et éveiller ainsi des haines, des rivalités invétérées. Le Patriarche Grec fut écarté des conciliabules qu'on tint dans ces circonstances. On saisit cette occasion pour avantager les moines Catholiques d'une possession sur les terrasses du temple jusqu'ici domaine exclusif des Grecs, malgré la promesse donnée à la Légation Impériale de convertir les bâtisses extérieures du dôme en terrain neutre, inaccessible à tous les cultes.

Chargé spécialement de promulguer et d'exécuter le dernier khatti-chérif, le Commissaire Ottoman déclara hautement qu'il n'avait aucune connaissance de cet acte, et qu'il se renfermerait strictement dans les limites de ses instructions.

Dans le sens de ces dernières, il insista sur la non-lecture et le non-enrégistrement du firman. Quoique obtenus plus tard, ils ne se firent qu'avec des restrictions blessantes pour le culte orthodoxe, et qui constituaient un acte de désobéissance à la volonté souveraine. Immédiatement après l'accomplissement de ces formalités, et pendant que la Légation Impériale recevait de la part des Ministres Ottomans les assurances les plus formelles sur la stricte exécution du firman, les principales dispositions de cet acte furent ouvertement transgressées à Jérusalem.

La Porte, cédant à de malveillantes suggestions, a cru pouvoir prendre des décisions sur une affaire d'une grande gravité, sans attendre ni consulter l'avis de l'Auguste Allié qui s'est épanché là-dessus en toute sincérité et confiance envers Sa Majesté le Sultan. On portait ainsi atteinte à la dignité de deux Souverains. C'est ainsi qu'on accordait aux Latins, contrairement au sens précis du firman, la clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, sans tenir aucun compte de la protestation du Patriarche de Jérusalem et des rapports du Commissaire Ottoman lui-même, qui considérait la nouvelle concession comme superflue et inopportune. Les moines Latins ne tardèrent point à user de cette clef pour entrer avec pompe et ostentation dans le Temple de Bethléem. Y ayant eu libre accès jusqu'alors, ils s'empressaient ainsi d'établir un nouveau droit, un nouvel empiètement sur les privilèges des Grecs.

Aucune mention n'a été faite dans le firman de l'Etoile qui avait disparu de l'Eglise de Bethléem en 1846. Le Commissaire Ottoman, sans que le clergé Grec en fût prévenu, remit aux moines Latins une autre Etoile, qui fut arbitrairement replacée dans la Grotte de Bethléem. Les préposés Ottomans eux-mêmes ne purent s'empêcher d'y voir un subterfuge honteux, qui devait amener de vives contestations de la part du culte Grec.

On attaquait le droit de préséance des Grecs en établissant qu'à Gethsémanie les orthodoxes et les Latins se succéderaient jour par jour dans l'exercice du culte. Une injuste disproportion était ainsi établie entre les droits de 15,000,000 de sujets du Sultan, et une communauté de religieux étrangers.

On remettait, en opposition au firman, la garde des deux jardins de Bethléem au moines Catholiques.

On s'opposait à ce qu'à Koublet-el-Messad les Grecs puissent officier selon les exigences de leur culte—ce qui annullait la nouvelle faveur qui leur était accordée.

On n'a voulu donner aucun cours à la protestation du Patriarche, et l'on empêchait d'aller déposer aux pieds de son Souverain les plaintes de ses ouailles et de toute la nation.

Enfin, comme, pendant que la Légation Impériale restait écartée de toute discussion sur la question des saints lieux, la Porte entretenait sur ce sujet une correspondance officielle avec l'Ambassade de France, qui nous restait complétement inconnue, d'autres avantages et concessions ont pû être accordées contrairement aux engagements pris envers la Cour Impériale.

L'Ambassadeur se flatte de l'espoir que la Porte prendra en sérieuse considération les faits ci-dessus exposés, qui constituent une atteinte flagrante aux convictions religieuses que professe Sa Majesté l'Empereur, en même temps qu'un manque d'égards et de procédés envers sa personne. Sa Majesté le Sultan, dans l'audience dont elle a bien voulu honorer l'Ambassadeur, a daigné lui témoigner de la manière la plus gracieuse ses intentions de maintenir et de resserrer les liens d'amitié qui l'unissent à son auguste allié et voisin.

L'Ambassadeur, par l'entremise des Ministres de sa Hautesse, fait appel à ces sentiments, et demande avec confiance le prompt redressement des torts qui ont été cause d'une fâcheuse mésintelligence entre les deux Gouvernements.

Animé des intentions les plus conciliantes, le Prince Menchikoff, dans les réparations qu'il est chargé d'obtenir pour le passé, se montrera disposé à aider la Sublime Porte dans les difficultés qu'elle pourrait rencontrer en revenant sur des faits accomplis; et le projet d'un arrangement stable et définitif pour la visitation des sanctuaires de la Palestine devra être dans tous ses détails arrêté avec la Sublime Porte, tant pour calmer le mécontentement des Grecs que pour leur accorder une garantie sûre et inviolable pour l'avenir.

Autant que le côté pratique de la question le permet, cet arrangement sera conçu dans un esprit de tolérance et de bonne entente, mais ne pourra plus se borner à des assurances stériles et incomplètes, qui pourraient être invalidées dans l'avenir. Un engagement solennel doit désormais attester de l'accord sincère qu'il devient si urgent d'établir à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements.

Il suffit réellement de jeter un regard retrospectif sur l'histoire de ces pays pour s'assurer que tout l'apanage actuel des religieux Latins en Palestine est le fruit d'empiètements pareils à ceux d'aujourd'hui, qui poursuivis pas à pas, à l'aide de l'appui politique venant de l'occident, ont avancé au point de menacer l'Église Grecque d'un envahissement général, qui serait en même temps un coup fatal porté aux droits souverains de la Turquie.

Mais tout en nourrissant les meilleurs espérances pour cet accord, l'Ambassadeur ne peut se dispenser d'exprimer ici la pénible impression qu'ont laissée au Gouvernement Impérial la méfiance et le mauvais vouloir dont les Ministres de la Porte ont depuis quelque temps fait preuve à l'égard du pieux et magnanime intérêt que l'Empereur professe pour les Chrétiens d'Orient. Ses avis les plus bienveillants, ses avertissements les plus désintéressés, ont été rejeté par les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, qui prêtaient volontiers l'oreille à des insinuations insidieuses pour méconnaître et dénaturer les meilleures intentions de Sa Majesté l'Empereur en y cherchant des arrières pensées incompatibles avec sa puissance et les dispositions généreuses qu'il a toujours témoignées pour l'Empire Ottoman. Il suffit ici, à l'appui de ces assertions, de citer sommairement la manière dont la Porte accueillait les conseils du Gouvernement Impérial dans les questions du Montenégro, du Patriarcat de Constantinople, des injustices commises contre les Rayas Chrétiens, &c. L'Ambassadeur a la mission d'en porter plainte à Sa Majesté le Sultan, en lui représentant avec tous les égards dûs à sa personne, la nécessité de faire disparaître le profond et juste mécontentement qu'en éprouve son ancien et meilleur Allié, par un Acte de confiance qui écarte pour l'avenir toute nuance de désaccord entre les deux Souverains.

Les Ministres actuels de la Sublime Porte voudront bien, je l'espère, apprécier toute l'importance du vœu que l'Ambassadeur est chargé d'exprimer à ce sujet à Sa Majesté le Sultan, et qu'il a cru devoir faire pressentir à ses conseillers pour s'assurer de leur part un concours intelligent et sincère dans l'intérêt des deux pays, dont la désunion pourrait amener les plus graves conséquences, tant pour le bien-être de la Turquie que pour la paix de l'Europe entière.

No. 273.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 196.)

St. Petersburgh, April 28, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Chancellor, whom I have just seen, acquaints me that he has received intelligence from Constantinople down to the 16th instant, which proves the falsehood of the late widely-circulated and alarming report.

His Excellency was good enough to acquaint me that, according to his despatches, all was tranquil at Constantinople, that the negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily, and that a good understanding prevailed among those by whom they are conducted.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 274.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 13.)

Constantinople, April 12, 1853.

My Lord,

I BEG to thank you for the communication of several confidential and interesting reports respecting the holy places, addressed to your Lordship by Her Majesty's Representatives at Paris and St. Petersburgh.

I observe with much satisfaction the conciliatory assurances given by Count Nesselrode to Sir Hamilton Seymour, as stated by the latter in his despatch No. 126 to your Lordship, and the more so as a corresponding improvement has been remarked of late in the tone and demeanour of Prince Menchikoff. It is remarkable at the same time that Count Nesselrode appears to have made no mention whatever of the ulterior and very important propositions brought forward here by the Russian Ambassador. This reserve corresponds with the endeavours made by Prince Menchikoff to insulate the Porte in its eventual negotiation respecting them, and his endeavours for that purpose are the more significant, as the principal interpreter of the Russian Embassy is alleged to have said in conversation within the last few days, that if the Prince failed in carrying his points, he would simply embark the Embassy, and retire altogether from Constantinople.

According to what is stated in one of Lord Cowley's despatches to your Lordship, M. Benedetti appears to have been well acquainted from the first with the nature and extent of Prince Menchikoff's demands; but I am assured by M. Pisani that no proposals of the kind described by M. Benedetti had transpired at the time when he stated them to his Government, and that, unless obtained through some secret channel, they must have been purely conjectural.

Prince Menchikoff has been with the Grand Vizier this morning. M. de la Cour is to have his audience of the Sultan to-morrow. I hope to see both these ambassadors in a day or two, with some prospect of being able to assist in removing the obstacles to their agreement.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 275.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 15.)

Constantinople, April 15, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE I had the honour of addressing your Lordship on the subject of the holy places and other matters of discussion pending between Russia and Turkey, but little or rather no progress has been made towards a satisfactory arrange-

ment, and certain appearances of a doubtful, if not a threatening, character have in some degree revived the anxiety of the public and increased the apprehensions of the Porte.

M. de la Cour had his first audience of the Sultan the day before yesterday. He called upon me in the evening and expressed the satisfaction which he has derived from his Majesty's gracious reception of him. He seemed to have taken an agreeable impression of the Sultan's manners and character. According to his statement, it does not appear that anything had passed on the occasion beyond the usual generalities of mutual good-will and desire to maintain and improve the existing relations between the two Empires. Rifaat Pasha's account of the audience agrees with the Ambassador's, and his Excellency sent me word that the friendly assurances given to the Sultan on the part of France, were extremely satisfactory. In his conversation with me the French Ambassador went over some of the points of difference respecting the holy places, and although his language was not that of determined resistance, it showed a most decided unwillingness to accept some of the Russian propositions. He is to see Rifaat Pasha to-morrow, for the purpose of stating his deliberate opinions respecting them.

Prince Menchikoff received despatches from his Government the same day. They are understood to express dissatisfaction at the slow progress of his negotiations, and to direct him to require an early decision from the Porte. He waited in consequence on the Ottoman Secretary of State yesterday, and his language appears to have agreed with the alleged tenor of the instructions. He pressed the Pasha for an answer; he declared his determination to abate nothing of his principal demands as to the holy places; he showed, if I am rightly informed, much impatience, and a readiness to terminate the negotiations abruptly on learning from Rifaat Pasha that the Council was unanimously of opinion that his ulterior proposals could not be accepted; and referring to the arrival of the French squadron at Salamis, and to the advanced positions of the Russian army in Bessarabia, he gave it to be distinctly understood that his Court would neither be restrained by that demonstration, nor induced to abandon its own while the discussions continued.

Happening to see the Prince immediately after receiving his instructions, I had some further conversation with him on the questions at issue. He read me parts of a despatch addressed by your Lordship to Sir Hamilton Seymour after the decision taken by Her Majesty's Government respecting the proposed movements of the squadron at Malta, and endeavoured to impress me with an idea that he could not recede from his demands, or at least from the essential parts of them, in so far as the holy places were immediately concerned. I tried to pave the way for an eventual effort to procure some modification of them by admitting the fairness of his claims where I could do so with justice, and at the same time I did not conceal from him my knowledge of his ulterior propositions, and my conviction that they would meet with serious opposition from the Porte, and be regarded with little favour by Powers even the most friendly to Russia.

Without taking my observations amiss, he endeavoured to make out that his demands were by no means of that insidious or dangerous nature which might be attributed to them elsewhere, and that their acceptance was called for by the vagueness of existing Treaties, which required some additional explanations and a more precise form of expression to render them capable of execution, and by the necessity imposed upon Russia of obtaining some effectual security for more respect and good faith in future on the part of the Turkish Government towards his Court.

In the course of the same day I called upon the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, and learned from him, in confirmation of what I had previously heard, that Prince Menchikoff was ordered to press for a speedy decision from the Porte. I found at the same time, in conversing with M. de Klezl, that however disposed to communicate confidentially with me in a conciliatory sense on the pending subjects of discussion, he was not prepared, in case of the Russian Ambassador's threatening to withdraw, to advise any other course for the Porte to pursue but that of unqualified compliance with his Excellency's demands. I told him that with every wish to avert such an extremity, and to recommend every reasonable concession, I was not prepared to take part in placing the last remains of Turkish independence at the feet of any foreign Power, and that I had ventured

to infer from the language of Count Buol at Vienna, that I should find him on the same ground with myself in that respect.

Adverting to those appearances which have again disturbed the minds of reflecting people, I have to state that they consist principally of the attitude still maintained by the Russian army in Bessarabia, of the contradiction given to the report of its advance having been suspended, and of the supposed continuance of defensive preparations on the side of Turkey. No doubt the arrival of so powerful a French squadron in the Archipelago has also contributed to produce this impression.

In separate parts of my correspondence of this date, I forward for your Lordship's more complete information reports and letters which cannot with propriety be annexed to this despatch, but which are calculated to throw a fuller light on the subject-matter of its contents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 276.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 6.)

(Confidential and Secret.)

Constantinople, April 15, 1853.

My Lord,

REFERRING to my ostensible despatch No. 15, of this day's date, I have the honour to forward herewith in copy two reports addressed to me on the 13th and 15th instant respectively by Mr. Stephen Pisani.

They both relate to the pending discussions, and contain a statement of circumstances not unworthy of your Lordship's attention.

It is satisfactory to learn from these reports that the Sultan and his Ministers are now prepared to treat me with unreserved confidence on the pending questions. Their first assurances on this point were not entirely confirmed by their conduct, and it was necessary for me to express my sentiments very distinctly on the subject. Even now that their communications are really more frank and complete than at first, I am obliged to proceed with caution, and to be careful in selecting the proper moment for declaring my opinions. The advice which I have already given appears to be kept in view, and I shall probably be able to make a more effectual impression upon them by waiting for a knowledge of the French Ambassador's deliberate answer to Rifaat Pasha's communication of the Russian demands. They are to have an interview to-morrow, and I propose to see M. de la Cour before it takes place.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 276.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Pera, April 13, 1853.

My Lord,

RIFAAT PASHA requests me to inform your Lordship that M. Argyropulo brought him a message on behalf of Prince Menchikoff, to the effect that a messenger, coming this morning from St. Petersburgh, brought despatches in which the Emperor complains of the long delay evinced by the Porte in bringing to a satisfactory solution the demands of the Russian Cabinet, and the Prince demanded an interview, for the purpose of communicating their contents to Rifaat Pasha. The interview is fixed for to-morrow, at Rifaat Pasha's house, between half-past ten and eleven, and his Excellency is most anxious to be favoured with your Lordship's advice as to the answer to be returned to the Russian Ambassador in case he insisted upon the conclusion of the proposed Treaty. The Sultan (said Rifaat Pasha), as well as all his Ministers, entirely rely upon your valuable advice and assistance on every occasion, and especially in the present crisis.

Rifaat Pasha wished me to report the above to your Lordship, and bring

him an answer to-morrow, as early as convenient, and before Prince Menchikoff goes to him.

The Pasha moreover told me, for your Lordship's information, that M. de la Cour had to-day his audience of the Sultan, and that, upon the whole, his language was very satisfactory, and full of assurances of good-will and friendship on the part of France.

After the audience was over, the Sultan sent for Rifaat Pasha, and asked him whether he had communicated to your Lordship the Draft of the Convention proposed by Russia, and wished to know, at the same time, whether you expressed any opinion on the subject. Rifaat Pasha answered in the affirmative, and took the opportunity to report to His Majesty what passed in the interview which he had with your Lordship on Sunday last, and added that you promised to offer your remarks upon the Treaty in question; upon which the Sultan replied, that he places his full reliance upon your opinion (which is of great weight with him), and your Lordship's well-known experience in the affairs induce him to entertain sanguine hopes that your advice will enable them to extricate themselves from this difficult position without prejudice to the independence and integrity of this Empire.

In informing your Lordship of the foregoing, I fulfil my promise to Rifaat Pasha to report faithfully his conversation with the Sultan.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 276.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Most Secret.)

Pera, April, 14, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that Prince Menchikoff had this day a long interview with Rifaat Pasha on the subject of the pending questions of the holy places, and the supremacy claimed by Russia over the clergy and the Rayahs who profess the Greek religion.

Rifaat Pasha began by telling the Prince that he was aware that the object of his visit was to complain of the delay used by the Porte in the settlement of his demands; but that he ought to take into consideration that the Porte was not to be blamed, because she had it not in her power to come to a conclusion respecting the question of the holy places without previously being in possession of the answer of the French Embassy.

The reply returned by Prince Menchikoff was, that he conceived the Porte's position in this affair, but at the same time he thought it his duty to apprize the Minister for Foreign Affairs that Russia was decided to make no concessions respecting the repair of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and that the hours for officiating at the Holy Virgin's shrine must be regulated in the way already proposed, and that at all events the right of precedency must be conceded to the Greeks. This must be clearly understood, said he, and Russia will not desist from it. If the French (added he, with emphasis) think that the appearance of their fleet in the East will have the effect of intimidating the Emperor and make him alter his mind, they are grossly mistaken, because Russia is determined to insist upon the points above specified; and he finally urged Rifaat Pasha for the speedy settlement of the question at issue.

In reply, Rifaat Pasha said that the French Ambassador was to have an interview with him on Saturday next, and that he (Rifaat Pasha) would not fail to let the Prince know, without delay, the result of the conference.

Subsequently the Russian Ambassador wished to be informed whether Rifaat Pasha was entrusted with full powers for the conclusion of the proposed Treaty. The latter replied in the negative, but added that the draft of the said Treaty, as presented by the Prince, was submitted to the mature consideration of the Council of Ministers, and that it was unanimously rejected, as most of the demands therein contained were detrimental to the rights and independence of the Porte; and he (Rifaat Pasha) was most certain that, were another Power to

put forward similar propositions, Russia herself, as a good neighbouring Power and ancient ally of the Porte, would advise them to avoid carefully entering into such an agreement.

Is this an official answer? inquired the Prince; and at the same time got up to take his leave. To this Rifaat Pasha said, that he was not yet authorized to make any official communication on the subject, but only stated the view taken by the Council. The matter, proceeded he, was before the Sultan for his consideration, and as the Iradé had not yet been issued he could not enter into further details respecting that matter. The Articles concerning the holy places, said Rifaat Pasha to the Prince, may be specified in another way than in a Treaty. As to those concerning exclusively the patriarchs and the churches, you observed several times that what you demand is already stipulated in the Treaty of Kainardji, and consequently you could not imagine why the Porte is making difficulties in giving a more extensive meaning to the Articles of a Treaty in full force between the two Governments.

To this I beg leave to observe, said Rifaat Pasha, that the Article stipulated in the Treaty you mention does not contain any provisions for the churches in general and the four patriarchs, but only bears upon particular points; whereas what you now propose is a general and exclusive protection over the whole Greek population, their clergy, and their churches.

Why does the Porte, said the Prince, object to grant to Russia what it had already conceded to Austria by the Treaty of Belgrade?

I am going to make an observation to the Russian Ambassador, said Rifaat Pasha to M. Argyropulo, which I am certain will remain without an answer. Tell the Prince that the protectorate of the Austrians extends solely to the clergy of their own nation, and not to the priests of the Fanal.

The Prince abstained from replying, but said to Rifaat Pasha that the object of Russia in all this were positive and unequivocal assurances for the future, and how could we rely upon them if they are not in writing and put in a proper shape? To-morrow the present Ministry may be changed and superseded by men like those lately in office. What guarantee shall we have then that things will not take another turn again, and that the Emperor will not be treated in the same disrespectful manner? Rifaat Pasha replied that there were different ways of giving formal and official assurances besides a Treaty.

The Prince then spoke about the hospital and the proposed church at Jerusalem, and endeavoured to ascertain whether the Porte would comply with the request. Rifaat Pasha said that he did not anticipate any opposition on the part of his colleagues, and thought that the Sultan would not refuse his sanction.

The Prince afterwards said that the late behaviour of the Porte, and the state of political affairs in Turkey, were the motive of the military preparations in Russia, and that he urgently requested Rifaat Pasha to induce the Porte to remove all causes which render necessary the keeping up of so large a force which occasions an immense expense to Russia.

Rifaat Pasha requested me to call your Lordship's attention to what Prince Menchikoff said respecting the French fleet and the Russian troops. Both, says he, have a very profound meaning according to his opinion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 277.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 6.)

(Private.)

My dear Lord, *Constantinople, April 15, 1853.*

REFERRING to the subject-matter of my ostensible despatch of this day's date, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship herewith an extract of a private letter addressed to me by Mr. Yeames, Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa.

Your Lordship will remark that Mr. Yeames contradicts the report

which had prevailed very generally before, that the preparations for advancing the Russian forces in Bessarabia had been suspended. The statement of Mr. Yeames is confirmed by letters received here from other quarters.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 277.

Consul Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Odessa, April 11, 1853.*

THE concentration of each of the three divisions of the 5th corps d'armée is at the present day completed, namely, the 13th division of infantry at Sevastopol; the 14th at Odessa; and the 15th at Leovo, on the Pruth. The artillery of the corps, usually kept in the rear on the left bank of the Dnieper, has already joined the divisions; and the 5th division of cavalry, composed of four regiments, is in march from Wornozensk to the Pruth. Such is the front of the demonstration; of the actual movements in the rear, necessary for its support, I have great doubt. It is certain that the 4th corps d'armée was from the first ordered to take a part in these operations, and that the reserves were called together from both the 4th and 5th corps. The cantonments of the 4th lay facing the frontier of Galicia, extending from the kingdom of Poland to the Dniester, with its centre and head-quarters at Kremenetz. It was by a flank movement to concentrate in Upper Bessarabia, with its advanced division at Lipkani, on the Pruth; but I believe that no such movement has commenced; and that it is utterly impossible in the present state of the roads of Volhynia and Podolia. These troops, therefore, cannot be in the positions designed within, at the least, six weeks; and so long will the 5th corps be entirely unsupported.

The division at Sevastopol is of course prepared for an expedition by sea; and we are told of the troops being exercised in the operation of embarking and landing.

The division here is destined for the same kind of service. Every man, including officers, is to carry rations for four days. No baggage will be taken, otherwise conveyed, and no horses are to be shipped.

With regard to the object of these embarkations, I have no information whatever. The fleet at Sevastopol may, it is said, take on board a complete division of infantry for a short voyage. No transports have been assembled, nor have any merchant ships been engaged. A division is composed of sixteen battalions, and its field artillery of eight batteries. The present effective strength of the battalion cannot exceed 800 men; so that at each of the three points, Sevastopol, Odessa, and Leovo, the force assembled is under 13,000 men. The reserves called to their standards in January, were to muster at Toula, Orel, and Woronije. They compose four battalions for each division, and they are still very far in the rear.

Preparations in front continue in great activity; of those in the rear I have doubts; and it is still whispered that the reserves are not advancing. The fleet has not moved, and the ships have not yet left their winter berths. I need scarcely say that the newspaper reports of reviews by Prince Menchikoff of armies and fleets, before proceeding on his mission, are entirely unfounded. It is the fashion likewise to talk of a popular feeling in this country for war with Turkey; now, there are no popular feelings in Russia, and most assuredly none would find utterance. There is no ardour for such a war even in the army, usually desirous of activity. Comfortable quarters in the two Danubian principalities may be thought of; but it is not forgotten that 300,000 men perished ignobly in the two miserable campaigns of 1828 and 1829. No one will presume to affirm that there is now more ability or less corruption than formerly; and all are aware that the want of the one, and the prevalence of the other, have been the causes of Russian disasters. In the science required for the preservation of armies, no progress has been made. Already disease is spreading among the troops now here assembled, in the form of scurvy and ophthalmia, which cause at times frightful ravages. Of the three battalions

quartered in this town last summer, there were never fewer than 600 or 700 men in hospital.

The commercial communities in these ports are, under the present circumstances, greatly disquieted, having immense engagements in suspense, though in general it is believed peace will be maintained, and great reliance is placed in the wisdom and moderation of the Emperor. The event that of late has caused the greatest sensation, is the arrival of your Excellency at Constantinople. It has renovated the best hopes, and given general confidence in a happy issue of all present difficulties.

No. 278.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 6.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 16, 1853.

I SAW the French Ambassador this morning, before he went to have his appointed conference with Rifaat Pasha. The principal object of my visit was to let M. de la Cour know on what points it might be expected that Russia would make no concession, and to dissuade him from committing himself on those points towards Rifaat Pasha, if, as I hoped, he did not mean to render an amicable solution of the whole difficulty impossible. I explained that the points in question were those of the cupola, of a Greek porter in the church at Bethlehem, and of Greek precedency as to the time to be fixed for the performance of certain religious functions, not only there, but also in the Chapel of the Virgin at Gethsemane. I gave him to understand that I thought the Greek pretension stood on strong ground in these respects; and I urged him to bear in mind the great European interests at stake; the declared moderation of his Government; the satisfaction already given by Russia to France as to the "key" and the "star;" and the importance of regulating all that concerns the holy places, without further delay, in order that the ulterior propositions of Russia might rest upon their own merits, and be dealt with accordingly; not for the extension of a single influence, nor for the benefit of a single class of Christians, but on true principles of European policy, and, if possible, for the advantage of all the Sultan's tributary subjects.

I must do M. de la Cour the justice to state that he appeared to enter into the spirit of my suggestions, at the same time that he did not give up his objections to the Russian plan of settlement. He read to me some conciliatory, but still rather antagonistic passages from a despatch addressed to him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, but also intimated that he was not prepared to give way on every point to the Russian Ambassador, with whom he had held a long conversation the day before.

As I am to have an account from both parties of whatever may occur at the approaching interview between them, and shall then, in all likelihood, be at liberty to take a more decided course for helping to remove the obstacles to a mutual understanding, it is unnecessary for me to trespass further on your Lordship's time at this moment.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 279.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 9.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, April* 20, 1853.

I AM now able to report that the discussions between Rifaat Pasha and the Ambassadors of France and Russia, respecting the holy places, have every appearance of drawing to an amicable and satisfactory conclusion. The points of difference which remain have very little importance in the sight of an impartial observer. They are matters rather of form than of substance, and in number they do not exceed two or three.

I had some conversation upon the subject this morning with Prince Menchikoff, and subsequently with M. de la Cour. I endeavoured, as I had done before, to bring them to a more complete understanding, without putting myself forward beyond what they appeared themselves to desire. I had hoped, indeed, that the result of their direct communications with each other would have rendered my interference superfluous. The remaining antagonism between them consists chiefly in this: the Russian Ambassador, suspicious of future encroachments, strives for every particular belonging to the *status quo*; while the French Ambassador reserves what he conceives to be his right under the Treaty of 1740, and seeks, by maintaining the Latins on an equal footing with the Greeks, to open a door for further advances hereafter, at some period more or less distant.

In communicating with Rifaat Pasha, I have suggested whatever appeared to me best calculated to conciliate the existing differences. I have urged him most earnestly to settle all that relates to the holy places before he enters upon the ulterior demands of Russia, conceiving it to be highly desirable that the two questions should be kept separate; and I have expressed my opinion that it was daily becoming more urgent for the Porte to terminate the discussion by the promulgation of a firman incorporating the terms agreed upon, and deciding equitably the still-disputed points, respecting which it seems to me that the Porte might in fairness almost entirely side with Russia.

The real difficulties and just causes of anxiety to the Porte remain to be considered. They are already known to your Lordship, and they are formidable, though I am happy to say that Prince Menchikoff, after a second conversation between us on the subject of his demands concerning the Greek Church, has informed me that he no longer means to press that part of them which regards the Greek Patriarchs and their patents of privilege. He explained this important change of plan by stating that he recognized the impossibility of separating the political from the spiritual character of the Patriarch, and that his Government disclaimed all intention of interfering with the Sultan's subjects in any political sense. He has since read over to me his amended draft of a Convention framed with the view of repeating and confirming the privileges secured to the Greek religion and its places of worship in Turkey by former Treaties, and particularly by that of Kainardji.

This agreement, whatever may be its name or its form, is to have the force of a Treaty, and the preamble is in the customary solemn style of that kind of instrument. As far as my memory serves, the terms are such as to give to the Russian Representative here a virtual right of protection over the Greek Church and clergy throughout the Sultan's dominions, and by a necessary, though underhand consequence, a vast exercise of influence on the Greek population at large. This advantage would result from taking Article VII of the Treaty of Kainardji with some modification of its terms, from extending the provisions of Article XVI, which concerns the Danubian provinces alone, to the whole empire, and from adding in substance, with a slight management of the terms, that Article of the Treaty of Carlowitz which gives to Austria the right, not indeed of protecting the religion of Roman Catholic subjects in Turkey, but of calling the Porte's attention to any just matter of complaint in that respect.

As Prince Menchikoff assured me, at the same time, that the proposed Convention was limited to an explanatory confirmation of existing Treaties, necessary as a guarantee to Russia, and only granting to its coreligionists what Austria already possessed with regard to hers, I am willing to hope that the impressions retained by me would disappear on a closer and more leisurely examination of its terms. I did not, however, leave him without remarking that the Sultan's promise to protect his Christian subjects in the free exercise of their religion differed extremely from a right conferred on any foreign Power to enforce that protection, and also that the same degree of interference might be dangerous to the Porte when exercised by so powerful an empire as Russia on behalf of 10,000,000 of Greeks, and innocent in the case of Austria, whose influence, derivable from religious sympathy, was confined to a small number of Catholics, including her own subjects.

The other Articles of Prince Menchikoff's draft were not of a nature to involve any objectionable or ulterior consequences; but an enumeration by

name of the holy places respectively possessed by the Greeks and Latins in Palestine would probably meet with serious opposition from the French Ambassador.

Looking to both the pending questions, I have directed my attention, and occasionally my efforts, to the following successive objects: namely, to relieve the Porte from all embarrassment about the holy places by an arrangement satisfactory to France and Russia; to keep the question of the holy places distinct from that of the Russian protectorate: to support the Sultan's Government in withholding any concessions dangerous to its independence; to favour the wishes of Russia in all matters, not only of strict justice to her, but such as are reasonable and free from danger in their consequences; and, lastly, to place the religious and, if possible, the civil privileges of all classes of the Sultan's tributary subjects on a solid and permanent footing by means of His Majesty's own authority.

I venture to consider the first of these objects as virtually accomplished. The second has been hitherto kept successfully in view. The third is guarded by the assurances which I have received from the Turkish Ministry, and by an unanimous decision of the Council, liable, however, to change under the pressure of intimidation. The fourth is my constant guide in communicating with Prince Menchikoff on one side, and with the Turkish Ministers on the other. The fifth presents great difficulties; but my first overture on the subject has been well received: the French Ambassador will co-operate with me, and the party of Reschid Pasha, though now in abeyance, will probably exert its private influence to promote my views.

Sensible how important it is for political as well as for commercial reasons that the excitement attendant upon Prince Menchikoff's embassy should be allayed as much as possible, I have sounded that Ambassador as to the expediency of withdrawing the Russian troops in Bessarabia from their advanced positions, now that the question which brought him to Constantinople approaches to a satisfactory conclusion, and I have also spoken to M. de la Cour, in the same sense with respect to the French squadron at Salamis. In neither case have I much reason to flatter myself with any prospect of success. Prince Menchikoff asserted that the Russian divisions were not advanced beyond their customary stations, one of which was habitually within a few hours of Jassy, and the French Ambassador showed no inclination to contribute towards an earlier departure of the squadron from Salamis than what would take place in the ordinary course of its proceedings as an evolutionary squadron.

In connection with these causes of excitement is a prevailing notion that the Turks are secretly buying fire-arms and gunpowder with a view to some act of violence against the Christians. My inquiries have not led to the discovery of any fact in support of this rumour; but I have drawn the Porte's attention to what is whispered about, and I have requested that measures of precaution may be discreetly adopted in time.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 280.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 21.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April 22, 1853.*

AFTER I had addressed your Lordship the day before yesterday, the difficulty of settling the question of the holy places threatened to increase. The French and Russian Ambassadors insisted on their respective pretensions, while the Porte inclined but hesitated to assume the responsibility of deciding between them. I thought it was time for me to adopt a more prominent part in reconciling the adverse parties. Having, therefore, ascertained that Rifaat Pasha did not object to my pursuing this course, I availed myself of a convenient opportunity this morning to address the two Ambassadors in presence of each other, and to express an earnest hope that they would no longer allow the remaining differences, which were matters rather of form than of substance, to retard the

conclusion of an adjustment acceptable to the Porte. The brief and amicable discussion which ensued between them was followed, after a few remarks from me, by a mutual adoption of terms which leave no ground for further dissent. It appeared to me that the view taken by Prince Menchikoff on one of the points was far from unreasonable, and M. de la Cour, in finally acceding to it, consulted, as I conceive, the justice of the case no less than the honour of his Government. It cannot after this be necessary to trouble your Lordship with details. I trust that the Sultan will now promulgate his firman, and close for years to come a question which it would have been better for all parties never to have opened. It is not impossible that M. de la Cour will "reserve his rights," but he has assured me that, if he finds it is his duty to do so, he will perform that duty in no public or ostensible manner.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 281.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 25.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, April 25, 1853.*

I HAD an interview yesterday with the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, at their request, at the country-house of the former.

They confirmed to me the final settlement of the question concerning the holy places, and expressed warmly their thanks for the part which I had taken in bringing it about.

They next informed me that the Government was determined neither to enter into a Convention with Russia on that subject, nor to accept Prince Menchikoff's proposals respecting the protection of the Greek Church in Turkey.

The line of conduct to be otherwise pursued by the Porte in dealing with Prince Menchikoff was an object of anxious inquiry to both of them. After presenting the matter in various lights, they agreed with me in thinking that if the Russian Ambassador were to offer an amended draft of his Convention, the best course would be to receive it for examination, and on finding it inadmissible as to any essential points, to decline negotiating without a previous distinct withdrawal of the objectionable parts, and to intimate at the same time a doubt whether the remainder would be worth the trouble of a negotiation. Were his Excellency to express a different opinion, preferring a simple confirmation of the Articles of existing Treaties concerning the Greek religion to no Convention at all, it might, we thought, be more advisable, on the whole, to meet his wishes in that respect than to hazard the consequences, whatever they might be, of his retiring in disgust.

I urged them strongly to complete the firmans relating to the holy places with all practicable speed, and to invest the official note, which is to accompany the communication of them to the two Ambassadors, as much as possible with that character of guaranty to which the Emperor of Russia appears to attach the highest importance.

In the course of discussion I learnt from Rifaat Pasha that the French Ambassador had warned him not to admit any contradiction between the firmans and the note delivered by Aali Pasha to the French Embassy in February of last year, and I presume that his Excellency would, in the contrary case, make a special reservation of his rights. The two Ministers assured me that no such contradiction existed, and that I should have the firmans to look over before they were finally delivered. The Council is to meet the day after to-morrow, and whatever remains to be done as to these matters will be taken into formal consideration.

Before we separated, I returned to the great subject of reform. I endeavoured to make the two Ministers sensible, first, of the advantages which they would derive from solemnly confirming and rendering more practically effective and comprehensive the privileges and immunities conferred by successive Sultans on the tributary subjects of the Porte; and, secondly, of the necessity which urged their Government to lose no time in striving to recover their position in

the sympathies and good opinion of Europe by a system of improvement acting on all the branches of administration, developing the resources of the empire, and bringing it into harmony with the spirit of the times, the claims of humanity, and the just expectations of commerce. In support of my counsels I pointed out the causes of those humiliations which they had lately undergone, and gave them, though guardedly, some insight into the dangers from which they had not yet entirely escaped, and which, if removed for the time and not destroyed in their causes by the application of adequate means, would infallibly return with augmented force at no distant period.

They appeared to admit the truth, they could hardly doubt the sincerity, of my suggestions; and I am authorized by their assurances to expect the adoption of such measures as I may recommend or approve, as soon as their present difficulties with Russia shall be overcome. Experience will not allow me to be sanguine in this respect; and, as to any immediate extension of Christian privileges, I feel more hope than confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 282.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)

Constantinople, April 23, 1853.

My Lord,

FOR your more complete information as to the state of the discussions respecting the holy places in Palestine, I have the honour to inclose herewith in copy a report addressed to me by Mr. Stephen Pisani. It confirms what I have stated elsewhere of the settlement of that question. Unfortunately it also confirms the Porte's anxiety with respect to the menacing demands of Russia; and in justification of the apprehensions expressed by Rifaat Pasha, I submit to your Lordship, inclosed herewith, a *note verbale* left with that Minister, or rather sent to him by the Russian Ambassador on the 19th instant.

Your Lordship will observe that the paper bears no signature, but it was given in soon after the arrival of fresh and pressing instructions from St. Petersburgh, nor is there much difference between the strongest of its expressions and the language which occasionally drops from the Ambassador himself or from those who may be supposed to know his sentiments.

In more respects than one a mystery hangs over the intentions of Russia, and the military demonstrations and movements of Russian partizans are such, that were it not for the moderate dispositions manifested on the whole by Prince Menchikoff in his intercourse with me, and the declarations of the Emperor himself, I should despair of a satisfactory issue to the remaining discussions.

The Russian Secretary of Embassy was with me yesterday on the part of his chief, who had caught cold and was in bed. He came to request my good offices for the removal of some new difficulty which had sprung up in connection with the adjusted question of the holy places, and entered confidentially with me on the subject of the remaining demands in a tone of the most moderate description. I took the opportunity to explain to him frankly my impressions upon the whole question, manifesting every wish to contribute towards a friendly termination of the business on safe and fair grounds, but not concealing, at the same time, the objections which every friend to the independence of Turkey must entertain to an increase of Russian influence over the churches and clergy of Greece.

I have only to add that Mr. Pisani has my instructions to divert Rifaat Pasha if possible from adhering to any additions, however insignificant in themselves, which may re-open the discussions, or give further discontent to Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I have just received official intelligence from the Porte that Rifaat Pasha, influenced I presume by my urgent representations of this morning, has sent the firmans to the two Ambassadors, after modifying the points which still involved some degree of objection.

S. DE R.

Inclosure 1 in No. 282.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord,

Pera, April 23, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to report that I saw Rifaat Pasha a little before he had his interview with Prince Menchikoff, and communicated to him verbatim your Lordship's instruction of this day's date, relative to the question of the holy places, and the Convention proposed by the Russians. His Excellency is most thankful to your Lordship for all the trouble you have taken towards facilitating the solution of the long-pending question of the holy places, and entertains very sanguine hopes that your Excellency will also devise means to extricate the Porte out of their present position in a manner consistent with their honour and independence.

On leaving Rifaat Pasha, I waited on the Grand Vizier, to whom I also explained word for word the purport of the above-stated instruction. He highly appreciated its contents and expressed the greatest deference for your Lordship's opinion. His Highness expressed a wish to hear a translation into Turkish of the main points of the instruction: I complied with his request.

Subsequently I called again on Rifaat Pasha in order to learn what had taken place at the interview, and was informed by his Excellency that Prince Menchikoff made no allusion to the "Sened," but only wanted and urged the delivery of the firmans about the sanctuaries and the repairs of the cupola. It was agreed that the words "présséance" and "participation" are to be omitted.

The firmans are already drawn up, and I suppose that in a day or two they will be promulgated.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 282.

Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.

Pera, le 7/19 Avril, 1853.

SON Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures, en prenant connaissance, à son entrée aux affaires, des négotiations qui ont eu lieu, a vu la duplicité de ses prédécesseurs; il doit s'être persuadé combien on a manqué aux égards dûs à l'Empereur de Russie, et combien est grande sa magnanimité en offrant à la Porte les moyens de sortir des embarras que lui a créé la mauvaise foi de ses Ministres. Ils ont abusé de la religion de leur Souverain en le mettant en opposition à ses propres paroles, et le plaçant envers son allié et son ami dans une de ces positions qui ne peuvent admettre ni de hautes convenances, ni la dignité souveraine.

Tout en voulant être oublieux du passé, et n'exigeant pour réparation que le renvoi d'un Ministre fallacieux et l'exécution patente de promesses solennelles, l'Empereur se trouvait obligé de demander des garanties solides pour l'avenir.

Il les veut formelles, positives, et assurant l'inviolabilité du culte professé par la majorité des sujets Chrétiens tant de la Sublime Porte que de la Russie, et enfin par l'Empereur lui-même.

Il ne peut en vouloir d'autres que celles qu'il trouvera désormais dans un acte équivalent à un Traité, et à l'abri des interprétations d'un mandataire mal avisé et peu consciencieux.

Les délais qu'on a apporté jusqu'ici à prendre une décision finale sur les propositions de l'Ambassadeur de Russie, l'obligent à demander à la Porte une réponse catégorique, et qu'il ne pourrait attendre plus longtemps. Il demande conséquemment:

1. Un firman explicatif et dont la rédaction serait convenue concernant la clef de l'Eglise de Bethléem ; l'étoile en argent placée sur l'autel de la Nativité, dans le souterrain de ce même sanctuaire ; la possession de la grotte de Gethsémanie par les Grecs, avec l'admission des Latins à y exercer leur culte, mais tout en conservant la préséance des orthodoxes et leur priorité pour la célébration du service divin dans ce sanctuaire ; et enfin, concernant la possession commune des Grecs avec les Latins des jardins de Bethléem : le tout d'après les bases discutées entre son Excellence Rifaat Pasha et l'Ambassadeur.

2. Un ordre suprême pour la réparation immédiate par le Gouvernement Ottoman de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre avec la participation du Patriarche Grec, sans l'ingérence d'un délégué d'un autre culte ; pour la clôture murée des lucarnes ayant vue dans ce sanctuaire ; et pour la démolition des harems attenants à la coupole, si la possibilité de cette démolition était prouvée.

L'Ambassadeur est chargé d'obtenir sur ces points une assurance et une notification formelles.

3. Un Sened ou Convention pour la garantie du *statu quo* strict des privilèges du culte Catholique Greco-Russe de l'Eglise de l'Orient, et des sanctuaires qui se trouvent en possession de ce culte exclusivement ou en participation avec d'autres rites à Jérusalem.

L'Ambassadeur doit répéter ici à M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures ce qu'il a déjà été dans le cas de lui exprimer plusieurs fois, que la Russie ne demande pas à la Porte des concessions politiques. Son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui est et de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps.

C'est donc à la suite des tendances hostiles qui se sont manifestées depuis quelques années envers tout ce qui touche à la Russie, qu'elle requiert dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe un acte explicatif et positif de garanties ; acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances.

Le Cabinet Ottoman voudra bien aussi peser dans sa sagesse la gravité de l'offence commise, en la comparant à la modération des demandes de réparation et de garantie, que le sentiment de légitime défense aurait pu poser dans un sens plus étendu et plus péremptoire.

La réponse de M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures indiquera à l'Ambassadeur les devoirs ultérieures qu'il aura à remplir, et qui ne pourront être que conformes au maintien de la dignité du Gouvernement qu'il représente, et de la religion que professe son Souverain.

No. 283.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 299.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 8, 1853.*

THE Constantinople mail of the 25th ultimo reached Paris this morning, and I have seen M. Drouyn de Lhuys this afternoon. I am happy to be able to state to your Lordship that it brings intelligence of a nature similar to that which had already reached Her Majesty's Government by telegraph, and that the question of the Sacred Places may be considered as settled.

It would appear from M. de la Cour's reports, that Prince Menchikoff had at length lent himself to enter into amicable conferences, and that the result had been an amicable arrangement.

The question of the repairs of the cupola of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre had been solved in the manner indicated in one of Lord Stratford's first despatches to your Lordship ; that is, the wood-work surmounting the whole, on which no images or inscriptions could be placed, was alone to be repaired. The under part was to remain in *statu quo*. Instead of giving the Greek Patriarch the superintendence of the repairs, as required by Russia, it is said that he may make observations respecting them if he pleases.

The question of precedence is arranged thus. The Greeks will possess it virtually, but it is not to be given them as a right. Something is to be said about Greek hours of divine service being earlier than those of the Latins, and consequently that they are to have possession of the altars first in the morning.

As a compensation, the Latins are to be in possession a somewhat longer time than the Greeks.

The other demands contained in the eight articles submitted by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, appear to be assented to by M. de la Cour, in the modified form proposed by the Ottoman Government.

M. de la Cour seems, however, to have raised objections to the Porte's confirming this arrangement by a Convention with the Russian Government ; and it has been settled that it should be made known by an Imperial firman, of which a copy is to be given to the Russian Embassy.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys very particularly whether he understood Prince Menchikoff to have assented to this last stipulation. He answered in the affirmative.

I then inquired whether he considered M. de la Cour to have acquiesced positively, or whether that Ambassador had referred to Paris for final instructions. He replied that he had every hope that the question was already terminated, though certainly M. de la Cour had reserved the right of the French Government to dissent if they thought proper. He had, however, no intention of so doing, and had written to M. de la Cour to say that he considered the arrangement might be accepted, or rather that the French Government had no objection to raise against it.

For throughout this conversation M. Drouyn de Lhuys, although constantly making use of the words "accepted by France," or "objected to by France," when speaking of the different points in dispute, was careful to impress upon me that he considered France to be rather a tacit spectator of the arrangement made with Russia, than a participator in it. He never could have put his name, he said, to any document sanctioning it ; for France would, in so acting, have been surrendering the rights of Rome. As it was, he feared that Rome would be much displeased, and would remonstrate with the French Government ; therefore, he added, "we have rather shut our eyes to what Russia is doing (nous avons plutôt laissé faire) than accepted what she has done ;" but at the same time he stated most distinctly that no attention would be paid to any remonstrances coming from Rome.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have some knowledge of the more secret demands of Prince Menchikoff, though to what extent I could not ascertain. He said that M. de la Cour described the Prince as less intent upon urging those demands ; but whether from a conviction that it was useless to do so, or whether because he had in fact already obtained them, M. de la Cour could not pretend to say.

It appears further from that Ambassador's reports, that the Greeks themselves are by no means anxious to see attentions introduced which would place them under the tutelage of Russia.

He mentions also that Prince Menchikoff had disapproved the proceedings of the Russian Consul-General at Belgrade in insisting on the dismissal of M. Garaschanin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 284.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 198.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 27, 1853.*

THE French Minister has had the kindness to read to me some of the last despatches which he has received from Paris.

A despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, dated the 15th instant, is of considerable interest. Its chief purport is to show that France, although disposed to act a conciliatory part with regard to the holy places, cannot entirely give up rights which have been secured by ancient Capitulations ; and above all, to make it clear that an attempt on the part of Russia to settle this affair without the participation of the French Embassy, would involve a direct breach of faith.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys almost regrets that the despatch [which Marquis

Castelbajac took upon himself to suppress, had not been communicated to the Chancellor; and adduces, as a proof of the dictatorial tone assumed by Russia in Turkish affairs, the fact of the Imperial Cabinet having called upon the Prince of Servia to dismiss his Minister Garaschanin, contrary to the wishes of the Prince and of the country, the result being, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys states, that Servia is actually demanding the support of the Sultan against Russian encroachments.

Of the two inclosures to the French Minister's despatch, the one is a despatch dated the 31st of March from M. Benedetti, who speaks of the mystery in which Prince Menchikoff's negotiation is involved, and of the objects which he is supposed to be pursuing. He conjectures that he has in view the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Turkey, and has some reason for believing that he has offered to extricate the Turks from their present financial difficulties by means of a loan; Russia—who, as I may observe, would have to borrow at 5 per cent.—being, M. Benedetti states, ready to advance money to the Porte at 2½ per cent.

The second inclosure, a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, of the 28th ultimo, is a very remarkable paper.

M. de Bourqueney gives an account of a conversation with Count Buol, which goes to prove that little difference exists between the Cabinets of Vienna and Paris in their view of Turkish affairs.

Count Buol is represented as approving warmly the conciliatory conduct of France in the question of the holy places, as ready to support the very reasonable objects which are pursued by France, and as so little disposed to concur in the policy adopted by the Emperor of Russia towards Turkey, that, in speaking of Turkish affairs, he observed, "Tout par les cinq Puissances, rien par quatre, ni par trois, ni par deux;" an expression which appears to me well worthy of being recorded.

In a second despatch, like the other under date of the 15th ultimo, M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs my French colleague that the good offices of France have been and will continue to be employed for the adjustment of difficulties between Austria and Sardinia. He further states that negotiations are on foot between Austria and the Swiss Confederation, which warrant a belief that the just demands of the former will be complied with without that recourse to violence which would be open to so many objections.

Before leaving me, General Castelbajac informed me that it appears from a report received at Paris from M. de Varennes, that Baron Manteuffel views with as little approbation as Count Buol, the conduct which the Russian Cabinet is pursuing in the affairs of Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 285.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 200. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 26, 1853.*

IN consequence of the alarming intelligence from Constantinople, which had been received here by telegraph on the 24th instant, I addressed to Count Nesselrode the short private note of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

The object I had in view was twofold: to remind the Chancellor that I had repeatedly warned him of the dangers which attended the military demonstrations of Russia on the Turkish frontiers; and to intimate that the Russian Government were especially bound not to take advantage of a crisis in Turkey, according to all probability brought about by those very measures.

Count Nesselrode, as I had been led to expect, and, as your Lordship will perceive from the inclosed copy* of the reply which he returned to me, was unable to give me any information beyond that which had reached St. Petersburgh yesterday.

I might point out various passages of my correspondence in proof of this

* Not sent.

last Turkish crisis not having taken me by surprise; but it will be sufficient to refer to the memorandum which I drew up nearly three months ago, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch No. 10 of the 8th of last January.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 285.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private.)

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, April 25, 1853.*

AS I am unable to leave my room to-day, I hope you will excuse me for begging you to let me know whether you have any confirmation of the intelligence received yesterday from Constantinople.

I shall be truly happy if the apprehensions which, from the first, I have entertained, should prove unfounded; but, in the contrary supposition, the more any outbreak in Turkey may be referable to pressure from without, the more sincere will, I am convinced, be your wish to prevent such a catastrophe from being attended by injury to the Sultan's authority.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 286.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 207. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April 30, 1853.*

THE Chancellor, upon whom I called yesterday by appointment, had the kindness to read to me several passages from a despatch and a private letter from Prince Menchikoff, of the date of the 16th instant, which produced a favourable impression upon my mind.

Not only was the manner in which the Prince speaks of his English and French colleagues such as to indicate his being upon terms of friendly intercourse with them, but in the account which he gives of his official interviews with M. de la Cour, it appears that in so far as any latitude has been left to him it has been his wish to conciliate the rights of the Greek with the demands of the Latin Church.

One great point is, at all events, established by these reports.

It has been proved that there is no intention on the part of the Russian Embassy of concluding the arrangements respecting the holy places without attempting to secure the cooperation of a French Negotiator.

With regard to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, again Count Nesselrode assured me that they were no other than have been made known to Her Majesty's Government and Her Majesty's Legation, and he once more repeated that the wish, the intention I should rather say, of causing the forthcoming arrangement to be embodied in an Act, was dictated solely by the urgency of making the arrangement final, of giving it a more binding character than could be derived from a firman, and for placing it at the least upon a footing of equality with those capitulations to which the French are apt to ascribe the force of Treaties.

After leaving the Foreign Office, I held some conversation with Count Orloff. I found him sanguine as to the negotiations carried on (and, as he observed, carried on slowly) at Constantinople, being brought to a satisfactory close.

He begged me, however, to bear in mind that the Emperor would not, and could not, give way as to points, apparently of insignificant value, but to which great importance was attached by a Sovereign who was bound to respect the religious feelings of his people; those feelings, he said, being in the highest degree sensitive upon all matters connected with the holy places of Jerusalem.

I will not conclude my despatch without stating to your Lordship, as in

justice to Baron Brunnow I am bound to do, that in a private letter to the Chancellor of the $\frac{1}{16}$th instant, he urges the great expediency of using all possible expedition in bringing negotiations at Constantinople to a close, and in releasing the public mind in England from the anxiety which must prevail so long as accounts of pretended diplomatic discussions are coupled with those of continued armaments.

I will again request your Lordship not to allow Baron Brunnow to be aware that I ever see his private letters; some of them were evidently not intended for English eyes, and I am frequently surprised at their being communicated to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 287.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 209.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, April* 30, 1853.

WHEN I saw M. de Séniavine three or four days since, I took occasion to speak to him of the extensive armaments in progress in this country, of which I have heard reports from so many quarters.

M. de Séniavine said he should be glad to know who had reported to me upon the subject.

The list, I replied, would be a long one: I hear the accounts from London, and Berlin, and Odessa, and Constantinople, and Taganrog: to give you the names of the persons who have written to me upon the subject, would be in other words to give a list of my correspondents.

An English gentleman who arrived here three days since, after leaving Odessa on the 12th instant, states that great mystery was observed there as to the movements of the army, and that General Lüders was supposed to know as little as the troops under his command what was their destination.

On his journey to St. Petersburgh the traveller in question observed that the military colonies on the Bug, especially Elizabethgrad, were deserted. Between Toula and Orel near Msensk, he met large trains of ammunition-waggons proceeding south; these, as soldiers informed him, were conveying 3000 pounds of gunpowder. This occurred on the 20th instant.

The accounts brought here by messenger Wright show that the movements of ammunition are not confined to the south of Russia.

On the 10th instant, while proceeding to Berlin, Lieutenant Wright overtook (he believes near Wilkomar), twenty-eight carts loaded with powder; on the 25th instant, whilst on his return to St. Petersburgh, he found a second convoy halting near Dunaburgh—twenty-four waggons were driven up in sight on the face of a hill, and as Lieutenant Wright imagines, he saw only half the number of which the convoy was composed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 288.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 33.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1853.

WITH reference to your despatch, No. 19, of the 20th April, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the objects which you have in view, as reported in that despatch, in regard to the questions under discussion at Constantinople, and also the means by which you have endeavoured to give effect to those objects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 289.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 34.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your timely and successful interference, as reported in your despatch No. 21 of the 25th of April, with a view to promote the adjustment of the questions respecting the holy places.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 290.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 35.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, May* 10, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which, as reported in your despatch No. 25, of the 25th of April, you have given to the Porte, as well with regard to the manner in which it should deal with Prince Menchikoff's proposals respecting the protection of the Greek Church in Turkey, as with regard to the general question of administrative reforms in Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 291.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 315.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 12, 1853.

THE French Government has received despatches from Constantinople up to the 28th ultimo, and I regret to find that their contents are not so favourable, even to the solution of the question of the holy places, as were those of the 25th.

Prince Menchikoff had objected to some of the modifications proposed by M. de la Cour, and particularly to the manner in which he proposed to settle the question of precedence between the Greeks and Latins.

I reminded M. Drouyn de Lhuys that he had told me a few days ago that Prince Menchikoff had acquiesced in M. de la Cour's alterations, and he replied that he had certainly so understood M. de la Cour's despatches of the 25th.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 292.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 211.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May* 5, 1853.

THE Marquis de Castelbajac has read me a despatch which he addressed to his Government by the messenger who left St. Petersburgh on the 30th ultimo. From this it appears that in despite of military preparations, the French Envoy has convinced himself that the intentions of the Imperial Cabinet are

pacific, and that Eastern difficulties are making progress towards a satisfactory solution.

The circumstance which is seen to have produced the greatest effect upon the mind of my colleague, was the feeling with which he states the sinister rumours lately brought here by telegraph to have been received by his Imperial Majesty.

General Castelbajac is persuaded that His Imperial Majesty was among the persons here who were the most distressed and perplexed by the accounts of revolt having broken out in Turkey, and of the Sultan having appealed to Russian forces for assistance.

The despatch concludes by observations as to the urgency of the negotiations at Constantinople being concluded as speedily as possible, and by the suggestion of such full-powers being sent to M. de la Cour as may enable him to close the pending arrangements without being obliged to refer to Paris.

I have, &c
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 293.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 215.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 5, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH no direct intelligence from Constantinople is expected to arrive here before the 6th or 7th instant, Count Nesselrode encouraged me to call upon him yesterday, that I might take the chance of learning something to communicate to your Lordship by the messenger proceeding this day to Berlin.

As Count Nesselrode had conjectured, no later accounts from Prince Menchikoff had reached the Foreign Office.

The Chancellor acquainted me that he had just received despatches from Vienna, which as far as they went were satisfactory; that they spoke of the increased expectation entertained by the Austrian Cabinet of a peaceable solution of Eastern difficulties, and of the improving relations of Austria with Her Majesty's Government.

Count Buol had, it appeared, expressed to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires his warm satisfaction at a communication dated the 19th April, which had been made to him by Lord Westmorland in consequence of orders received from your Lordship and had stated that for a considerable time the same good feeling had not existed between the two Governments.

Reverting to the affair of the holy places, Count Nesselrode said:

"My only remaining fear is that of our not coming to a good understanding with France. As regards the Turks we have no longer any apprehensions, but we believe the French Ambassador not to be provided with sufficiently extensive powers, and fear that the business will hardly be settled without his referring to his Government, or sheltering himself behind a reserve or a protest."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 294.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 217. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 5, 1853.*

ONE of my colleagues remarked to me, the other day, upon the difficulty of comprehending the actual policy of Russia, and of reconciling the objects professedly sought by her at Constantinople, with the amount of military preparations and expenditure which has for some months been observable.

It occurred to me, that if this difficulty was experienced by a sensible man trained to diplomatic pursuits, long resident in this country, and well acquainted

with the Emperor's feelings, it may well be conceived that the doubts thus suggested should be extremely embarrassing to the European public in general.

The explanation, as more generally happens, is not to be sought in one cause. It is, I apprehend, the result of various causes.

First. It must never be forgotten that any question relating to the holy places is of great interest to the Emperor and the whole of his people. It has a great hold upon the personal feelings of the one, and of the religious and fanatical feelings of the other.

Second. The possibility is to be assumed of the decision of the Porte upon the questions set on foot by M. Lavalette being so displeasing to France, that those threats which were uttered with an intemperate disregard of consequences may be acted upon.

In this event the Emperor would be bound in honour to protect the Sultan from injury, and would be still more impelled to do so by attention to that apparently-recognized principle (recognized, that is, in this country), that henceforward the existence of Turkey must be dependent upon the will of her traditional rival; that what happens to her of weal or of woe, must be bestowed or inflicted by Russia.

Third. It is next to be considered, that the influence of the Russian Mission at Constantinople had been allowed to run down, to use an expression which I heard employed by one of the Emperor's most constant associates. During the absence of M. Titoff, and under the direction of M. Ozeroff, the Russian Mission had ceased to speak with the same authority which it had previously possessed in Turkey.

This state of things had been already felt at St. Petersburgh, and it was felt still more keenly after the diplomatic *coup de main* achieved by Count Leiningen had rendered the Emperor Francis more formidable in the eyes of the Turks than the Emperor Nicholas himself.

It was at once held to be desirable that the fears excited by 40,000 Austrian troops should be obliterated by those which the neighbourhood of a Russian force of triple that amount would arouse.

When, to the above considerations is added, that of its being, as it should appear, expedient to subject Turkey to a series of agitations and crisises which shall prevent the country ever recovering any degree of stability; and when it is remembered that the long exercise of unlimited authority over many millions of subjects, and a million of soldiers, has rendered His Majesty a little reckless as to the manner in which he indulges, I will not say his warlike, but his military tastes, it may be the better understood how, without having any actual design of overrunning Turkey, he should have assembled upon her frontiers an amount of force which is generally considered threatening to the existence of a weakened Government and a degenerate race.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 295.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 60.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 16, 1853.*

BARON BRUNNOW has read to me a despatch to himself from Prince Menchikoff, stating that, in the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, he had received important assistance from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, but that with respect to the further demands that he had to make upon the Porte, he had met with opposition from Lord Stratford.

I said, that in not advising the Turkish Ministers to accede to demands that must be prejudicial to the independence of Turkey, Lord Stratford had acted not only according to what he knew must be the policy of Her Majesty's Government, but also in conformity with what he had every reason to believe were the intentions of the Emperor of Russia.

You will learn the nature of these demands from Lord Stratford's despatches, copies of which are forwarded to you.

I also told Baron Brunnow that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Menchikoff could not have authority for seeking to extend the religious influence, and by that means the political power of Russia in Turkey; because Count Nesselrode had informed you, that when once the question of the Holy Places was settled, there would remain nothing but ordinary business for Prince Menchikoff to transact; and moreover, we were in possession of the Emperor's views as to the necessity of upholding the Sultan's independence.

Her Majesty's Government were, therefore, compelled either to think that Prince Menchikoff had exceeded his instructions, or to doubt the assurances they had received; but that the latter alternative was impossible, and had never been entertained. Her Majesty's Government, on the contrary, have felt the extreme advantage of the frank and friendly explanations offered by the Emperor of Russia, which had enabled them entirely to disregard, instead of sharing in, the apprehensions which the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, coupled with the vast military preparations in the south of Russia, had not unnaturally produced throughout Europe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 296.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 328. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 16, 1853.*

I HAVE no doubt that M. de Brunnow will have been directed to communicate to your Lordship a despatch from Count Nesselrode to M. de Kisseleff, dated the 3rd instant, written after the receipt at St. Petersburgh of Prince Menchikoff's despatches of the 16th ultimo.

Prince Menchikoff states that upon three points respecting the Holy Places he had not been able to come to an understanding with M. de la Cour, who intended to refer them to Paris, and Count Nesselrode, in calling M. de Kisseleff's attention to the uselessness of sending a French Ambassador to Constantinople, without giving him full powers to conclude the business with which he was chiefly charged, says that Prince Menchikoff will be forced to conclude the questions at issue with the Porte without the participation of the French Ambassador, and if, in so doing, a general conflagration should be the consequence, the responsibility of it will rest with France.

M. de Kisseleff saw M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of this despatch two days ago. The interview does not appear to have led to any result, nor indeed was it likely that it should do so, since events at Constantinople outstrip any possibility of an arrangement here.

The contents of the telegraphic despatch which I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship this afternoon, show the gravity of the state of affairs at Constantinople on the 7th; for it must have been an extraordinary circumstance that could have induced M. de la Cour, who wrote by the ordinary French boat on the 5th, and would have had another opportunity of writing on the 15th, to despatch on the 7th the war-steamer stationed in the Bosphorus. M. Drouyn de Lhuys expects the despatches brought by the "Chaptal" to-night or to-morrow morning. Those of the 5th will reach him a few hours later.

He has promised to communicate their contents to me immediately. In the meantime, I have impressed upon him the necessity, if he wishes the two Governments to act together, of taking no sudden determination here. He acquiesced in the prudence of this course, and when I asked him whether I might give this assurance to your Lordship, gave his permission without hesitation.

I am happy to add, that although impressed with the gravity of the news which he has received by telegraph, he does not show any signs of excitement or irritation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 297.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 331.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 17, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received last night the despatches brought by the "Chaptal," which boat left Constantinople, as I had the honour to inform your Lordship yesterday, on the 7th instant; but he is not yet in possession of M. de la Cour's previous despatches of the 5th. He is consequently still without accurate information of all the circumstances which have occurred at Constantinople since the 25th ultimo, and which have led to Prince Menchikoff's note of the 5th instant, alluded to in my despatch No. 328.

A copy of this note was brought by the "Chaptal," and M. Drouyn de Lhuys read it to me this morning. It must already be in your Lordship's hands, and I need not allude to its contents except for the purpose of stating the impression produced on the French Government by its contents.

If it shall be found, on the arrival of M. de la Cour's despatches of the 5th, that the question of the holy places has been settled by the two firmans to which reference is made in Prince Menchikoff's note, the French Government has no objection to offer. There is nothing in those firmans, in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' opinion, at variance with the concessions made to the Latins in the note addressed by the Porte to M. de Lavalette on the 8th of February, 1852, and France consequently is perfectly satisfied. But, observed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, these concessions are far less than France has a right to ask under her Capitulations with the Porte; and the aspect of the question becomes changed when the Porte is required, as appears by Prince Menchikoff's note and annex, to engage by a Convention that this state of things shall never be altered. We have no wish or intention to insist on a more literal fulfilment of the rights conferred on France by the Capitulations of 1740, but at the same time we cannot admit that a Convention, signed at the present day between the Porte and Russia, can override prior Treaties signed between the Porte and us.

I observed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys that it would be better not to raise that question now; that there was no use in putting such an axiom upon paper; that as a general proposition it was one in which every one must concur, and that whatever the Porte might sign with Russia could not invalidate the previous engagements of the Porte towards other Powers.

My object in using this language was to prevent any further discussion of the rights of France; at the same time that I admitted that those rights, whatever they might be, remained unimpaired by any transaction of the present day to which France herself was not a party. I doubt however whether, should the Porte consent to give Prince Menchikoff the solemn assurance he demands, France will not reserve her rights, but if so, it will be done, I trust, more as a matter of form, and without comminatory language.

The question of the holy places settled, continued M. Drouyn de Lhuys, there remains the general one of the protectorate demanded by Russia over the Greek Church and religion. Upon this France has no pretension to act alone. Whatever may be the conduct of the Porte, whether she yields the point or not, we have no more interest at stake than have the other great Powers, and we shall be quite ready to consult and act with them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 298.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 7, 1853.*

A PERSON, who assures me that the statement is made upon good authority, acquainted me yesterday that the Russian forces which are assembled in the neighbourhood of the Turkish frontier, now amount to 190,000 men.

For some days a rumour has been spoken, or whispered of, as to the Emperor's intention of visiting his forces in the south. A member of the household assures me that the report is unfounded, and that His Majesty will not leave the neighbourhood of St. Petersburgh until after the great reviews which will take place in July or August.

The Grand Duchess-Dowager of Mecklenburg-Schwerin will leave St. Petersburgh in the course of three or four days, and according to report the Empress is likely to receive a visit from her brother the Prince of Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 299.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 221.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 8, 1853.*

IT is with infinite satisfaction that I beg to acquaint your Lordship that despatches under date of the $\frac{14}{26}$th ultimo, which arrived here this morning, bring intelligence of the details of an arrangement respecting the holy places having been agreed upon between Prince Menchikoff and M. de la Cour.

I am indebted to the Chancellor for the power of making this agreeable communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 300.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 41. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 6, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose in a confidential shape, but for the immediate information of Her Majesty's Government, the copies of an official note and Project of Convention which have been communicated to me this morning by the Ottoman Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, as having been addressed to him the evening before by Prince Menchikoff.

Those papers are so important that I have called upon the commander of Her Majesty's steam-ship "Wasp" to convey them with all possible speed to Syra, where he hopes to overtake the messenger who started yesterday in the French steam-vessel with despatches for London, or, should he fail in that object, to Malta, whence, in some way or other, they will doubtless be forwarded to England.

Prince Menchikoff's decisive communication must appear the more alarming to the Porte, as it has followed close upon the arrival of fresh instructions from Petersburgh, and closer still upon his Excellency's receipt of the firmans and official note which but yesterday terminated with his assent the question of the holy places. That communication is moreover peremptory in fixing a very brief delay for the Porte's definitive reply, and it comprises the Russian *note verbale* of the 10th ultimo in its more formal expression of Russia's demands. It insists on certain unexplained additions to the settlement of the Jerusalem question, but little palatable to France; and, although in some degree moderated in comparison with its original extent, requires, under the name of "guaranty," a concession, the dangerous character of which will not escape your Lordship's observation.

Rifaat Pasha sent for M. Pisani to-day, and placed the accompanying papers in his hands for consideration, observing that they had been sent to him late last night by a cavass or common Turkish attendant on the Russian Embassy, and requesting likewise my opinion at an early hour to-morrow with respect to the course to be pursued by the Porte, and the propriety of communicating the papers in question to the French Embassy, and perhaps also to other friendly

Representatives. His Excellency was much affected by the peremptory form and manner of Prince Menchikoff's communication at a time when the Sultan was labouring under a severe affliction, and the more so as it was accompanied with a continuance of intimidating appearances on the Danube frontier.

The Sultan's Ministers will meet to-morrow in order to take cognizance of the Russian ultimatum, and a more formal council will be assembled on the following day with the view of coming to a final decision respecting the answer to be given.

I must confine myself for the present to this short statement of what has occurred, as any additional delay in the departure of the "Wasp" will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Lord John Hay to overtake the messenger at Syra. Rather too much time has elapsed in making this communication to me, but the public offices being closed to-day, and Rifaat Pasha having been at his country-house, where he received Prince Menchikoff's note, to say nothing of his having to take the Grand Vizier's opinion this morning, there is really no room for complaint or mistrust.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 300.

Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.

Péra, le $\frac{31 \text{ Avril}}{13 \text{ Mai}}$, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a eu l'honneur de remettre à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, le $\frac{19}{31}$ Mars, une communication confidentielle qui accompagnait le Projet d'un Acte devant offrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des garanties solides et inviolables pour l'avenir, dans l'intérêt de l'Eglise Orthodoxe d'Orient.

L'Ambassadeur croyait pouvoir s'attendre à rencontrer de la part du Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte, un désir empressé à renouer sur cette base des relations de bonne et franche amitié avec la Russie. Il doit l'avouer avec un profond régret, il a été ébranlé dans cette conviction qui, dès son début, lui avait été inspirée par l'accueil gracieux de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Animé néanmoins de cet esprit de conciliation et de bienveillance qui forme le fond de la politique de son auguste maître, l'Ambassadeur ne rejete point les observations préalables qui lui furent faites par son Excellence Rifaat Pasha, tant sur la forme de l'Acte précité, que sur la teneur de quelques-uns des Articles qui devaient en faire partie.

Quant à la forme, l'Ambassadeur maintient la déclaration qu'une longue et pénible expérience du passé exige, pour prévenir toute froideur et méfiance entre les deux Gouvernements dans l'avenir, un engagement solennel ayant force de Traité.

Pour le contenu et la rédaction des Articles de cet Acte, il demandait une entente préalable; et voyant avec une peine profonde les retards qu'y apportait le Cabinet Ottoman et son désir évident d'éluder la discussion, il se vit obligé par sa note verbale du $\frac{7}{19}$ Avril, de récapituler ses demandes et de les formuler de la manière la plus pressante.

Ce n'est qu'aujourdhui que la note de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en date du 26 Redjib ($\frac{12 \text{ Avril}}{24 \text{ Mai}}$) accompagnant les copies vidimées des deux ordres souverains sur les sanctuaires de Jérusalem et la coupole du Saint Sépulcré, est parvenue à l'Ambassadeur. Il considère cette communication comme une suite donné aux deux premières demandes contenues dans sa note du $\frac{7}{19}$ Avril, et se fera un devoir de placer ces documents sous les yeux de son Gouvernement.

Mais n'ayant obtenu jusqu'ici aucune réponse au troisième et plus important point qui réclame des garanties pour l'avenir, et ayant tout récemment reçu l'ordre de redoubler d'insistance pour arriver à la solution immédiate de la question qui forme le principal objet de la sollicitude de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, l'Ambassadeur se voit dans l'obligation de s'adresser aujourd'hui à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en renfermant cette fois-ci ses réclamations dans les dernières limites des directions supérieures.

Les bases de l'arrangement qu'il est chargé d'obtenir, restent dans leur fond les mêmes.

Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, et ses possessions, jouiront dans l'avenir, sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, et, dans une principe de haute équité, participeront aux avantages accordé aux autres rits Chrétiens.

Le nouveau firman explicatif sur les lieux saints de Jérusalem, aura la valeur d'un engagement formel envers le Gouvernement Impérial.

A Jérusalem, les religieux et les pélerins Russes sont assimilés aux prérogatives des autres nations étrangères.

Ces points indiqués ici sommairement, formeront l'objet d'un Séned qui attestera de la confiance réciproque des deux Gouvernements.

Dans cet Acte les objections et difficultés exprimées à plusieurs reprises par son Excellence Rifaat Pasha, et quelques-uns de ses collègues, ont été prises en consideration, comme son Excellence le verra par la minute d'un Séned que l'Ambassadeur a l'honneur de joindre à la présente note.

L'Ambassadeur se flatte de l'espoir que désormais la juste attente de son auguste maître ne sera pas trompée, et que mettant de côté toute hésitation et toute méfiance dont sa dignité et ses sentiments généreux auraient à souffrir, la Sublime Porte ne tardera plus à transmettre à l'Ambassadeur Impérial les décisions souveraines de Sa Majesté le Sultan, en réponse à la présente notification.

C'est dans cette espérance que l'Ambassadeur prie son Excellence Rifaat Pasha de vouloir bien lui faire parvenir cette réponse jusqu'à Mardi prochain, le $\frac{24 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$. Il ne pourrait considérer un plus long délai que comme un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait le plus pénibles obligations.

L'Ambassadeur offre à son Excellence l'assurance, &c.

(Signé). MENCHIKOFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 300.

Project of Convention.

SA Majesté l'Empereur et Padishah des Ottomans et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, dans le désir commun de maintenir la stabilité du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe professé par la majorité de leurs sujets Chrétiens, et de garantir ce culte de tout empiètement à l'avenir, ont designé.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans
et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies ;

lesquels, après s'être expliqués, sont convenus de ce qui suit.

ARTICLE I.

Il ne sera apporté aucun changement aux droits, privilèges, et immunités dont ont joui, ou sont en possession *ab antiquo*, les églises, les institutions pieuses, et le clergé orthodoxe dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, qui se plait à leur assurer à tout jamais sur la base du *status quo* strict existant aujourd'hui.

ARTICLE II.

Les droits et avantages concédés par le Gouvernement Ottoman, ou qui le seront à l'avenir, aux autres cultes Chrétiens par Traités, Conventions, ou dispositions particulières, seront considérés comme appartenant aussi aux culte orthodoxe.

ARTICLE III.

Etant reconnu et constaté par les traditions historiques et par de nombreux documents que l'Eglise Grecque orthodoxe de Jérusalem, que son patriarcat, et

les évêques qui sont subordonnés, ont été de tout temps depuis l'époque des Calif et sous les règnes successifs de tous les Empereurs Ottomans, particulièrement protégés, honorés, et confirmés dans leurs anciens droits et leurs immunités, la Sublime Porte, dans sa sollicitude pour la conscience et les convictions religieuses de ses sujets de ce culte, ainsi que de tous les Chrétiens qui la professent et dont la piété a été alarmée par divers évènements, promet de maintenir et de faire respecter ces droits et ces immunités tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'au-dehors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes d'indigènes, rayas, ou étrangers, admis à l'adoration du Saint Sépulcre et des autres sanctuaires, soit en commun avec les Grecs, soit dans leurs oratoires séparés.

ARTICLE IV.

Sa Majesté le Sultan aujourd'hui glorieusement régnant, ayant jugé nécessaire et equitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hatty-humayun au milieu de la lune de Rebi-ul-Akhir, 1268 (fin de Janvier, v. s. 1852), par son firman souverain du , et d'ordonner en sus par un autre firman en date , la réparation de la grande coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés pour maintenir à jamais le *status quo* strict des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est convenu que l'on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation de quelques points de détail qui n'ont pas trouvé place dans les firmans précités.

ARTICLE V.

Les sujets de l'Empire de Russie tant séculiers qu'ecclésiastiques, auxquels il est permis suivant les Traités de visiter la sainte ville de Jérusalem et autres lieux de dévotion, devant être traités et considérés à l'égal des sujets des nations les plus favorisés, et celles-ci tant Catholiques que Protestantes ayant leurs prélats et leurs établissements ecclésiastiques particuliers, la Sublime Porte s'engage, pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie lui en fera la demande, d'assigner une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

ARTICLE VI.

Il est entendu que par le présent Acte motivé par des circonstances exceptionnels, il n'est dérogé à aucune des stipulations existantes entre les deux Cours, et que tous les Traités antérieurs, corroborés par l'Acte séparé du Traité d'Andrinople, conservent toute leur force et valeur.

Les six Articles qui précèdent ayant été arrêtés et conclus, notre signature et le cachet de nos armes ont été apposés au présent Acte, qui est remis à la Sublime Porte Ottomane en échange de celui qui nous est remis par précités.

Fait à le mil huit cent cinquante trois, et de l'Hégire .

(Signé)

Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plenipotentiaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies près la Sublime Porte Ottomane.

Inclosure 3 in No. 300.

Note Verbale by Prince Menchikoff.

Péra, le 7/8 Avril, 1853.

SON Excellence le Ministre des Relations Extérieures en prenant connaissance, à son entrée aux affaires, des négociations qui ont eu lieu, a vu la

duplicité de ses prédécesseurs; il doit s'être persuadé combien on a manqué aux égards dus à l'Empereur de Russie, et combien est grande sa magnanimité en offrant à la Porte les moyens de sortir des embarras que lui a créé la mauvaise foi de ses Ministres. Ils ont abusé de la religion de leur Souverain en le mettant en opposition avec ses propres paroles, et le plaçant envers son allié et son ami, dans une position que ne peuvent admettre ni de hautes convenances ni la dignité souveraine.

Tout en voulant être oublieux du passé, et n'exigeant pour réparation que le renvoi d'un Ministre fallacieux, et l'exécution patente de promesses solennelles, l'Empereur se trouvait obligé de demander des garanties solides pour l'avenir.

Il les veut formelles, positives, et assurant l'inviolabilité du culte professé par la majorité des sujets Chrétiens, tant de la Sublime Porte que de la Russie, et enfin par l'Empereur lui-même.

Il ne peut en vouloir d'autres que celles qu'il trouvera désormais dans un Acte équivalent à un Traité, et à l'abri des interprétations d'un mandataire mal-avisé et peu consciencieux.

Les délais qu'on a apporté jusqu'ici à prendre une décision finale sur les propositions de l'Ambassadeur de Russie, l'obligent à demander à la Porte une réponse catégorique et qu'il ne pourrait attendre plus longtemps. Il demande par conséquent:

1. Un firman explicatif, et dont la rédaction serait convenue, concernant la clef de l'Eglise de Bethléem, l'étoile en argent placée sur l'autel de la Nativité dans le souterrain de ce même sanctuaire;

La possession de la Grotte de Gethsémanie par les Grecs, avec l'admission des Latins à y exercer leur culte, mais tout en conservant la préséance des orthodoxes, et leur priorité pour la célébration du service divin dans ce sanctuaire;

Et enfin, concernant la possession commune des Grecs avec les Latins des jardins de Bethléem;

Le tout d'après les bases discutées entre Son Excellence Rifaat Pasha et l'Ambassadeur.

2. Un ordre suprême—

Pour la réparation immédiate par le Gouvernement Ottoman de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, avec la participation du Patriarche Grec, sans l'ingérence d'un délégué d'un autre culte;

Pour la clôture murée des lucarnes ayant vue dans ce sanctuaire, et pour la démolition des harems attenants à la coupole, si la possibilité de cette démolition était prouvée.

L'Ambassadeur est chargé d'obtenir sur ces points une assurance et une notification formelles.

3. Un Séned ou Convention pour la garantie du *statu quo* strict des privilèges du culte Catholique Greco-Russe de l'Eglise d'Orient, et des sanctuaires qui se trouvent en possession de ce culte exclusivement ou en participation avec d'autres rites à Jerusalem.

L'Ambassadeur doit répéter ici à M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures ce qu'il a déjà été dans le cas de lui exprimer plusieurs fois, que la Russie ne demande pas à la Porte des concessions politiques; son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui est, et de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps.

C'est donc à la suite des tendances hostiles qui se sont manifestées depuis quelques années envers tout ce qui touche à la Russie, qu'elle requiert dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe, un Acte explicatif et positif de garantie—Acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances.

Le Cabinet Ottoman voudra bien aussi peser dans sa sagesse la gravité de l'offense commise en la comparant à la modération des demandes de réparation et de garantie que le sentiment de légitime défense aurait pu poser dans un sens plus étendu et plus péremptoire.

La réponse de M. le Ministre des Relations Extérieures indiquera à l'Ambassadeur les devoirs ultérieurs qu'il aura à remplir, et qui ne pourront être que conformes au maintien de la dignité du Gouvernement qu'il représente et de la religion que professe son Souverain.

No. 301.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 19.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 3, 1853.

THOUGH more than a week has elapsed since I was entitled to consider the question of the holy places as virtually settled, I am still unable to report its formal and definitive conclusion. Two firmans, embodying the terms of the arrangement, have been prepared and communicated to the Embassies of France and Russia. These firmans, being accepted by both parties, are to be invested with the usual forms and again communicated to the two Embassies, with an official note addressed respectively to each. Of the firmans and note, as intended for communication, I have now the honour to inclose copies, in the hope that those shadows of mystery and indecision which still float over them, will soon be dispersed for ever.

I am, nevertheless, informed that the note has met with some opposition in the Council, and that it is now before the Sultan with the disadvantage of having been rejected by a majority of that assembly.

The firmans and the note were both referred to me for consideration before they were finally adopted by the Ministers, and I suggested two or three alterations in the latter, which were approved by the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha. I have since addressed myself in private to the Sultan, urging him to confirm the decision of his Ministers, and to empower them to make their final communication without further delay. As Russia continues to insist upon a guarantee, the note may fairly be preferred by them as being the simplest form of compliance with that requisition.

Your Lordship may rest assured that I have spared no pains to hasten the conclusion of this delicate and protracted question.

Unfortunately the dangerous illness of the Sultan's mother, and the lateness of the Greek Easter, have furnished excuses for hesitation and delay. Petty additions or changes, proposed by interested parties after the main points were settled, have not been set aside without a strong remonstrance on my part.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 301.

Draft of Firman.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Gouverneur du Sandjak de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à toi, Cadi de Jérusalem, j'ordonne:

Comme la grande coupole de l'Eglise de la Résurrection (le Saint Sépulcre) a besoin d'être réparée, que les réparations ont été différées à cause de quelques contestations qui sont survenues, et que maintenant toute contestation à cet égard a cessé, mon Conseil des Ministres, après avoir délibéré sur cette question, a pris les résolutions suivantes:

Pour donner une preuve de ma munificence Souveraine, ma Sublime Porte nommera et expédiera exprès un Commissaire chargé de réparer la coupole susmentionnée, sous mes auspices, en mon nom, et sur le même plan. Si l'on fait quelque chose qui n'est pas conforme au plan sur lequel la coupole se trouve actuellement bâtie, le Patriarche Grec sera autorisé à faire des représentations à cet égard. Et attendu qu'il ne convient pas de démolir les maisons attenantes à l'Eglise de la Résurrection parcequ'elles sont un hospice et un oratoire, si ces maisons ont des fenêtres qui donnent sur l'eglise, on les murera.

Mes ordres étant que les dispositions ci-dessus soient mises à exécution, et présent firman Impérial qui renferme ces dispositions est émané de mon Divan Impérial et expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur et Cadi susmentionnés, informés que vous serez qu'il a été résolu que la coupole susdite sera réparée sur le même plan dans

lequel elle se trouve actuellement par l'entremise du commissaire *ad hoc* et de la part de ma Sublime Porte, vous vous empresserez de porter cela à la connaissance du public.

Ayez-le pour entendu et ayez confiance dans le noble signe qui décore le présent firman Impérial.

Inclosure 2 in No. 301.

Draft of Firman.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, mon Vizir, Gouverneur du Sandjak, de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à mon Cadi, Muftis, et Lieutenant Naquib-el-Eshref de Jérusalem, j'ordonne:

Il est superflu de dire que la Commission établie, il y a quelque temps, pour l'aplanissement des différends survenus entre les nations Grecque et Latine, et le Conseil des Ministres, ayant à plusieurs reprises discuté cette question, il a été arrêté ce qui suit.

La clef de la porte de la Grande Eglise qu'il y a dans le village de Bethléem, et une clef de chacune des deux portes qu'il y a du côté du nord et du côté du sud de la grotte où naquit Jésus (que la paix de Dieu soit sur lui!), resteront comme *ab antiquo* entre les mains des Latins.

Les deux jardins attenant au Convent Franc resteront comme par le passé sous la surveillance des deux parties.

L'autorisation que les Catholiques ont depuis un ancien temps d'exercer aussi leur culte dans la Chapelle du Tombeau de Sainte Marie, comme les autres nations, leur est confirmée.

Désormais la nation Grecque aussi officiera et priera comme les Latins dans l'intérieur de la coupole de l'Ascension au Mont Olivette.

Les susdites dispositions ont été mises à exécution sur les lieux mêmes en vertu d'un firman émané et orné de mon rescrit Impérial.

Les autres points qui restaient ont aussi été discutés afin qu'ils servent de complément aux dispositions susmentionnées, et ayant été modifiés de commun accord ils ont été inscrits dans un mémoire qui renferme plusieurs Articles que voici.

Si une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem a été donné aux Latins, c'est pour qu'ils aient, comme ils l'avaient anciennement, le droit de passage dans cette église; on ne leur a pas donné par là le droit d'y officier ou le droit de possession en commun avec les Grecs; on ne leur a pas donné le droit de changer le *statu quo* de cette église ou d'y officier; on n'a donné à aucune des parties la faculté d'introduire quelque nouveauté, soit par rapport au passage de cette église pour se rendre à la grotte, soit à d'autres égards, et de changer ainsi la règle suivie tant anciennement qu'à présent.

Attendu que le portier de l'église susmentionnée a été un prêtre Grec, sujet de ma Sublime Porte, depuis un très ancien temps, et que ce portier n'est nullement autorisé à empêcher les nations qui ont droit d'entrée d'y entrer, le même système sera suivi à cet égard comme par le passé.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a fait mettre dans la Grotte de l'Eglise de Bethléem comme un souvenir public qu'il laisse à la nation Chrétienne, à la place de l'Etoile qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, une autre Etoile tout-à-fait pareille, et cela afin de mettre fin aux contestations qui s'étaient élevées à cet égard; mais cette Etoile ne confère à aucune des nations Chrétiennes un droit nouveau quelconque, et il n'y aura aucun changement à ce sujet.

Les nations qui ont le droit d'exercer leur culte dans la Chapelle du Tombeau de la Bienheureuse Marie et de visiter cette chapelle, la visiteront et exerceront leur culte tous les jours, et à condition de n'être pas un obstacle à ce que d'autres nations aussi visitent cette chapelle et y exercent leur culte.

Les Grecs y exerceront leur culte chaque matin depuis le lever du soleil jusqu'à une heure-et-demie après le lever du soleil; après eux les Arméniens y exerceront leur culte pendant une heure-et-demie; et après les Arméniens, les Latins y exerceront leur culte pendant deux heures: dispositions arrêtées et qui

seront mises à exécution sous l'autorité et avec la permission de ma Sublime Porte.

Les deux jardins qui sont contigus au Convent Franc continueront d'être sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine, et l'on en usera comme on en a usé jusqu'à présent sans aucun droit privilégié pour aucune des deux parties.

Toutes ces dispositions resteront telles qu'elles sont, attendu qu'il n'y a pas des nouvelles concessions faites à une nation quelconque par des documents formels.

Tous les lieux saints que les nations Grecque, Latine, et Arménienne possèdent actuellement à Jérusalem, soit en commun, soit exclusivement, resteront tels quels en leur possession pour toujours.

Voilà ce qui est écrit dans le rapport de la Commission; et comme tous ces points ont été discutés et approuvés dans les Conseils tenus par mes Ministres et soumis à ma sanction souveraine, j'ai ordonné et ordonne qu'ils les mettent à exécution tels qu'ils sont écrits; et en conséquence le présent firman Impérial émané du Divan Impérial, et orné de mon khatti-chérif, a été expedié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur, Cadi, Muftis, et autres susmentionnés, informés que vous serez de tout ce que ci-dessus, vous ferez enrégistrer ce commandement Impérial au mahkémé, et vous agirez toujours et à tout jamais conformément à son noble contenu. Ayez-le pour entendu, et ayez confiance dans l'auguste signe qui le décore.

Inclosure 3 in No. 301.

Note addressed to the Ambassadors of Russia and France.

COPIE est transmise à votre Excellence du firman, orné d'un khatti-chérif, qui est destiné à servir de conclusion et de complément aux différends qui existaient entre les nations Grecque et Latine au sujet des lieux saints à Jérusalem, et qui renferme la décision prise dernièrement en définitive, soit par rapport à ces lieux saints, soit par rapport à la réparation de la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre.

Et comme c'est la volonté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan que les dispositions de ce firman soient invariablement et pour toujours mises à exécution complétement, je m'empresse d'en informer votre Excellence par cette note officielle, en saisissant, &c.

No. 302.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 5, 1853.*

EVEN if I had the necessary time at my disposal, I should hardly think it worth while to trouble your Lordship with the particulars of my long conversation with M. d'Ozeroff. As soon as Prince Menchikoff is well enough to receive me, I shall probably have to go over the same ground again, and his previous knowledge of my sentiments in the present stage of his discussions with the Porte, will help to bring on, if he be so inclined, a more complete disclosure of his real views. The present appearances are that the Emperor of Russia, though moderate in his requisitions as to form, and in some measure as to terms also, is determined to obtain a treaty guaranty for the strict execution of the Porte's engagements, as well with respect to the holy places as for the protection of the Greco-Russian Church throughout Turkey; and that Prince Menchikoff, on failing in the attainment of this object by means of negotiation, will break off his relations with the Porte, and open the door for his Government to take any measures more or less coercive on the Porte, which the Emperor's policy or sense of offended dignity may prescribe.

The Porte will not accept the Ambassador's proposals, as embodied in the *projet*, of which I transmitted a copy to your Lordship soon after my arrival here. I do not see how it is possible for the Porte to accept them without disparaging her authority, and endangering her independence. It remains to be seen whether by standing to a refusal of those demands, and at the same time affording Prince Menchikoff an opening for other more moderate propositions, she may gain the advantage of either carrying with her the favourable opinion of Europe, should Russia resort to strong measures, or of embarking in a negotiation capable of terminating in a safe and durable adjustment of differences.

My counsels are requested in face of this dilemma, and such are the difficulties and dangers of the case under its present appearances, that in giving them, I stand in need of all the indulgence of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 303.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 38.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 5, 1853.*

SINCE I addressed your Lordship on the 3rd instant, I have had some further conversation with M. de la Cour, M. de Klezl, and M. d'Ozeroff, Principal Secretary of the Russian Embassy. I called on Prince Menchikoff, but did not find him at home. He has had a return of his previous indisposition, and is now confined to his bed.

It results from these several communications that the two firmans and official note prepared at the Porte with reference to the holy places, would suffice to terminate that portion of the pending questions in a manner satisfactory to the respective Parties; but that a certain degree of doubt and uneasiness is still kept up by the variable language and procrastination of the Turkish Ministers. It is more than time for this ill-omened vacillation to cease, and my opinion has been strongly and repeatedly expressed, not only to the Grand Vizier and Rifaat Pasha, but even to the Sultan himself. The Grand Vizier was to see His Majesty this morning, for the express purpose of engaging him to declare his final decision without further delay.

I had scarcely finished the preceding sentence, when I was interrupted by a report from M. Pisani, whom I had sent to obtain intelligence from Rifaat Pasha before the departure of the messenger. He writes me word that the Sultan has sanctioned the firmans and the note, and that they have been immediately forwarded to the Russian Embassy with the date of this day, and, as I understand from M. Pisani's letter, in the terms already made known to your Lordship. If any alteration has been introduced, either into the firman or into the note, it will appear from the copies, which have been also sent in a more official manner to this Embassy, together with a memorandum suggested by me, and intended, I believe, for communication to other friendly Powers, as well as to Her Majesty's Government.

It will scarcely be possible for me to receive the translations of these papers in time for transmission to your Lordship by the present opportunity; but I may be allowed to congratulate your Lordship upon the peaceful termination of those discussions, respecting the holy places, which have so long occupied the attention and threatened the tranquillity of Europe.

The difficulties which unfortunately remain to be overcome before the relations of the Porte with Russia can be settled on a stable and friendly basis, appear, from my last communications with the Russian Embassy, to be still of a very serious character. I hope, nevertheless, that it will not be impossible for me to contribute towards so desirable a result, by persevering in that line of conciliation and firmness of which I have hitherto found no reason to repent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 304.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 334.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith an article published in the "Moniteur" of yesterday, relative to the present state of affairs at Constantinople. Your Lordship will remark that it is written in terms which accord perfectly with the language held to me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

Nevertheless it is to be regretted that it should have been published, nor is it possible to overrate the mischief which is done by these almost official declarations of the French Government. I believe that the object of the Government in the present instance was to calm the agitation which had begun to manifest itself in the money market in consequence of the vagueness of the reports circulated as coming from Constantinople; but your Lordship will probably agree with me that that object could have been attained without employing language which can hardly fail to irritate the Russian Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 304.

Extract from the "Moniteur."

Paris, le 17 Mai.

ON avait pu craindre, au moment où M. le Prince Menchikoff se rendit à Constantinople en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, que l'un des effets de sa mission ne fût d'annuler en partie les concessions obtenues par M. de Lavalette au profit des pères Latins de Terre Sainte dans le courant de 1852. On se rappelle que, sur la demande de la Légation de France, le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse avait consenti à restituer au Patriarche de Jérusalem, délégué du Saint Siége, la clef de la grande porte de l'Église de Bethléem, à donner l'ordre de replacer dans la Grotte de la Nativité une étoile ornée d'une inscription Latine et qui avait disparu en 1847; et enfin à accorder à la communion Catholique le droit de célébrer son culte dans un sanctuaire vénéré, l'église dite du Tombeau de la Vierge.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale ne pouvait admettre qu'aucun de ces avantages fût retiré aux Latins. Le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, du reste, transmit bientôt au Cabinet des Tuileries l'assurance que son intention n'était pas de contraindre la Porte à revenir sur les concessions qui nous avaient été faites.

Les dernières nouvelles de Constantinople, apportées par l'aviso-à-vapeur le "Chaptal," en date du 7 Mai, nous permettent d'affirmer que le maintien du *statu quo* à Jérusalem, réclamé par M. le Prince Menchikoff, n'implique, dans l'état de possessions des Latins, aucune modification susceptible d'affecter l'arrangement convenu avec M. le Marquis de Lavalette. C'était là, pour nous, le point essentiel, celui qui ne pouvait être, de notre part, l'objet d'aucune transaction. Quant à nos anciens Traités avec la Turquie, nul acte diplomatique, nulle résolution de la Porte ne saurait les invalider sans le consentement de la France.

M. le Prince Menchikoff demande encore au Divan la conclusion d'un Traité qui placerait sous la garantie de la Russie les droits et les immunités de l'église et du clergé du rite Grec. Cette question, complétement différent de celle des lieux saints, touche à des intérêts dont la Turquie doit, la première, apprécier la valeur. Si elle amenait quelques complications, elle deviendrait une question de politique Européenne, dans laquelle la France se trouverait engagée au même titre que les autres Puissances signataires du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841.

No. 305.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 339.)

Paris, May 19, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS mentioned to me to-day that he had despatches of the 9th from St. Petersburgh, stating that Count Nesselrode had congratulated General Castelbajac on the settlement of the question of the holy places, calling the General to bear witness to the moderate and conciliatory conduct of the Russian Government, and to the loyalty with which he (Count Nesselrode) had adhered to his word.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 306.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 340.)

Paris, May 19, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE I addressed your Lordship the day before yesterday, M. Drouyn de Lhuys has received M. de la Cour's despatches of the 5th instant. On that day M. de la Cour had received the assurances of the Turkish Government, that the question of the sacred places was settled by the two firmans, of which your Lordship has knowledge. His despatches contain nothing else of importance.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me this morning that he had yesterday sent instructions to M. de la Cour respecting the attitude he was to take under the new phase which Eastern affairs had assumed. Not, he said, that these instructions could reach that Ambassador in time, but that he wished to put on record the opinions of the French Government.

With regard to the question of the holy places, M. de la Cour is authorized to state that the French Government is satisfied. The present arrangement is the arrangement made by M. de Lavalette, and France has consequently nothing to say against it. M. de la Cour is enjoined neither to protest nor to make reserves.

But with respect to the question of a Convention which is to guarantee to Russia the *status quo* at Jerusalem for ever, M. de la Cour is told that France cannot recognize the principle that any third Power may use her greater influence to invalidate Treaties existing between two other Powers, but he is not desired to make any declaration on the subject. Indeed, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes that an assurance of the continuation of the *status quo* is more valuable to France than Russia, as modern history proves that the Latins have much more to apprehend from the encroachment of the Greeks, than the Greeks have to fear from the encroachments of the Latins.

Finally, M. de la Cour is instructed to give his opinion freely as to the fatal results which, in the opinion of the French Government, must attend a Russian protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Porte; but he is not to take upon himself the responsibility of exciting the Ottoman Government to refuse the demands of Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 307.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 42.)

Constantinople, May 9, 1853.

My Lord,

SINCE I transmitted to you on the 6th instant what may be called Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, though he has prudently, and I hope with intention, avoided the use of that word, my time has been entirely occupied with communications relating to it. Your Lordship may easily conceive that so abrupt and peremptory a step could not be taken in secret, and that the public would not be slow in catching the excitement, and sharing the apprehensions of the Porte.

The Russian note and accompanying *Projet* were conveyed to me with a request from the Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that I would acquaint him with my impressions respecting them at an early hour next morning, preparatory to a meeting of the Council.

In reply to this message, I suggested what follows:

1. To make the communication of the Russian papers common to the British and French Embassies in a strictly confidential form.

2. To prepare a written answer to the Russian declaration as exhibited in the official note, the *Projet de Sened*, and the *note verbale* of April the 19th.

3. To frame the answer in a spirit of conciliation and firmness, giving every assurance of a cordial intention on the side of the Porte to act towards Russia on principles of strict good faith and friendly consideration; to place in their proper light, clearly but temperately, the proceedings and requisitions of Russia in connection with Prince Menchikoff's embassy; and to declare, notwithstanding, an unalterable readiness to entertain his Excellency's propositions, in so far as they were free from objections bearing on the Sovereign dignity and independence of the Sultan, however superfluous they might be as to the question of the Holy Places in Palestine already settled to the satisfaction of all parties; to redress any grievances fairly made out on behalf of the Greek Church, and to confirm and carry into effect all the established rights and privileges secured already by Imperial favour to the Christian religion, and its ecclesiastical property throughout the Empire.

4. To communicate the note containing an answer of this kind, together with the three abovementioned documents, to the Representatives of the four great Powers who, in common with Russia, were parties to the Treaty of 1841.

The Secretary of State conferred with the Grand Vizier, and expressed his satisfaction with the advice which I had tendered; authorizing me at the same time to place the Russian papers, as confidentially as they had been sent to me, in the hands of the French Ambassador.

My next step was to see M. de la Cour. I found his Excellency at home, and after reading the documents in our possession, we talked over their contents and the general features of the crisis, with a total absence of reserve, equally, in so far as I could perceive, on his part as on my own. I left him with the impression that we were both on the same ground; that he, no more than myself, contemplated an appeal to the squadrons without express orders from home; that he disapproved of the proposed Sened, even in point of form; that he fully appreciated the dangers involved in the terms of its first and second Articles, and deprecated the peremptory attitude assumed by the Russian Ambassador; at the same time that he entered into all those considerations which naturally result from the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and the occasional imprudence of its Government.

We separated with an understanding that each of us would see the Turkish Ministers and Prince Menchikoff, holding to both parties the same kind of language, and meeting again afterwards for our mutual information.

The Russian Ambassador called upon me and also upon M. de la Cour in the course of the day. His visit to me had the air of a private attention, irrespective of politics. I took occasion, however, to bring up the topic nearest to my thoughts, and also, in all probability, to his also. Avoiding with care any warmth of expression which might lead to an unpleasant discussion, I intimated a strong impression that the Porte was not more likely to accept his new than

his original *Projet*, and added such remarks as I thought best calculated to incline him, if it were still possible, to a reconsideration of the most exceptionable part of his demands. My endeavours were to no purpose. He would not admit that his propositions lay open to any unfavourable construction. He gave me to understand that having run out the whole line of his moderation, he could go no further; and that his Government could no longer submit to the scale of inferiority in which he pretended that Russia was held, with respect to those who in this country profess the same religious tenets as the Emperor Nicholas himself. It was to no purpose that I reminded him of the unexpected length to which he had carried his pretensions, and the immense difference which exists between the position of Russia, with respect to its millions of co-religionists in Turkey, and that of France or of Austria, with respect to the small number of Catholics placed by Treaty, to a certain degree, under their protection.

Late at night I saw the Grand Vizier at his country-house on the Bosphorus. Rifaat Pasha and the Seraskier were present at our interview. We went at once into the subject of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, and before I declared any opinion of my own, I found them unanimous in regarding the Convention proposed by him as inadmissible. The only question between us was by what means the impending danger might be warded off without any essential sacrifice, and the Porte justified towards Europe in exposing itself to the hazard of a rupture with Russia. I advised them to open a door for negotiation in the note to be prepared, and to withhold no concession compatible with the real welfare and independence of the Empire. I could not in conscience urge them to accept the Russian demands as now presented to them, but I reminded them of the guaranty required by Prince Menchikoff, and strongly recommended that, if the guaranty he required was inadmissible, a substitute for it should be found in a frank and comprehensive exercise of the Sultan's authority, in the promulgation of a firman securing both the spiritual and temporal privileges of all the Porte's tributary subjects, and by way of further security communicated officially to the five great Powers of Christendom.

In rising to take leave, I was asked by the Grand Vizier whether any reliance could be placed on the eventual approach of Her Majesty's squadron in the Mediterranean. I replied that I considered the position in its present stage to be one of a moral character, and consequently that its difficulties or hazards, whatever they might be, should be rather met by acts of a similar description than by demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resentment.

On comparing notes the next day with M. de la Cour, I found him under an impression that the Turkish Ministers were disposed to shrink from encountering the consequences of Prince Menchikoff's retirement in dudgeon, and that the Prince himself showed no inclination whatever to abate a particle of his pretensions in so far as their essential points were concerned. It appeared to me that M. de la Cour was quite as anxious as I could be for an amicable settlement of the questions at issue, but he was no more prepared than myself, as I understood him, to counsel the Porte to accept Prince Menchikoff's project, and his disapproval of the form of a Sened was carried further than I think advisable in view of ulterior contingencies.

The day before yesterday Prince Menchikoff went into the country, with the intention, as I am informed, of not returning till to-night. He has, however, returned to town this morning, and the general expectation is that he will retire with the whole Embassy unless the Porte should signify its acceptance of his ultimatum to-morrow.

Meanwhile, I have determined to offer one more chance for the preservation of friendly relations between Turkey and Russia. Not being able to see Prince Menchikoff in time, I have addressed him in writing, adopting a confidential form to avoid offence, but stating the general opinions with the frankness which the interests at stake and my official character alike require under circumstances of such critical urgency.

The hurry in which I was compelled to draw up my letter entitles me to your Lordship's indulgence, and should it appear to Her Majesty's Government that my zeal in the cause of peace and national independence has carried me in any degree beyond the bounds of diplomatic discretion, I am content to bear the reproach and its accompanying regret.

The Porte, on its side, has made a further attempt at conciliation by proposing an interview between Prince Menchikoff and the Grand Vizier.

I grieve to say that the former has declined this overture, and that the Porte, having expressed its regret, while inferring that Russia intended to close the door of negotiation, received for answer that the Prince could only consent to enter into further discussion on learning that the bases of his ultimatum were accepted.

Informed that the steam-packet is preparing to start, I have no choice but to bring my despatch to an immediate conclusion, with this addition, that I have seen the Sultan in private this morning, and cannot conceal from your Lordship my impression that in all probability the Russian Embassy will withdraw to Odessa under circumstances which give ample room for the worst conjectures and even for the most painful apprehensions.

The Council is sitting at this moment, but the final result of its deliberations cannot be known for two or three hours to come.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I forward herewith a copy of my confidential despatch to Prince Menchikoff.

Inclosure in No. 307.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Prince Menchikoff.

(Confidentielle.)

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Péra, le 8 Mai*, 1853.

VOTRE départ pour la campagne m'oblige d'avoir recours à la plume pour vous entretenir des affaires qui dans ce moment occupent péniblement tous les esprits capables de réflexion. Si je devais me justifier d'une démarche qui a pour motif le désir de contribuer à la solution amicale d'un état de choses compliqué, pour ne pas dire menaçant, je me rapporterais aux grands principes déclarés par le Cinq Puissances en faveur de l'indépendance et de l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman dans l'année 1840. Mais il m'est plus agréable de citer les communications franches et confidentielles qui ont eu lieu à St. Pétersbourg et à Londres entre nos Gouvernements respectifs au sujet de votre Ambassade, et de tirer quelque espoir rassurant de celles qui, marquées au même coin, se sont passées ici entre votre Altesse et moi.

Il résulte des premières que la Cour de Russie, non moins que celle que j'ai l'honneur de représenter, continuerait à respecter l'indépendance de la Porte et désirerait la voir à l'abri de toute secousse qui pourrait ébranler les bases de sa tranquillité. Nous étions fondés à croire que les demandes de la Russie, adressées au Gouvernement Ottoman par votre intermédiaire, seraient bornées aux strictes exigences de l'affaire des Saints Lieux de la Palestine, et qu'il n'entrait pas dans les vues de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie de chercher aucune extension de droit ou de pouvoir dans ce pays-ci au-delà de ce que lui assurent les Traités existans.

Malgré que les propositions soumises par votre Altesse aux Ministres de la Porte avaient pris de proportions qui, à mon avis, n'étaient pas exactement conformes à ces impressions, les déclarations que vous avez bien voulu me faire de temps à autre, dans nos entretiens, me laissaient dans l'assurance que les mêmes sentiments de modération et de respect pour l'autorité souveraine de la Porte qui se manifestaient à St. Pétersbourg ne manqueraient pas en dernière analyse, de votre côté, aux négociations ici. Je me plaisais dans cette conviction à employer mes bons offices dans les limites d'une stricte discrétion diplomatique, pour écarter les incertitudes qui pesaient encore sur la question des lieux saints, et je me flattais de l'espoir que la conclusion satisfaisante de cette affaire amènerait une heureuse entente par rapport à ce que les parties en litige pourraient avoir encore à régler entr'elles.

J'ai besoin de toute votre indulgence, M. l'Ambassadeur, quand je vous avoue la difficulté que j'éprouve en cherchant à concilier le ton et la portée de vos dernières démarches avec les dispositions que je me croyais, pour ainsi dire, en droit de vous attribuer. Usant de la franchise qui convient dans ce moment de crise à ceux qui professent d'être guidés par les mêmes principes, je ne saurais vous cacher combien me semblent insurmontables les objections

qui s'opposent à ce que la Porte accepte volontairement les premières Articles de votre projet de Sened. Permettez que je sollicite en termes généraux votre attention au caractère et à l'étendue des propositions qu'ils renferment.

J'ai présentes à l'esprit les modifications que votre Altesse y avait préalablement introduites par rapport aux Patriarches et au Protectorat; mais qu'il me soit permis de douter si à côté de cette modération, la rédaction actuelle n'aurait pour effet de transférer virtuellement de l'une à l'autre des deux parties—c'est à dire, du plus faible au plus fort—par le moyen d'un Acte ayant force de Traité, des pouvoirs réservés ailleurs à l'autorité suprême de l'état, et d'entraver ainsi au bénéfice d'une influence étrangère la haute surveillance du Souverain par rapport à des objets qui, dans cet Empire, malgré leurs dénominations spirituelles, touchent les ressorts intimes du Gouvernement et affectent les intérêts et spécialement les sympathies d'une population de plus de dix millions de sujets dépendans en grande partie de leur clergé. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous rappeler, M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'une telle extension des Traités existants courrait risque d'être regardée, ailleurs, comme une innovation hors de toute proportion avec la question, cause principale de votre Ambassade, et peu en harmonie avec l'esprit de légalité consacré de commun accord par le Traité de 1840.

J'aime à vous supposer de toutes autres intentions, et, comptant sur la justesse de mon appréciation, je vous supplie au nom de tous les grands intérêts qu'une mouvement précipité de votre part pourrait exposer aux plus sérieux hasards, de peser dans votre sagesse les moyens qui sans le moindre doute vous restent encore de mener vos négociations à une issue amicale pour peu que la dignité et l'indépendance d'action inséparables de la souveraineté en temps de paix soient mutuellement ménagées, et que les heureux résultats déjà obtenus dans l'intérêt de la conciliation fassent foi des dispositions nécessaires pour les couronner d'un succès complet.

Soyez persuadé, M. l'Ambassadeur, que de mon personnel, ainsi que dans l'esprit de mes instructions, je m'estimerais heureux de pouvoir contribuer encore dans cette circonstance décisive à un dénouement ayant pour but d'asseoir les relations amicales de la Russie et de la Porte sur une base solide et permanente, sans déroger à des principes qui doivent être aussi chers à votre Cour qu'à la mienne et à leurs Hautes Alliées de la Chrétienté.

Je prie, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 308.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 223. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 13, 1853.*

THE intelligence from Constantinople, which I had the honour of transmitting to your Lordship in my despatch No. 221, of the 8th instant, was unknown to me by the Chancellor in the short note of which I beg to inclose a copy.

Among the many persons to whom the prospect of a speedy arrangement of a difficult question will prove satisfactory, by none, as I truly believe, will it be more welcomed than it has been by Count Nesselrode.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 308.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{\text{5 Avril}}{\text{17 Mai}}$, 1853.

J'AI reçu ce matin des nouvelles de Constantinople du $\frac{1}{13}$ Avril. Les choses allaient bien, et le Prince Menchikoff était tombé d'accord avec M. de la Cour sur les détails d'un arrangement sur la question des lieux saints.

Je m'empresse, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 309.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 224. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 13, 1853.*

FEARING that I may possibly not have time to address your Lordship to-day after the interview which I am to have with Count Nesselrode, I beg to inclose to your Lordship the copy of a private note which I have just received from his Excellency.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 309.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Private.) *St. Pétersbourg, $\frac{1}{13}$ Mai, 1853.*

AU lieu d'une heure que je vous ai indiquée hier, je vous prierai, mon cher Sir Hamilton, de ne venir chez moi qu'à trois-et-demie heures.

Les nouvelles de Constantinople sont tous les jours meilleures. J'en ai reçu ce matin du $\frac{\text{2 Mai}}{\text{14 Mai}}$, que je me ferai un vrai plaisir de vous communiquer tantôt.

Tout-à-vous,
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 310.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 226. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 14, 1853.*

I HAVE ventured in various despatches to submit to your Lordship my own observations upon the imposing or menacing attitude assumed by the Russian Government whilst negotiating with the Porte, and these observations are little worthy of being repeated.

As your Lordship however may be desirous of learning what is the opinion of other diplomatic agents, who, like myself, have been witnesses of what has been passing here, I beg to send you the substance of a conversation which I held with my Greek colleague upon the receipt at St. Petersburgh of the late peaceable intelligence from Constantinople.

On the following day M. Zographo, who bears the character (as I have always held unjustly) of being a Russian agent, called upon me; he said he was desirous of conversing with me upon late events and of expressing opinions which unquestionably he should not venture to confide to any other of his brother Ministers.

"Well," M. Zographo said, "it proves then that the suspicions which in spite of myself I could not help entertaining were unfounded: we see that nothing but an arrangement of some small points relating to the holy places has been arrived at by Russia, and that these are upon the point of being settled satisfactorily.

"I am delighted; but you must admit that such a *deploiement de force* for obtaining an insignificant object was never witnessed—never after a tedious labour was there so striking a case of the *nascitur ridiculus mus*.

"Now I will tell you what it appears to me will be the result of all this as regards the Turks, the Greek subjects of the Porte, and the Emperor's Government.

"With respect to the Turks, they will see in these enormous armaments of Russia fresh evidence of her desire to encroach, and a proof that the affairs of

the Russian Cabinet have not been conducted with their usual dexterity; they will consequently emerge from this crisis with an increase of bad feeling towards Russia, and with the firm purpose of running counter to her interests as often as they can do so with any safety.

"With regard to the Greek subjects of the Porte I ought to know something of their feelings, and I am convinced that their confidence in the Emperor will be greatly shaken: they have been in the habit of considering him all-powerful; they have seen him make the most extensive preparations for a war to be undertaken as they all supposed against the Sultan, and this all ends in an arrangement about some beams and planks in the cupola of a church. It is impossible but that they must consider themselves to have been mystified, and that the Emperor does not entertain those feelings towards his co-religionists which have hitherto been ascribed to him.

"As regards the Emperor himself, he has shown us that the Turkish Government is not in that absolutely crumbling state which it has been considered by Russian diplomatists to be in; and for the sake of making a puerile and unmeaning demonstration, he has involved his Government in financial embarrassment."

Rather by way of keeping up the conversation, I said that it was not clear to me that the hostile feelings of the Turks towards Russia would be acted upon by warlike preparations which had been turned to no account; that, on the contrary, I remembered having heard from old inhabitants of Constantinople, that nothing had so much impressed the Turks with the real good-will of England as the appearance of Admiral Duckworth's squadron before the town without his having made an attempt at its capture or destruction.

M. de Zographo would not admit that there was any analogy between the cases: the Turks, he said, knew very well that the English squadron might have done them the greatest mischief had it been so desired; they suffered no injury, and therefore the wish to injure them was wanting; with the Russians it was widely different; reason and instinct agreed in teaching them to look upon Russia as the mortal enemy of Turkey: if then the blow which was aimed had not fallen, this, in Turkish estimation, would be simply owing to a want of calculation as to fitness of opportunity, and to the apprehensions of consequences.

The French Minister has conversed with me upon the same subjects, and, like M. Zographo, observed that he does not comprehend why such enormous preparations have been made by Russia for obtaining that which might have been secured by ordinary negotiation: the only solution of the enigma he conceived to be this, that Prince Menchikoff was despatched with very "elastic" instructions, and with the fullest discretionary powers; that he was desired upon his arrival at Constantinople to take a careful survey of affairs, and to shape his demands in consequence; if circumstances were favourable, to obtain so much; if less favourable, so much less; if wholly unfavourable, a minimum of concession, which, as General Castelbajac surmises, is that with which it will prove that Prince Menchikoff has contented himself. In this manner General Castelbajac explains the studied mystery which was observed by the Russian Government as to the compensation which was to be claimed of the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 311.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 230.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 14, 1853.*

WHEN I called upon the Chancellor yesterday, his Excellency acquainted me that the questions which have been agitated at Constantinople might be considered as virtually settled.

That as regards the holy places, an arrangement had been made which was satisfactory both to Prince Menchikoff and to M. de la Cour; and that with respect to the sanction to be given to the arrangement, as the form of a Treaty had been considered objectionable both by the Queen's Ambassador and by the Porte, some other would be devised. What it would be, he was unable to say; but full latitude had been given to the Russian negotiator, and the point was one which was sure to be speedily adjusted.

The proposed Convention had been, Count Nesselrode observed, sent to London a fortnight ago for the purpose of being communicated to your Lordship; but since the original sketch had been delivered to [by?] Prince Menchikoff, it had been greatly modified.

The modification applied particularly to the Article III. It had been found that the Patriarch of Constantinople exercised certain administrative powers (pouvoirs administratifs), and permanency of tenure would accordingly be secured by the corrected Article only to the Patriarch of Jerusalem.

Count Nesselrode was unable to communicate to me the draft of the Convention or agreement as it now stands, this paper not having been returned by the Emperor; but he read to me the original Article, and I was careful not to allow him to be aware that I had any previous knowledge of the Russian demands.

As we conversed upon the phases of a question, now happily, as it should appear, very nearly put to rest, I remarked that it was not usual for an English Minister to come forward as the eulogist of his French colleague; but that I thought it fair to state, that we were all under great obligations to General Castelbajac, who, in the midst of warlike preparations, had acted with a calm and moderation which had kept off difficulties which might easily have led to very serious consequences. In this opinion Count Nesselrode agreed the more readily, as, from a knowledge of circumstances, I was able to explain to him how difficult it has been for the French Envoy to pursue the even course which he has adhered to under considerable inducements to take a very different line.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 312.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 347.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 23, 1853.*

THE Turkish Ambassador received a messenger last night from Constantinople with despatches of the 9th instant. He called this morning on M. Drouyn de Lhuys and communicated to him the substance of them. They mention the demand made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte, and state that the Sultan, while determined to respect the religious privileges and rights of his Greek subjects, and to extend them if possible, is firmly resolved not to sign any Convention which would give Russia the right of interfering in their favour. The despatch states the reasons which have induced the Sultan to take this resolution, the principal being that to sign such a Convention would be to sign away his sovereign rights, by admitting a foreign Power to interfere between himself and his subjects. It adds, moreover, that Prince Menchikoff's demand is in contradiction with the assurances which he had solemnly given on his arrival at Constantinople, in the name of his Imperial master, that he was not come to attack the independence of the Ottoman Empire. Several friendly Powers, the despatch says, had approved these reasons, and the Porte hoped that they would be appreciated by France, and that if the consequence of the Sultan's refusal was to be a rupture with Russia, the French Government would admit that it would not be the fault of the Porte.

Such is the account given me by M. Drouyn de Lhuys of the communication made to him by Vely Pasha. He had, he said, in reply recommended prudence and conciliation. While admitting the validity and force of the objections taken by the Ottoman Ministers to Prince Menchikoff's demands, he could not assume the responsibility of advising the Porte to reject them. He had recommended that those objections should be carefully stated, and laid before the great Powers of Europe.

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys whether Vely Pasha had appealed to the

French Government for protection? He answered, not exactly; but that he had received despatches of the same date from M. de la Cour, by which it would appear that in conversation the Turkish Ministers had been more urgent in their expressions, and had indicated a hope of the kind. This hope had not been encouraged by M. de la Cour, who appears to have abstained from doing more than recognizing that the Porte would be perfectly justified in refusing the demands of Prince Menchikoff, without however advising her to adopt that line of conduct.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 313.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 176.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 24, 1853.*

COUNT WALEWSKI has read to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys, stating at great length the views of the French Government upon the Convention presented by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, and its practical operation in Turkey. The despatch concluded by an assurance that France was ready to fulfil every obligation imposed upon her by Treaty, and was desirous to cooperate with England in upholding the Turkish Empire.

I informed Count Walewski that the Cabinet was about to meet; and that I should immediately make known to my colleagues the contents of this important despatch; and that in the meanwhile I must express my concurrence in the views of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which appeared to me both just and comprehensive, and conveyed in terms remarkable for their moderation and perspicuity.

I added that any determination now taken by our respective Governments must be hypothetical, and dependent on events over which we could exercise no control, and that the proper course seemed to be to wait for the definitive information from Constantinople that must arrive in a few days.

I also assured Count Walewski that it was the desire of Her Majesty's Government to act in cordial concert with the French Government; and that it was a satisfaction to us to think that upon the Eastern question, and the serious contingencies that might arise out of it, the interests of England and France were entirely identical.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 314.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 350.)
My Lord, *Paris, May 24, 1853.*

M. DROUN DE LHUYS read to me this afternoon a despatch dated the 20th instant, which he had this morning received from the French Minister at Vienna. M. de Bourqueney gives a short account of a conversation he had just had with Count Buol upon the Eastern question, promising details by the messenger. It is to the effect that Count Buol will not give any opinion upon what is passing at Constantinople until he knows whether Prince Menchikoff's conduct is approved by the Russian Government; but it is clear that he considers that conduct to be in contradiction to the solemn assurances given by the Emperor Nicholas to the Cabinet of Vienna, and he remarked that an ultimatum was never posed but where there was a violation of a Treaty.

The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires had asked Count Buol for advice in the strait in which his Government was placed. Count Buol had recommended that the Porte should scrupulously fulfil its engagements towards Russia, and in general should conciliate that Power by all the means at the Sultan's command. As to the question immediately at issue, Count Buol said it was one in which the Sultan must take counsel of his own interests and dignity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 315.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 49.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1853.*

THE repeated and explicit assurances received by Her Majesty's Government from Sir Hamilton Seymour and from Baron Brunnow, rendered it impossible to doubt that the sole object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was to obtain a final and satisfactory settlement of the question of the holy places, and that no other matter remained behind, and that no demands were contemplated that could lead to difference between Russia and the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government have accordingly thought themselves not alone justified, but called upon entirely to discredit the many rumours inconsistent with the above assurances that circulated since the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople; and for the same reason when it recently became clear that he was about to make demands with which the Porte could not comply, Her Majesty's Government were induced to believe that Prince Menchikoff was acting on his own responsibility, and not upon instructions from his Court, of which Her Majesty's Government had no knowledge.

It was therefore with extreme surprise and regret that they received the note in the form of an ultimatum (inclosed in your Excellency's despatch, No. 41, of the 6th instant), and Project of Convention, which had been presented on the 5th by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte, and to which a definitive answer was demanded in the space of five days.

Your Excellency was not furnished with instructions to meet a course of proceeding that Her Majesty's Government had such abundant reason for not contemplating: to have sent instructions upon a question that must have been determined before it came to the knowledge of Her Majesty's Government would have been useless; but upon that point they felt no uneasiness, because their general views and policy were well known to your Excellency; and in carrying them out, they relied upon the ability and experience, as well as the local knowledge and well-earned influence of your Excellency with the Porte.

That confidence has been fully justified; and I have the pleasure to convey to you the entire approval of Her Majesty's Government of all your proceedings, as stated in your No. 42 of the 9th instant.

Her Majesty's Government view the proposed Convention and the practical operation that it would have in Turkey, in the same light as your Excellency appears to do: they consider that its acceptance by the Porte in its present form would have been incompatible with the honour and independence of the Sultan; and that the advice given by your Excellency to the Turkish Ministers as to the mode of meeting this demand, was alike prudent and dignified; and Her Majesty's Government most especially approve of your answer to the Grand Vizier, advising him that demonstrations calculated to increase alarm and provoke resentment, should be avoided so long as the question retained what your Excellency considered to be its moral character.

Her Majesty's Government observe with satisfaction, that M. de la Cour appears to have adopted the views of your Excellency, and to have held the same language as yourself to the Porte. The co-operation of the Ambassadors of England and France at this important crisis of Eastern affairs cannot fail to give confidence to the Porte, and is in conformity with the desire of their respective Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 316.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 27.)

(No. 239. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, May 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HEAR from various quarters that the Russians in general consider what has been done lately at Constantinople only as a prelude to some more decisive exhibition of Imperial influence, and amongst other persons the Greek Minister has drawn my attention to this state of public feeling.

M. Zographo remarked that in consequence of the community of religion the Russians are apt to consider him as in some measure a countryman, and that amongst those who have conversed with him lately there were hardly any who were not impressed with the belief of the great point being yet to be carried, the point of bringing the Greek subjects of the Porte under the more immediate protection of the Emperor.

Supposing these expectations to be wholly gratuitous, I imagine that the annals of diplomacy do not record any instance of such an amount of preparation having been made for the attainment of a disproportionate result as has followed the late large gathering of forces upon the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 317.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 27.)

(No. 240. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, May 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour of transmitting to your Lordship the copy of a private note which Count Nesselrode wrote me on the 7th instant, and in which were inclosed copies of the official note addressed by the Porte to Prince Menchikoff for the purpose of communicating to him the two firmans relating to the holy places, as well as of these two documents.

The firmans must be already in your Lordship's possession, and I only inclose a copy of the Porte's note to the Russian Ambassador.

Your Lordship will judge from the tone of the Chancellor's private communication to me that his Excellency considers the controversy between the Greeks and Latins at Jerusalem to be satisfactorily disposed of—an expectation which appears to me to be perfectly reasonable; it is not, however, shared by the French Envoy, who apprehends that his Government will hardly be brought to recognize an arrangement to which he imagines M. de la Cour to have lent himself only with the reserve of its being approved of by the Emperor of the French.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 317.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Le 7/19 Mai, 1853.

VOUS avez pris trop de part, mon cher Sir Hamilton, à l'affaire des Lieux Saints pour ne pas être curieux de savoir comment elle s'est terminée. Vous le saurez en prenant connoissance des deux firmans ci-joints, et vous vous en réjouirez sûrement avec moi.

Veuillez me les restituer lecture faite.

Mille et mille hommages,

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 317.

Rifaat Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.

26 *Redjib*, 1269. (5 April / 5 May, 1853.)

J'AI l'honneur de transmettre à votre Altesse la copie d'un ordre suprême en date du dernier jour de Redjib 1269, orné de l'autographe Souverain Impérial, concernant les Sanctuaires de Jérusalem, émané à l'effet de faire cesser les contestations, ainsi que la copie d'un autre ordre suprême portant que la grande coupole de l'Eglise Camamé sera réparée de la part de la Sublime Porte.

La volonté suprême de la Majesté le Sultan étant que les dispositions de ces deux ordres ci-dessus mentionnés soient intégralement exécutées sans aucune changement, je m'empresse d'en avertir votre Altesse, et je saisis, &c.

(Signé) MEHEMED RIFAAT.

No. 318.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received May* 27.)

(No. 244.)

St. Petersburgh, May 19, 1853.

My Lord,

WHEN I waited yesterday upon the Chancellor I found him in momentary expectation of a messenger from Constantinople, who will in all probability be the bearer of the Convention which it may be assumed has been concluded between Russia and the Porte for the sanction of the two firmans which have lately been signed by the Sultan for the regulation of the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches at Jerusalem.

Count Nesselrode allowed me to read a copy of the Projet de Traité as latterly modified with the consent of Prince Menchikoff. He acquainted me that in the course of a few days this paper will be known to your Lordship, a copy of it having been forwarded to Baron Brunnow by the steamer which left St. Petersburgh on the 15th instant.

I requested the Chancellor to inform me whether I was at liberty to acquaint your Lordship that orders had been given for a discontinuance of the Russian armaments in the south; his Excellency was unable to give me an assurance to that effect, but stated that the orders to which I alluded would be issued upon the receipt of the Treaty which is looked for from day to day.

Without making any direct assertion to this effect, Count Nesselrode gives me to understand that the Emperor will remain in the neighbourhood of St. Petersburgh until after the great summer reviews.

I mention this because during the last few days many persons have asserted that His Majesty was about to proceed to Odessa for the purpose of inspecting the large bodies of troops collected in that neighbourhood.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 319.

Baron Brunnow to the Earl of Clarendon.

(Confidentielle.)

Mon cher Lord Clarendon, *Chesham Place, le 14/26 Mai*, 1853.

J'AI eu l'honneur de vous prévenir l'autre jour que j'allais m'occuper d'un résumé des explications échangées entre nous sur les négociations à Constantinople. Il m'a semblé que cette relation historique pourrait être de quelque utilité pour se rendre compte de ce qui s'est dit de part et d'autre, afin de placer dans son jour véritable l'intention que nous avions tous deux d'arriver à un arrangement à l'amiable entre les parties directement intéressées. Si ce résultat venait à manquer, la faute n'en serait assurément ni à vous ni à moi. Voilà la

vérité que j'ai fait ressortir, je le crois, aux yeux de tous ceux qui liront mon travail.

Comme il rapporte sommairement ce qui s'est dit entre Lord John Russell et moi, avant votre gestion, je désirerais qu'il prît lecture de mon résumé, afin d'en examiner l'exactitude.

Si vous jugiez désirable, de votre côté, de me faire quelque observation sur les notions que je rapporte, je vous prierai de m'en faire part amicalement afin que je puisse profiter de vos avis, avant de transmettre ce récit à mon Cabinet.

Il m'importe que nous soyons complètement d'accord sur l'exactitude des faits. Quant aux observations dont je les ai accompagnés, elles sont faites, comme vous le verrez, sans blesser et sans mécontenter personne. Les Français pourront lire un jour ce travail, sans y trouver le moindre motif de plainte ni contre vous ni contre moi. Lord Redcliffe et le Prince Menchikoff n'y rencontreront pas non plus une seule parole amère. En un mot, ce travail est conçu dans l'intérêt de la vérité, et avec le désir bien sincère de prévenir tout malentendu. Ces considérations me font espérer, mon cher Lord Clarendon, que vous voudrez bien accueillir ce récit avec bonté.

Mille hommages, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

Inclosure in No. 319.

Memorandum.

DÈS la formation du Cabinet actuel, je me suis fait un devoir de signaler à l'attention des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, la gravité des difficultés survenues alors à Constantinople, par suite de la violation des engagements que la Porte avait contractés envers nous, relativement à la question des Saints Lieux.

Dans mon premier entretien confidentiel avec Lord John Russell, je lui ai exposé avec la plus entière franchise les considérations qui ne permettaient point au Cabinet Impérial de transiger sur une affaire à laquelle se rattachaient des intérêts de dignité, unis au sentiment religieux et national de la Russie.

J'ai eu l'honneur de prévenir dès lors le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat qu'il fallait s'attendre à voir le Cabinet Impérial renforcer son attitude à Constantinople par une démarche vigoureuse, pour ramener le Divan à une appréciation sérieuse d'une situation que son manque de parole venait de compliquer si gravement envers nous.

Lord John Russell m'a exprimé l'espoir que cette démarche serait conçue dans un esprit de conciliation et de paix.

Cette attente n'a pas été déçue.

En effet, l'Empereur, loin de rechercher aussitôt le redressement de ses griefs par l'emploi de la force, a préféré d'abord recourir aux moyens de persuasion, dans les voies d'une négociation pacifique.

Sa Majesté a daigné en confier le soin à M. le Prince Menchikoff, accrédité en qualité d'Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Le désir sincère qu'a éprouvé le Cabinet Impérial de conduire cette négociation à un résultat conforme aux grands intérêts de la paix, lui a inspiré la pensée de s'ouvrir au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, afin que l'influence morale de l'Angleterre contribuât d'une part à éclairer le Divan, et de l'autre à disposer le Cabinet Français à faire disparaître les obstacles que l'attitude prise à cette époque par M. de Lavalette semblait opposer à un arrangement à l'amiable.

Les vœux que j'ai été chargé d'énoncer à ce sujet ont rencontré auprès des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique l'accueil le plus amical. Ils ont reconnu que la complication survenue à Constantinople avait pris son origine dans les embarras suscités par les demandes de l'Ambassadeur de France; ils ont compris de plus qu'il fallait tenir compte du sentiment national de la Russie qui ne pouvait point rester indifférent à ce que les immunités de l'Eglise d'Orient fussent lésées par les concessions faites au clergé Latin.

Ces vérités, je me fais un devoir de le constater, ont été sérieusement appréciées par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. Sans entrer dans l'examen des questions de détail d'un litige auquel l'Angleterre elle-même était étrangère, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté a jugé que ses conseils pouvaient être

utilement employés à aplanir les difficultés dont je ne lui avait point laissé ignorer les conséquences extrêmes.

Dans un esprit de conciliation, auquel je rends la plus entière justice, Lord John Russell m'a exprimé le désir de recueillir des informations ultérieures sur les griefs dont nous avions à demander le redressement, afin que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté Britannique fût mieux à même de contribuer, s'il était en son pouvoir, à arriver à une solution à l'amiable.

En réponse à ce désir, le Cabinet Impérial m'a autorisé à offrir au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat les éclaircissements dont je vais résumer la substance.

Je lui ai exposé d'abord les raisons qui empêcheraient le Prince Menchikoff d'entrer en négociation avec Fuad Effendi. Ce Ministre ayant occasionné la rupture des engagements formels pris par le Sultan envers l'Empereur quant au maintien du *statu quo* légalement établi par les hati-chérifs souverains, ne pouvait assurément pas servir utilement d'intermédiaire à une négociation destinée à réparer une offense dont il avait été l'auteur. Cette considération a dû nécessairement inspirer au Sultan lui-même la conviction qu'il importait de placer entre d'autres mains le soin d'un négociation, à laquelle se rattachaient de si grands intérêts. La Russie n'a point demandé, comme on l'a faussement allégué, la destitution de ce Ministre. Elle a attendu de la sagesse du Sultan la désignation d'un Plénipotentiaire plus impartial, plus capable de conduire la négociation à bonne fin. La retraite de Fuad Effendi a été volontaire.

J'ai indiqué ensuite l'altération apportée au *statu quo* des droits anciennement acquis à l'Eglise Orthodox d'Orient, et j'ai fait ressortir, comme je le devais, le désir du Cabinet Impérial d'arriver à l'aplanissement de ce différend de manière à garder de justes ménagements envers la France, afin que la Porte, dans ses relations directes envers cette Puissance, ne se trouvât point exposée à de nouveaux embarras.

En troisième lieu, j'ai dit que le manque de parole dont la Porte s'était rendue coupable envers l'Empereur, constituait une offense dont Sa Majesté demandait réparation; que d'ailleurs l'infraction du dernier firman, annullé par la Porte presqu'en même temps qu'il avait été rendu, ne nous permettait plus d'accorder à un pareil document une pleine croyance; qu'en conséquence le Cabinet Impérial devrait insister sur un Acte explicatif plus solennel, dont le caractère fût obligatoire, pour prévenir le retour de nouvelles causes de mésintelligence entre la Russie et la Porte.

Cet exposé, verbalement fait dans une entrevue que j'ai eue avec Lord John Russell, peu de jours avant qu'il quittât la gestion des Affaires Etrangères, a précédé les négociations qui allaient s'ouvrir à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a accueilli ces explications sans entrer dans un examen spécial du litige en question. Il a gardé son attitude de bienveillante observation, sans offrir et sans promettre à la Russie un appui que celle-ci ne demandait point. Il ne s'est engagé à rien. Je constate ce fait parcequ'il importe de l'établir pour apprécier dans son exacte vérité la relation des circonstances qui vont suivre. Si l'Angleterre, dès l'ouverture de la négociation, avait pris sur elle le soin de faire accepter nos demandes par le Divan, elle aurait été indubitablement en droit de s'enquérir en détail de nos propositions auxquelles elle aurait accordé son appui. Elle ne l'a point fait. Elle est restée libre de ses conseils, comme la Russie à son tour est restée libre de son action dans la poursuite d'une négociation qui allait s'ouvrir directement entre le Cabinet Impérial et la Porte, sans médiation, sans intervention aucun.

Dans cet état des choses l'Angleterre, comme je viens de le dire, est restée libre de ses conseils. Si cette assertion avait besoin de preuve, on en trouverait la confirmation la plus évidente dans la liberté pleine et entière avec laquelle M. l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique à Constantinople a interposé ses conseils et émis son avis sur les propositions dont le Prince Menchikoff a été le premier à lui faire connaître l'ensemble.

Ces réflexions n'ont paru nécessaires d'une part pour rendre aux intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique la justice qui leur est due, de l'autre pour placer dans son vrai jour la marche que le Cabinet de Russie a suivie durant le cours des explications confidentielles dont j'ai eu l'honneur d'être l'organe.

Le siége de la négociation étant à Constantinople, un Ambassadeur de l'Empereur, muni de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet, avait été chargé de la conduire à

bonne foi. Il ne m'appartenait en rien d'anticiper sur une délibération qui ne se traitait pas à Londres entre l'Angleterre et la Russie, mais à Constantinople entre la Russie et la Porte.

Mon devoir, dans les limites de mes attributions, se bornait à communiquer au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, à mesure qu'elles parvenaient à ma connaissance, les informations qui pouvaient lui paraître désirables pour compléter et au besoin pour rectifier les données qu'il recevait par la voie de ses agents directs.

Je me suis trouvé appelé à remplir ce devoir au milieu des circonstances critiques qui se sont présentées au moment même où le Prince Menchikoff venait d'arriver à sa destination.

Je n'ai pas besoin de m'appesantir ici sur les nouvelles alarmantes répandues alors à Péra, accréditées à Paris et à Londres, quant aux intentions de la Russie; arrivée de l'escadre de Sévastopol dans le Bosphore; occupation des Principautés; agrandissement de nos frontières Asiatiques; prétention de nous assurer la nomination du Patriarche Grec de Constantinople; soulèvement prémédité de la population Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman; renouvellement du Traité d'Unkiar-Skélessi—toutes ces assertions sur lesquelles je ne m'étendrais point ici, doivent encore être présentes à la mémoire des Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Ils se souviendront aussi, j'en suis certain, du calme que j'ai opposé à ces rumeurs—de la fermeté avec lesquelles je n'ai point hésité à les démentir.

De mon côté, je garderai toujours un souvenir plein de reconnaissance de la franchise qui a présidé aux explications intimes que j'ai échangées avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté dans ce moment de crise.

Lord Clarendon venait de prendre alors la direction des Affaires Etrangères. Je m'en remets à son témoignage pour attester le langage que je lui ai tenu afin de rétablir les faits dans leur exacte vérité. Dès notre première entrevue, j'ai placé entre ses mains la lettre de Cabinet dont l'Empereur avait muni le Prince Menchikoff, en l'accréditant son Ambassadeur auprès du Sultan. Elle renferme ce passage: "Dans la question actuelle je ne puis que vous conseiller le maintien des droits consacrés par des siècles, reconnus par tous vos illustres prédécesseurs et confirmés par vous-même, en faveur de l'Eglise Orthodoxe, dont les dogmes sont professés par les populations Chrétiennes qui vous sont soumises, aussi que par la grande majorité de mes sujets."

Tel était le langage, tel était le conseil de l'Empereur au Sultan: le maintien des droits consacrés, reconnus, confirmés en faveur de l'Eglise d'Orient.

Je cite ces paroles parcequ'elles caractérisent la pensée et qu'elles déterminent la politique de l'Empereur. Il sait que le repos de la Turquie n'est possible qu'à condition que l'immense majorité de la population du rit Grec Orthodoxe de l'Empire Ottoman soit mise à l'abri de toute lésion. Il sait aussi que les relations de bonne intelligence entre la Russie et la Turquie ne sont solides et durables qu'à condition que la Porte, fidèle à ses engagements, qui datent du Traité de Kaïnardji, accorde à l'Eglise Orthodoxe cette liberté de culte, ce repos de conscience, et cette possession paisible de droits acquis, à l'inviolabilité desquels la Russie ne cessera jamais de veiller, avec toute la force de ses convictions nationales et religieuses.

Il faudrait peu connaître l'histoire des deux Empires, il faudrait surtout perdre de vue le grand intérêt de la conservation de la paix entre tous deux, pour qu'on oubliât que l'Empereur, lorsqu'il conseille et qu'il demande le maintien de l'Eglise d'Orient dans ses droits, parle et agit en ami qui veut le repos de l'Empire Ottoman et qui veille à l'existence de la Turquie dans son indépendance et dans son intégrité.

Si j'avais mal compris ou mal rendu à ce sujet les intentions de l'Empereur, dans mes entretiens confidentiels avec les Ministres de Sa Majesté Britannique, ils en auraient trouvé l'expression plus fidèle dans une dépêche du 26 Mars que M. le Chancelier de l'Empire m'a autorisé à placer sous les yeux du Cabinet de Sa Majesté.

Je me permettrai de transcrire ici trois passages de ce document:

"Il nous a été bien agréable de voir par le résumé de vos entretiens avec les Ministres Britanniques, que tous les faux bruits répandus à Constantinople à l'égard de nos intentions n'avaient causé aucune alarme ou appréhension au Cabinet de Londres, convaincu par les assurances personnelles qu'il a reçues à ce sujet de l'Empereur, que le désir et la résolution de Sa Majesté sont de respecter

l'indépendance et l'intégrité de l'Empire Turc, et que si ses vues à cet égard venaient à subir un changement quelconque, notre Auguste Maître serait le premier à en avertir le Gouvernement Anglais."

Le second passage est conçu en ces termes:

"Vous pouvez assurer également les Ministres Anglais que dans l'arrangement à négocier il n'est pas question de faire revoquer ou ôter aux Latins les dernières concessions qu'ils ont obtenues par la note Ottomane du 8 Février de l'an passé, mais simplement de faire concorder ces concessions avec les dispositions du hatti-shérif en les dépouillant de ce qu'elles peuvent avoir d'exclusif, d'obtenir aux Grecs quelques compensations pour le tort qui leur a été fait, et surtout de les mettre à l'abri contre le retour de nouveaux préjudices."

Le troisième passage est ainsi conçu:

"L'apparition simultanée des deux flottes rendait la question insoluble à Constantinople. Elle nous plaçait dans une position que nous n'aurions pu accepter, et qui n'eut plus permis à l'Empereur, se trouvant ainsi sous le coup d'une démonstration comminatoire, de suivre librement ses inspirations conservatrices et pacifiques."

En jetant un coup d'œil sur ce résumé des explications échangées entre les deux Cabinets, on se persuadera que, jusqu'à ce jour, leur bonne foi mutuelle a servi à empêcher le mal qu'un système de méfiance réciproque aurait causé inévitablement aux intérêts communs de la conservation de la paix dans le Levant.

Grâces à cette réciprocité de confiance, la flotte de Sévastopol, dont on prévoyait l'arrivée dans le Bosphore, est restée à l'ancre; les troupes Russes, dont on annonçait l'entrée dans les Principautés, n'ont point passé la frontière; les populations Chrétiennes, dont on prédisait le soulèvement, sont demeurées dans l'obéissance, et une négociation pacifique a suivi sa marche régulière entre les Plénipotentiaires chargés du soin de la conduire à son terme par un accommodement à l'amiable.

A mesure qu'elle avançait, j'ai mis successivement sous les yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté les communications que le Prince Menchikoff a adressées au Divan d'abord pour exposer les griefs dont nous avions à porter plainte; ensuite les propositions qu'il a faites pour en obtenir le redressement quant au passé, ainsi que les garanties jugées nécessaires afin de prévenir le retour des mêmes torts et des mêmes causes de mésintelligence entre les deux Empires voisins.

Si l'on se souvient, comme je l'ai dit, que cette négociation se poursuivait à Constantinople, et si l'on prend en considération que, selon l'usage consacré dans toute délibération diplomatique, on ne saurait rendre compte d'une proposition qu'après qu'elle a été faite par le négociateur qui en est l'organe, on ne sera point surpris de voir que les communications dont j'ai été chargé de m'acquitter à Londres, au lieu de précéder les démarches du Prince Menchikoff, ayent dû les suivre, dans l'ordre naturel des dates, à de si longues distances.

Je m'en rapporte encore, à ce sujet, au témoignage du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat. Il a pu juger, jour par jour, de l'empressement et de l'exactitude que j'ai mis à le tenir au courant des informations qui me sont parvenus durant cette longue négociation.

Elles ont été devancées plus d'une fois par les confidences personnelles que le Prince Menchikoff a faites sur les lieux à Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. C'est ainsi que cet Ambassadeur a obtenu, avant moi, la connaissance du premier Projet de Convention dont le Prince Menchikoff lui a donné lecture.

Lorsque ce document m'est parvenu de St. Pétersbourg, je me suis fait un devoir aussitôt de le communiquer textuellement au Principal Secrétaire d'Etat.

Ce projet a été modifié depuis par le Prince Menchikoff et remplacé par une rédaction, dans laquelle cet Ambassadeur s'est attaché à se conformer, autant que possible, aux vœux qui lui avaient été exprimés par les négociateurs Ottomans, profitant à cet effet des avis qu'il avait recueillis de Lord Redcliffe lui-même.

Ce second document se trouve également sous les yeux du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

En rapprochant le texte de l'un et de l'autre, on se persuadera facilement des dispositions conciliantes dans lesquelles l'Ambassadeur de Russie a usé de la latitude des pouvoirs dont il avait été muni, pour aller au-devant des observations

qui lui avaient été faites, dans le but d'écarter de l'Acte projeté, jusqu'aux moindres expressions qui auraient pu donner lieu à une fausse interprétation des vues du Cabinet Impérial.

S'il pouvait s'élever à cet égard un doute dans quelque esprit prévenu, si l'on essayait d'attribuer à la Russie la pensée d'étendre son intervention sur les intérêts locaux ou sur la situation politique des populations Chrétiennes en Turquie, il me suffirait de rappeler ici un fait qui servirait à démentir cette assertion.

Le Prince Menchikoff, en me transmettant le Projet de Sened présenté le 5 Mai, a bien voulu l'accompagner d'une dépêche dont je vais transcrire les termes suivans:

"Nous ne demandons pas le droit de protéger les Chrétiens du rit orthodoxe, sujets de la Porte; mais le maintien du *statu quo* religieux de ce rit, dont l'existence a été gravement menacée par la tendance manifestée par la Porte à protéger les empiétements du rit Latin sur celui qui est professé par la majorité des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan."

Afin de prévenir tout malentendu et de rétablir les faits dans leur exacte vérité, je n'ai point hésité à placer entre les mains du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique un extrait de cette dépêche, par laquelle M. le Prince Menchikoff définit si clairement les propositions qu'il venait d'émettre sur une question d'intérêt religieux, à l'exclusion de toute arrière-pensée et de toute ingérence politique.

Je ne suis pas appelé à entrer en discussion sur le mérite de l'œuvre de réconciliation qui a fait l'objet des négociations directement établies à Constantinople entre les Plénipotentiaires des deux Souverains amis et voisins.

Dans l'accomplissement strict de mon devoir, je n'ai qu'une seule réflexion à y ajouter:

Quelle que soit l'opinion que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique puisse former sur la teneur de l'Acte projeté, les Ministres de Sa Majesté, avec lesquels j'ai eu l'honneur d'entrer depuis cinq mois dans un échange constant des communications les plus intimes, voudront bien garder présents à leur mémoire les éclaircissements qu'il m'a été prescrit de leur offrir sur la pensée de mon Cabinet qui a présidé à cette transaction. Je vais les résumer ici en peu de mots:

Le Sultan a commencé par manquer de parole envers l'Empereur.

Sa Majesté s'est trouvée dans la nécessité de demander réparation de cette offense, faite à sa dignité.

Pour obtenir cette réparation l'Empereur a choisi la voie d'une négociation pacifique, de préférence à l'emploi immédiat de la force.

En demandant cette satisfaction à la Porte, par la persuasion et non par des mesures d'hostilité, il a tenu uniquement en vue de sauvegarder l'Eglise Orthodoxe en Turquie contre les empiétements et les lésions dont elle venait d'éprouver l'injuste et flagrante atteinte.

Dans ce but il a reconnu qu'un simple firman serait insuffisant pour réparer le tort commis quant au passé, ni pour prévenir le renouvellement de pareils griefs à l'avenir.

D'après cela, il a résolu de demander et d'obtenir de la Porte un Acte formel—un Acte explicatif, comme je l'ai nommé.

Cet Acte, dans la pensée de Sa Majesté, ne doit servir qu'à confirmer l'Eglise Orthodoxe dans la possession des droits dont elle jouit en Orient.

L'Empereur ne demande ni plus ni moins. Il veut que ce qui existe, reste intact; que le culte professé par la Russie demeure libre, respecté, inviolable sous la domination Ottomane.

Sa Majesté demande cette garantie: il la conseille à la Porte, dans le double intérêt de rendre la tranquillité intérieure de l'Empire Ottoman mieux assurée et sa paix avec la Russie plus durable.

Les Puissances qui désirent la conservation de la Turquie, pourraient-elles se montrer jalouses de voir cette œuvre de paix accomplie par les conseils de la Russie? Aimeraient-elles mieux que l'Eglise Grecque Orthodoxe, sans garantie, en lutte constante contre l'Eglise Latine, devînt une cause permanente de troubles, d'inquiétude, et peut-être de dissolution au sein de l'Empire Ottoman? Cette pensée, je me permets de la dire, ne serait pas conforme à la prévoyance des Grandes Puissances amies de la Turquie.

Pour preuve de leur sollicitude j'ai souvent entendu citer le texte du Traité des Dardanelles, conclu à Londres le $\frac{13}{15}$ Juillet, 1841. Comme j'ai eu l'honneur

de concourir à la signature de cet Acte, me serait-il permis de terminer le présent mémoire par une considération que me suggère le souvenir de cette transaction.

Le préambule qui précède les stipulations qu'elle renferme quant à la fermeture des deux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, indique une pensée qu'on devrait ne point méconnaître dans son application à la crise du moment.

Les Puissances Contractantes y expriment la volonté de donner à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains, ainsi que de leur désir de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire.

Or, la plus grande preuve de respect qu'on puisse donner à un Souverain indépendant, c'est de ne pas mettre obstacle à ce qu'il remplisse ses promesses envers une Puissance amie et voisine. S'il n'est plus libre de tenir sa parole ni de réparer les torts qu'il a commis, il cesse d'être indépendant.

La seconde conclusion à laquelle la lecture du Traité de 1841 m'amène, c'est que les Puissances animées du désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de l'Empire Ottoman, devraient être les premières à conseiller au Sultan de ne point refuser à l'Eglise Grecque, comme la Russie l'a demandé, un gage de sécurité qui tend à retenir l'immense majorité de la population Chrétienne de l'Empire Ottoman dans les bornes de la soumission et dans le repos des consciences.

L'Empereur, pour sa part, a rempli un sérieux devoir en donnant ce conseil au Sultan. S'il n'est point apprécié comme il mérite de l'être, je pense que le Cabinet Impérial aura la satisfaction de se dire qu'il ne sera pas responsable des conséquences qui pourront résulter de ce refus.

Londres, le $\frac{13}{25}$ *Mai*, 1853.

No. 320.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 368. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, May* 29, 1853.

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has received despatches from Vienna respecting the views of the Austrian Cabinet in regard to the present aspect of Eastern affairs, with which he is satisfied. M. de Bourqueney describes Count Buol as disapproving both the matter and form of Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum.

M. de Hübner has also read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a despatch upon the subject from Count Buol; but its terms, if I am correctly informed, are hardly as strong as those given in M. de Bourqueney's reports. M. de Hübner is desired to express the hope of the Austrian Cabinet that modifications, especially in form, may yet be introduced into Prince Menchikoff's demands, so as to render them acceptable to the Turks.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys asked, what was meant by form? If it meant that words might be changed while the sense remained unaltered, or that the Russian negotiator was to put on an uniform instead of a great coat, he did not see that the sting of the ultimatum was reduced. If on the other hand it meant that the rights, privileges, and immunities of the Greek Church, of which Russia wished to make herself the guarantee, were to be secured by some firman or sovereign act of the Sultan, such a modification might be acceptable.

M. de Hübner replied that he could do no more than give M. Drouyn de Lhuys the text of Count Buol's despatch, but he asked whether he might report the French Minister's words to his Government, to which he received a reply in the affirmative.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 321.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 46.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1853.

I PREPARE a few lines on the presumption that M. de Klezl will send off an estafette to Vienna in the course of the day.

A partial and sudden change of Ministry took place yesterday. It remains

to be seen in what sense the Sultan has acted. My communications with the old, as well with the new Ministers, lead me to suppose that His Majesty has not changed his mind as to the character of Prince Menchikoff's demands. Some of my colleagues appear to be under an impression somewhat different. The only things certain are the composition of the new Ministry, the principal circumstances which attended the change, and the continuance of the Russian Embassy here at this moment.

The new Grand Vizier is Mustapha Pasha, formerly Governor of Candia, and lately President of the Council. He is succeeded in the latter office by Rifaat Pasha, who is himself succeeded by Reshid, the ex-Grand Vizier. Mehemet Ali, the late Grand Vizier, takes the post of the late Seraskier, who himself is placed at the head of the Sultan's guard. All these Ministers are already pledged, as members of the Council, to opinions adverse to the extreme demands of Russia.

It was agreed that Prince Menchikoff who had deferred his departure to this day, should have a conference with the Grand Vizier at half-past one P.M. yesterday. At ten his Excellency went unexpectedly, so far, I believe, as the Ministers were concerned, to the Sultan's palace, and had a private audience of His Majesty, who, as I am authentically informed, referred him to the Ministers for an answer. The Grand Vizier was at the same time sent for to the Palace, and on learning the facts of the case, his Highness demanded permission to stay at home, and at the same time gave up his seals of office.

It was in consequence of this resignation that the new Ministers were appointed, and the Sultan showed that he had not taken offence at Mehemet Ali's independent behaviour by including him in their number; though his acceptance of the resignation shows at the same time that he meant at least to convince the Russians that the rejection of their demands did not rest with that Minister.

I am informed by one of my colleagues that the Russian Embassy is in a state of great excitement, and it is evident that without some kind of miracle, either the Turkish Government must give way, or the Russian Ambassador will break off his relations and depart, though I do not mean to say that an amicable arrangement may not by possibility still be effected without any improper concession. The particulars of what has occurred within the last few days, and the correspondence which has passed between the Russian Embassy and the Porte, shall be transmitted to your Lordship without any avoidable delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 322.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 51.)
Constantinople, May 15, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Austrian estafette having been detained till to-day, I take advantage of the delay to add a few sentences to my despatch No. 46 of yesterday's date.

Prince Menchikoff began his official communications with Reshid Pasha by insisting on an immediate final reply to his note of the 11th instant. This demand has not been complied with. The Pasha has written to urge the necessity of a further delay in virtue of the recent change of Ministry, and his very imperfect acquaintance with the anterior proceedings and correspondence. He limits his request to a term of five or six days, promising to curtail it if possible.

While the French Ambassador was in conference this morning with Reshid Pasha, Prince Menchikoff waited on the Grand Vizier, in order to learn what kind of answer he was to expect to his last note, accounting for his importunity by a reference to the tenor of his freshest instructions from St. Petersburgh.

The Grand Vizier finding that Prince Menchikoff had left his house before he had heard from Reshid Pasha, owing to the necessity of taking the Sultan's sanction before the note was transmitted to its destination, stated to him the substance of its contents, upon which the Ambassador gave signs of displeasure,

and expressed his regret at being obliged to break off his relations with the Porte, and to hasten his departure. The Grand Vizier replied by echoing his expressions of regret, and added that it was not in his power to prevent him from carrying his intention into effect. His Highness remained under an impression that the Prince had made up his mind to leave.

We have still, however, to learn what may have since passed between the Russian Embassy and Reshid Pasha. M. de la Cour, who saw the latter this morning, came away with the impression that there was an inclination on Reshid's part to be more accommodating than his predecessor.

I have the honour to inclose a paper which I left yesterday in confidence with Reshid Pasha, as exhibiting in substance the extent to which concession might be carried without any serious danger. Your Lordship will perceive that it gives everything required by Russia but a form of guarantee, which in principle, if not in practice, and probably in both, would eventually prove fatal to the Porte's independence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—7 P.M. I am informed by a message from Reshid Pasha that the Sultan has been informed of the apparently impending departure of Prince Menchikoff and the Russian Embassy, with the rupture of diplomatic relations between the two Empires; and that His Majesty resigned himself with much firmness to the necessity of the case.

I am still uncertain whether the Russians have actually embarked.

S. DE R.

2nd P.S.—I inclose duplicates* of the note addressed on the 10th instant to Prince Menchikoff by Rifaat Pasha, and of the Russian Ambassador's reply.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 322.

Confidential Paper presented by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Reshid Pasha.

LE culte orthodoxe d'Orient et son clergé, de même que ceux des autres dénominations Chrétiennes, continueront, en ce qui regarde le spirituel, à jouir sous la protection souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impériale.

Leurs églises et leurs autres possessions légalement acquises leur seront respectivement conservées.

A Jérusalem les religieux et les pélerins Russes seront assimilés en fait de protection et de prérogatives à ceux des autres nations étrangères.

Les nouveaux firmans explicatifs concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem doivent être regardés comme ayant la valeur d'un engagement formel.

On accorderait aux Russes une église et un hôpital à Jérusalem.

Ces divers objets auraient la garantie d'une déclaration Impériale revêtue des formes les plus solennelles, promulguée au public et communiquée à la Cour de Russie et aux autres grandes Puissances de la Chrétienté.

No. 323.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 55.)
Foreign Office, May 31, 1853.

My Lord,

THE latest despatch received at this office from your Excellency, is No. 51, dated the 15th instant, and Her Majesty's Government are therefore uninformed respecting the negotiations which took place between the 15th and the 22nd, on which day Prince Menchikoff quitted Constantinople, nor do they yet know whether the rupture between the Russian Ambassador and the Porte was of a character to preclude all hope that negotiations might be resumed.

* See Inclosures in No. 335.

Nevertheless the departure of Prince Menchikoff, followed by the entire Russian Mission, is a fact in itself of such grave importance; the military preparations of Russia on the Turkish frontier are upon a scale of such vast magnitude, and the danger which threatens the Porte may be so imminent, that it appears indispensable to take measures for the protection of the Sultan, and to aid his Highness in repelling any attack that may be made upon his territory.

I have accordingly to inform your Excellency that by Her Majesty's commands the fleet now stationed at Malta is placed at the disposal of your Excellency, and that orders will be sent to Admiral Dundas to conform to the instructions he may receive from you, and to repair to such place as you may direct in the event of your considering the presence of a British force absolutely essential to the safety of the Turkish Empire. Her Majesty's Government, however, are desirous that your Excellency should distinctly understand that in coming to this determination they by no means intend to depart from the moderate and conciliatory course which they have always adopted between the Porte and its Allies; but in the use of the power now confided you, involving as it may do the momentous question of peace or war, Her Majesty's Government place the fullest reliance on the discretion of your Excellency.

A declaration of war by Russia against Turkey, the embarkation of troops at Sevastopol, or any other well-established fact denoting intentions of unmistakable hostility, would in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government entirely justify your Excellency in sending for the fleet, which however would not pass the Dardanelles except on the express demand of the Sultan; but the use of force should only be resorted to as a last and unavoidable resource for the protection of Turkey against an unprovoked attack, and in defence of her independence which England is bound to maintain.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 324.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 81.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 31, 1853.*

YOU will have learned by my despatch No. 69 of the 17th instant, that great anxiety prevailed here with respect to the negotiations then pending between the Russian Ambassador and the Porte. Subsequent intelligence tended to increase that anxiety, and a state of painful excitement was created on Saturday last, when the news arrived that diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte were broken off; that Prince Menchikoff had quitted Constantinople on the 22nd instant, and that the remainder of his Embassy was to follow him in three days.

Her Majesty's Government are at present uninformed of the immediate cause that led to this rupture; but the undoubted fact of Prince Menchikoff's departure is to them a source of deep regret; nor can they view without the utmost alarm, an event that may lead to war between two Powers in close alliance with England, and which must consequently endanger the peace of Europe. But in a state of affairs so critical and so full of peril to the best interests of society, it is indispensable that between England and Russia no misunderstanding should exist, and Her Majesty's Government feel that they should be wanting in that perfect confidence which has hitherto prevailed, and which they trust will always continue to exist between the two Cabinets, if they did not at once seek from the Russian Government the most frank and unreserved explanations.

For this purpose it becomes necessary to revert to your correspondence during the present year, which conveyed the assurances given to you respecting the policy and intentions of Russia towards Turkey, that, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, were received, as they were entitled to be, with unreserved confidence.

It appears then by your despatch No. 7 of the 8th of January, that on the 8th of January, in a conversation which you held with Count Nesselrode respecting the reported armaments in the South of Russia, the Chancellor assured you that the Emperor deprecated the fall of Turkey, and that as regarded the

present crisis, Count Nesselrode hoped it would be brought to a conclusion by negotiation, but that the diplomacy of Russia must be supported by a demonstration of force, and that the Porte would be required strictly to fulfil its engagements towards the Greek Church and the Emperor, and that a corresponding compensation must be made to the Greek, for any new concession to the Latin Church.

In a conversation (No. 13, of the 11th January) which you had the honour to hold with the Emperor on the following day, the 9th of January, His Imperial Majesty said that it was very important that England and Russia should come to a perfectly good understanding on the affairs of Turkey, and that neither should take any decisive step of which the other was not apprized.

By a despatch from Count Nesselrode dated January 14, it clearly appears that the sole object of Russia at that time was "un arrangement qui puisse rendre au firman la validité qu'on lui a ôtée; rétablir à Jérusalem les deux rits sur un pied d'égalité; et concilier leurs prétentions sans léser les droits de l'un ou de l'autre."

On the 5th February (No. 56), you stated that Count Nesselrode told you that Prince Menchikoff was going to Constantinople, where a person of greater weight than a Chargé d'Affaires was required; that his instructions would be of a conciliatory character; and that the Prince was himself animated by the most pacific intentions. Count Nesselrode also added that Prince Menchikoff would be instructed to occupy himself with the affairs of Montenegro, as well as with the question of the Holy Places.

On a subsequent occasion (No. 70, 10th February), Count Nesselrode still represented Prince Menchikoff's instructions as moderate, observed there was necessarily some vagueness in his orders, as it was hardly ascertained to what extent the rights secured to the Greeks last year had been infringed; but there would be no question of attempting to regain from the Latins any of the privileges which they might subsequently have acquired at Jerusalem—the object to be sought for was an equivalent for any privileges lost by the Greeks.

Count Nesselrode said (No. 116, March 9), there was no such hurry in settling the question of the Holy Places as that of Montenegro; that Prince Menchikoff had been provided with very ample powers; that it was impossible for the Emperor to recede from the position secured to the Greeks by the firman of February 1852, and the Sultan's letter; that Prince Menchikoff's mission had long been determined upon, and only delayed on account of his health.

In reply to your inquiry (No. 134, March 24), whether an adjustment of the difficulties respecting the holy places would settle all matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, or whether Prince Menchikoff had other grievances to bring forward, Count Nesselrode said he was not aware that any such existed; there might be some outstanding private claims, but he knew of no other demands; in short, of none except such as might exist between any two friendly Governments, and form part of the current business of every Chancery.

Count Nesselrode remarked (No. 151, March 29), that the only moment during the late transactions when he had felt apprehension was that at which the urgency of affairs at Montenegro had called for the mission of Count Leiningen; that he had never contemplated the chance of the question of the Holy Places leading to war; and that his anticipation of a speedy conclusion of all matters in dispute, had been confirmed by Prince Menchikoff's despatches of the 17th, which represented affairs as going on satisfactorily.

Count Nesselrode said (No. 160, April 5), that there had been no sort of demand for the dismissal of Fuad Effendi; no ultimatum; no demand for extension of territory; no attempt at procuring for Russia the nomination of the Greek Patriarch; no wish was entertained of calling upon France for the restitution of any rights in regard to the holy places which she had obtained; and that the Emperor was only waiting for a confirmation of the peaceful intelligence which he had received from the South, when orders would be issued for discontinuing all warlike preparations.

Count Nesselrode's language on a subsequent occasion (No. 165, April 7), still alluded to the question of the Holy Places as the only one under discussion, and the speedy arrangement of which he looked forward to with confidence.

In a despatch to Baron Brunnow (April 7), Count Nesselrode repeats that it is the desire and resolution of the Emperor to respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and if his views in that respect should change, he would be the

first to apprize the British Government of the alteration; that the reports which followed the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople—of the occupation of the principalities; of the aggrandizement of territory in Asia; of the demand for the nomination of the Greek Patriarch; of the hostile and threatening language of Prince Menchikoff—were altogether unfounded; that in a word Prince Menchikoff's mission never had and has not any other object than that stated by Baron Brunnow to the British Government.

Count Nesselrode denied (No. 185, April 20) the truth of the report of a Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with Turkey, but admitted that the Sultan had been told he might count upon the protection of Russia against an attack of France in consequence of concessions made to the Greek Church in regard to the holy places.

You were informed (No. 190, April 21) that in the opinion of the Emperor "le meilleur moyen de soutenir la durée du Gouvernement Turc est de ne point le fatiguer par des exigeances impérieuses appuyées d'une manière humiliante pour son indépendance et sa dignité."

Count Nesselrode, in conversing with you (No. 191, April 21) on the note presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the 16th of March, said with reference to the expression "Acte de confiance," that it was intended that the Porte should redress the grievances set forth in the note, and that it was desired that the recognition of the rights secured to the Greek Church should be sanctioned by such formalities as would give it the character of an international engagement between Russia and Turkey; that the old Capitulations were represented by France as having the force of Treaties, and that it was desired that an arrangement intended to be permanent should possess an unquestionable character of this description. The Chancellor in the rest of the conversation continued to apply his remarks wholly to the question of the holy places.

With regard to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission, Count Nesselrode assured you (No. 207, April 30) that they were no others than have been made known to Her Majesty's Government, and that the intention of causing the forthcoming arrangement to be embodied in an Act, was dictated solely by the urgency of making the arrangement final, and placing it on the same footing as the French Capitulations.

Count Nesselrode said (No. 215, May 5) his only remaining fear was that of not coming to a good understanding with France in regard to the holy places; he had no longer any apprehensions as regarded the Porte.

In your despatch (No. 230, May 14) you say, "When I called upon the Chancellor yesterday, his Excellency acquainted me that the questions which have been agitated at Constantinople might be considered as virtually settled. That as regards the holy places, an arrangement had been made which was satisfactory both to Prince Menchikoff and to M. de la Cour; and that with respect to the sanction to be given to the arrangement, as the form of a Treaty had been considered objectionable both by the Queen's Ambassador and by the Porte, some other would be devised; what it would be he was unable to say, but full latitude had been given to the Russian negotiator, and the point was one which was sure to be speedily adjusted. The proposed Convention had been, Count Nesselrode observed, sent to London a fortnight ago, for the purpose of being communicated to your Lordship, but since the original sketch had been delivered to [by] Prince Menchikoff, it had been greatly modified. The modification applied particularly to the Article III. It had been found that the Patriarch of Constantinople exercised certain administrative powers (pouvoirs administratifs), and permanency of tenure would accordingly be secured by the corrected Article only to the Patriarch of Jerusalem."

Lastly, in your despatch No. 244, May 19, you report that having on the day before waited on the Chancellor, you found him "in momentary expectation of a messenger from Constantinople, who will in all probability be the bearer of the Convention which it may be assumed has been concluded between Russia and the Porte for the sanction of the two firmans which have lately been signed by the Sultan for the regulation of the rights of the Greek and Latin Churches at Jerusalem."

These explicit, precise, and satisfactory assurances given to you by Count Nesselrode have been repeated to me by Baron Brunnow in the strongest terms at the numerous interviews which I have had with him, and by written or verbal communications that he was instructed to make to Her Majesty's Government;

and on the 21st instant he informed me that he had received a letter from Count Nesselrode, stating that if it became necessary to resort to other measures with respect to Turkey, none should be undertaken without previous communication to Her Majesty's Government.

It now becomes necessary to advert to the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff so far as they are within the official cognizance of Her Majesty's Government, and in so doing I shall confine myself to the period subsequent to the arrival of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople.

Prince Menchikoff, in his note of the 5th of May, recapitulated the proposals he had previously made to the Porte on the 22nd March and 19th April; but in addition to those of the 22nd March relating to the holy places, Prince Menchikoff simultaneously made other proposals far more important and comprehensive in their character, accompanied with warnings of the danger which Rifaat Pasha would incur if any of those proposals were permitted to transpire.

These last proposals amounted in substance to the conclusion of a Treaty stipulating that Russia should enjoy the exclusive right of intervening for the effectual protection of all the members of the Greek Church, and of the interests of the churches themselves; that the privileges of the Patriarchs should be effectually confirmed, and that the Patriarchs should hold their preferment for life independently of the Porte's approval; the protection of Greek pilgrims in Palestine; the construction of a Russian church at Jerusalem; and the confirmation and enforcement of all Imperial rescripts granted from time to time to Russia. These demands were put forward as an explanation of the Treaty of Kainardji, and necessary for its complete execution.

On the 19th of April, soon after the arrival of fresh and pressing instructions from St. Petersburgh, Prince Menchikoff sent to the Porte a note verbale, in which, after specifying the demands of Russia in regard to the holy places, he says that he demands "un Séned ou Convention pour la garantie du *statu quo* strict des privilèges du culte Catholique Greco-Russe de l'Église de l'Orient, et des sanctuaires qui se trouvent en possession de ce culte exclusivement, ou en participation avec d'autres, à Jérusalem. La Russie ne demande pas à la Porte des concessions politiques; son désir est de calmer les consciences religieuses par la certitude du maintien de ce qui a toujours été pratiqué jusqu'à nos temps. Elle requiert dans l'intérêt des immunités religieuses du culte orthodoxe un Acte explicatif et positif de garanties—Acte qui n'affecterait en rien ni les autres cultes ni les relations de la Porte avec d'autres Puissances."

Finally, on the 5th of May, shortly after the arrival of fresh instructions from St. Petersburgh, and the day after the delivery of the firmans respecting the holy places, Prince Menchikoff addressed a further note to the Porte, in which, while he acknowledges the firmans as a compliance with his demands in regard to the holy places, he says that "n'ayant obtenu jusqu'ici aucune réponse au troisième et plus important point qui réclame des garanties pour l'avenir, et ayant tout récemment reçu l'ordre de redoubler d'insistance pour arriver à la solution immédiate de la question qui forme le principal objet de la sollicitude de Sa Majesté l'Empereur, l'Ambassadeur se voit dans l'obligation de s'adresser aujourd'hui à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères en renferment cette fois ses réclamations dans les dernières limites des directions supérieures."

Prince Menchikoff then goes on to say that his demands are substantially the same as they were at the outset, viz., that "le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, et ses possessions, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rits Chrétiens.

"Le nouveau firman explicatif sur les lieux saints de Jérusalem aura la valeur d'un engagement formel envers le Gouvernement Impérial.

"A Jérusalem les religieux et les pélerins Russes seront assimilés aux prérogatives des autres nations Etrangères."

Prince Menchikoff incloses the project of a Sened "qui attestera la confiance réciproque des deux Gouvernements," couched in more moderate terms than the first draft, and differing from it by the omission of specific reference to any other patriarch than that of Jerusalem; but it contains a further stipulation for the future arrangement of certain details respecting the holy places not specified in the firmans; and Prince Menchikoff ends by requiring an answer by

the 10th of May, any delay beyond which he could only consider as "un manque de procédés envers son Gouvernement, ce qui lui imposerait les plus pénibles obligations."

To comment upon the discrepancy that exists between the assurances given to Her Majesty's Government by the Government of the Emperor, and the language and acts of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, would be superfluous. But in my No. 69 of the 7th instant, I expressed to you the conviction of Her Majesty's Government that Prince Menchikoff must have been acting on his own responsibility; because the Emperor has declared his resolution to maintain the independence of the Porte; and no Sovereign having a proper regard for his own dignity and independence, could admit proposals so undefined as those of Prince Menchikoff, and by Treaty confer upon another and a more powerful Sovereign a right of protection over a large portion of his own subjects. However well disguised it may be, yet the fact is, that under the vague language of the proposed Sénad, a perpetual right to interfere in the internal affairs of Turkey would be conferred upon Russia; for governed as the Greek subjects of the Porte are by their ecclesiastical authorities, and looking as these latter would in all things do for protection to Russia, it follows that 14,000,000 of Greeks would henceforward regard the Emperor as their supreme protector, and their allegiance to the Sultan would be little more than nominal, while his own independence would dwindle into vassalage.

Nor can it be said that the proposed Sénad in any respects resembles the Capitulations of 1740, to which it is compared. For by that engagement the French only acquired a right to protect a few religious establishments served by foreigners, whereas Prince Menchikoff proposes to extend the protection of Russia to millions of subjects of the Porte who are under their own ecclesiastical Government, with respect to whom no engagement has been violated, nor on whose behalf has any complaint been made save that respecting the holy places, which, according to the admission of Prince Menchikoff, has been satisfactorily arranged.

But the most striking as well as the most serious part of these proceedings remains still to be noticed. The negotiations at Constantinople have been supported by great demonstrations of force, and every preparation for war has been made in the southern provinces of Russia. Great Britain has long been a quiet spectator of those armaments; but now that the relations between Russia and Turkey are broken off, it becomes our duty to ascertain what is the object in view, and in what manner and to what extent the dominions of the Sultan and the tranquillity of Europe are now threatened.

It is upon all these points that you are instructed earnestly but in the most friendly spirit to seek for explanations from the Russian Government, and at the same time to express the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Turkish Ministers, however well disposed they appear to have been to meet every just demand of Russia, could not and ought not, with any regard for the dignity of their Sovereign or the future security of his dominions, to have advised the Sultan to accept the proposals of Prince Menchikoff.

Count Nesselrode will, I am sure, readily admit that the confidence exhibited by Her Majesty's Government in the policy and intentions of Russia towards Turkey has been unlimited, and his Excellency has been made aware, by more than one recent communication, of the grounds upon which we consider that the maintenance of the Turkish Empire is an European necessity, and that its dismemberment, whether arising from foreign aggression or internal convulsion, would be an European catastrophe entailing disasters of incalculable magnitude and extent; and Count Nesselrode therefore cannot doubt that these views, which Her Majesty's Government have had every reason to believe are shared in by the Russian Government, remain in full force.

The same spirit now animates Her Majesty's Government which in 1840 impelled them to sign a Treaty, in conjunction with Russia, Austria, and Prussia, to aid the Porte under difficulties "qui menacent de porter atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, et à l'indépendance du trône du Sultan. Leurs dites Majestés, mues par le sentiment d'amitié sincère qui subsiste entr'elles et le Sultan; animées du désir de veiller au maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la paix de l'Europe; fidèles à l'engagement qu'elles ont contracté par la note collective remise à la Porte le 27 Juillet, 1839, &c."

And again, when in July 1841 the five Powers signed a Treaty, "persuadées que leur union et leur accord offrent à l'Europe le gage le plus certain de la conservation de la paix générale—objet constant de leur sollicitude; et leurs dites Majestés voulant attester cet accord en donnant à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits souverains, ainsi que de leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le répos de son Empire, &c."

To the solemn engagements thus entered into by the preambles of these Treaties, to the sound principles they lay down, and the great objects they seek to secure, Her Majesty's Government will faithfully adhere, and they rely with confidence that recent events at Constantinople will be powerless to induce the Emperor to depart even for a moment from that wise and generous policy towards Turkey, in which Her Majesty's Government have hitherto had the happiness of being united with that of His Imperial Majesty.

You will read this despatch to the Chancellor, and furnish him with a copy should he desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 325.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 19, 1853.*

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF and the Russian Legation are still here; and it is not easy to divine why they are so, after what has occurred. The fact, however, still affords a chance of their being induced to postpone their departure indefinitely without any improper sacrifice on the part of the Turkish Government. With the view of improving that chance, if possible, I proposed a meeting of the four Representatives, which accordingly took place this morning at the French Ambassadors.

Before I mention the substance of what passed at this meeting, I must apprize your Lordship of the state of things as now existing between the Porte and Prince Menchikoff. It may be described in a single sentence. The Russian Ambassador has declared his mission to be terminated, the whole of his legation to be on the point of leaving Constantinople, and the interests of Russian trade and shipping to be consigned to the Director of the Chancery, who is to remain here with the persons employed in his department.

A copy of the note by which his Excellency has made this declaration to the Porte, is inclosed herewith. I received it last night from Reshid Pasha, and at his request communicated it to the French Ambassador, the Prussian Envoy, and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires.

Prince Menchikoff sent in this decisive note after he had received a visit the same day from Reshid Pasha, who, passing over considerations of etiquette suggested by the previous interruption of the Ambassador's personal relations with the Porte, as signified officially by himself, called upon his Excellency in the hope of disposing him favourably to the reception of the Porte's definitive communication, prepared, but not yet delivered.

The Porte was thus prevented from making any official communication of its last intentions, and the Russian Ambassador's all but hostile declaration arrived when the Ottoman Council, composed of unusual numbers, had decided on maintaining its previous resolution by a majority of forty-two members out of forty-five.

To make the course of this unhappy business still more clear to your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government, I have the honour to inclose herewith in copy a short correspondence* which had taken place between Reshid Pasha and Prince Menchikoff two or three days before.

Of the Porte's intended note, it is but justice to say, that it declared a readiness to concede every point demanded by Russia with the single exception of that form of guarantee, I mean an engagement with the force of Treaty, which the Porte conceives to be inconsistent with its independence and sovereign

* See Inclosures in Nos. 337, 342.

dignity, and which opinion is more or less entertained by every one who may be supposed to have acquired a competent knowledge of the subject.

I now return to the meeting which I held this morning with my colleagues of Austria, France, and Prussia. It afforded me sincere satisfaction to find that there was no essential difference of opinion in our judgment of the emergency and of its bearings. We could not question the soundness of the Porte's views in resisting the extreme demands of Russia; we could not but acknowledge the spirit of conciliation displayed by the Sultan's Ministers; we agreed in our anxiety to find some means of averting the rupture which was all but carried into effect; and unfortunately we could not but agree in the difficulty, not to say impossibility of reconciling, after all that had passed, the requirements of the adverse parties. We finally determined on making an overture to Prince Menchikoff in the form least calculated to give umbrage. On the one hand we had some cause to hope that his Excellency would not be sorry to find a reasonable excuse for improving his position towards the Porte. On the other, we saw no reason to doubt that he would hesitate to avail himself of any proposal coming in an ostensible shape from an union of four Representatives. We thought to secure the advantage, and to avoid the danger, by requesting M. de Klezl, who had thoughts of paying a farewell visit to Prince Menchikoff the following day, to apprize him of the sorrow with which, individually, we all contemplated the rupture of his relations with the Porte, to express the lively gratification which a friendly solution of the present difference, if that were still possible, would afford us, and to ascertain whether he was disposed to receive through a private channel the Porte's intended note, and to give it a calm consideration, notwithstanding the measures which he had officially declared.

The prospect of success to be expected from this step is far from encouraging; but your Lordship will probably agree with me that the motives for making so doubtful an experiment overbalance the objections to incurring the risk of failure.

M. de Klezl is not at liberty to make this communication to Prince Menchikoff without having previously obtained the assent of Reshid Pasha. Whatever may be its result, there is room for consolation in the limited extent of Prince Menchikoff's admonitions.

Their tone is harsh, and their aspect is threatening; but there is at least no threat of immediate war, no hint of an approaching occupation of the principalities. Whatever perils may be involved in the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey, they do not appear to be immediate; and I cherish a sanguine hope that the exertions of European influence will check the ebullitions of resentment, and ultimately ward off those contingent evils which it is now the business of Prince Menchikoff to paint in imposing colours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 325.

Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.

Bruyukderé, le $\frac{9}{21}$ Mai, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la notification de la Sublime Porte en date du $\frac{8}{20}$ Mai. Elle est loin de répondre aux espérances que lui avait fait concevoir l'accueil bienveillant et les gracieuses paroles de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

En réponse à trois notes consécutives que le Soussigné a eu l'honneur de remettre au Cabinet Ottoman, et qui, appuyées de ses explications verbales avec les Ministres de la Sublime Porte, n'ont pu laisser aucun doute sur les intentions désintéressées de son Auguste Maître, il n'a reçu que des assurances évasives et illusoires.

Les deux firmans destinés à clore le débat sur les saints lieux de Jérusalem ne sauraient, vu les précédents, offrir la garantie que désire l'Empereur. La promesse isolée d'étendre à nos sujets les privilèges dont jouissent à Jérusalem les pélerins et les établissements des autres nations, ne confirment qu'un droit incontestable dont l'exercice seul réclamait la sanction souveraine.

La Sublime Porte en repoussant avec méfiance les vœux de l'Empereur en

faveur du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe, a manqué aux égards dûs à un auguste et ancien allié. Elle n'a fait qu'ajouter ainsi un nouveau grief à ceux dont le Soussigné avait l'ordre de réclamer le redressement, et justifier les sérieuses appréhensions du Gouvernement Impérial pour la sécurité et le maintien des droits antiques de l'Eglise d'Orient. L'identité du culte, ce lien séculaire cimenté par les besoins et les intérêts réciproques des deux pays autant que par leur position géographique, au lieu d'être le gage d'une amitié solide, devient de la sorte, par une erreur déplorable dans la pensée du Gouvernement Ottoman, la cause permanente d'une attitude blessante pour la Russie.

Son Altesse le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères vient encore de se rendre auprès du Soussigné l'organe de propositions qu'il est d'autant moins à son pouvoir d'accepter avec les réserves qui s'y attachent, qu'elles ne font que reproduire celles qu'il a dû rejeter antérieurement et que le projet de séparer et de graduer dans leur forme les actes que les contiendront, impliquernit evidemment l'idée de ne rendre strictement obligatoire que celui qui concerne l'établissement d'un hospice Russe à Jérusalem. Son Altesse Reshid Pasha en fesant pressentir qu'une note responsive devait encore être discutée au conseils sur la bases de ses mêmes propositions, et n'ayant pas en outre voulu en préciser les termes, le Soussigné n'y voit qu'un nouveau moyen dilatoire qui ne peut changer en rien ces déterminations.

L'ensemble de communications de la Sublime Porte ayant ainsi convaincu le Soussigné de l'inutilité de ses efforts pour amener sur l'objet de ses réclamations une entente satisfaisante et conforme à la dignité de son Auguste Maître, il se voit dans l'obligation de déclarer—

Qu'il considère sa mission comme terminée;

Que la Cour Impériale ne saurait, sans déroger à sa dignité et sans s'exposer à de nouvelles offenses, continuer d'avoir une Légation à Constantinople et entretenir sur l'ancien pied ses relations politiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman; qu'en conséquence et en vertu des pleins pouvoirs dont le Soussigné est muni, il quittera Constantinople en amenant avec lui tout le personnel de la Légation Impériale à l'exception du Directeur de la Chancellerie commerciale, qui, avec les employés qui lui sont adjoints, continuera à gérer des affaires de navigation et de commerce, et à protéger les intérêts des sujets Russes et l'expédition de leur batiments;

Qu'il regrette profondement de devoir prendre cette détermination, mais qu'après avoir rempli fidèlement les ordres de l'Empereur en soumettant à la délibération de la Sublime Porte les propositions les plus conciliantes, les plus équitables, et les plus conformes aux véritables intérêts de l'Empire Ottoman, et avoir acquis la pénible certitude que le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan n'était point disposé à les accueillir et à y faire droit, il s'acquitte d'un dernier devoir en rejetant toute la responsabilité des conséquences qui pourraient surgir sur le Cabinet Ottoman, qui semble avoir pris à tâche de faire naître une grave mésintelligence entre les deux Empires;

Que le refus d'une garantie pour le culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe devra désormais imposer au Gouvernement Impérial la nécessité de la chercher dans sa propre puissance;

Qu'ainsi toute atteinte portée au *statu quo* de l'Eglise Orient et à son intégrité, sera considérée par l'Empereur comme l'équivalent d'une infraction à l'esprit et à la lettre des stipulations existantes, et comme une acte hostile à la Russie qui imposerait à Sa Majesté l'obligation de recourir à des moyens que dans sa constante sollicitude pour la stabilité de l'Empire Ottoman et par son amitié sincère pour Sa Majesté le Sultan, et celle qu'il a professé pour son auguste père, l'Empereur a toujours eu à cœur d'écarter.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 326.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 374.)

My Lord, *Paris, May 31*, 1853.

IT is not uninteresting at the present moment to hear the opinions of a person who has some knowledge of the character of the Greek subjects of the

Porte, and there is now living in Paris a certain Prince Stourdza, who was formerly Hospodar of Moldavia. I have not had an opportunity of conversing with him myself, but one of my colleagues tells me that he has questioned the Prince minutely as to the assistance which the Emperor of Russia would be likely to obtain from the Greek population of the Principalities, in case the present occurrences of the Porte should lead to war.

Prince Stourdza's opinion is that Russia would meet with no sympathy from the Greek clergy, because although they are very willing to profit by the mediation of Russia in case of any differences with the Porte, and to accept of Russian money for repairing their churches, &c., they look upon the Patriarch of Constantinople as the orthodox head of their Church, and would not like to see the sacred synod transferred to St. Petersburgh. Furthermore, the clergy would never meet with so much individual liberty and latitude of action under Russia as they do under Turkish rule.

Neither, in the opinion of the same person, would Russia meet with sympathy from the Greek population; true, the Greeks now pay taxes which the Turks do not, but they are exempt from military service; they are mostly engaged in trade, and they are aware that they have far greater liberty than would be the case if the Emperor of Russia was their liege lord and master.

Prince Stourdza is further of opinion that a descent on Constantinople by land is a much more difficult undertaking than is generally supposed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 327.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 376.)

Paris, May 31, 1853.

My Lord,

IT may not be perhaps irrevelant to notice the very strong disclaimer on the part of the French Government which the late discussions at Constantinople have produced, of all right to protect any other Roman Catholics in Turkey than the Latins of the Holy Land. It was until lately supposed that the French claimed under their Capitulations with the Porte the title to protect every Roman Catholic stranger within the Sultan's dominions. I must do them the justice to say, that I never heard the claim urged as is now insinuated by Russia over the few Roman Catholic subjects of the Porte, but over Roman Catholic strangers in general it was certainly put forward. This latter claim, however, is at present modified to the exercise of protection over the Latins of the Holy Land, and over the members of such religious establishments as are admitted to belong to France.

As M. Drouyn de Lhuys is now warm in his assertions of the slender title which France puts forward to religious protection in Turkey, it may not be amiss to take a note of them. He tells me that he has had all the despatches of the time when the Capitulations were made looked into, and that he has examined several memoirs bearing upon the subject, and that nothing can be clearer than that the Ambassadors of France have always repudiated the religious protection of Turkish Roman Catholic subjects, as derogatory of the sovereign rights of the Sultan and of the independence of the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 328.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 383. Confidential.)

Paris, June 1, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Minister informed me this morning that his Government had received assurances from St. Petersburgh that great latitude had been left to Prince Menchikoff in respect to the form in which the guarantees demanded by Russia in favour of protection to the Greek religion should be given by the Porte, and he appears therefore to indulge the hope that the Emperor of Russia, while approving the demands of his Ambassador, may be willing to accept some other arrangement by which those demands may be agreed to without wounding the susceptibility of the Porte. I do not think that M. de Hübner would have stated this opinion unless he knew it to be the opinion of his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 329.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1853.

My Lords,

I HAVE received the Queen's commands to acquaint your Lordships that, in the present critical state of Turkish affairs, it is Her Majesty's pleasure that Her Majesty's fleet, now stationed at Malta, should proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, and that Vice-Admiral Dundas should be instructed to send a fast steamer to Constantinople to enable Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe to communicate with him without loss of time, and should further be instructed to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet under his orders which he may receive from Her Majesty's Ambassador.

I have at the same time the honour to transmit to your Lordships for your information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe placing the fleet at his disposal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 330.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 59.)

Foreign Office, June 2, 1853.

My Lord,

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter which, by the Queen's commands, I have addressed to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, by which you will perceive that Vice-Admiral Dundas is instructed to proceed forthwith to the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles with the fleet under his orders, and to comply with any requisition in regard to the movements and operations of the fleet which he may receive from your Excellency.

I need scarcely remind your Excellency of the necessity of taking care that proper firmans for the unmolested passage of the fleet through the Dardanelles are sent to the Pasha, in the event of your being requested by the Sultan to call up the fleet to Constantinople.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 331.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 387.)

Paris, June 2, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE read to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the greater part of your Lordship's despatch No. 81 to Sir Hamilton Seymour, omitting those passages only where Count Nesselrode's words might possibly give offence to the French Government; and I have moved the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to send a

similar despatch to General Castelbajac. M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed without hesitation to do so, observing that his catalogue of Russian promises and assurances would be quite as long as that of Her Majesty's Government. He expressed himself much pleased with your Lordship's despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 332.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 388.)

Paris, June 2, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS informs me that he forwarded to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship, two important telegraphic despatches received yesterday by the French Government from Berlin, the one stating that Count Nesselrode had declared to the English and French Ministers at St. Petersburgh that he had never given any assurances that the question of the holy places was the only one which Prince Menchikoff had to settle with the Porte, and that Russia intended to have the protectorate of the Greek religion in Turkey—and, moreover, would have it; the other giving intelligence that orders had been received at Warsaw to put the 4th Corps d'Armée in movement towards the Moldavian frontier, where it was to be assembled on the 10th of June.

The first of these despatches I did not see, and am willing to hope that, as M. Drouyn de Lhuys was somewhat excited when he told me its contents, his expressions may have been a little exaggerated.

A telegraphic despatch of the 23rd instant has also reached the French Government from M. de la Cour, but it adds nothing to the intelligence which we already possess.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 333.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 261.)

St. Petersburgh, May 27, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE held to-day a very long and by no means satisfactory conversation with Count Nesselrode upon the subject of your Lordship's despatch No. 69 of the 16th instant, which paper, however, I refrained from communicating to his Excellency.

It is perhaps not necessary that I should detail to your Lordship all that passed upon this occasion, the object which I had in view having been to show that the Treaty, or rather Sened, which has been presented to the Turkish Government for their acceptance, is contrary to the declarations made over and over again both to your Lordship and to myself; and Count Nesselrode endeavoured to show that the utmost frankness had characterized the Russian negotiation; that I had been always informed by him that two points were sought by Russia—satisfaction for the past, and security for the future; that I had been acquainted that the Imperial Government would insist upon the firmans settling the state of Church-possession at Jerusalem and the disputes between the Greeks and Latins, being placed under the sanction of a Convention answering to the French Capitulations; and that this demand pointed clearly to an agreement of the nature contained in the Sened, against which such "unaccountable" objections had been raised by the late Turkish Ministry and the English Embassy.

I had taken with me four of my despatches, Nos. 134, 160, 164, and 191, from all of which I had been desirous of reading extracts in proof of the English view of the question under discussion, but the length of the conversation prevented me from reading more than that portion of my despatch No. 134 which

begins with the words "I told Count Nesselrode," and ends with these,—"the current business of every Chancellerie."

The Chancellor threw no doubts upon the correctness of my report, but maintained that an adjustment of Church difficulties was precisely the object all along given out, and the attainment of which was now sought by the Sened.

I admitted having, some considerable time since, learned from his Excellency that it was considered essential that the two firmans should be reinforced by, or, if he pleased, embodied in a Convention, but that there was entirely new matter in the "Projet de Traité" brought forward by Prince Menchikoff; that there was now question of granting to the Emperor a right of protection over 10,000,000 of Greeks, which would render him more powerful in Turkey than the Sultan himself, which would make them all look up to a foreign Sovereign, and not to their own master.

Have they looked, Count Nesselrode replied, for the last hundred years in any other direction? No; believe this Convention upon which we so strongly insist is perfectly inoffensive and anodyne (*sic*); it changes nothing in the state of affairs; it does not tend to weaken the Sultan's authority, and it is in some measure calculated to strengthen it since it removes the possibility of such contestations as those which we have lately witnessed.

I rejoined that I could not admit that the proposed Act contained no innovation; that, beyond being a confirmation, it was a very great extension of the rights secured to the Russian Crown by the Treaty of Kainardji; that the old rights applied to the Danubian provinces, whilst those proposed were to range over the whole of Turkey.

The Chancellor could not give up his position, and testified his great regret at the view of the subject which has been taken by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, an expression which I met by assuring his Excellency that no difference upon the point existed between Lord Stratford de Redcliffe and Her Majesty's Government.

Count Nesselrode hoped that this would yet prove not to be the case; the opinion of Her Majesty's Government had been formed upon the original "Projet de Traité" presented by Prince Menchikoff, and would by this time be considerably modified by the amended draft which Baron Brunnow had been directed to communicate to your Lordship.

The last expressions employed by Count Nesselrode appeared to me to sound ominously.

The Emperor had, he said, shown the greatest consideration for Turkey in the demands which he had made upon her; great latitude had been left in Prince Menchikoff's hands, of which a full use had been made by the Prince in attempting to meet the objections of the Turkish Government and of Her Majesty's Embassy; and further alterations of form might be possibly admitted; but from the substance (le fond) of his demands, His Imperial Majesty could not recede, and "a dreadful responsibility would be assumed by any Government which by counselling the rejection of these demands might bring about the downfall of the Ottoman Empire."

I have omitted to state that when the Chancellor remarked, as he did in the course of the conversation, that it was only asked that the Emperor of Russia should be put in possession of a right similar to that enjoyed by the Emperor of Austria; I replied that besides that the demand now made was a new feature in the transaction: there was this difference between the two Sovereigns, that one possessed a hold over some thousands of Catholics, and that the other would obtain the same influence over some millions of Greeks.

It may indeed be argued that this influence is already possessed by Russia, and that although the right to interfere generally on behalf of the Greek subjects of the Porte is not yet secured to her, the practice of so interfering has long prevailed; all this may be true, but it is not less certain that a long-cherished object is seen to have been sought by a tortuous path, and that if words be not intended to disguise rather than to manifest intentions, Her Majesty's Government have good right to look with surprise upon the demands made upon the Sultan, in the name of his master, by Prince Menchikoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 334.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 43.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 10, 1853.

IN one of my preceding numbers I mentioned that I had seen the Sultan in private. The interview took place yesterday morning. Rifaat Pasha accompanied me to the Sultan's apartment, and then withdrew. I found His Majesty to all appearance much cast down, and having an air of weakness as well as melancholy. The loss of the Validé Sultana was no doubt weighing on his spirits, but the demands of Russia and the attitude assumed by Prince Menchikoff, were also, I conceive, among the prominent causes of their depression.

Reminding the Sultan of the disposition he had shown to receive my counsels, I said that I had hitherto confided them to his Ministers, not wishing to trespass personally on His Majesty's indulgence without necessity. I added that in the present critical juncture of affairs the case might be different, and His Majesty might like to know what I thought from my own lips. I then endeavoured to give him a just idea of the degree of danger to which his Empire was exposed, first from an increasing opinion of its decline entertained in one and proclaimed in another part of Europe, with a corresponding disposition in the north to provide as for an approaching crisis, and a growing indifference in the west to an event more or less considered as unavoidable. The immediate danger had been arrested for the time, if not removed, and Her Majesty's Government had nothing more at heart than to assist in rescuing the Porte from everything which might threaten a return of it, while the Porte itself was careful to meet the demands of Russia in a spirit of conciliation, equity, and prudence, united when necessary with firmness and resolution. The success which had fortunately attended the negotiations relating exclusively to the holy places at Jerusalem, promised well for an eventual arrangement of the subsequent discussions, and I was happy to find that His Majesty's servants, both Ministers and Council, were not less inclined to gratify the Russian Ambassador with all that could be safely conceded to him, than determined to withhold their consent from every requisition calculated to inflict a serious injury on the independence and dignity of their Sovereign. I had waited to know their own unbiassed impressions respecting the kind of guarantee demanded by Prince Menchikoff, and I could not do otherwise than approve the decision which they appeared to have adopted with unanimity. My own impression was, that if His Majesty sanctioned that decision, the Ambassador would probably break off his relations with the Porte, and go away, together perhaps with his whole Embassy; nor was it quite impossible that even a temporary occupation, however unjust, of the Danubian Principalities by Russia might take place; but I felt certain that neither a declaration of war nor any other act of open hostility was to be apprehended for the present, as the Emperor Nicholas could not resort to such extremities on account of the pending differences, without contradicting his most solemn assurances, and exposing himself to the indignant censure of all Europe. I conceived that under such circumstances the true position to be maintained by the Porte was one of moral resistance to such demands as were really inadmissible on just and essential grounds, and that the principle should even be applied under protest to the occupation of the Principalities, not in weakness or despair, but in reliance on a good cause and on the sympathy of friendly and independent Governments. A firm adherence to this line of conduct, as long as it was possible to maintain it with honour, would in my judgment offer the best chances of ultimate success with the least practicable degree of provocation and present disturbance of commercial interests.

I concluded by apprizing His Majesty of what I had reserved for his private ear, in order that his Ministers might take their decision without any bias from without, namely, that in the event of imminent danger I was instructed to request the Commander of Her Majesty's Forces in the Mediterranean to hold his squadron in readiness.

The whole of this language appeared to interest the Sultan deeply, and also to coincide with His Majesty's existing opinions. He said that he was well aware of the dangers to which I had alluded; that he was perfectly prepared in the exercise of his own free will to confirm and to render effective the protection promised to all classes of his tributary subjects in matters of religious worship, including the immunities and privileges granted to their respective clergy, observing that his ancestors had been more liberal in promise than exact in performance; and he gave me the full measure alike of his apprehensions and of his resolution by saying, with reference to the loss of his mother, that having now so little to attach him to life, the sacrifice even of that would scarcely cost him a feeling of regret. He showed me the last communications in writing which had passed between his Ministers and the Russian Embassy; he thanked me for having helped to bring the question of the holy places to an arrangement; he professed his reliance on the friendly support of Great Britain, and finally dismissed me with gracious expressions of confidence and satisfaction.

I have since learned from the Grand Vizier, to whom the Sultan had mentioned his private reception of me, that His Majesty had been much gratified by the tenor of my communications.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 335.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1853.

I ADDRESSED you last on the 10th instant. I have now to continue my statement of the principal incidents relating to Prince Menchikoff's ill-omened difference with the Porte.

The first object to which I have the honour of soliciting your Lordship's attention is an official note addressed to the Prince by Rifaat Pasha, on the 10th of this month. A copy of it is inclosed herewith; and, agreeably to my advice, it has been communicated to the French, Prussian, and Austrian Representatives. The communication is confidential.

Your Lordship will observe that the note has been framed in general with reference to my suggestions, as stated in my despatch No. 41, of this year; but any responsibility which may in consequence devolve upon me, does not extend beyond the principal heads, excluding composition, and the reserve of unnoticed points. The object of the note was to declare the Porte's readiness to accept all the Russian demands not utterly inadmissible; to comply with those wishes of Russia which could not be demanded on any ground of right; and to offer such guarantees as the Sultan could give without a sacrifice of his independence and sovereign dignity.

On the following day Prince Menchikoff sent in a rejoinder, expressing dissatisfaction with the terms proposed by the Porte, and insisting, though with somewhat more of courtesy than before, on a more complete and immediate acceptance of his own. This note bears a date equivalent in our style to Wednesday, May 11; and Rifaat Pasha was given to understand that Saturday, the 14th, would be really the extreme goal of Russian forbearance. The interval was occupied with private or indirect endeavours to obtain a more liberal allowance of time, and to discover some mode of bringing the adverse parties within reach of an accommodation. I kept myself in communication with the French Ambassador and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires; I put Rifaat Pasha in possession of whatever struck me as at all calculated to smooth down the existing obstacles without a surrender of the main point at issue, and, acting through a secret channel, I endeavoured even to dispose the Russian party to more accommodating terms, notwithstanding the positive manner in which Prince Menchikoff had closed every avenue to negotiation but that which required a ticket of surrender at its entrance.

The Prince himself, though shunning, in the country, all contact with his diplomatic colleagues, and sticking pertinaciously to his basis, was busy in knocking at every door where the slightest chance existed of gaining a vote in

favour of his views. He paid a second visit to the superannuated Hosreff; he wrote to Reshid Pasha; he consented to wait on the Grand Vizier; and, finally, he applied for a private audience of the Sultan.

Simultaneously with these operations, clandestine agents were employed to work upon the apprehensions of Rifaat Pasha, and intimidating language was circulated with much industry.

The change which took place in the Turkish Administration on Friday, and the supposed causes of the measure, together with its more immediate consequences, are related in other despatches for your Lordship's information.

It remains for me at present only to inclose, as I do herewith, a copy of Prince Menchikoff's last note to Rifaat Pasha.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 335.

Rifaat Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.

(Translation.) *Shaban* 2, 1269. (*May* 10, 1853.)

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note dated the 5th of May, N. S. The contents of the other papers having reference to it, have been taken into due consideration.

It has been His Imperial Majesty the Sultan's earnest and constant desire to maintain and increase by every means the strong relations of sincere friendship and concord between the Sublime Porte and the illustrious Government of Russia, and more especially to confirm and consolidate those same relations which for a long time have been happily established on a firm basis between His Imperial Majesty the Sultan and His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Russia. It is therefore the sincere desire of the Porte in pursuance of the relations of good neighbourhood and a sincere and generous friendship, to settle any Russian claims which do not in any way injure or affect the independence, the special interests, or the rights of the Porte. The Sublime Porte in reserving to itself the power of giving a decisive reply, if it should be expedient, to the matters contained in the paper inclosed in your Excellency's note, desires earnestly that your Excellency should take into your friendly consideration the following points.

The Sublime Porte will not decline to negotiate on the demands made by Russia concerning a church and a hospital at Jerusalem, and relative to Russian subjects, monks, and pilgrims, in so far as they do not militate against the rights of the Porte, and to give a written assurance in harmony with the decision which may be come to.

The Sublime Porte, and more especially His Imperial Majesty the Sultan, in his royal solicitude on behalf of his subjects, has been ever desirous that the religious privileges enjoyed by his Christian and other subjects should be fully preserved, while the Imperial Government of Russia, having conceived certain doubts concerning the religious privileges of the Greek subjects of the Porte, demands assurances in that respect.

Now, His Imperial Majesty the Sultan being extremely desirous that the ancient privileges of his Greek as well as his other subjects should be perpetually preserved, it is not only His Majesty's intention that these religious privileges should be by no means destroyed, but constant care and attention is given for confirming and preserving them in perpetuity. However friendly may be the reciprocal sentiments of the Sublime Porte and the Government of Russia, it is contrary to international rights that our Government should conclude a Treaty with another on a dangerous matter, affecting not only those things in which her independence is grounded, but as it is well known her independence itself in its very foundations.

The great and valid objections entertained by the Porte on this subject, will be generally acknowledged, and more especially so by His Majesty the Emperor, whose sense of justice is so widely known.

In like manner as the Porte has hitherto fully preserved the many

religious privileges which she has, of her own free will and from a very remote period, conceded and granted to her Christian subjects, and more especially to the Greek subjects and monks; she will likewise henceforward, in harmony again with her own rights, be careful to continue and duly preserve them.

It is the decided intention of the Porte by again specially proclaiming His Imperial Majesty's resolution and unalterable views in this respects to the world at large, to afford a decisive proof of His Royal solicitude on behalf of his people; and there can be no doubt whatever that this measure will serve as a real and full security to all.

In making this communication to your Excellency by order of His Imperial Majesty, I avail myself, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 335.

Prince Menchikoff to Rifaat Pasha.

Buyukdéré, le $\frac{29 \text{ Avril}}{11 \text{ Mai}}$, 1853.

LE Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de Son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte en date du $\frac{28 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$. C'est avec un contentement profond qu'il s'est plu à y trouver l'expression des sentiments d'amitié qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour l'Empereur son Auguste Allié ainsi que des assurances sur le désir sincère du Cabinet Ottoman de resserrer les anciens liens qui l'unissent au Gouvernement Impérial.

Mais l'étonnement que le Soussigné a ressenti n'en a été que plus pénible, lorsqu'il a dû en même temps relever dans cette communication la méfiance avec laquelle le Gouvernement de la Sublime Porte recueillait des démarches franches et loyales qu'il avait à formuler au nom de l'Empereur. Cette méfiance se fait jour dans l'interprétation que la Sublime Porte veut donner aux intentions de Sa Majesté Impériale en y cherchant la pensée inadmissible et contraire à sa politique généreuse et conservatrice, de vouloir obtenir un droit nouveau au détriment de l'indépendance et de la souveraineté de la Sublime Porte. Le Soussigné se croit en devoir de faire observer à son Excellence que ce doute est émis lorsque, avec un épanchement affectueux, l'Empereur fait un appel à l'amitié de son Auguste Allié, et ne lui demande, sans préjudice aucun au pouvoir sacré et inviolable de Sa Majesté le Sultan, qu'une preuve ostensible de sa sollicitude pour le culte orthodoxe Grec, qui est celui de la Russie, et dont l'Empereur est le défenseur naturel.

Le Soussigné croit inutile de rappeler ici les faits regrettables qui ont éveillé les appréhensions si justes de son Auguste Maître pour l'avenir du culte Chrétien d'Orient. Ce n'est qu'un Acte émanant de la volonté souveraine du Sultan, un engagement libre mais solennel qui peut effacer le souvenir pénible des fautes commises par quelque conseiller inhabile et malveillant de Sa Majesté le Sultan. Le Soussigné est chargé de négocier ce témoignage d'égards pour les convictions religieuses de l'Empereur, mais si les principes qui en forment la base sont rejetés ainsi qu'il ressort de la note de son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du $\frac{28 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$, si par une opposition systématique la Sublime Porte persiste à lui fermer jusqu'aux voies d'une entente intime et directe, comme elle doit l'être dans un différend à régler entre deux Puissances amies, le Soussigné le déclare avec peine, il devra considérer sa mission comme terminée, interrompre les relations avec le Cabinet de Sa Majesté le Sultan, et rejeter sur la responsabilité de ses Ministres toutes les conséquences qui pourraient en résulter.

Le Soussigné se flatte de l'espoir que ces considérations fixeront l'attention la plus sérieuse de la Sublime Porte, et que son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, pénétré de leur haute importance ainsi que de l'esprit de conciliation que les dicte, voudra bien apprécier en même temps les motifs qui ne permettent point à l'Ambassadeur d'accepter la note du $\frac{28 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$, comme une réponse conforme à la dignité de son Souverain.

Il ne reste au Soussigné qu'à prier son Excellence de vouloir bien lui répondre à la présente communication jusqu'à $\frac{1}{13}$ Mai. Il croit ainsi donner le temps nécessaire à la reflexion que demande la gravité même de la question.

L'Ambassadeur saisit, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 336.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1853.

I HAVE mentioned in another despatch that Prince Menchikoff had written a letter to Reshid Pasha before the late change of Ministry. I received the communication of it from Reshid himself, and I now inclose a copy for your Lordship's information. The Pasha sent it to me with a message purporting that he had submitted it to the Sultan, and he asked my opinion as to the expediency of sending an answer to the Russian Ambassador. I said in reply, that I thought he was the best judge of that expediency, but that if he made up his mind to send an answer he would do well not to make it more than an acknowledgment of his Excellency's letter.

As I am anxious to give your Lordship a full and unreserved account of my proceedings in this most delicate negotiation, I transmit herewith a list of queries addressed to me by Rifaat Pasha on the 11th instant, together with my answers to the same, which, according to Mr. Pisani's report, were received with satisfaction by his Excellency. My opinion of the value likely to be attached by Russia to the Sultan's assurances is founded in part on information derived from secret sources, and in part on intimations given by Prince Menchikoff himself.

Your Lordship may remember that on the arrival of that Ambassador here, it was alleged that he had proposed a Treaty of Alliance with the Porte. How far the rumour may have been correct, I cannot presume to determine. My impression is, that a feeler was privately put forward, but not meeting with encouragement, was drawn in for the time. The accompanying secret report from Mr. Stephen Pisani will inform your Lordship, on the high authority of the Grand Vizier then in office, what has since occurred on that subject. The only reason for suspecting any deception in the Vizier's statement, is the difficulty of reconciling it with the repeated assurances and professions of the Russian Government. But is this the only contradiction offered by Russia in the course of the pending discussions? Was not Sir Hamilton Seymour informed by Count Nesselrode that the dismissal of Fuad Effendi was never demanded by Prince Menchikoff? Is not the direct contrary stated—though the dismissed Minister be not named—by that Ambassador in his *note verbale* of the 19th ultimo? Can any degree of human indulgence reconcile the assurances given by Count Nesselrode with the demands now urged by Prince Menchikoff with all the force of indignant virtue and unquestionable right! Alas! my Lord, these flaws of conduct cannot pass under notice without touching the springs of memory. They remind me but too painfully of the language ascribed to the Russian Plenipotentiaries at Ackermann, and of the alleged duplicity of the Russian interpreter here during the triple conferences of 1827.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 336.

Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.

Péra, le $\frac{29 \text{ Avril}}{10 \text{ Mai}}$, 1853.

M. le Pasha,

Il paraîtrait peut-être étrange à votre Altesse de recevoir une lettre de l'Ambassadeur d'une Puissance qu'on suppose n'avoir pas eu vos sympathies; mais c'est à l'homme d'expérience et de talent que je m'adresse, au Ministre

enfin qui apprécie la gravité de la position où se trouve la Porte, par suite des rapports chanceux dans lesquels elle est placée vis-à-vis de la Russie.

Je ne sais, M. le Pasha, si, vous trouvant en-dehors de la politique, vous avez la possibilité de faire connaître à votre Souverain, sans intermédiaire quelconque, tous les résultats que pouvait amener une rupture entre les deux Etats; mais il est certainement du devoir d'une bon citoyen de le faire.

J'adjure donc votre Altesse, pour l'amour qu'il doit avoir pour le bien-être et la stabilité de son pays, et pour le dévouement qu'elle professe pour le Sultan son maître, de placer immédiatement sous ses yeux le tableau de la situation actuelle, ainsi que des prévisions qui en sont les conséquences, et que personne mieux que vous, Monsieur, ne saurait développer.

Je prie votre Altesse de me pardonner de venir l'importuner dans sa retraite en faveur de l'intention qui a provoqué ma démarche—intention de parvenir au maintien de la paix et de l'harmonie entre les deux Puissances voisines intéressées à vivre en bonne intelligence.

J'offre, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

Inclosure 2 in No. 336.

Queries addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe by Rifaat Pasha.

Queries.	*Answers.*
1. THE Porte cannot make a Sened touching the religious points: can it?	1. THIS point seems to be already settled in the negative.
2. Can verbal assurances be given respecting those points by the Sultan himself without harm?	2. If the Russian Ambassador asked for an audience, it would be right to give it; but the Sultan's assurances would have little value in his eyes.
3. Would it be advisable to insert some assurances in the letter to be written by the Sultan in answer to the Emperor's autograph?	3. It may be doubted whether such assurances would have any effect beyond that of being taken as an act of courtesy.
4. Whether the firman of privileges shall be sent without or with an official note?	4. I am of opinion that it should be sent with a note.
5. Can the Porte make a Sened respecting the Russian priests, pilgrims, church and hospital at Jerusalem, and also confirming the clauses of the last firman relative to the sanctuaries, and promising to maintain the *status quo*?	5. A Sened, even for these objects, would be best avoided; but, in case of need, it might be granted without any great inconvenience.
6. Can the Porte enter into discussion with Prince Menchikoff regarding the holy places, and say to him that for the other points sufficient assurances and guarantees will be given in the firman to be promulgated forthwith?	6. No means, whether ostensibly or confidentially official, of clearing up the questions at issue ought to be refused to Prince Menchikoff; but, in truth, all that is contained in the sixth query has been already tried.
7. What answer is to be given to the Prince's note?	7. The Porte has already announced its determination in that respect.

Inclosure 3 in No. 336.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Most Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *Pera, May* 11, 1853.

THE Grand Vizier, whom I had occasion to see this morning, told me in the strictest confidence, for your Excellency's information, that a few days since Prince Menchikoff paid a secret visit to Namik Pasha, at which no one else was present, and said to him that the principal object of the Emperor in the present

negotiation, was not the protectorate of the Greeks and their churches, which was a secondary question, and could easily be abandoned, but the conclusion of a Treaty of offensive and defensive alliance. The aim of this Treaty was, he said, to close the Dardanelles to British and French men-of-war. The Emperor, by proposing such a Convention, had no other design but that of guarding his house against foreign invasion. For this purpose His Majesty was ready to place at the disposal of the Sultan an army of 150,000 men. The Prince concluded, by requesting Namik Pasha to convey this message to the Sultan. Namik Pasha observed, that a message of so delicate and serious a nature could not be delivered to His Majesty through him, but through the proper channel of communication, which was the Grand Vizier.

No sooner had the Prince left Namik Pasha, than the latter proceeded to the Grand Vizier's, and disclosed to him all that had passed at this secret interview. His Highness having communicated these circumstances to me, confirmed the truth of them by the most solemn asseverations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ET. PISANI.

No. 337.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 47A.) *Constantinople, May* 14, 1853.

My Lord,

IN compliance with an official invitation from Reshid Pasha, now Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I waited on his Highness at the Porte this afternoon. He excused himself for the trouble he had given me, by saying that the pressure of the Russian requisitions had compelled him to seek an interview with the least possible delay. He explained his meaning further by stating that Prince Menchikoff had called upon him in the morning, and insisted on an immediate final reply, setting entirely aside, as *non avenue*, Rifaat Pasha's official note of the 10th instant, and threatening, if not satisfied, to break off his relations with the Porte; that he was in consequence very desirous of knowing my opinion as to what it was best for him to do in such an emergency; that the Council was going to take the subject into deliberation immediately; and that he was the more embarrassed, because from his recent return to office he had not yet possessed the necessary time for reading papers, and making up his mind.

I replied, that I conceived the Porte to be fully entitled to a reasonable delay, in consequence of the change of Ministry, which, to all appearance, had been the result of a step taken by Prince Menchikoff himself; but I advised that the delay should not be extended beyond a few days at most, and that, if it were possible to shorten the term, it might be prudent to do so.

The Pasha then drew up a short note in Turkish to Prince Menchikoff; and after a trifling alteration or two, suggested by me, it remained in the form of which an exact translation is inclosed herewith. It has since received the unanimous approval of the Council. It will be sent to the Russian Ambassador as soon as the Sultan's sanction is obtained.

Not only does the Porte's request appear reasonable in itself, but there is something indelicate in the pressure of the Russian Embassy, considering the settlement of the original question, the Sultan's domestic affliction, and the unexpected change of Administration. It is, moreover, desirable on every account that time should be gained, not only in the interests of the Porte, but for the conveyance of information to friendly Powers at a distance.

I did not, of course, neglect the opportunity of ascertaining the real intentions of the Turkish Government with respect to the main point of difference. I had already communicated, during the night, by means of Mr. Pisani, with the principal Ministers, both the old ones and the new; nor was there anything in his report to shake my conviction as to their steadiness and that of the Sultan. I received a full confirmation of this impression from Reshid Pasha, and the difficulty which he felt in addressing a note to Prince Menchikoff

appeared to arise from his desire to obtain the Ambassador's assent to some further delay without exposing himself to the charge of raising expectations which must end in disappointment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 339.

Reshid Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.

(Translation.) *Shaban* 7, 1269. (*May* 15, 1853.)

PRINCE MENCHIKOFF'S last note has been laid before the Sultan.

His Excellency the Prince has already been informed, both directly and indirectly, that owing to the change in the Department, it is impossible to give a precise answer on a matter of such delicacy as this of the religious privileges, without acquiring sufficient information thereon; but as His Imperial Majesty is most desirous that all manner of friendly relations should be maintained with the illustrious Government of Russia, the Prince is informed that the Sublime Porte is sincerely desirous that an arrangement, conveying assurances satisfactory to both parties, should be come to; that a delay of five or six days will be sufficient for this purpose, and that it will be endeavoured to settle the matter earlier if possible.

I have, &c.
(Signed) RESHID PASHA.

No. 338.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 3.)

(No. 47B. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 14, 1853.

THE confidential letter which I addressed to Prince Menchikoff on the 8th instant, as mentioned in one of my preceding despatches, did not remain unanswered, and a copy of his Excellency's reply is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

As the Russian Ambassador showed no disposition whatever either to avail himself of my good offices, or to modify demands which no Turkish statesman was likely to accept without constraint, I abstained from prolonging a correspondence incapable, under such circumstances, of producing any good, and far more likely to degenerate into an irritating controversy. The remarks which some parts of it have suggested, find a natural and less inconvenient place of record in my correspondence with your Lordship. Though somewhat numerous, they may be expressed in few words. For the sake of clearness as well as brevity, I have numbered the passages to which they relate.

1. The Russian grievances alluded to by Prince Menchikoff, in so far as they are special or known to me, originate almost exclusively in the question of the Holy Shrines in Palestine.

2. Satisfaction was given by the forced retirement of Fuad Effendi.

3. The guarantee required by Russia is objectionable to the Porte, on grounds of real danger to its independence. A more legitimate guarantee, which can hardly be refused without offence, is given instead.

4. The guarantee required by Russia goes far beyond the Treaties existing between that Power and the Porte. It is founded on a principle admitted nowhere else, and which is less admissible here than elsewhere, when applied to the millions of Rayahs professing the Greek religion.

5. These are simple assertions which will not stand the test of even a slight examination.

6. The objection does not lie against the interest taken by the Emperor in his religion and in that of his subjects, but in his attempt to extend to the

Sultan's Greek subjects the same degree of protection which for his own he may fairly claim.

7. I do not complain of insincerity on Prince Menchikoff's part towards me. But what, to all appearance, may be justly complained of, is the utter want of agreement between his principal requisition and the assurances of his Court. Still less is he entitled to complain of me. I gave him freely my good offices with respect to the holy places, and he acknowledged their efficiency. I gave him distinctly to understand that I could not support his ulterior pretensions. I did so at an early period of our intercourse, at the risk of drawing down his resentment on the Minister from whom I derived my knowledge, and whom he had threatened with the fate of Garaschanin, if his communications with the Porte were in any way divulged.

8 An immense exaggeration is involved in these expressions. The influence of the Russian Embassy is more than equal to that of any other when exercised within its legitimate sphere. History, and the inequality of force between Russia and Turkey, explain sufficiently why the former should in other respects be an object of mistrust and apprehension to the Porte. That Russia had something to complain of in the question of the Holy Places at Jerusalem, is true enough; but the Porte has paid the price of its error on that account; and the claim of France to anything of a religious protectorate over other subjects than its own, and those not rayahs, is limited to a few religious establishments and their inmates or dependents.

Such, my Lord, are the cursory remarks which I have to offer on Prince Menchikoff's reply to my confidential letter. The resistance which he encounters at the Porte may be steadied by foreign sympathies, but it most assuredly originates in the Porte's own intuitive apprehension of future consequences, aided by traditions from the past.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 338.

Prince Menchikoff to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Confidentielle.)

Péra, le $\frac{21 \text{ Avril}}{3 \text{ Mai}}$, 1853.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre confidentielle de votre Excellence du 8 Mai, et je m'empresse d'y répondre avec une entière franchise.

(1.) J'ai eu l'occasion de vous exposer dans nos conversations les griefs de mon Gouvernement contre la Porte. Sa conduite avait porté atteinte à la dignité de l'Empereur.

(2.) J'avais la mission d'obtenir la réparation qui lui était dûe, ainsi (3)qu'une garantie solide pour l'avenir du culte que Sa Majesté professe. C'est sur ce point que portait surtout la méfiance et la mauvaise volonté du Gouvernement Ottoman à notre égard. Dans l'intérêt même des relations solides et amicales avec la Turquie, mon Auguste Maître me chargea d'insister pour que la Porte (4) s'engage par un Acte formel à respecter sa sollicitude pour l'Eglise d'Orient. Des promesses et des assurances n'offraient point une garantie suffisante, vu la triste expérience du passé. Il m'est impossible, M. l'Ambassadeur, de convenir avec vous sur la portée que vous attribuez à nos demandes.

(5.) Les droits souverains du Sultan, et l'indépendance de son Gouvernement, y sont respectés ainsi que ses rapports avec ses alliés. Loin de toucher aux principes de l'accord qui s'est établi en 1840 entre les cinq Grandes Puissances pour la conservation de l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement Impérial demande (6) le maintien de ce qui existe *ab antiquo*, et fait ainsi preuve d'une prévoyance désintéressée. La modération et la générosité de ses demandes nous donnent droit à une parfaite liberté d'action dans les questions que nous avons à régler avec la Porte, et qui prennent leur source uniquement dans l'intérêt de notre Souverain pour sa religion et cette de ses sujets.

(7.) Je n'ai pas la conscience d'avoir manqué aux assurances loyales données

par le Ministère Impérial au Cabinet de la Reine sur nos vues concernant la Turquie.

J'ai usé de la plus grande sincérité envers votre Excellence, et je dois l'avouer je comptais sur une franche coopération de votre part.

(8.) La Légation de l'Empereur ne peut point rester à Constantinople dans les conditions qui lui sont faites. Elle ne saurait accepter la position secondaire à laquelle on voudrait la réduire. Loin de prétendre à un droit de supériorité quelconque, le Gouvernement Impérial ne cherche qu'à placer son cercle d'action en Orient au niveau de celui qu'exercent ici ses Alliés de l'Occident.

J'attendrai en conséquence la réponse de la Porte à ma dernière communication, pour prendre les déterminations qui me sont indiquées par les ordres supérieurs; et j'aime à espérer que le Cabinet Ottoman, ayant présent à son souvenir les anciennes et intimes relations de la Turquie avec la Russie, ne voudra point les compromettre en prenant un parti irréfléchi et inspiré par le même esprit de méfiance calculée à notre égard qui l'a jetée dans ses embarras actuels.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 339.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 48.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1853.

THE following incident is not wholly destitute of interest as illustrative of the manner in which political objects are pursued in this country. Rifaat Pasha sent for the Greek Patriarch a few days ago, employing as interpreter, for the occasion, one Aristarchi, agent for the Prince of Wallachia, a notorious Russian partizan, and by his office of Logothete, the official intermediary between the Porte and the Patriarch.

The Ottoman Minister proposed that the Patriarch should get up a petition among the synod and clergy of his religion declaring their unbounded confidence in the Sultan, and praying that the Russian demands might not be accepted by the Porte.

Aristarchi interpreted the Pasha's suggestion, advising the Patriarch at the same time to decline it. His Holiness acted accordingly, and, at the interpreter's *sotto voce* instigation, suggested to the Pasha that another kind of proceeding might be adopted with less inconvenience. The notion was that an address should be presented by the Patriarch, and, perhaps, by some of his clergy, to Prince Menchikoff, acknowledging the Ambassador's exertions in favour of his nation, and expressing a hope that his Excellency would not go away in consequence of any difficulties which he experienced from the Porte, as his departure under such circumstances would have the effect of leaving him and his countrymen exposed to the natural consequences of irritation and animosity engendered by adverse discussions and their probable termination.

I am assured that Signor Aristarchi's suggestion, notwithstanding its evident aim and tendency, met with favour from Rifaat Pasha, but I do not know whether it has been, or is to be, carried into execution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 340.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 49.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 15, 1853.

A FEW days ago the chief interpreter of the Porte, Nourreddeen Bey, called by order of the late Ministry, to pay me an official visit in acknowledgment of the good offices which I had successfully employed in contributing to a satisfactory solution of the question of the holy places.

As this unusual compliment belongs to me only as an agent of Her Majesty's Government, I make a point of recording it here for your Lordship's satisfaction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 341.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 50. Secret.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 15, 1853.*

ABOUT an hour ago a confidential Secretary in the service of one of the principal Turkish Ministers came privately to tell me that the late change of Ministry was an intrigue created by a Russian partizan, named Aristarchi, acting in concert with Reshid Pasha; that Prince Menchikoff's private audience of the Sultan was got up with a view to the success of that intrigue; that the late Grand Vizier was dismissed by an order from the Sultan, and that the Russians are in a fair way to carry their point, notwithstanding the defeat which they had undergone a few days before. He said, in explanation of his visit for such a purpose, that he had the interest of the Empire at heart; that compliance with Russia would, in his judgment prove fatal to Turkey; that he relied upon my character and principles of conduct as friendly to the Empire; and that he thought himself bound on that account in conscience to give information which might enable me to ward off an imminent danger.

The ostensible position of the Sultan and of his Ministers on the present occasion towards me, their language and their statements to M. Pisani, the character and known opinions of Reshid Pasha, to say nothing of other circumstances, make me exceedingly unwilling to give credence to this information. At the same time I know from another source, that a leading fact in my informant's recital is perfectly true, and at a crisis like the present, nothing in the way of change or intrigue is impossible here. He told me, moreover, that the Russian Ambassador had tried to secure his secret services by the offer, which he had refused, of a considerable sum of money.

I have no time at present to take any steps for the verification of my informant's story, and supposing the tale not to be an entire fabrication, I should rather ascribe it to some mistake than to the corruption of Reshid Pasha. It has come round to me that the Russians have expressed discontent with that Minister since yesterday; but they may circulate the rumour in order to blind their adversaries; and I know that Prince Menchikoff addressed a letter to Reshid Pasha, which his Highness submitted to the Sultan, and communicated to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 342.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 16, 1853.*

AS the French Ambassador is sending off a steamer to overtake the French packet boat at Syra, I avail myself of the opportunity to transmit to your Lordship in copy an official note addressed by Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha at a late hour yesterday. I have obtained a confidential communication of it from the Porte.

Your Lordship will observe that the Russian Ambassador has declared his official relations with the Porte to be broken off, although he is willing to suspend the remaining steps, which he threatens to take, for two or three days, in the hope that his requisitions may still be complied with.

I understand that he means to stay till over Wednesday, and if the Porte

does not come in to his terms by that time, that he will embark and go away with the whole of the Russian Embassy.

On the other hand there is no appearance of any disposition among the members of the Turkish Government to recede from the position already taken up, and a rupture seems therefore to be inevitable.

The terms of Prince Menchikoff's note, as your Lordship will perceive, are very menacing, and sufficient to imply a danger of immediate hostilities, if the want of reasonable grounds for going to war, and the pacific assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor Nicholas did not militate against such an idea.

I propose to send an express with the bulk of my despatches as soon as a final decision shall have been formally adopted.

An extraordinary Council is to be assembled to-morrow at the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—The French Ambassador having deferred the departure of his steamboat, I retain this despatch for the earliest convenient opportunity.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 342.

Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.

M. le Ministre, *Buyukdéré, le 4/16 Mai, 1853, 11 heures du soir.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note de la Sublime Porte datée de ce matin.

Les paroles gracieuses et l'accueil bienveillant dont a daigné m'honorer Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan dans l'audience intime qu'elle a bien voulu m'accorder, m'avaient donné l'espoir de recevoir une réponse explicite à ma dernière note. Je ne puis considérer la communication préalable qui m'est faite ni comme satisfaisante ni comme conforme à la dignité de mon Auguste Maître.

Il m'impose la pénible obligation d'interrompre dès aujourd'hui mes relations officielles avec la Sublime Porte. Mais prenant en considération l'entrée récente de votre Altesse aux affaires, et dans l'espérance que les lumières que vous y apportez contribueront à représenter sous leur véritable jour les intentions amicales et désintéressées du Gouvernement Impérial, je suis prêt à surseoir à la dernière demande qui décidera de l'attitude que la Russie devra prendre désormais vis-à-vis de la Turquie. J'exhorte votre Altesse à employer tous vos efforts afin que la décision de la Sublime Porte me parvienne dans le plus bref délai. Je me flatte de l'espoir, M. le Ministre, que vous voudrez bien en apprécier les motifs sérieux. Si l'hésitation du Gouvernement Ottoman devait continuer malgré les explications franches et cordiales que j'ai été à même d'offrir, elle ne pourrait être envisagée que comme un indice d'une méfiance et d'un éloignement blessants pour le Gouvernement que je représente. Mon départ, ainsi que celui de la Légation Impérial, en serait la conséquence inévitable et immédiate.

Il appartient à la sagacité de votre Altesse de peser les suites incalculables et les grandes calamités qui pourraient en résulter, et qui retomberaient de tout leur poids sur la responsabilité des Ministres de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 343.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 54.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 20, 1853.*

I AVAIL myself of an express which Reshid Pasha despatches this evening, to continue my narrative of what relates to Prince Menchikoff, and his untoward negotiations.

M. de Klezl has executed the commission which he kindly undertook

yesterday, at the request of his three colleagues, as I had the honour of stating to your Lordship in my preceding number.* I wish it were in my power to add that he had succeeded in making an effectual impression on Prince Menchikoff. On the contrary, he has just been here to inform me that although his Excellency listened with politeness to what he was authorized to state with suitable explanations on the part of his three colleagues and himself, he remained in substance steady to his former resolutions, and intimated his intention of going to sea to-night, unless the Porte gave in to his demands in full.

It appeared at the same time that some further communication of a private and indirect character had passed between the Prince and Reshid Pasha since yesterday morning. The former had in that way sent in a fresh note on trial with some modifications, but little to the taste of the Porte.

It was proposed to make one document of all the Turkish concessions, to give that document the form of an official note having the force of a Treaty, and to erase the limitation conveyed in the term spiritual, as applied to the privileges and immunities of the Greek Clergy. This note was shown to Reshid Pasha, but not left with him.

I have to add that Prince Menchikoff did not object to receive a copy of the Porte's definitive note, as prepared for official communication to him, but stifled by his persisting in declaring the rupture of his relations with the Porte and approaching departure. This paper is to be conveyed to him by one of Reshid Pasha's sons in the course of the day, and one more effort will thus be made to bring about an understanding, on grounds satisfactory to both parties.

M. de Klezl took leave of the Russian Ambassador under an impression that the chance of any such result was extremely slender, if it might be said to exist at all. The note prepared by Prince Menchikoff could not, at all events, be accepted by Reshid Pasha. It would have to undergo the same deliberation and the same formalities as the preceding one, with little or no prospect of success.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 344.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 55.)

Constantinople, May 22, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has sent to inform me that he intends to send an estafette to Vienna, at noon to-day. I therefore employ the few minutes at my disposal to apprize your Lordship of Prince Menchikoff's departure, and the withdrawal of the Impérial arms from the hotel of the Russian Embassy here. I understand that M. de Ozeroff stays behind for a few days, and that after his departure the Chief Secretary and First Interpreter of the Embassy will continue here, but in a private capacity. The Consuls, I am told, are not to be recalled.

Letters from Galatz and Trebizond allude to appearances of a military advance in the neighbourhood of both these places.

It remains to be seen whether the movements in question announce any hostile intention.

I inclose herewith a copy of the project of a note drawn up by Prince Menchikoff for presentation to him by Reshid Pacha, and sent privately the evening before last to that Minister, who immediately sent it to me for communication to the three other Representatives, with a request that we would give him an opinion as to the most advisable mode of proceeding.

Early next morning I sent Mr. Alison to ascertain more precisely the circumstances under which Prince Menchikoff had taken this last unofficial step, and the opinion entertained by Reshid Pasha himself of his Excellency's communication. At the same time, I proposed another meeting of the four Representatives.

The meeting took place, and we came unanimously to the resolution expressed

* See No. 53, page 323.

in the accompanying memorandum, which was transmitted to Reshid Pasha, by means of M. Pisani, without a moment's delay.

In reporting the execution of his commission, M. Pisani states that Reshid Pasha made no remark upon our memorandum, but informed him that the Porte had already adopted the resolution of resisting the objectionable parts of the Russian demands, even in this new form.

I had already ascertained through Mr. Alison, as well as through M. Pisani, that his Highness understood the Prince's project to be offered as a basis on which it was expected that a "yes" or "no" would be given in reply. The Pasha had also declared his opinion that the altered form of the Russian demands left them in reality as objectionable as ever, and I found that my colleagues agreed with me in adopting an opinion essentially identical with that of the Turkish Minister.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 34.

Draft of Note proposed by Prince Menchikoff to be addressed to him by the Porte.

LA Sublime Porte, après l'examen le plus attentif et le plus sérieux des demandes qui forment l'objet de la mission extraordinaire confiée à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, Prince Menchikoff, et après avoir soumis le résultat de cet examen à Sa Majesté le Sultan, se fait un devoir empressé de notifier par la présente à son Altesse l'Ambassadeur la décision Impériale émanée à ce sujet par un Irade suprême en date du (date Musulmane et Chrétienne).

Sa Majesté voulant donner à son auguste allié et ami l'Empereur de Russie un nouveau témoignage de son amitié la plus sincère, et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats, plaçant en même temps une entière confiance dans les intentions constamment bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Impériale pour le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman, a daigné apprécier et prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations franches et cordiales dont l'Ambassadeur de Russie s'est rendu l'organe en faveur du culte orthodoxe Greco-Russe professé par son auguste allié ainsi que par la majorité de leurs sujets respectifs.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de donner par la présente note l'assurance la plus solennelle au Gouvernement de Russie, que représente auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff, sur la sollicitude invariable et les sentiments généreuses et tolérans qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour la sécurité et la prospérité dans ses états du clergé, des églises, et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient.

Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites, préciser d'une manière formelle les objets principaux de cette haute sollicitude, corroborer par des éclaircissements supplémentaires que nécessite la marche du temps, le sens des Articles qui dans les Traités antérieurs conclus entre les deux Puissances ont trait aux questions religieuses, et prévenir enfin à jamais toute nuance de malentendu et de désaccord à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigné est autorisé par Sa Majesté le Sultan à faire les déclarations suivantes:

1. Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, ses églises, et ses possessions, ainsi que ses établissements religieux, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, ou qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impérial, et dans un principe de haute équité participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rites Chrétiens, ainsi qu'aux Légations Etrangères accréditées près la Sublime Porte par Convention ou disposition particulière.

2. Sa Majesté le Sultan ayant jugé nécessaire et équitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hatti-houmayoun le 15 de la lune de Rebiel-Akhir 1268 (10 Février, 1852), par son firman souverain du
et d'ordonner en sus par une autre firman en date du
la réparation de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans

seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés, pour maintenir à jamais le *status quo* actuel des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est entendu que cette promesse s'étend également au maintien de tous les droits et immunités dont jouissent *ab antiquo* l'église orthodoxe et son clergé tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'au-dehors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiennes.

3. Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par les ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

4. On donnera les firmans et les ordres nécessaires à qui de droit et aux Patriarches Grecs pour l'exécution de ces décisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation des points de détail qui n'auront pas trouvé place tant dans les firmans concernant les lieux saints de Jérusalem que dans la présente notification.

Le Soussigné, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 344.

Memorandum by the Representatives of Austria, Great Britain, France, and Prussia.

LES Représentants d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de France, et de Prusse, en réponse au désir exprimé par son Altesse Reshid Pasha, de connaître leur opinion sur un projet de note communiquée par le Prince Menchikoff par voie particulière, sont d'avis que sur une question qui touche de si près à la liberté d'action et à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Altesse Reschid Pasha est le meilleur juge du parti qu'il convient de prendre, et qu'ils ne se considèrent pas comme autorisés, dans la circonstance actuelle, à émettre une opinion à cet égard.

No. 345.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 199.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 3, 1853.*

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the great satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning from your despatch No. 387 that the French Minister at St. Petersburgh will be instructed, in the matter of the Russian negotiations at Constantinople, in the sense of my despatch No. 81 to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 346.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 200.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 3, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government have read with interest your Excellency's despatch No. 376, in which you state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had searched the Treaties and records relative to the protection to be afforded by France to the Latin Church in Turkey, but had not found therein any rights reserved to France beyond that of protecting the Latins of the Holy Land, and the members of her own churches and religious establishments.

This is of importance at this moment; and I have to instruct your Excellency to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the French Minister at St. Petersburgh will be directed to communicate these facts to the Russian Government, which pretends that the arrangement proposed by Prince Menchikoff is similar in its character to the Capitulations of 1740 between France and Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 347.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 207. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, May 30, 1853.*

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel yesterday, his Excellency having previously informed me that he wished to see me on the subject of the late news from the East.

He began by observing that he had been desired by the King to make known to me the concern which His Majesty's felt at the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, as reported by the telegraph, and the probable suspension of the diplomatic relations of Russia and Turkey, and then said that he wished to know whether I could communicate to him any intelligence that would guide him as to the policy of Her Majesty's Government at this juncture. I replied that I had no instructions relative to the turn which these affairs had taken, but that I was so far aware of the opinions of Her Majesty's Government that I could assure him they were unprepared for the "Sened" or Convention which had been proposed by Prince Menchikoff—a document having nominally for its object the better protection of the Greek subjects of the Porte in the exercise of their religion, but which would in reality give to Russia a right of interference in the internal affairs of Turkey incompatible with her independence. I then communicated to his Excellency, and I trust your Lordship will approve of my having done so, your despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour No. 69 of the 16th instant, for which he thanked me, saying the opinions which it contained quite coincided with those of the Prussian Government, and the knowledge of them would be of the greatest value to him. Baron Manteuffel went on to say that the impression which had been made on him by the intelligence received from St. Petersburgh, and from other quarters, was the same as that stated by your Lordship, and that it appeared that the Cabinets of Berlin, London, and Paris, had been all led to believe that when once the question of the holy places was settled nothing else of importance remained to be done by Prince Menchikoff; consequently, as no intimation to the contrary had reached him from the Russian Government, the King was inclined to believe, and he fain wished to be of the same opinion as His Majesty, that Prince Menchikoff had overstepped his instructions and must be disavowed.

I replied that this would be the most satisfactory way of getting out of the difficulty, but that disavowals were not usual in Russian diplomacy; and that, further, Baron Budberg, to whom I had just been speaking, gave me to understand that he believed Prince Menchikoff had not acted without instructions, and that the draft of Convention which he had proposed, had actually been sent from St. Petersburgh. I added that I had had a good deal of experience of the system pursued by Russia in matters relating to the East, and that I had always found the Government, though disposed to communicate at times with frankness upon the affairs of Western Europe, unwilling to act in the same way as regards those of Turkey, and moreover that it invariably considered its position towards that country exceptional, and was therefore reserved in her communications; that her confidences as to her plans never went further than she considered likely to answer her own immediate purposes, and to advance her own selfish interests, and that I thought this was clearly demonstrated by her present conduct.

Baron Manteuffel then said that he thought of writing to St. Petersburgh, and expressing the astonishment with which the last news from Constantinople had been received here; that the Prussian Government had expected to learn a

totally different termination to Prince Menchikoff's embassy; and that he conjured the Russian Government so to act towards Turkey, that while attending to the wants of the Christians, there should be no attempt at interference with the independence of the Porte, which Prussia, in common with the other Powers, was interested and bound in maintaining; and, that further, in consequence of the difficulties which had arisen, the Prussian Government offered the services of their Mission at Constantinople, if they could be made available in bringing about a settlement of the difference with the Porte.

I replied that I was sure Her Majesty's Government would learn with satisfaction the feelings which the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff had produced, but I thought that before taking this step, he should await the arrival of his despatches from M. Wildenbruch; that he had as yet only received a telegraphic account of the occurrences at Constantinople; that in a couple of days we should probably have some news from St. Petersburgh, and that I therefore thought he could safely delay a short time before sending off this instruction, when he would be in possession of further details.

He agreed with me that there was no immediate hurry, and he said that he had been the more anxious to unburthen his mind to me, as he had spoken on the subject to the Russian Minister, who had told him that any communication of this nature from Berlin would be very displeasing to the Emperor, and that it should be avoided.

I then said that I was glad to see the independent course he was about to adopt at this important crisis, and I trusted that although he might be disposed to modify his instructions according to the news which he must shortly receive from different quarters, nothing would deter him from carrying out his present intentions.

Baron Manteuffel rejoined that I might depend upon this being done, adding, "Je tiens à constater que nous ne voulons pas être à la remorque de la Russie."

The impression which has been made by the last reports from Turkey is most unfavourable to the Russian Government. Baron Manteuffel considers Prince Menchikoff to have gone far beyond everything that we were given to expect, and that the endeavours of the Great Powers must now be directed to discover some loophole by which a reconciliation of the differences can be effected and a rupture avoided. I think that I may safely assure your Lordship that the conduct of the Russian Government is generally condemned, and that the opinion of the public and of the diplomatic body here is united in deprecating the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff; all agree that it is impossible for the Porte to sign this Treaty, without incurring the loss of her independence.

The language of my Austrian colleague is that he believes his Government does not object to the substance of the Russian demands, but to the form in which they have been put, and that the Great Powers should endeavour to come to an understanding as to the establishment of a conference on the affairs of Turkey, the basis of which to be, that none of them should act singly against the Porte, and that the determination of the Five to uphold her dignity and independence should be thus proclaimed.

The Russian Minister's language has lately been in contradiction of his former assurances, but still I am not aware that he is fully informed as to the nature of the instructions which have been sent to Prince Menchikoff; but he has certainly given me to understand that the terms of the "Sened" were not invented by Prince Menchikoff, but sent from St. Petersburgh; and, further, on my observing that the departure of M. Ozeroff was impossible, as it would imply a rupture of diplomatic relations between the two Courts, he said that he believed it was probable. In reply to a further question I put to him as to what was to happen next—whether the Russian armies would advance, he said that he did not believe they would; that time would probably be allowed for negotiations; but that, if the French squadron passed the Dardanelles, the Russian troops would enter the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 348.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 3.*)

(No. 219.)

My Lord, *Vienna, May 30, 1853.*

AT this late hour (half-past 4 o'clock, P.M.) I have received the despatches under flying seal from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe which I have the honour of forwarding.

I have only time to say that I saw Count Buol at the time these despatches were delivered to me at the Foreign Office, and that I read to him a private note detailing their contents which I received from Lord Stratford. Count Buol said he was quite sure he was acting in accordance with your Lordship's views in representing, first at St. Petersburgh, the danger of the proceedings which had been adopted by Prince Menchikoff; next, to the Turkish Government, the propriety of a conciliatory policy in as far as, in their judgment, their essential interests were not comprised; and finally, in awaiting the explanations which the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh would give of proceedings so little to be expected from the assurances they had previously given.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 349.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's despatches from No. 43 to No. 57, including two marked No. 47, both dated the 14th of May, and comprising within the series duplicates of Nos. 46, 51, and 53, the receipt of which I have already acknowledged, were received at this office yesterday and will be laid before the Queen.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your proceedings as reported in your despatch No. 44, of the 14th of May, with reference to the communications which passed between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte on the 10th and 11th of that month.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 350.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

YOUR Excellency's despatch No. 43, of the 10th of May, reporting what passed at an interview which you had with the Sultan on the previous day, did not reach this office until yesterday; and I have great satisfaction in acquainting your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the judicious advice which you offered to the Sultan on that occasion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 351.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 62.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the answers which you returned to the questions put to you by Reshid Pasha, as reported in your despatch No. 45 of the 14th of May.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 352.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 63.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 47 of the 14th of May, giving an account of an interview which you had with Reshid Pasha on that day, I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the advice which on that occasion you gave to the Pasha in regard to the reply which he should return to Prince Menchikoff's demand for an immediate and final answer from the Porte.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 353.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 64.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government agree in the remarks which, in your despatch No. 47 of the 14th of May, you make upon the reply returned by Prince Menchikoff to your letter of the 8th of that month.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 354.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 65.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 4, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatches Nos. 53 and 54, of the 19th and 20th of May, that Her Majesty's Government consider that the measure of sending M. de Kleel to Prince Menchikoff on the part of the Representatives of the Four Powers was very judicious.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 355.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 397.)
My Lord, *Paris, June 5, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just informed me that he saw the Emperor yesterday, and that, after acquainting His Majesty with the resolution taken by Her Majesty's Government, in consequence of the intelligence lately received both from Constantinople and St. Petersburgh, to order Admiral Dundas to approach the Dardanelles, and to place himself under the orders of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, he stated to His Majesty the strong desire which your Lordship had expressed, that the two Governments should act entirely in concert for the maintenance of the independence of the Porte, and of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

His Majesty inquired whether it was certain that Admiral Dundas had been actually ordered to leave Malta, and on being assured of the fact, acquiesced in telegraphic orders being sent to Marseilles, to order the "Chaptal" to get under weigh with despatches for Admiral de la Susse and M. de la Cour.

These despatches, being sent by telegraph, were naturally short, but as both the Admiral and M. de la Cour were provided with ample instructions at an earlier period, it is only necessary that they should now be informed of the movements of Her Majesty's fleet, and that the one should be enjoined to act in concert with Admiral Dundas to execute any orders which may be transmitted from Constantinople, and that the other should be instructed to consult and come to an understanding with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as to the orders which the Admirals are to receive.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys was good enough to read me the instructions now sent by the "Chaptal," as also those with which M. de la Cour was furnished in March last, on taking his departure for the East. As these latter will be communicated to your Lordship confidentially by Count Walewski, I need only add that the most complete authority is given by them to M. de la Cour to bring the French fleet, under certain eventualities and at the demand of the Turkish Government, within the Dardanelles, and, should more be required in consequence of actual hostilities on the part of Russia, to dispose of the material force of the fleet for the Sultan's assistance.

Neither must I omit to record the satisfaction with which I read that M. de la Cour was enjoined, the case arising, to inform Her Majesty's Representative at Constantinople of any determination to which he might come; that if (what is admitted to be most unlikely) no demand for assistance should be made of England when it is made of France, he should urge the Turkish Government to place the two countries in a similar position; and that, finally, the French Admiral is to be desired, if the British fleet should arrive after the French fleet had taken a decided step, to enter into immediate relations with his British colleague, and offer to share with him whatever plan of action had been or might be agreed upon.

In the despatches transmitted by the "Chaptal," M. de la Cour is referred to these instructions; he is told that Her Majesty's fleet is placed under Lord Stratford's directions, and that the two fleets will rendezvous at Besika Bay, there to await orders from Constantinople.

Admiral de la Susse is desired to make for Besika Bay, where he is told he will find the English fleet.

Some misunderstanding has arisen with respect to this latter point. I was asked, as having some acquaintance with Turkey, where it was probable the English fleet would go, and I replied that in summer Besika Bay, which is at the mouth of the Dardanelles, would very likely be the rendezvous. M. Drouyn de Lhuys took what I mentioned as a probability for a certainty, and gave orders in consequence. I have called his attention to the error which he has made, but as it is more than probable that a part, if not the whole, of the British fleet will make for that anchorage, I trust that the error will be of no material consequence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 356.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 398.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 5, 1853.*

I HAVE expressed to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, as desired by your Lordship's despatch No. 199 the great satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning that the French Minister at St. Petersburgh will be instructed, in the matter of the Russian negotiations at Constantinople, in the sense of your Lordship's despatch No. 81 to Sir Hamilton Seymour.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys read me this morning the memorandum which had been drawn up for transmission to St. Petersburgh, of the assurances given at different times both by the Emperor of Russia and by Count Nesselrode to General Castelbajac, and they are quite as strong, if not stronger, than those given by the same high authorities to Sir Hamilton Seymour. At my request a copy of this memorandum will be sent to Count Walewski for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 357.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 399.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 5, 1853.*

I MENTIONED this morning to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the hope of Her Majesty's Government that the French Minister at St. Petersburgh may be instructed to communicate to Count Nesselrode the disclaimer made by the French Government of any rights being reserved to France by the Capitulations of 1740 to protect any of the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan, and he informed me that this step had already been taken.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 358.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 400. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 5, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS spoke to me this morning in the strictest confidence of a conversation which he had just had with M. de Hübner. It appears that, on the 26th ultimo, M. de Bourqueney was desired to call Count Buol's attention to Prince Menchikoff's proceedings at Constantinople, and to the array of Russian troops on the Turkish frontier, and to express to Count Buol the desire of France to come to some understanding with her allies on the Eastern question, and to ask how far she might depend on the concert of Austria to prevent the annihilation of Turkish independence by Russia. M. de Bourqueney seems at the same time to have suggested from himself the propriety of establishing a sort of conference of the four Powers at Vienna.

M. de Hübner brought Count Buol's answer this morning. It is to the effect that Austria is equally anxious with France for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire; that she thinks that the intentions of the Emperor of Russia are misrepresented, or, at all events, seen in an exaggerated light; that Austria cannot pronounce herself until she has heard from St. Petersburgh; that she could not consent to a conference from which Russia should be excluded; and

that the time is hardly come for taking such a step, even with the agreement of the five Powers.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys assures me that he told M. de Hübner that France could not rest satisfied with such an answer, and that he must insist on having a more positive declaration from Count Buol as to the views of the Austrian Cabinet in the present crisis of Eastern affairs. "France," he told M. de Hübner, "had been too often summoned and humiliated by demands as to her intentions in regard to existing Treaties and territorial arrangements not to have the same right in her turn to put similar questions to those who had questioned her;" he must therefore again, both through M. de Bourqueney and through M. de Hübner, press for an answer from the Austrian Government; and he must add that the conduct of France in other questions interesting to Austria might be influenced by the answer he received.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 359.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 211. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 3, 1853.*

BARON BUDBERG called on me yesterday. Our conversation related mainly to the affairs of Turkey, and though the observations of the Russian Minister may not present anything new to Her Majesty's Government or be of value in throwing much light on this complicated question, I still think it my duty to lay before you the tenor of his observations.

He commenced by inquiring if I had received anything of interest from London on the subject. I replied that it was not from London that there was anything to be looked for at this moment, but from St. Petersburgh; that Prince Menchikoff had proposed a Convention to the Porte, for which Her Majesty's Government had been by no means prepared by the communications which had passed through Baron Brunnow or Sir Hamilton Seymour, and that we had consequently been greatly surprised at the proceedings of the Russian Ambassador at Constantinople, and could only account for them by his having gone beyond his instructions.

Baron Budberg then argued with much warmth that Russia required a guarantee for the future; that the firmans issued by the Porte in favour of the Christian population had not been strictly kept; that something else must be obtained, and that the Emperor would not rest until this was effected. I answered that we were disposed to make allowances for the natural desire of His Imperial Majesty that the members of the Greek Church in Turkey should enjoy freedom in their religious exercises; but that it was one thing for an independent Sovereign to give a greater extension of liberty in these matters, and another to assign away a positive right of interference in the internal affairs of his country such as had been proposed by Prince Menchikoff.

Baron Budberg allowed that Prince Menchikoff had perhaps gone too far, and that there was a sentence in one of his notes to the Turkish Government which made it appear as if the principal object of his mission was to obtain the guarantee for the future, and that this had not been introduced adroitly into the communication to the Porte.

I replied that the tenor of Prince Menchikoff's communications with the Porte, as far as I was acquainted with them, was reprehensible, and that by breaking off diplomatic relations, he had unnecessarily embarrassed the whole of Europe; and I asked him whether there was any truth in a report I had read in the papers as coming from Vienna, that the Austrian Government had suggested a joint Convention to be made by the Five Powers, for the better protection of the Christian population of Turkey. The Russian Minister was unable to control himself on my saying this, and thus hinting at this newspaper report, and said that the Emperor could never listen to any such a proposition; and he evidently felt that to admit joint action in such a question would

be departing from the traditional policy of Russia in the East, and giving up one of the "prestiges" of her power.

Baron Budberg does not seem to apprehend that the Emperor has any intention of immediately occupying the Danubian Principalities; he considers that the further advance of troops will depend on the attitude that might be taken by the French fleet, and confirmed what I reported in my No. 207, that if the Dardanelles were not passed, the Principalities would not under present circumstances be entered, and further that the military preparations of the Emperor were insufficient for war; that as to the conquest of Turkey, it was an absurdity with the small force collected to think of it, and that a demonstration was all that was meant by the concentration of these troops.

He asked me where our fleet was. I replied that as far as I knew anything about it, it was at Malta, where I trusted it would remain; and that all the accounts I had received proved an anxious desire and expectation that the affair would be settled by negotiation, and that we counted much on the moderation of the Emperor.

Baron Budberg told me, but begged me to consider what he was about to say as strictly confidential, that Count Nesselrode, he had reason to believe, had never approved of the selection of Prince Menchikoff for the embassy on which he had been employed, and that the Prince had certainly made several mistakes, but still he could not be disavowed. He then repeated the old worn-out arguments that Russia must have security for the future good conduct of the Turkish authorities respecting the Greek Church, and added that nothing short of a Convention drawn up perhaps a little differently would satisfy the Emperor; and that he was full of hope that the last communication made to your Lordship by Baron Brunnow, would smooth the way for an arrangement. He talked of the admirable condition of the fleet in the Black Sea, and seemed to think that it required but the will of the Emperor to drive the Turks from Europe; for that the Christians would one and all, if the least effort was made to rouse them, join the Russian standard, but that nothing was further from the Emperor's wishes than having recourse to such a proceeding.

It did not appear to me that Baron Budberg was aware of the conversation which Sir Hamilton Seymour had held with Count Nesselrode, as reported in that Minister's despatch No. 261. He came to me, however, prepared to allow that Prince Menchikoff's negotiation had been badly managed, but determined to convince me that, although faults had been committed, his Highness would be supported. Further he would not allow that there had been any serious discrepancy between the assurances given at St. Petersburgh to Her Majesty's Minister and by Baron Brunnow to your Lordship, and the proceedings of Prince Menchikoff; neither would he admit that any ill effect had been produced here or at Vienna, by what had oked out relating to the proceedings of his Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 360.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 212.)

Berlin, June 3, 1853.

My Lord,

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, he received a telegraphic despatch from the Prussian Minister at Vienna, reporting that there was a probability of an Austrian mediation in the affairs of Turkey being accepted by Russia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 361.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 214.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 3, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL has confirmed to me the report, transmitted some days since to your Lordship by Colonel du Plat, that the 4th corps of the Russian army stationed in Podolia had been suddenly ordered to march to the frontiers of Moldavia.

His Excellency said that Field-Marshal Prince Paskevitch was to inspect this corps before it moved, and had invited the Prussian Consul-General at Warsaw to accompany him, but that M. de Wagner had excused himself.

I regret to have to inform your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel seems under the impression that the Russian troops will not delay entering the Principalities; and upon my observing that there was no justifiable cause for so doing, and that the Porte had certainly done nothing to call down this visitation upon that portion of her dominions, he said, that he nevertheless feared the Russian Government would discover some plea for the occupation. He then said that the Hospodar Prince Ghika had expressed a desire to resign; and it is not impossible that this may be turned into an excuse, for the Russian Government was always ready enough in discovering reasons for marching into these provinces.

I understand that Prince Lobanoff, the son-in-law of Prince Paskevitch, and one of the Field-Marshal's aide-de-camps, who had accompanied Prince Menchikoff to Constantinople, was despatched from Odessa, on the arrival there of the Ambassador, to the head-quarters of the Russian army on the Turkish frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 362.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 6.)

(No. 215.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 3, 1853.*

BARON MANTEUFFEL told me this evening, that he had just signed a despatch addressed to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, in which he referred him to the instruction that he had sent to M. de Wildenbruch at Constantinople, approving generally of that Minister's conduct.

His Excellency said that Count Henckel had been informed that the Prussian Government had learned with regret the rupture of the diplomatic relations of Russia with Turkey, observing, that they had not been prepared by communications from St. Petersburgh for any demands such as that made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte; and that they felt, from the intimate relations subsisting between Prussia and Russia, and the habit of confidential communication which existed between them, that some previous knowledge of the intentions of Russia on this subject might have made known to them, more particularly as the Treaty of 1840, one of the objects of which was the greater security of the independence of Turkey, gave them a claim to be considered in matters of importance affecting the Ottoman Empire and the peace of Europe.

Count Henckel, as I understand, is directed to speak in this sense to Count Nesselrode; and Baron Manteuffel mentioned that he had also written a confidential letter to Count Münster, the military agent of the Prussian Government at St. Petersburgh, in still stronger terms, with the view of making a communication to the Emperor himself on the subject, if the opportunity for so doing should present itself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 363.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 7.)

Paris, le 5 Juin, 1853.

M. le Comte,

J'AI reçu les dépêches que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire jusqu'au No. 272, et j'ai placé sous les yeux de l'Empereur celle où vous m'annoncez que l'escadre commandée par M. l'Amiral Dundas est mise à l'entière disposition de Lord Stratford. Sa Majesté Impériale se félicite de l'identité de vues et d'action qui existent entre son propre Gouvernement et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique, et elle espère que son effet sera d'empêcher les complications qui pourraient surgir en Orient et menacer sérieusement la paix générale.

Dès le début de la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff, nous avions conçu des inquiétudes sur son résultat; mais nous n'avions jamais douté que du moment où le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique partagerait nos appréhensions, des intérêts communs et un désir égal de maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman dans leurs conditions actuelles ne dussent réunir vers le même but les efforts de la France et de l'Angleterre. C'est dans cette confiance si pleinement justifiée, que j'avais, d'après les ordres de l'Empereur, rédigé les instructions de M. de la Cour, et qu'en lui donnant, à la date du 22 Mars, l'autorisation d'appeler l'escadre Française aux Dardanelles, je lui recommandais, si cette grave mesure lui paraissait nécessaire, de s'entendre avec Lord Stratford pour combiner autant que possible les mouvements de nos forces navales avec ceux de la flotte Anglaise.

L'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Impériale, M. le Comte, se trouve donc déjà muni de toutes les directions dont il a besoin pour prendre une attitude absolument semblable à celle de l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté Britannique, et M. l'Amiral de la Susse recevra en même temps que M. l'Amiral Dundas, l'ordre de se rapprocher des Dardanelles et de mouiller dans la Baie de Besica. Le "Chaptal," qui lui porte cet ordre, a quitté Toulon hier, et de cette façon les deux escadres arriveront ensemble à leur destination. Nous ne pouvions mieux constater l'accord des deux Gouvernements, et nous espérons fermement qu'une telle démonstration, autorisée par les armements de la Russie elle-même, suffira pour donner à la diplomatie le temps de prévenir une rupture plus complète entre le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg et la Porte Ottomane. C'est dans le Traité de 1841 que nous puisons notre droit; il ne saurait dès-lors être dans nos intentions de ne pas l'observer fidèlement, tant qu'aucun acte agressif n'aura pas mis la Turquie dans le cas d'une légitime défense. Nous attendrons donc pour franchir les Dardanelles, que la Russie ait commencé les hostilités par terre ou par mer contre l'Empire Ottoman, et que la Porte, en nous adressant une demande d'appui, nous ait déclaré qu'elle se considère comme en état de guerre. Ce jour-là, M. le Comte, le Traité de 1841 sera méconnu par l'une de ces Parties Contractantes, et, en vertu de l'esprit qui l'a dicté, à raison des immenses intérêts qui font du maintien de la Turquie une nécessité d'équilibre Européen, nous prêterons à cette Puissance tout le concours qu'elle réclamera de nous. Il est bien entendu, d'ailleurs, M. le Comte, que non-obstant les circonstances qui peuvent survenir, nous ne cesserons de faire, à tout moment, de loyaux efforts pour concilier les prétentions de la Russie avec les droits de souveraineté de la Porte. A notre sens, le meilleur moyen d'y parvenir consiste, comme je vous le disais dernièrement, à encourager le Sultan à relever sans cesse la condition des Chrétiens soumis à son sceptre, et à fondre ensemble, autant que possible, toutes les populations de son Empire; et pour que cette œuvre soit efficace et durable, nous croyons qu'il faut que l'honneur en revienne au Gouvernement Ottoman lui-même, sans qu'une Puissance étrangère soit admise à stipuler seule au profit d'une classe des sujets du Grand Seigneur, à quelque intérêt que ces stipulations doivent se rapporter.

Si, comme je n'en doute pas, les intentions du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique sur les points que je viens d'indiquer, sont celles qui animent aussi le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale, je vous prie de transmettre officiellement à Lord Clarendon une copie de cette dépêche. Votre communication, et la réponse que le principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique vous adressera ou me fera remettre par Lord Cowley, constateront l'union de la France et de l'Angleterre dans un but qui ne saurait exciter les alarmes d'aucune Puissance, puisque les Gouvernements qui ont signé la Convention du 13 Juillet 1841 demeurent libres de s'associer à nous dans la forme et selon les moyens qu'il leur conviendra d'employer.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 364.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 96.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch, No. 207, of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Baron Manteuffel and yourself on the subject of the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople. I have to inform you that I approve of your having communicated to Baron Manteuffel my despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour No. 69 of the 16th ultimo; and I have to instruct you to express to Baron Manteuffel the sincere satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt the views of the Prussian Government with respect to the conduct of Russia.

Her Majesty's Government cannot but approve of the rejection by Turkey of Prince Menchikoff's proposals, which were incompatible with Turkish independence; but the policy of Her Majesty's Government is a pacific policy, and they earnestly hope that the question may still be settled by negotiation; and their wish is to co-operate with the other three Powers for bringing about this desirable end.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 365.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 141.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 219 of the 30th ultimo, reporting what passed between Count Buol and your Lordship on the receipt at Vienna of the despatches from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, which were forwarded by your Lordship, I have to instruct you to express to Count Buol the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his views of the Russian proceedings, and at the course the Austrian Government intends to adopt.

Her Majesty's Government hope that the Government of Turkey will concede to every reasonable demand that Russia is entitled to make; but they cannot sanction, or be a party to, the arrangement which Prince Menchikoff proposed, the practical operation of which might be to confer upon the Emperor of Russia more power than would be possessed by the Sultan over the Greek subjects of the Porte; and it is quite unnecessary to point out to the discrimination of Count Buol what would be the result of this to Europe as respects the general balance of power, but more particularly to Austria.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 366.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 93.)

Foreign Office, June 7, 1853.

Sir,

YOUR despatch No. 261, of the 27th of May, has been the cause of great surprise and regret to Her Majesty's Government.

We are indeed surprised that, after the numerous and explicit communications made to Her Majesty's Government during the last four months, and the assurances of a similar character which other Governments are said to have received, Count Nesselrode should state to you that you "had always been informed by him that two points were sought by Russia—satisfaction for the past, and security for the future; that you had been acquainted that the Imperial Government would insist upon the firmans settling the state of church-possession at Jerusalem and the disputes between the Greeks and the Latins being placed under the sanction of a Convention answering to the French Capitulations; and that this demand pointed clearly to an agreement of the nature of that contained in the Sened against which such 'unaccountable objections' had been raised by the late Turkish Ministry and the English Embassy."

It is a source of deep regret to Her Majesty's Government that, upon questions of such a nature, any misunderstanding should have arisen with the Government of His Imperial Majesty; but my despatch No. 81 of the 31st ultimo will have placed you in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this subject, and further comments are unlikely to lead to any useful result, while they might produce feelings of irritation which it is the anxious desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid. They do not doubt that Count Nesselrode conscientiously thinks himself justified in making the statement reported by you; but, on the other hand, Her Majesty's Government can solemnly affirm that, up to a late period, they could not hesitate in their belief, founded on the assurances which they had received from the Imperial Government, that the sole object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was to settle the question of the holy places in a manner consistent with the dignity of the Emperor, and to obtain such guarantees as should effectually guard against all future differences on this question.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was accordingly instructed to afford all the assistance in his power towards bringing about this settlement, and he acted upon his instructions in a manner that procured for him the thanks both of the Russian Ambassador and the Porte; but when Prince Menchikoff made proposals incompatible with the rights of the Sultan as an independent Sovereign, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe would have failed in his duty if, on being appealed to by the Turkish Ministers, he had advised their acceptance of such terms.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe having been made aware by Her Majesty's Government that it was the determination of the Emperor to uphold the independence of Turkey, he naturally thought that he was performing no disservice to His Imperial Majesty by endeavouring to point out to Prince Menchikoff in what manner and to what extent his proposals trenched upon the independence and rights of the Sultan. In all other respects, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe throughout the negotiations exhibited an earnest desire that the Turkish Government should satisfy every claim of the Russian Ambassador; and Her Majesty's Government are convinced that to attribute to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe the result of Prince Menchikoff's mission, rather than to the nature of the proposals which he made, would be an injustice for which the real facts of the case afford no foundation.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 367.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 262.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May 31, 1853.*

HALF-AN-HOUR after the departure of the messenger who left St. Petersburgh on the 28th instant, I received a note from Count Nesselrode who desired to see me on the following day. I requested that our meeting might take place immediately, as I was aware that a Feld-Jäger from Prince Menchikoff had arrived in the morning. I learned, however, from his Excellency that the papers which he wished to communicate to me would be returned to him only on the 29th.

On the 29th accordingly I waited upon the Chancellor, who gave me an account of the circumstances which had led to the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, and read to me various documents in explanation of his withdrawal.

These papers were the letters addressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Prince Menchikoff, and the Prince's reply; the "Projet de Note" which had been prepared by the Russian Embassy for the signature of the Sultan's Minister; and the short despatch in which the Russian Ambassador relates the events which led to his embarkation for Odessa. Count Nesselrode, as before, laid great stress upon the moderation of the Russian demands: they were only for a confirmation of the Emperor's rights, and such as I had always been led to expect; they bore upon no exclusive privilege, they should be received as a proof of the wish of removing all grounds of dissension between Russia and Turkey.

If the demands too were moderate, the manner in which they were urged was not less so. To meet the views of Her Majesty's Ambassador a Sened had been prepared in lieu of a Treaty, and subsequently an ordinary official note had been substituted for the Sened; conciliation could hardly be pushed further, whilst, as I had heard, it was the Queen's Ambassador who had prevented the acceptance of those moderate terms which the most prudent of the Sultan's advisers had considered essential for the safety of Turkey.

To this I replied that I must repeat that I had been informed several times by his Excellency that it was intended that the *status quo* which had been troubled at Jerusalem should be re-established by firmans, the force of which should be sanctioned by an international Act, but that I had never understood that there was question of any new rights being conferred by that Act upon the Crown of Russia.

At the close of our conversation, Count Nesselrode, who is evidently much pained by the events which he had been communicating to me, observed that it could not be denied that the state of affairs was very alarming; that the position of the Emperor was one from which it was impossible for His Majesty to recede, and that he would not conceal from me that a continued rejection of the terms offered to the Porte, would be followed by the issue of orders for the entrance of the Russian armies into the Principalities. His Excellency was desirous of remarking to me that war could hardly be undertaken by the Sultan under more disadvantageous circumstances than when it was brought about by a refusal of those conditions the acceptance of which was so warmly desired by the whole Greek population of Turkey, and which carried with them the sympathy of the co-religionists of this country.

It only remained for him to say that he had been ordered to apprize me that, if I desired to see the Emperor, His Majesty would receive me on the following day; to which I answered that there was but one reply to such an intimation, and that of course I should have the honour of obeying the Emperor's commands.

It is right that I should report to your Lordship that the Chancellor then suggested that I should unhesitatingly entreat of His Majesty to refrain from issuing orders for the advance of the Russian forces until the opinion of Her Majesty's Government should be learned upon the late events, intelligence of which, as I found, has been conveyed to London by Count Dimitri Nesselrode.

I will likewise observe that Prince Menchikoff, whilst relating particulars of the activity displayed by Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe in urging the Turks to reject his demands, and of course taking the line of blaming his Excellency's conduct, makes no allusion to the attitude assumed by the French Ambassador during the late critical transactions.

Before concluding my despatch, I am desirous of stating to your Lordship that a very manifest change has taken place of late in the public feeling of the Russian society, which is now seen to be very favourable to matters being pushed to extremity with the Turks.

The language commonly used, and which has been repeated to me by some of my diplomatic colleagues, is that further negotiation is idle trifling; that the course which ought to be followed is to fall upon Turkey and to settle differences at the point of the bayonet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 368.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 263. Secret and Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May* 31, 1853.

I HAD the honour of holding yesterday a long and extremely interesting conversation with the Emperor, the most important parts of which it becomes my duty to report to your Lordship.

The Emperor, somewhat to my surprise, received me most graciously, saying that he was glad to see me, that he had felt sure I must wish to converse with him upon the late important events, and that, as I must be aware, he was always ready to receive me.

I had expected that His Majesty would have opened the conversation, but instead of that he desired to hear what I thought of the events which had led to the rupture of the negotiation at Constantinople.

In general terms I expressed my deep regret at any circumstances which threatened the good understanding which ought to exist among all Governments, and particularly between those of England and Russia, when the Emperor asked me very pointedly whether he had not kept faith with me? at the same time alluding to passages in former conversations which I had held with His Majesty.

I replied that of the wish entertained by the Emperor and his Government to keep faith with every one no doubt could be entertained, and therefore it was that I was compelled to infer that some misapprehension (mésentendu) must exist with regard to the demands upon the Porte.

His Majesty, I said, would perhaps be good enough to allow me to recapitulate events.

When the dispute, I said, respecting the holy places took place, I was told that Russia required a satisfaction for the past and security for the future. Later, this was explained to me more fully as meaning that the status of the Greek and Latin rights should be settled by a firman, and that this firman should be sanctioned by a Treaty or public Act, in short by an international engagement. It was further stated to me, and this over and over again, that the precaution was required, as it was essential that Russia should possess an instrument of the same value as Capitulations often invoked by the French Government; but, I said, Sir, there never was to my knowledge any question of new rights to be conferred upon the Crown of Russia, and when your Majesty complains (as the Emperor had done) of English diplomacy in Turkey, it may well be conceived that an English diplomatist would give his support to those pretensions which had been made known and admitted to be just, whilst he would oppose those of which he had no knowledge.

The Emperor replied that I was quite correct; that a confirmation of existing rights had been all that it was intended to ask for, and all that had been demanded by Prince Menchikoff.

His Majesty then spoke with some vivacity of the conduct of the Queen's Ambassador at Constantinople, saying that in strict right he should be justified in asking for explanations of Her Majesty for this conduct. This he should not do, but he had now an opportunity of judging of the feelings of the English Government towards him. Professions of goodwill and friendship had been made to him; if, as he hoped and believed, those professions were sincere, the conduct of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople could not be approved of.

I requested permission to observe, that Lord Stratford's conduct was to be judged of by the circumstance to which I before alluded, that is, by the fact whether or no the Treaty, or "Sened," or note to be required from the Porte, confirmed old rights, or invested the Emperor with new ones.

I hoped that His Majesty would excuse me if I remarked that I was not aware of any Treaty which gave to Russia the sort of protectorate now claimed; and I said, Sir, so much is this the case that when Colonel Rose wrote word that it was conjectured that a protectorate was one of the points to be demanded of the Porte, I took upon myself to say that I believed the suspicion to be devoid of foundation.

The Emperor insisting upon the ancient date of his rights, I ventured to ask by what Convention they were guaranteed; and when His Majesty alluded to that of Kainardji, I took the liberty of replying, that having looked into the Treaty of 1774, I had been unable to discover anything of the kind.

I added, that perhaps His Majesty would allow me to call upon the Chancellor in his name, and ask him to show me the Article or Articles referred to. The Emperor rejoined, with much good humour, that I was quite at liberty to do so; that I might, if I pleased, call for the originals of the Treaties.

After this discussion had continued a little longer, I observed that I had now to make an appeal to the Emperor's goodwill and high feelings; that I had been informed that unless the breach recently made in the relations between Russia and Turkey should be speedily repaired, His Majesty intended to give orders for the occupation of the Principalities; that I would earnestly beg that no orders to this effect should be issued until time were afforded for communication with Her Majesty's Government.

The Emperor observed, that the demand was just, and that my wishes had been forestalled; that a courier would be dispatched to-morrow (meaning the 31st, to-day) to Constantinople, to apprize the Turkish Government that eight days were allowed for reconsideration of the terms proposed; but that if at the expiration of the term, satisfaction were not afforded, His Majesty, however unwillingly, must give orders for the advance of his forces.

Allow me, Sir, I said, as very important interests are at stake, to suggest that you should wait until I can have an answer to the reference which on the 1st of June I shall be able to make to Her Majesty's Government. That, the Emperor replied, is not necessary, as already a reference to London has been made by Prince Menchikoff.

The precaution, Sir, I said in reply, was very commendable; but permit me to remark, that little attention would be paid by Her Majesty's Government to Prince Menchikoff's statements, in comparison to what would be bestowed upon your Majesty's representations. Will it not, then, be better to await an answer to the words which your Majesty has just spoken, or to those which you may think proper to address to me?

Upon this point the Emperor was not to be moved. Sir Hamilton Seymour, he said, has had several conversations with the Emperor, who spoke to him with a total absence of reserve. Sir Hamilton Seymour must have written a report of these conversations. I have nothing to add to the information of which the English Government is in possession.

We next spoke of eventualities. If hostilities broke out in the East, the event might, the Emperor feared, produce evil consequences for Her Majesty's Government. I replied, that I thought it highly probable that, in this event, the public would not fail to reproach the Government with their extreme confidence in the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, which had led to the neglect of those precautions usually resorted to when the safety of Turkey was menaced. As regards myself, I said, Sir, I believe your Majesty knows my feelings; nobody can be more indifferent than I am whether I retain or lose my position. With regard to Her Majesty's Government, the question has a very different importance. It is probable that a change of Government, under existing

circumstances, must have very disastrous effects—that is a point which I leave to your Majesty's consideration.

After a digression upon this subject, I returned to the former, and, as it appears to me, the real point of the whole question. Sir, I said, as your Majesty is good enough to listen with great patience to my observations, permit me to remark, that if your Majesty is correct in stating that no fresh rights are sought for the Imperial Government, the objections entertained towards the note presented for the Porte's acceptance and signature must turn upon a matter of "rédaction;" allow me, then, to inquire whether there will be any objection to such an alteration in the terms of the note as shall remove all doubts—as shall leave a simple confirmation of old rights, and preclude the possibility of any new ones being claimed.

No, the Emperor replied, certainly not. Every effort has been made to meet the views of the Turkish Government, or rather of the English Ambassador. The note having been rejected shall now be accepted as it stands, without the alteration of a single word; and its acceptance shall be signified within eight days, or Turkey must abide by the consequences.

The Emperor proceeding to speak as if England must necessarily be a party to any war which might break out in consequence of a refusal by the Sultan to accept the conditions offered by Prince Menchikoff, I said it is impossible, Sir, to take a more dispassionate view than I do of the state of Turkish affairs. Your strength and the weakness of the Ottoman Empire are so palpable that I do not question the power which you possess of overrunning the country when you please; only I would remark, as I was born in 1797, it is not probable that I should ever witness the conclusion of a war commenced under such circumstances. The fact is, I continued, Sir, that the repose of the world depends mainly upon the relations in which England and Russia stand to each other; a good understanding existing between the two countries, the peace of Europe is assured; two such colossal Powers disagreeing, the peace of the world is troubled, and the greatest mischief may be inflicted by each upon the other.

There, the Emperor said, you are perfectly right. I am a year older than you are; family considerations, national interests, every motive the most powerful, induce me to wish for peace. We require peace for the consolidation of a young country. War, I well know, would paralyze commerce in the North, and would lead to its utter destruction in the South; but you see what my position is. I am the head of a people of the Greek religion; our co-religionists of Turkey look up to me as their natural protector; and these are claims which it is impossible for me to disregard. I have the conviction that good right is on my side: I should therefore begin a war, such as that which now impends, without compunction, and should be prepared to carry it on, as I have before remarked to you, as long as there should be a rouble in the Treasury, or a man in the country.

The Emperor proceeded again to speak of Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, whom His Majesty regards (and as I assured him without any reason) as his personal enemy; the position of affairs, His Majesty said, is a very singular one. We had a dispute with France, who, finding that she was wrong, withdrew her Ambassador, and sent another in his place, when the quarrel is terminated without difficulty. At its conclusion, however, the English Ambassador, who is understood to be instructed to support my claims, takes part against me; in the arrangement to be made with the Porte proves himself more Turkish than the Sultan's own Ministers, and prevents the acceptance of conditions which had been offered with full consideration for the Sultan's dignity and independence, whilst the French Ambassador takes no part against me.

I will not conclude the report of my conversation with the Emperor without stating, that the patience which His Majesty bestowed to the various observations which I addressed to him, was the more remarkable as I happen to know that some strong and indiscreet expressions with regard to the bad faith of the Government, which had escaped me under the influence of fresh feelings, had been brought to His Majesty's knowledge.

It was to these which His Majesty alluded in the first question which he addressed to me.

Upon quitting the palace, I called upon Count Nesselrode, to whom I related my conversation with His Imperial master, laying particular stress upon the reference which I was empowered to make to his Excellency.

Count Nesselrode replied, that there could be no doubt of the fact being as it had been stated by the Emperor; but this was said, as appeared to me, with a want of assurance; and I propose returning to the subject, and requesting a reference to the Treaty by which any protectorate of the Turkish Greeks is secured to the Crown of Russia.

Baron Meyendorff, who, I may remark, was to set off yesterday upon his return to Vienna, is equally positive as to the rights already possessed by Russia; this, however, does not alter my opinion, and the clearer the right may be, the less will be the difficulty of establishing it by proof.

At the same time I will not, on this occasion, mention Baron Meyendorff's name without stating, that the part which he has taken in this new crisis, is one which is infinitely to his credit.

I have omitted many points of minor importance which were touched upon by the Emperor, but am willing to believe that these will find their place in a long report upon the Turkish difficulties which has been for the last two or three days in preparation, and which, if completed and approved of by the Emperor, will be despatched by messenger this evening to Baron de Brunnow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 369.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 264.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, May* 31, 1853.

UPON reflecting upon a brief conversation which I held yesterday with the Chancellor, it strikes me that his Excellency is inclined to surmise that we may hear of the Turkish Government having apprized Prince Menchikoff of their willingness to accept of the terms hitherto refused.

This idea was obscurely expressed, but this I think must have been the meaning of his Excellency's words.

It is reported, but with what truth I cannot say, that two days ago further orders were sent from hence for the advance of the Russian reserves.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 370.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, June* 8, 1853.

I RECEIVED on Sunday afternoon the 5th instant, by telegraph from Lord Bloomfield at Berlin, the communication which you requested him to forward to me that, "at the date of the 30th of May, the Emperor whom you had just seen, is insisting on the immediate and unconditional acceptance by the Turkish Government of the *projet de note* which was delivered to them by Prince Menchikoff;" and in consequence of your request that a reply might if possible be sent to you by telegraph, I sent a message to Lord Bloomfield in the course of Sunday night, by telegraph, directing him to "inform you that the form of a Treaty is alone objectionable. Russia can in other ways get anything she is entitled to claim."

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 371.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 96.)

Foreign Office, June 8, 1853.

Sir,

YOUR despatches of the 31st of May, Nos. 262 and 263, have been received.

I have the satisfaction to inform you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Count Nesselrode, and subsequently to the Emperor, at the interview with which you were honoured by His Imperial Majesty.

You will see by my despatch No. 93, written prior to the receipt of yours, that Her Majesty's Government were aware of the erroneous impressions which existed at St. Petersburgh respecting the conduct of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and they now perceive with deep regret the effect which these misrepresentations have produced on the Emperor's mind.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt the correctness with which Lord Stratford de Redcliffe has reported all his proceedings, and as you will be in possession of every despatch he has written, it is hoped that you may be able to correct the unjust view that is taken of his conduct.

The observations of the Emperor to you and the replies which you so properly made, prove how great has been the misunderstanding between the two Governments, and I cannot too often repeat that we distinctly understood, not alone from yourself, reporting the assurances you had received, but also from Baron Brunnow to more than one member of Her Majesty's Government, that the object of Prince Menchikoff's mission was the settlement of the question of the Holy Places, and some binding agreement which should prevent any future disturbance of that settlement by the Turkish Government; but that no fresh question was to be opened, no extended power was to be sought by Russia in Turkey, and that so far from infringing upon the rights of the Sultan, the Emperor was determined to respect both his dignity and his independence, because the necessity of upholding the Turkish Empire as a great principle of European policy and an absolute necessity for the maintenance of peace, were fully recognized by His Imperial Majesty.

That the question of the holy places was settled in accordance with the Emperor's wishes there can be no doubt, for it has been recorded by Prince Menchikoff, who also conveyed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe his acknowledgments for the service he had rendered in bringing about that arrangement; and if the further proposals of the Russian Ambassador had been confined to a Treaty ratification of the firmans respecting the holy places, as Lord Stratford de Redcliffe equally with Her Majesty's Government had reason to expect they would be, or even if they had been limited to a re-statement or fresh confirmation of the provisions of the Treaty of Kainardji which regard the Christian religion, as the Emperor appears to suppose they did, it is impossible to believe that the Turkish Government would have hesitated to comply with such demands; but, at all events, it is certain that Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, on being appealed to by the Porte, would have tendered no advice contrary to the acceptance of those terms.

Before the receipt of this despatch you will doubtless have availed yourself of the permission of the Emperor to examine the Treaty of Kainardji with Count Nesselrode, and Her Majesty's Government rely upon the dispassionate judgment of the Chancellor to determine whether the original Sened or the final project of Prince Menchikoff does not so far exceed any provision to be found in the Treaty of Kainardji as to lose all resemblance to the latter document by the increased power over the Greek subjects of the Sultan that a compliance with the demands of Prince Menchikoff would confer upon Russia.

It was upon these grounds, and because the demands were a departure from the principles which the Emperor again insisted upon on the 30th of May, and from the *status quo* which His Imperial Majesty was determined to maintain, that not Lord Stratford de Redcliffe alone, but the Sultan and his Ministers and the Representatives of France, Austria, and Prussia, were of opinion that the proposals would be fatally injurious to Turkey.

The Emperor cannot doubt the warm feelings of friendship towards himself entertained by our Gracious Sovereign, and His Imperial Majesty must be also aware that it is alike the duty and the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the most cordial relations with Russia, feeling how essential such relations are to the peace of Europe, and viewing as they do with alarm and abhorrence whatever may tend to the interruption of that peace. His Imperial Majesty may therefore be well assured that it is upon no light grounds that they differ from him as to the demands he now makes upon Turkey; and Her Majesty's Government will not bring themselves to think that these demands do not still admit of settlement in a manner entirely consistent with the dignity of His Imperial Majesty without having recourse to those measures of coercion which, once undertaken, must soon have the most baneful effects throughout Europe, and which even now are looked to by the evil-minded with joyful expectation, while by every friend of order they are regarded with the deepest apprehension.

Her Majesty's Government, I repeat, do not believe that Europe can be in danger of the terrible and overwhelming calamity of war from a question such as that which is now pending at Constantinople; they do not believe that the door will be finally closed against an arrangement which to them appears to be still practicable and they venture therefore to hope that the demands of Russia may be confined to the recapitulation of existing Treaties and their due fulfilment, but without seeking to extend that influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte that Russia must always and necessarily exercise. Her Majesty's Government are convinced that such a course would not be inconsistent with the dignity of the Emperor, and they are encouraged in the hope that it may still be adopted, with reference to the misunderstanding under which they have so long laboured with respect to the Emperor's intentions, with reference also to the most recent declaration of His Imperial Majesty of his own views as to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's demands, but, more than all, with reference to that pacific policy which has invariably and with most signal success been maintained by the Emperor of Russia.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 372.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 216.)

My Lord,

Berlin, June 5, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch which I received this morning from Sir Hamilton Seymour, the substance of which will, I hope, have reached your Lordship in the course of to-day by telegraph.

As the intelligence contained in this communication came by post, and was forwarded to your Lordship through the telegraph office, I conceived it might have been known to Baron Manteuffel. I called this evening on his Excellency, and had a few minutes' conversation with him on the subject. He seemed to think it more favourable to the maintenance of peace than what had been heretofore received; he had not present to his memory the exact tenor of the draft of note delivered by Prince Menchikoff, but he imagined that there was one part of it which alluded to the conclusion hereafter of a Convention or "Sened," and that the objection to the proposed note was, that it gave an opening for further negotiations, and could not be looked upon as a final arrangement.

Baron Manteuffel said, that he had heard from Warsaw, that Prince Gortschakoff was to command the army collected on the Turkish frontier, and that his horses and baggage had already proceeded to the head-quarters.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 372.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Lord Bloomfield.

St. Petersburgh, May 30, 1853.

My Lord,

I WILL request your Lordship to have the goodness to inform Her Majesty's Government by telegraph, that the Emperor, whom I had the honour of seeing an hour since, insists upon the immediate and unconditional acceptance by the Turkish Government of the projet de note delivered to them by Prince Menchikoff.

I shall write fully to Her Majesty's Government by a person who leaves St. Petersburgh by the Lübeck steamer the day after to-morrow.

Time being of great value, I will further beg of you to move Her Majesty's Government to send me through Berlin and Bromberg a telegraphic answer to this communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 373.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 217.)

Berlin, June 5, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 215 of the 3rd instant, in which I mentioned that an instruction had been addressed by Baron Mantouffel to the Prussian Chargé d'Affairs at St. Petersburgh upon the affairs of Turkey, I have the honour to state that, to judge from what I have since heard respecting the contents of this document, I was under an erroneous impression as to that part of it which relates to the Treaty of 1840, and which had better be expunged from my despatch.

The entire object of the communication to Count Henckel appears to have been to make the Russian Government sensible of the ignorance in which Prussia has been kept by them as to the late negotiations at Constantinople, and of her desire to preserve independence of action in the question hereafter.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 374.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 228.)

Vienna, June 4, 1853.

My Lord,

AS Count Dimitri Nesselrode, in passing through Vienna on his route from Constantinople to London, had represented very generally, and particularly to Count Buol, that the consent of the Turkish Government to the mitigated demands of Prince Menchikoff had been prevented by the interference of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I thought it advisable, towards counteracting any impression which might be produced, to place in the hands of Count Buol, for his perusal, the despatch of Lord Stratford addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour, and dated 23rd ultimo, in which his Lordship's conduct is so clearly and so ably described.

Count Buol stated his concurrence with the sentiments expressed in this despatch, and that he considered the proceedings of Lord Stratford as he had described them, and as M. de Klezl had also represented them, as entirely satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 375.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 211.)

Foreign Office, June 8, 1853.

My Lord,

COUNT WALEWSKI has communicated to me a despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys stating that his Excellency's despatch announcing that the British fleet under the command of Admiral Dundas was placed at the disposal of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, had been laid before the Emperor, and that His Imperial Majesty rejoiced at the identity of views and action which existed between his own Government and that of Her Majesty, and hoped that the result would be to prevent the complications that might arise in the East, and seriously menace the general peace.

The despatch further states the reasons which induced the Emperor to direct that authority should be given to M. de la Cour on the 22nd March last to send for the French fleet to the Dardanelles, and that Admiral de la Susse will now receive orders, at the same time as Admiral Dundas, to proceed towards the Dardanelles, and to anchor in Besika Bay.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys then, after adverting to the circumstances which would render it expedient to afford assistance to Turkey, and to the advice which should be tendered to the Sultan, concludes by saying that if similar views and intentions are entertained by Her Majesty's Government, their answer will record the union of France and England for an object that can give no cause for alarm to other Powers, as the Governments which signed the Convention of the 13th of July, 1841, will be at liberty to associate themselves with us in the manner and according to the means that they may think proper to employ.

Your Excellency is accordingly instructed to inform M. Drouyn de Lhuys that his despatch has given much satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government, who entirely concur in the views and intentions which it sets forth.

It has hitherto been the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government to avoid any demonstration that should wear the appearance of threat or even be thought to endanger an amicable settlement of the negotiations pending at Constantinople; but I have repeatedly informed the French Ambassador, and it has been announced in both Houses of Parliament, that a complete identity of opinion existed between the two Governments, and that both consequently were desirous to uphold the Turkish Empire.

The time has however now arrived when an understanding as to unity of action becomes necessary, and Her Majesty's Government cordially agree with the French Government that the main object of this must be to avoid complications dangerous to the peace of the world, and to afford time to the friendly action of diplomacy to prevent a more complete rupture between the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh and the Ottoman Porte.

They desire equally with the French Government to prove that they are animated by no hostile feeling towards Russia, by exerting their best efforts to reconcile the claims of that Power with the sovereign rights of the Porte. They intend, as does the French Government, scrupulously to observe the Treaty of 1841, and to excite no alarm on the part of other Governments; and finally, they hope that the Representatives of England and France at Constantinople will, in the exercise of the great powers now confided to them, observe the utmost moderation and discretion.

In the belief that the above is a faithful interpretation of the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and with the desire that unreserved confidence should exist between the two Governments upon this important question, your Excellency is instructed to give to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a copy of this despatch, together with copies of my despatch to Lord Stratford placing the British fleet at his disposal, and of the instructions that have in consequence been sent to Admiral Dundas.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 376.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 57.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 22, 1853.*

IT would be difficult to overrate the importance of Prince Menchikoff's departure, when taken in connection with the circumstances which have preceded and accompanied that event. The immediate menace which it implies to the peace of Turkey, both internally and externally, is, perhaps, the smallest part of the evil to be apprehended. There needs but a continuance of that spirit which has come out on the side of Russia in the recent negotiations, to endanger the very existence of the Ottoman Empire, and to bring into action all the dormant elements of conflict and confusion which are already repressed with difficulty throughout Europe. A heavy responsibility must weigh upon that Government which has unnecessarily brought matters to so dangerous a pass.

It is but justice to admit that Russia had something to complain of in the affair of the holy places; nor can it be denied that much remains to be done for the welfare and security of the Christian population in Turkey. But it is equally true that a fair measure of reparation has been given to the Russian Ambassador; that the question of Jerusalem has been settled to the apparent satisfaction of those concerned; and that the Porte has displayed its readiness to meet the ulterior demands of Russia, in so far as they do not manifestly trench on the sovereign rights and independence of its Empire. However benevolent and conciliatory the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas may be, there is but one opinion among all who are not the sworn partizans of Russia, as to the dangerous and inadmissible character of the powers which His Majesty's Ambassador has sought to obtain by intimidation at the Sultan's expense. The Turkish Ministers and their Sovereign required no advisers to persuade them that the direct influence of such a Power as Russia could never be entitled to bear, with all the force of mutual and solemn engagements, upon more than ten millions of their Christian dependents professing the religion of Russia, and not have the effect of disparaging the credit and undermining the authority of their Government to an alarming degree. Their resistance to a pretension as dangerous as it was unexpected, could hardly fail of gaining strength in proportion as they found a corresponding sentiment among the Representatives of Foreign Powers, and, what is more significant, symptoms of indifference among the Greeks themselves to an increase of Russian intervention. Let me remind your Lordship that, with every conciliatory disposition in other respects, they have stood to their refusal on the one essential point, notwithstanding the alternate menaces and seductions, the untiring manœuvres, of a skilful diplomacy, assisted by the smallest indications of other than moral support to be expected from any more friendly quarter.

The line taken and the language employed by me has been duly reported in my correspondence, and I have no reason to suppose that the French Ambassador has materially deviated from the course which, in concert with him, I originally adopted.

Now that the suspension of diplomatic relations between the Porte and Russia has unhappily taken place, it remains with your Lordship and Her Majesty's Government to judge how far the stronger of the two parties has been justified in pushing its pretensions to that extreme, and how far the weaker was compelled in self-defence to incur the hazards of a rupture. The peril braved by the latter is evidently so great that any sacrifices of a temporary nature might perhaps have been wisely made for the sake of avoiding it. But the Turkish Government has had no such choice to make. It was not the amputation of a limb, but the infusion of poison into the system that they were summoned to accept. Everything short of this, both in form and in substance, they declared their willingness to concede; and far from blaming the reservation, I cannot conceal from your Lordship that I approve and admire it, even while lamenting the necessity and deprecating its consequences. The independence of Turkey is still a recognized object of European, and most especially of British diplomacy. Russia no less than the other four parties to the Convention

of 1840, professes an unabated adherence to this principle. But the legalized introduction of a dominant foreign influence may prove as fatal to the independence of a country as partial dismemberment or military occupation. Circumstances have brought this question to an issue. If the Porte be right in its apprehension and resistance, Her Majesty's Government will no doubt employ their available means for the purpose of rescuing it from an unmerited and imminent danger. Unsupported by such assistance, whether single or united, moral or material, the Turkish Empire will have to undergo either the risks of actual war with disproportioned means of defence, or a protracted state of tension and alarm, involving much expense, and liable to terminate at least in hostilities, or in a disastrous compromise.

The solemn assurances repeatedly given by the Emperor of Russia, the total absence of any just cause of war, and the terms in which Prince Menchikoff declared his final resolution, would seem to forbid a recourse to immediate hostilities. But some expressions which have occasionally escaped from His Majesty's lips, the signal want of harmony between certain statements of Count Nesselrode and certain proceedings of Prince Menchikoff, the unexplained continuance in Bessarabia of a strong Russian force occupying advanced positions, and the latest reports from Galatz and Trebizond, indicating preparations for a general movement, leave a painful doubt upon the mind.

In reliance rather on principles than appearances, I have hitherto advised the Turkish Ministers, not indeed to suspend altogether the defensive preparations which they had commenced before my arrival, but to continue them with as little excitement and outward demonstration as the nature of the service would allow. This method of proceeding they have hitherto observed with scrupulous attention, and nothing at all calculated either to express defiance or to provoke resentment has appeared in their operations. Now that the threatened rupture has actually occurred, more active and decided measures of preparation must in their judgment be adopted; nor could I, with any shadow of fairness, or indeed with much prospect of success, attempt to dissuade them from putting themselves without delay into a more effective posture of defence.

It is not necessary for this purpose to depart from the principle of a moral resistance, which, as your Lordships knows, I have recommended to the Porte, not only as the safest ground to occupy at present, but as the wisest with reference to future results. The possibility of maintaining this position hereafter must, of course, depend on the conduct of Russia, and the Sultan meanwhile has to guard his responsibility towards the nation, no less than his Ministers have to provide for their own towards the Sovereign.

On the supposition of its being found impossible to avoid hostilities, I need not suggest to your Lordship the probable issue of the struggle, if Turkey were left to sustain singlehanded all the weight and pressure of its formidable opponent. In that case—a case which I am unwilling to anticipate—the sooner the Porte were apprized of its helpless condition the better. Placed at the mercy of Russia, the Sultan would have no choice but to accept the terms of pardon, which a triumphant enemy, anxious to save appearances towards Europe, and determined at the same time to accomplish his purpose, might be expected to grant.

I would not willingly exaggerate the character and drift of that purpose; but, judging from what little knowledge I possess of Russian policy in this country, and not losing sight of the lessons derived from experience, I cannot disguise my conviction that it involves the establishment of a predominant influence over the counsels of the Porte, tending, in the interest of absolute power, to exclude all other influences, and to secure the means, if not of hastening the downfall of this Empire, at least of obstructing its improvement, and settling its future destinies to the profit of Russia, whenever a propitious juncture shall arrive. Other and juster considerations—those in particular of religion and good neighbourhood—may have their place in the Emperor's mind; but the master-view is the one most likely to predominate under favourable circumstances, and thither, I humbly conceive, the forethought and energies of Western Europe cannot be too soon or too vigorously directed.

There is little room for supposing, that even the tranquillity of Turkey would be promoted by a compliance with the demands of Russia. The exercise of a protecting influence over the churches and clergy of the Greco-Russian religion, as it is ominously called by Russian statesmen, would ever be attended

with the excitement of mistrustful and irritated feelings. The Russian Embassy would be provoked by interested individuals to wield its power with a high hand and to apply it with a searching spirit; nor would the Porte be so humiliated by concession, as not occasionally to struggle for the recovery of its lost ascendancy. The natural consequences of such antagonism are obvious enough, and the process of contention between force and weakness destitute of confidence or mutual sympathy, must terminate, sooner or later, in the hopeless subjection of the victim.

What Russia requires of the Porte would bear a strange appearance, if the principle involved in it were applied to other countries less anomalously situated. What would be thought in Europe, if France or Austria were to demand a guarantee from Great Britain for the protection and good treatment of the Roman Catholic priesthood in Ireland? What, if Her Majesty's Government were to interfere in a similar way in behalf of the Protestants in France? Is there a canton in Switzerland endowed with so little spirit and foresight as to submit without a struggle to France asserting her right to take part in the protection of all Roman Catholic churches and priests in that country?

In Turkey, the dignitaries of the Greek or orthodox church exercise in some degree the powers of civil magistrates. Russia, overstepping the spiritual limit declared by herself, includes those powers in the sphere of privilege for the unalterable maintenance of which she seeks a treaty right.

The abuses of the Greek hierarchy, as well in the exercise of civil authority as in the management of temporalities, are notorious; but if the pretensions of Russia were placed under the sanction of international law, all prospect of improvement would be lost. Privilege and abuse would be bound up together in scandalous perpetuity; or if in the course of time the just complaints of the laity were to prevail, the Russian Embassy, and not the Sultan's Government, would be the object of their addresses for relief, and also of their gratitude when relieved.

These objections to the extension of a legalized Russian influence over the millions who profess the Greek religion in Turkey, by no means exempt the Ottoman Government from the duty of securing to the Greeks, and indeed to their tributary subjects in general, the full and free exercise of religious worship, together with the enjoyment of all that pertains to its maintenance and efficiency. The Turks are not indifferent to this claim. Their fears of Russia and consequent need of European support increase their sense of it; and the Porte is now going to proclaim with due formality a solemn confirmation and enforcement of all the religious privileges accorded of old or in later years to its Christian subjects. An additional pledge of sincerity is to be conveyed in this instance by the Sultan's firmans, in virtue of their official communication to the Representatives of the five Powers who concluded the Treaty of 1840.

We are thus brought by a spontaneous but necessary act of the Porte upon that ground where a lever may best be planted for exercising more actively than heretofore a joint European direction, in place of any single influence exciting too much jealousy to work with advantage. The meetings of the four Representatives lately held at my suggestion, and the collective communication addressed by them to Reshid Pasha, fall in with this idea; and it remains for Her Majesty's Government to follow up the principle, now recommended to their approval, by a confidential understanding with the Cabinets of Paris, Berlin, and Vienna, preparatory to a more complete agreement between the five Powers.

This would, of course, imply the formation of a Conference here for carrying out the objects of common adoption in such manner as might prove most efficient, and give least umbrage to the Porte.

There is no denying that the general convenience of Europe calls for the preservation of this Empire, however deep and wide-spread may be the germs of decay in its bosom. At a period of frequent change and rapid movement, the hour of its dissolution, if not retarded by adequate combinations, may strike much sooner than is generally expected. We are taught by experience that the Turks alone are not equal to the task of improvement on a sufficient scale.

The separate exertions of friendly Governments have hitherto obtained no more than some imperfect and insulated measures. They have stopped short of that sustained and pervading system of reform, without which it is idle to look for any real or durable return to a healthy condition. In the united

wisdom of the five Great Powers of Christendom, the Porte might find an auxiliary capable of leading it with safety in the path of European civilization, and the same friendly union which might render that important service would strengthen the bonds of peace, and afford no weak security against the impatience or ambition of any single State.

But the field of improvement is a wide one. The obstructions are seated deep in religious prejudice, erroneous principles, and inveterate abuses. The views of the Five Powers, when applied to particular objects, would be occasionally divergent, and it may be doubted whether all of them would enter with the same conviction and the same singleness of purpose upon a reconstructive policy. It would probably be found necessary to limit the suggestive action of the Conference, and to give it principally a preventive character, with the view of diverting the Porte from ill-advised enterprizes and unjustifiable evasions, nor less of imposing on each of the Powers—together with a constant respect for the rights of the Porte as an independent State—that degree of forbearance in the prosecution of its claims which would be compensated by the support and effective cooperation, when needed, of the others. There is reason to hope that the dread of having to deal with this kind of European Confederacy would operate favourably on the policy of the Porte, and also on the conduct of its administration in matters of current interest. It is evident at the same time that a collective interference must be reserved in practice for cases of magnitude and real importance. A want of attention to this rule would be productive of much embarrassment, if it did not finally defeat the main purpose of the Allies. The restraint upon each Power could hardly be expected to go beyond a fair trial of their collective influence, and an engagement not to resort without due notice to separate means of coercion.

With respect to suggestions of improvement in the internal conduct of the Porte's affairs, a previous distinct understanding as to the more prominent objects of recommendation and to the course of procedure, both in urging and enforcing their adoption, would be indispensable. Guidance without dictation, compliance without restraint, constitute the ideal of such a plan; but perfection is rarely attainable in human contrivances, and success must ultimately be sought either in coercion or abandonment,—the former an inroad on national independence, the latter an invitation to single aggression and eventual dismemberment.

Notwithstanding its difficulties, inconveniences, and hazards, the experiment is one that has many and powerful considerations to recommend it. All Europe professes the same creed with respect to Turkey. Its decline is unquestioned; its dissolution is deprecated; its vices and its resources are alike universally acknowledged; its dangers, when left to itself, are obvious to the meanest capacity. By what more promising or safe method than the one suggested can the evils implied in those opinions be either avoided or remedied? The interests of government, of commerce, of humanity, of morals and religion, are all more or less concerned in the rescue of this noble Empire from the degrading consequences of a vicious and oppressive Administration combined with a jealous and unexpansive policy. Such are the requirements of the age, and such the progress of events, that Turkey must either be brought, as a whole, into greater accordance with Europe, or be fractionally assimilated with neighbouring Empires by repetitions of that process which has already curtailed its extent to an ominous degree.

If there be one Power among the five more interested than another in the support and improvement of Turkey, it is evidently Great Britain, which has everything to gain from the expansion of Turkish resources, and little, by comparison, to seize in the scramble for Turkish spoils. How indeed can it be otherwise? The Turkish Empire—still of vast extent—is rich in the elements, and poor in the means of production. It has need of British science, enterprize, skill, capital, and energy, to place the one upon a level with the other. To these auxiliaries an easier admission will naturally be given in proportion as more enlightened maxims prevail in its government, and with our imposing but necessitous redundance in population, manufactures, and machinery, our defective supplies of grain, our dependence on foreign countries for raw materials, and our maritime ubiquity, we cannot fail of deriving exhaustless profits from the advancement of Turkey in all that constitutes the wealth and strength of an empire. Hitherto we have endeavoured, as your Lordship must be aware, to

realize those views by the exertion of British influence moving in the line pursued by Turkey itself, and occasionally in concert with other friendly Powers; never seeking any exclusive advantage, but acting on broad European principles for the benefit of all classes within the Empire, and of all commercial nations without. The language which I hold to the Sultan and his Ministers is still of the same character, and their assurances are sufficiently favourable to warrant the hope of some proficiency in a right course as soon as the present unusual pressure upon their attention shall have subsided. It remains with your Lordship to consider the expediency of bringing a combination of influences to bear upon the same point. Meanwhile we have to deal with circumstances of greater urgency, and the Porte is compelled by them to employ a large portion of its energies in another direction. Reports and appearances, confirmed by some partial facts, and expressions dropped by Russian agents, concur to prepare us for the contingency of some coercive measure of unavowed hostility, as the immediate result of the Emperor's annoyance on learning the failure of his Ambassador's negotiations. This apprehension may or may not be realized; but the Turkish Ministers would be little justified in leaving everything to chance, and they are necessarily engaged in making such defensive arrangements as the limited means at their disposal will allow. I must refer your Lordship to another of my despatches for such information as I am able to obtain on this head, and also for a further statement of the aggressive indications which have been reported to me from both sides of the Black Sea.

The anxiety with which I am waiting for your Lordship's reply to my despatches respecting Prince Menchikoff's ultimatum, is fully partaken by the Porte; and I need not add that, to judge from his language to me, the French Ambassador is equally desirous of receiving instructions from his Government, and being thereby enabled to form a clearer perception of the course which Russia will take in pursuance of its diplomatic rupture with Turkey. To me as well as to him it is of urgent importance to know with the least practicable delay the position which we shall be called upon to occupy with respect to each other, and also to the Porte, under the circumstances which we may now expect to see rapidly unfolded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 377.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 58.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

YOU will not be surprised to learn that much anxiety prevails among the public in this capital, and more particularly at the Porte and on the Exchange, in consequence of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Turkey and Russia. The advanced positions maintained by the Russian forces in Bessarabia, and other circumstances, had caused uneasiness even while Prince Menchikoff was here. His departure has given birth to a thousand rumours, which might be dismissed without attention, were it not that advices from Varna, Galatz, Batoum, and Trebizond concur on different grounds in justifying an apprehension of some coercive, if not hostile operation on the part of Russia. It is remarkable that I have received no advices on this subject from Her Majesty's Consul at Odessa during several weeks.

Extracts of the several despatches in question are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information; and I have only to add, that the Porte, as I am told by Reshid Pasha, has received intelligence of the same description.

I have sent round to my colleagues this morning in order to ascertain how far their information agrees with mine, and the only one who was to be found (the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires), without partaking the general alarm, confirmed the principal fact, that Russian troops were moving towards the Danube, and that means for passing the river had been more or less collected.

Information, derived from a private and secret source, points to the European defences of the Dardanelles as being the more immediate object of attack by

means of an expedition directed against them from the side of Bulgaria and the Danube. So hazardous an enterprize is hardly credible under present circumstances; but the Porte has been apprized of the danger, such as it is, and may best judge of its possibility and chance of success. The number of troops in what is called the Province of Bigha, that is, the district of the Dardanelles, amounts, with Rediff, to 18,000 men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 377.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Varna, May 22, 1853.*

I AM informed from Sulina, that on the 16th instant three Russian steamers arrived at that place, bringing with them fifteen small gun-boats to be stationed along the river, and it was expected that more would arrive.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 377.

Vice-Consul Cunningham to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Galatz, May 16, 1853.*

FROM Ismail it is reported that besides the bridges to cross the Danube which are being got ready, certain portable bridges of great length are preparing, supposed to be for passing marshy ground. It is also said that after the arrival of a steamer at Ismail from Odessa or Sevastopol, guns were immediately put into pontons.

We learn also from Reni that all the waggons have been impressed to carry army stores forward to the frontiers of Moldavia, not only the waggons not otherwise employed, but even those loaded and engaged in transporting grain. These were stopped on the road and unloaded wherever found, and the contents left on the wayside. Merchants at Reni, therefore, refused to sell grain excepting what they had already in warehouse.

With regard to the number of troops in Bessarabia, nothing satisfactory can be learnt; but it appears that there are about Leovo and Soulcni, 1 polk of Cossacks, 1 polk of Hulans, and 4 polks of infantry. A polk, or regiment of infantry, consists of 4000 men, I believe; but I cannot at present say how many men there are in a polk of cavalry.

The last news from Constantinople has effectually roused the inhabitants of Galatz and Ibraila from their lethargy, but even now they cling to the idea that all will be settled quietly without the Russians entering the provinces even. Such, however, is not my opinion.

Inclosure 3 in No. 377.

Vice-Consul Holmes to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Batoum, May 12, 1853.*

I HEAR that about a month ago a considerable number of soldiers were sent from Georgia towards Odessa, small detachments having been withdrawn from all the military stations. It would appear that Sheik Shamyl has taken advantage of this to make some bold attacks on the Russians; and the boats arriving from the Georgian coast report that within the last fortnight most of the remaining soldiers have been sent towards Daghestan. The rais of a boat which arrived last night from Sokum-Kaleh, assured me that there were few or no soldiers remaining there. All persons visiting the Georgian coast are assured

that there will positively be war between Russia and Turkey. The report having spread along the coast between this and Trebizond, has given rise to considerable excitement, and the country is quite unsafe to travel through. The people fancying a war to be on the point of breaking out, imagine that they can commit any excess with impunity.

Inclosure 4 in No. 377.

Vice-Consul Stevens to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Trebizond, May* 16, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that some traders have arrived from Alexandropol, formerly called Gumri, and report that a large Russian force had arrived at that garrison from the Caucasus. They estimate the number of troops which had arrived at 10,000, and were informed that another reinforcement might be expected in the course of a fortnight. These traders quitted Alexandropol about four weeks ago.

I have, &c.

(Signed) FR. J. STEVENS.

No. 378.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Baron Brunnow, June 8.)

M. le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{\text{29 Mai}}{\text{10 Juin}}$ 1853.

AU moment où votre Excellence recevra le présente dépêche, le Comte Dimitri de Nesselrode vous aura déjà mis au fait du déplorable dénouement de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, et du départ définitif de cet Ambassadeur pour Odessa, à la suite du rejet successif de toutes nos dernières propositions. Toutes les pièces diplomatiques échangées de part et d'autre à cette occasion entre nous et la Porte Ottomane, ont été mises entre vos mains.

Antérieurement le Prince Menchikoff vous avait déjà envoyé les deux firmans plus spécialement relatifs à la question des lieux saints communiqué les modifications apportées au premier Projet de Convention destiné à nous servir de garantie contre le retour des difficultés que viennent d'aplanir ces firmans, et fait part de la vive opposition que rencontraient nos demandes à ce sujet, principalement du côté de l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre.

Vous êtes dès lors en possession de toutes les pièces de conviction nécessaires, et nous ne doutons pas que votre zèle n'y ait déjà puisé les moyens de faire apprécier au Gouvernement Anglais jusqu'à quel point nous avons poussé l'esprit de conciliation, les efforts consciencieux que nous avons employés à prévenir la fatale rupture de nos relations avec la Porte, et toutes les facilités que notre Ambassadeur a offertes au Divan pour l'acceptation de nos dernières propositions, soit en modifiant celles-ci, soit en prolongeant à trois reprises différentes, moyennant de nouveaux sure s le terme originairement fixé pour cette acceptation.

Notre premier Projet de Convention avait donné matière à de graves objections, la forme d'un Traité paraissant inacceptable aux conseillers de la Porte. Notre Ambassadeur a consenti à y substituer la forme plus simple et moins solennelle d'un Sened.

Plusieurs clauses de ce Sened, notamment celles qui avaient trait aux patriarches, métropolitains, et évêques de l'Eglise d'Orient, ayant également soulevé des difficultés, le Prince Menchikoff a pris sur lui de supprimer entièrement ces clauses. Enfin au dernier moment, et quand la négociation était déjà rompue officiellement, la Porte persistant à se refuser à tout acte qui porterait une forme bilatérale quelconque, notre Ambassadeur en était venu jusqu'à déclarer qu'il se contenterait d'un engagement par note officielle, telle que celle dont il vous a transmis copie.

Toutes ces concessions ont été tour-à-tour inutiles. Une méfiance aussi injuste que blessante pour les sentiments de l'Empereur les a rejetées avec

persistance, en sorte qu'après plusieurs mois de négociation infructueuses, bien que nos griefs les plus criants ait été redressés pour le moment, on nous refuse pour l'avenir, contre le retour d'éventualités pareilles, la garantie formelle et positive à laquelle nous avions attaché le caractère d'une réparation indispensable pour le manque de foi dont nous avons eu à nous plaindre—garantie sans laquelle les nouveaux firmans n'ont pas plus de valeur réelle que celui dont, au mépris de la parole solennelle du Sultan, nous avons vu en dernier lieu annuler la teneur et l'exécution.

Le moment est donc arrivé où en dépit des intentions les plus pacifiques, l'Empereur dans l'intérêt de sa dignité, et dans l'accomplissement de ses devoirs envers la Russie, se voit obligé d'adopter à l'égard de la Turquie une politique autre que celle qu'il aurait voulu continuer à suivre.

Il se hâte d'exposer aujourd'hui sans détour au Ministère de Sa Majesté Britannique les nouvelles mesures qu'il va prendre au milieu de cette crise provoquée par une aveugle obstination.

Avant tout, et malgré tant d'inutiles sursis qu'il a déjà accordé à la Porte, il veut lui laisser encore un dernier moyen de revenir à de meilleurs conseils que ceux qu'elle a pris jusqu'à présent : Que le Sultan conformément à l'invitation qui lui en est faite par une lettre que j'adresse à Réchid Pasha, et que vous trouverez ci-annexée, se décide à accepter et à signer la note proposée par le Prince Menchikoff, et notre Auguste Maître ne se refusera pas d'accepter encore cette tardive réparation. Mais pour s'y décider, il se peut accorder à la Porte qu'une semaine de réflexion. Ce terme écoulé, l'Empereur ne prendra plus conseil que de l'honneur et de la dignité de la Russie.

Il ordonnera à ses troupes d'occuper les Principautés, et les gardera en dépôt jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu la satisfaction précitée.

Ce n'est pas sans un vif et profond regret que Sa Majesté se voit forcée de prendre une pareille mesure. Même en l'adoptant, son intention n'en est pas moins de rester fidèle au principe fondamental de sa politique, celui de ne point vouloir renverser l'Empire Ottoman. L'Empereur ne cherchera donc, tout en occupant momentanément une partie des possessions de la Porte, aucun agrandissement de territoire. Il évitera de favoriser sciemment et volontairement toute tentative de soulèvement parmi les populations Chrétiennes. Il ne veut qu'atteindre le but qu'on l'aura mis délibérément dans le cas d'obtenir par d'autres moyens que ceux qu'il a employés sans succès.

En agissant comme il l'a fait, et comme il se propose de le faire si on l'y oblige, l'Empereur croit être resté fidèle aux déclarations qu'il a faites au Gouvernement Anglais. Il avait promis de pousser la modération et la patience aussi loin qu'elles pourraient aller. Mais en portant à la connaissance du Cabinet de Londres les préparatifs militaires qui coincidèrent avec l'ouverture des négociations, il ne lui avait pas dissimulé qu'il pourrait arriver un moment où il se verrait contraint d'y avoir recours. C'est pourquoi il priait l'Angleterre d'employer son influence à Constantinople pour y faire entendre les conseils de la prudence, et de s'efforcer de son côté d'y conjurer une crise imminente, en éclairant les Turcs sur les conséquences, au lieu de les encourager dans leur aveugle obstination par des espérances de secours. Le Cabinet Britannique,—c'est là une justice que nous nous plaisons à lui rendre,—a agi dans cet esprit. Il s'est montré persuadé de nos intentions conciliantes. Il nous a franchement aidé à Paris dans cette partie épineuse de la question des lieux saints qu'il s'agissait d'arranger avec la France. Quand celle-ci, sur la foi des bruits mensongers répandus à Constantinople, a envoyé sa flotte dans les mers de Grèce, l'escadre Anglaise de Malte n'a fait aucun mouvement. Malheureusement l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Constantinople était animé d'autres dispositions envers nous. Une incurable défiance, une activité passionée, ont caractérisé toute sa conduite dans la dernière phase de la négociation. Même après la conversion du Projet de Convention en simple Sened, même après les modifications importantes apportées à ce dernier par la suppression de l'Article des Patriarches, il a continué à nous refuser pour l'avenir toute espèce de garantie quelconque. Nous connaissons les efforts qu'il a fait auprès du Sultan, comme auprès des membres de son Conseil, pour l'encourager à la résistance, en cherchant à lui persuader que nos menaces ne dépasseraient pas la portée d'une pression morale, en lui promettant l'appui et les sympathies de l'Europe, s'il accordait à ses sujets l'égalité devant la loi et des privilèges plus conformes aux mœurs libérales de l'Occident.

Enfin au dernier moment, quand le Prince Menchikoff avait consenti à abandonner même le Sénad modifié pour se contenter d'une note, quand Réshid Pasha lui-même, frappé des dangers que le départ de notre Légation pouvait faire courir à la Porte, conjurait l'Ambassadeur Britannique avec instance de ne pas s'opposer à la remise de la note formulée par le Prince Menchikoff, Lord Redcliffe l'en a empêché, en déclarant que la note avait la valeur d'un Traité, et qu'elle était inacceptable.

Nous en appelons de ce jugement passionné à la raison et à l'impartialité du Gouvernement Britannique lui-même. Qu'il veuille bien examiner froidement le contenu et les termes de cette note, et après l'avoir méditée, qu'il nous dise ce qu'elle offre véritablement de compromettant pour la dignité de la Porte, de dangéreux pour sa sécurité intérieure, quel accroissement si grand d'influence elle nous donne, et si le prétendu risque qu'elle fait courir aux intérêts ultérieurs de la Porte pouvait un instant seulement entrer en balance avec les risques bien autrement graves auxquels son rejet—entraînant, comme il était devenue inévitable, le départ immédiat de la Légation Impériale—pouvait, et peut encore exposer la Porte Ottomane, l'Europe, et je dirai même, dans les circonstances actuelles, le monde social tout entier.

A dire vrai, M. le Baron, nous n'avons jamais pu comprendre pourquoi même le projet originaire de Convention, auquel le Prince Menchikoff a renoncé, suivant la latitude que nous lui en avions laissée, excitait de telles craintes, provoquait une opposition si grande. Nous ne concevons pas jusqu'ici ce qu'en principe il peut avoir de contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, ce qu'en fait il a de nouveau, et peut ajouter aux moyens que nous possédons déjà d'intervenir, au nom de la religion, dans les affaires intérieures du Gouvernement Ottoman, si telles étaient, comme on se plait à le supposer d'une manière si gratuite, nos intentions et notre constante politique. S'agit-il du principe seulement? Mais en principe une pareille transaction ne serait pas plus contraire aux droits d'autonomie du Souverain de la Turquie que ne sont jugés tels les Capitulations ou Traités que la Porte Ottomane a conclus avec la France et avec l'Autriche. En principe n'avons nous pas déjà nous-mêmes dans nos Traités de Kainardji et d'Andrinople obtenu le droit de veiller aux intérêts de nos coreligionnaires dans les provinces Turques? Le règlement par Traité d'une ou plusieurs affaires ecclésiastiques, une garantie assurée, également par Traité, dans un autre Etat aux intérêts d'une communion étrangère, n'ont rien de nouveau, n'offrent au contraire rien que d'usuel dans les rapports de Puissance à Puissance. L'histoire en présente plus d'un exemple que nous pourrions citer à l'appui. C'est ainsi entr'autres qu'en Autriche—pour ne parler que d'un grand Etat dont nul certes ne contestera la force et la pleine indépendance, la position civile des Protestants découlait de Traités conclus en faveur de leurs immunités par les Princes d'Allemagne qui embrassèrent la réforme, et qui la prirent sous leur garantie, sans que pareilles stipulations aient jamais été envisagées comme attentant en principe aux droits de souveraineté de l'Empereur. Si de tels pactes ont pu se conclure sans la compromission pour leur dignité avec des Etats Chrétiens, à plus forte raison peuvent-ils l'être avec un Gouvernement Mussulman—un Gouvernement surtout où les Chrétiens ont vu tant de fois menacés, non seulement leur immunités religieuses, mais leurs biens et leurs vies mêmes.

Ce que nous disons du principe, nous pouvons le dire également du fait. Encore une fois, une nouvelle Convention destinée à nous fournir des prétextes d'intervention religieuse en Turquie, si nous en cherchions, ne nous offrirait rien de plus que nous ne puissions trouver à volonté dans nos Traités antérieurs, et n'ajouterait rien à la réalité de notre influence sur nos coreligionnaires, laquelle influence est dans les choses et non dans les mots. Mais alors, objectera-t-on, pourquoi l'avez vous demandée cette nouvelle Convention à propos de la question spéciale et locale des lieux saints? Nous l'avons demandée, M. le Baron, parceque, à propos de cette question, soulevée si gratuitement et si inopinément pour nous, on nous a mis dans la nécessité d'aviser à combler les lacunes de nos transactions antérieures, afin de sauver des immunités que nous avions cru consacrées et à l'abri de tout danger par la possession et l'usage; parceque lorsque nous avons réclamé contre la violation de firman (fin de Janvier, v. s., 1852), on nous a répondu que la France avait un Traité, et que nous n'en avions pas; parcequ'enfin, après la manque de foi dont la Porte s'était rendu coupable envers nous dans cette circonstance, comme nous n'avions pas la prétention d'exiger qu'elle retirât pour nous à la France ce que celle-ci venait d'obtenir, il

nous fallait néanmoins un acte de réparation quelconque, une garantie plus positive que tels manques de foi n'arriveraient plus. Sans cela, nous n'y aurions pas songé, et le peu d'importance que nous y mettons ressort assez de la facilité avec laquelle nous nous sommes montrés et nous montrons encore prêts à la dernière heure à nous contenter d'une note, comme réparation du passé et garantie de l'avenir.

Que le Gouvernement Anglais nous permette de le lui dire en tout franchise. En se préoccupant à tel point des inconvénients d'une Convention, comme donnant à la Russie des droits d'ingérence qu'elle ne possédait pas, on se crée un monstre à plaisir, on se débat contre un fantôme. Pense-t-on sérieusement que nous ayons besoin d'un pareil Acte, pour intervenir en Turquie en faveur des Grecs orthodoxes, si leurs droits, leurs intérêts, leurs propriétés ou leurs vies venaient à être menacés? Le possédions-nous quand nous avons, à l'époque de la révolution Grecque, rompu nos rapports avec la Turquie à la suite des persécutions exercées sur le culte orthodoxe? L'absence d'une Convention semblable a-t-elle empêché l'Angleterre et la France elle-même d'intervenir en Turquie chaque fois que les principes de la tolérance religieuse leur ont paru méconnus par le Gouvernement Ottoman? Il y a un fait que toutes les précautions et méfiances diplomatiques ne seront pas en état de déplacer. C'est celui de la sympathie et de la communauté d'intérêts qui attachent notre population de 50,000,000 d'orthodoxes aux 12,000,000 et plus qui composent la majorité des sujets du Sultan. Que cela puisse être fâcheux pour ceux qu'inquiète notre influence, le fait n'on existe pas moins. Apparemment on n'exigera pas de nous que nous renoncions à cette influence pour dissiper des alarmes exagérés. Nous le voudrions par impossible que nous ne le pourrions pas. En s'armant contre ce fait-là; en cherchant avec une affectation si marquée à se prémunir contre lui; en forçant la Porte Ottomane à nous braver pour en conjurer les conséquences éventuelles sur de vaines suppositions, on ne fait que le mettre davantage encore en lumière aux yeux des sujets Chrétiens de la Porte; qu'affaiblir d'autant dans leur esprit l'autorité morale de celle-ci; et au lieu de nous témoigner à cause de lui des défiances aussi peu méritées qu'injurieuses, il serait mieux de s'en fier à la modération de l'Empereur du soin de ne point en abuser.

Mais au reste ce n'est plus là qu'est la question. A l'heure qu'il est, il ne s'agit plus d'une Convention bilatérale ni d'un Sened même, mais d'une simple note. Le rejet de cette note, si nous le tolérions, constituerait pour nous un échec moral que nous ne pouvons accepter, et de concessions en concessions étant arrivés aux dernières limites que l'esprit de conciliation puisse atteindre, nous sommes obligés d'honneur à nous en tenir à ce dernier mot. A son acceptation pure et simple sont encore subordonnées les mesures que nous allons prendre.

Veuillez donc, M. le Baron, les porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Anglais. Nous espérons encore qu'une appréciation plus mure de sa situation véritable engagera la Porte Ottomane à entrer dans la voie de salut que nous lui ouvrons. S'il devait en être autrement, si, par suite des complications qu'une guerre entraînera nécessairement, l'Empire Ottoman voit s'ajouter de nouvelles causes d'affaiblissement au principe de dissolution qui le mine, la responsabilité en appartiendra à cette politique de défiance qui, en excitant la Porte contre nous, l'a déjà plus d'une fois poussée sur le bord d'une abime où la modération de l'Empereur seul l'a empêchée de s'engloutir.

Recevez, &c.
(Signed) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure in No. 378.

Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha.

St. Pétersbourg, le $\frac{1}{13}$ *Mai*, 1853.

L'EMPEREUR mon Auguste Maître vient d'être informé que son Ambassadeur a dû quitter Constantinople à la suite du refus péremptoire de la Porte de prendre vis-à-vis de la Cour Impériale de Russie le moindre engagement propre à la rassurer sur les intentions protectrices du Gouvernement Ottoman à l'égard du culte et des églises orthodoxes en Turquie.

C'est après un séjour infructueux de trois mois, après avoir épuisé, de vive voix et par écrit, tout ce que la vérité, la bienveillance, l'esprit de conciliation pourraient lui dicter; c'est enfin après avoir cherché à ménager tous les scrupules malfondés et toutes les susceptibilités de la Porte par les modifications successives, auxquelles il avait consenti dans les termes et la forme des garanties qu'il était chargé de demander, que le Prince Menchikoff a du prendre la détermination que l'Empereur apprend avec peine, mais que Sa Majesté n'a pu qu'approuver pleinement.

Votre Excellence est trop éclairée pour ne pas prévoir les conséquences de l'interruption de nos relations avec le Gouvernement de Son Altesse. Elle est trop dévouée aux intérêts véritables et permanents de son Souverain et de son Empire pour ne pas éprouver de profonds regrets en présence des événements qui peuvent éclater, et dont la responsabilité pesera tout entière sur ceux qui les provoquent.

Aussi en adressant aujourd'hui cette lettre à votre Excellence, je n'ai d'autre but que de la mettre à même, tant qu'elle le peut encore, de rendre un très important service à son Souverain. Mettez encore une fois, Monsieur, sous les yeux de Son Altesse la situation réelle des choses; la modération et la justice des demandes de la Russie; la très grave offense que l'on fait a l'Empereur en opposant à ses intentions si constamment amicales et généreuses une méfiance sans motif et de refus sans excuse.

La dignité de Sa Majesté, les intérêts de son Empire, la voix de la conscience, ne lui permettent pas d'accepter des procédés pareils, en retour de tous ceux qu'elle a eus et qu'elle désire encore avoir pour la Turquie. Elle doit chercher à en obtenir la réparation et à se prémunir contre leur renouvellement à l'avenir.

Dans quelques semaines ses troupes recevront l'ordre de passer les frontières de l'Empire, non pas pour faire la guerre au Sultan—guerre qu'il répugne à Sa Majesté d'entreprendre contre un Souverain qu'elle s'est toujours plue à considérer comme un allié sincère et un voisin bien intentionné;—mais pour avoir des garanties matérielles jusqu'au moment où, ramené à des sentiments plus équitables, le Gouvernement Ottoman donnera à la Russie les sûretés morales qu'elle a demandées en vain depuis deux ans par ses Représentants à Constantinople, et en dernier lieu par son Ambassadeur.

Le projet de note que le Prince Menchikoff a formulé avant son départ et qu'il vous a remis, se trouve entre vos mains. Que votre Excellence se hâte, après avoir obtenu l'assentiment de Sa Hautesse le Sultan, de signer cette note, sans variante, et de la transmettre au plus tard dans huit jours à notre Ambassadeur à Odessa, où il doit se trouver encore.

Je souhaite vivement que, dans ce moment décisif, le conseil que j'adresse à votre Excellence avec la confiance que ses lumières et son patriotisme m'inspirent soit apprécié par elle comme par ses collègues du Divan, et que dans l'intérêt de la paix, que nous devons être tous également désireux de conserver, il soit suivi sans hésitation ni retard.

No. 379.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 60.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 25, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, for your Lordship's information, copies of the Jerusalem firmans; of the accompanying note to the French and Russian Embassies, and of the memorandum by which they were communicated officially to the Representatives of Austria and Prussia, as well as to Her Majesty's Embassy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 379.

Memorandum of the Porte to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Traduction.) 26 *Rejib*, 1969. (5 *Mai*, 1853.)

J'AI l'honneur d'envoyer ci-joint à votre Excellence, pour qu'elle en prenne connaissance, copies de deux firmans qui viennent d'être écrits relativement à certains lieux saints à Jérusalem, et de la note officielle qui a été remise en conséquence aux Ambassadeurs de Russie et de France.

Inclosure 2 in No. 379.

Note addressed by Rifaat Pasha to the Ambassadors of Russia and France.

(Traduction.) *Rejib* 1269. (5 *Mai*, 1853.)

COPIE est transmise à votre Excellence du firman orné d'un hatti-shériff, émané vers la fin du mois de Rejib de l'année 1269, qui est destiné à servir de conclusion et de complément des différends qui existaient entre les nations Grecque et Latine au sujet de quelques sanctuaires à Jérusalem, qui renferme la décision prise dernièrement en définitif, soit par rapport à ces sanctuaires, soit par rapport à la réparation de la coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre. Et comme c'est la volonté du Sa Majesté le Sultan que les dispositions renfermées dans ce firman soient invariablement et pour toujours mises à exécution complétement, je m'empresse d'en informer votre Excellence.

Je saisis, &c.

Inclosure 3 in No. 379.

Firman respecting the Holy Places.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem et dépendances; à toi Juge de Jérusalem, et à vous Mufti, Caïmakam de Nakib ul Eshref, et autres Membres du Conseil, j'ordonne:

Il vient de m'être représenté que quelques-unes des dispositions du firman Impérial qui était daté des derniers jours du mois de Djemazi-ul-Evel, mil deux cent soixante huit (vers la mi Février, 1852), orné de mon hatti-sheriff, et adressé tant à toi, Gouverneur susmentionné, qu'à d'autres autorités, nécessaires pour la solution de l'aplanissement des différends survenus entre les nations Grecque et Latine, relativement à certains lieux saints qui existent dans la ville et hors de la ville de Jérusalem, n'ont pas encore été mises à exécution; et comme ma volonté souveraine est que tout ce qui régarde cette affaire soit fait, le Conseil de mes illustres Ministres, après avoir discuté cette question, a rédigé un mémoire qui consiste en six Articles servant à expliquer, corroborer, et compléter mon firman Impérial susmentionné.

En consignant aux Latins une clef de la grande porte de l'Eglise de Bethléem, on leur a donné le droit de passer de cette église suivant l'ancienne pratique; on ne leur a pas donné le droit d'y exercer leur culte, ou de posséder cette église en commun avec les Grecques; on n'a autorisé par là ni la subversion, par aucune des parties, du *statu quo* de l'église ni l'exercice du culte Latin dans cette église, ni un changement du système qui a toujours existé et qui existe encore par l'introduction d'une nouveauté, soit par rapport au passage à travers cette église pour se rendre à la grotte, soit à d'autres égards.

Comme depuis un ancien temps le portier de l'Eglise de Bethléem a toujours été un prêtre Grec, sujet de ma Sublime Porte, et que ce portier n'a absolument aucune autorité d'empêcher de passer les nations qui ont *ab antiquo* le droit du passage, il en sera ainsi comme par le passé.

La nouvelle étoile que j'ai fait placer pour mettre fin aux contestations qui se sont élevées à cet égard dans la grotte qu'il y a dans l'enceinte de l'Eglise de

Bethléem, étoile pareille à celle qui s'est perdue l'année 1847, et pour qu'elle serve de souvenir visible de ma part à la nation Chrétienne, ne confère à aucune nation en particulier un droit exclusif et nouveau, et, en aucun temps, il n'y aura le moindre changement à cet égard.

Les nations Chrétiennes qui ont le droit de visiter le Sépulcre de Sainte Marie et d'y exercer leur culte, visiteront ce lieu et y exerceront leur culte tous les jours, à condition de n'être pas un obstacle à ce que les autres nations aussi y exercent leur culte; les Grecs y officieront tous les matins depuis le lever du soleil; après eux les Arméniens; et après ceux-ci les Latins—chacune de ces nations ayant pour cela une heure et demie de temps. C'est une règle établie avec la sanction et sous l'autorité de ma Sublime Porte.

Les deux jardins attenants au Couvent Franc dans le village de Bethléem, continueront d'être, comme auparavant, sous l'inspection des nations Grecque et Latine, et on en fera l'usage qu'on a fait jusqu'à présent, sans aucune prérogative en faveur de l'une ou de l'autre partie.

Comme il n'y a pas d'autre concessions faites nouvellement par des firmans formels à aucune nation, toutes celles qui existent seront maintenues telles qu'elles, et tous les lieux saints de Jérusalem qui sont actuellement au pouvoir des nations Grecque, Latine, et Arménienne, soit qu'ils leur appartiennent en commun ou en propre, devront rester en leur pouvoir pour toujours.

Le mémoire susmentionné m'ayant été soumis par le Conseil, qui a demandé mes ordres, j'ai ordonné que tout ce qui y est écrit fût mis à exécution.

En conséquence de mes ordres souverains, mon présent firman Impérial est émané de mon Divan Impérial, et, orné de mon hatti-sheriff, il vous est expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur susmentionné, Juge, Mufti et autres, informés que vous serez de tout ce que ci-dessus, vous ferez enrégistrer mon présent firman Impérial dans les régistres du Mahkémé, et vous aurez à agir invariablement et pour toujours conformément aux ordres souverains qu'il renferme. Ayez-le pour entendu, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré mon présent firman Impérial, écrit dans les derniers jours du mois Rejib, l'an mil deux cent soixante neuf.

Inclosure 4 in No. 379.

Firman respecting the Cupola of the Holy Sepulchre.

(Traduction.)

A TOI, mon Vizir, Hafiz Ahmed Pacha, Gouverneur de Jérusalem et dépendances, et à toi, Juge de Jérusalem, j'ordonne:

J'ai donnée l'année 1257 (1841), un firman Impérial pour la réparation dont la grande coupole de l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre à Jérusalem a besoin. Mais comme cette réparation n'a pas été faite jusqu'à présent, on vient de me représenter cette fois-ci encore que la coupole tombant en ruine a besoin d'être réparée, ce qui a été avéré par l'intermédiaire de l'ingénieur expédié à Jérusalem.

Ma volonté et mes ordres souverains conséquemment sont: que cette coupole soit réparée sous mes augustes auspices, et dans la même forme qu'elle a actuellement, par ma Sublime Porte; que le Patriarche Grec de Jérusalem soit autorisé, s'il se fait quelque chose qui diffère de la forme actuelle de la coupole, à faire des représentations là-dessus pour l'empêcher; et que comme il ne convient pas de démolir les maisons attenantes à l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre, attendu que ces maisons sont un hospice et un oratoire, on ait à murer les fenêtres qui donnent sur l'Eglise du Saint Sépulcre; et mon présent firman Impérial, qui contient ces dispositions, est émané de ma Chancellerie Impériale et expédié.

Vous donc, Gouverneur et Juge susmentionnés, quand vous aurez appris qu'il a été décidé que la coupole susdite sera réparée sur le même plan sur lequel elle se trouve bâtie actuellement, par ma Sublime Porte, et par les soins d'un Commissaire *ad hoc*, vous vous empresserez de la publier, et de procéder, dès à present, à murer les fenêtres en question pour obvier au mal qu'elles causent.

Ayez-le pour entendu, et ajoutez foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré mon présent firman Impérial, écrit dans les derniers jours du mois de Rejib, l'an mil deux cent soixante neuf (5 Mai, 1853).

No. 380.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 61.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

A COPY of the circular by which Prince Menchikoff announced the rupture of his diplomatic relations with the Porte is inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information.

The Prince having sailed out of the Bosphorus before I received his note, it was impossible for me to send him a reply.

I have, &c

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 380.

Prince Menchikoff to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Buyukdéré, le $\frac{9}{21}$ Mai, 1853.*

LA Sublime Porte ne s'étant pas montré disposée à entrer dans les vues conciliantes du Gouvernement Impérial pour arriver à une entente et établir un accord sincère entre les deux Puissances, je me suis vu dans l'obligation de rompre mes relations diplomatiques avec le Cabinet Ottoman, et de quitter Constantinople. Mon départ sera suivi de près par celui du personnel de la Légation Impériale.

En ayant l'honneur, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vous faire part de cette détermination, je prie, &c.

(Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 381.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 62.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

TWO papers of considerable interest are inclosed herewith for your Lordship's information. One of them is the Porte's ultimatum to Prince Menchikoff, explained to him in person by Reshid Pasha before delivery, and retained in consequence of the Prince's note, dated the 18th instant, having been delivered to Reshid Pasha before His Highness had time to issue his own. This paper, on being afterwards submitted in private by one of Reshid Pasha's sons to the Russian Ambassador, produced no effect in the way of accommodation.

The other inclosure is Prince Menchikoff's parting declaration to the Porte on hearing that a firman, repeating and confirming the privileges of the Greek church and clergy, was on the point of being issued in terms unsatisfactory to Russia.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 381.

Reshid Pasha to Prince Menchikoff.

(Translation.)

THE statement made by Prince Menchikoff, in his written and verbal communications, concerning the doubts and want of confidence entertained by the Porte with regard to His Majesty the Emperor's good intentions, has been seen with great regret. His Majesty the Sultan has perfect faith and confidence in His Majesty the Emperor, and highly appreciates the great qualities and spirit of justice which animate his august ally and neighbour, and it is a great honour for me to proclaim that it has always been His Majesty the Sultan's desire to consolidate and strengthen the friendly relations happily subsisting between the two countries.

With reference to the religious privileges of the Greek churches and clergy, the honour of the Porte requires that the exclusively spiritual privileges granted under the Sultan's predecessors, and confirmed by His Majesty, should be now and henceforward preserved unimpaired and in force; and the equitable system pursued by the Porte towards its subjects demands that any spiritual privilege whatever granted henceforward to one class of Christian subjects should not be refused to the Greek clergy. It would be a cause of much regret that the fixed intentions of His Majesty the Sultan in this respect should be called into question.

Nevertheless, the Imperial firman now granted to the Greek Patriarchate, confirming the religious privileges, is considered to afford a new proof of His Imperial Majesty's benevolent sentiments in this respect, and the general promulgation thereof must afford every security, and remove for ever from His Imperial Majesty's mind all doubts for the future respecting the religion which he professes, and it is with pleasure that I perform the duty of making this declaration.

In order that there should be no alteration respecting the Shrine at Jerusalem, it is formally promised that for security in the future thereon the Sublime Porte will take no step concerning them without the knowledge of the French and Russian Governments. An official note has been addressed to the French Embassy also to this purpose.

The Sultan consents that a church and hospital should be built at Jerusalem (for the Russians); and the Porte is ready and disposed to conclude a Sened, both on this subject and concerning the special privileges of the Russian monks at that place.

Inclosure 2 in No. 381.

Prince Menchikoff to Reshid Pasha.

Buyukdéré, le $\frac{9}{21}$ *Mai*, 1853.

AU moment de quitter Constantinople, le Soussigné, Ambassadeur de Russie, a appris que la Sublime Porte manifestait l'intention de proclamer une garantie pour l'exercice des droits spirituels dont se trouve investi le clergé de l'Eglise d'Orient, ce qui de fait rendait douteux le maintien des autres privilèges dont il jouit.

Quel que puisse être le motif de cette détermination, le Soussigné se trouve dans l'obligation de faire connaître à son Altesse M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qu'une déclaration ou tel autre acte qui tendrait, tout en maintenant l'intégrité des droits purement spirituels du culte orthodoxe d'Orient, à invalider les autres droits, privilèges, et immunités accordés au culte et à son clergé depuis les temps les plus anciens et dont ils jouissent aujourd'hui, serait considéré par le Cabinet Impérial comme un acte hostile à la Russie et à sa réligion.

Le Soussigné, &c. (Signé) MENCHIKOFF.

No. 382.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

No. 63.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 25, 1853.

I FEAR it will prove a work of supererogation, but unwilling to lose any chance, however slender, of making an impression on the Court of St. Petersburgh at this important juncture, I addressed an explanatory letter to Her Majesty's Envoy, and forwarded it by express through Vienna the day before yesterday. I have now the honour to inclose a copy of it for your Lordship's more complete information.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 382.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *Constantinople, May* 23, 1853.

LONG before this letter can reach St. Petersburgh, you will probably have heard, from some other source, of Prince Menchikoff's departure from Constantinople, and of the suspension of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte. I shall deem myself sufficiently fortunate if my letter arrives in time to give you a just notion of the causes of his failure, before any mistaken or hasty resolution be adopted by the Russian Cabinet in consequence of that disappointment. I am the more desirous of bringing the case to your knowledge in its true colours because it has come round to me that I am suspected of having mainly contributed to the Ambassador's discomfiture; not that I would take the trouble to remove any error of that kind from personal considerations, but simply because a false impression of our policy at home may follow from the imputation, and diminish for a time your means of exercising a salutary influence in Eastern matters.

When I left England, and indeed when I arrived here, after passing through Paris and Vienna, it was generally supposed that the only important object of Prince Menchikoff's embassy was to settle the question of the Holy Places. To all appearance no one, even at Vienna, dreamed of the far more important demands which Russia held in reserve, and which, when finally made known to the Turkish Ministers, were strictly confined to them, as matters not to be divulged with impunity to any third party. Though I was not long in obtaining access to the secret, I did not the less endeavour to promote an early and amicable adjustment of what belonged more particularly to the holy places; and I had the good fortune to receive an acknowledgment of my friendly offices from Prince Menchikoff himself. The confidential interview which took place between us afforded me in due time an opportunity, of which I availed myself, to apprize his Excellency of the difficulties which I foresaw that he would encounter whenever he entered upon the ground of the Russian protection and Greek privileges.

I must do him the justice to say that he listened to me with courtesy, and subsequently gave me to understand that he had partially modified his demands with reference to the considerations which I had urged. Unfortunately the amendment was superficial; and when the Turkish Ministers, immediately upon the arrangement of the first question, were compelled by a peremptory requisition from the Prince to enter seriously into the remaining questions, they manifested a settled determination not to comply with that part of them which related to a guarantee in the shape of an engagement binding upon both parties with the force of a Treaty.

From this resolution of theirs I was not prepared to dissent, for the reasons which are stated in a confidential letter subsequently addressed by me to the Russian Ambassador, less with any hope of inducing him to alter his views,

than for the purpose of undeceiving him as to the reliance which I was privately told that he persisted, however strangely, in placing on my cooperation.

Inclosed herewith are copies of this letter, of the Ambassador's answer, and also of my report thereon to Lord Clarendon.

All that has happened since, though covering much paper and extending over a number of days, may be briefly summed up as a succession of efforts on the one side, to obtain the Porte's consent to the same objectionable propositions, varied in form, but identical in substance, and a firm resistance, on the other, to anything which involved the surrender to Russia of a recognized right to interfere, in a spirit of protection, with the privileges of the Greek church and its clergy in Turkey.

Notwithstanding their perfect knowledge of the danger to which they exposed themselves by a continued refusal, and notwithstanding a partial change of Ministry, favourable, it was imagined, to the views of Russia, the Ottoman Cabinet stood to its first resolution, without a shadow of change, and finally acquiesced in the Prince's departure, although the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia joined with me in declining to give any advice as to Prince Menchikoff's last and conclusive ultimatum.

This resolution was not adopted unadvisedly. It was sanctioned not only by the Sultan, but also by a Council comprising unusual numbers, and voting in the proportion of 42 to 3 in its favour.

Allow me to add, that the opinions of my three colleagues, similar to my own, agree with the decision of the Porte, and find a general concurrence even among the public, whose fears are excited, and whose interests are compromised by the rejection of Prince Menchikoff's demands. There is even some reason to think that the Greek synod, and the more enlightened portion of the Greek laity, have less of sympathy than usual with their northern protectors, whose pretensions in the present instance would tend in some measure, if accepted, to perpetuate ecclesiastical abuses, while they would encroach upon the sovereign rights and independence of the Porte.

A Government exposing itself courageously to peril on the strength of their own convictions, and supported by such a mass of concurrent opinion, is surely entitled to respect and forbearance, notwithstanding its numerous errors and prejudices.

The Porte has declared its readiness to comply with the wishes of Russia on all other points, and to respond with gratitude to the cordial assurances of that Court. A moral resistance is all that it opposes to a pressure which may overpower its strength, but cannot extort its consent.

It really appears to my humble judgment, that Russia is pursuing a course which can hardly terminate in any beneficial result. It is only by force that she can hope to succeed; and a triumph, so obtained, would probably be attended with no inconsiderable danger to herself in many important respects, with an increased estrangement here, and the risk of perilous disturbances from one end of Europe to the other.

I will not pursue this subject further. It would be a great consolation to me were I to learn that in thus opening myself to you, I had contributed to the removal of erroneous impressions, and promoted the cause of peace without prejudice to that of national independence.

Within you will find a copy of the Porte's ultimatum to Prince Menchikoff. The Prince would not receive it officially, but took private cognizance of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 383.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 10.*)

(No. 64.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 25, 1853.*

THE Porte at my suggestion has addressed a circular instruction to the Provincial Governors, for the purpose of preventing unnecessary excitement and danger of collision under present circumstances, and I have now the honour to inclose a translation of it for the information of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 383.

Circular Instructions to the Provincial Governors.

(Traduction.)

UNE parfaite entente sur quelques questions entre la Sublime Porte et la Cour de Russie n'ayant pas pu avoir lieu, les relations officielles entre les deux Gouvernements en sont venues à un point qu'elles ont été rompues. Nous espérons, toutefois de la faveur Divine, que l'affaire s'arrangera sans qu'il en résulte aucunes difficultés.

Seulement, comme chacun donnera à cette circonstance, lorsqu'elle sera parvenue à la connaissance du public dans le pays où vous êtes, différentes interprétations, et se livrera à son penchant naturel; et si de mauvais procédés, tels que changer de manière de traiter les négocians et les protégés de la Cour de Russie, et molester les sujets de la Sublime Porte ont lieu, on en ressentira—Dieu nous en préserve!—les mauvaises conséquences; c'est pourquoi il est devenu nécessaire de développer ici le système que les autorités de la Sublime Porte sont chargées et seront désormais obligées de suivre.

Il faut donc, en premier lieu, protéger, plus que jamais, les négocians et les sujets Russes; avoir des égards pour eux faciliter leurs affaires; avoir des attentions pour les Consuls et autres Agens de la Cour de Russie; et tâcher d'éviter de leur donner, en quoi que ce soit, le moindre juste sujet de plainte. On mettra tous les soins possibles à protéger et défendre en chaque occasion tous les sujets de la Sublime Porte, et à éviter en même temps de s'ingérer en aucune manière dans l'exercice de leur culte, en vertu des privilèges religieux dont ils jouissent, et suivant leur système accoutumé. Ainsi qu'il est clairement prescrit par les ordres et les instructions envoyées par le passé et récemment encore, on mettra tous les soins possibles à ce que les sujets de la Sublime Porte n'aient à souffrir de rien absolument et qu'il ne soit porté aucune atteinte ni à leur vie, ni à leur honneur, ni à leurs biens. En un mot, comme la plus petite négligence, la moindre méprise sur les points précités, causeraient beaucoup de mal, et que par là les autorités assumeraient sur elles une très grande responsabilité, elles devront considérer comme le premier de leur devoir d'être très-vigilans dans l'exercice de leurs fonctions et de les remplir avec beaucoup de prudence et de sagesse.

Il faut aussi savoir qu'il ne s'agit pas de permettre, parcequ'on traite bien les Rayahs, que les Mussulmans nos frères de religion soient traités avec mépris et vexés. Le principal objet en vue est que tout en traitant parfaitement et en protégeant complètement les Mussulmans aussi, on prévienne une attaque, chose contraire à la volonté du Gouvernement, de la part d'un parti contre un autre.

Il ne faut pas que ces ordres, qui sont basés sur l'équité et la justice, ni que la pensée qu'ils pourraient alarmer les Chrétiens, servent de motif pour se ralentir sur le système du gouvernement et de la police du pays; il faut, au contraire, le maintenir avec plus de vigueur et plus de vigilance encore. Il est très-important que l'on s'occupe, sans cesse, de prendre des renseignements et de se mettre au fait de ce qui se passe. Seulement, comme il n'est pas convenable d'armer, sans nécessité, le peuple, dans la pensée que cela con-

tribuerait au maintien du bon ordre avec plus de vigueur, et d'alarmer les Rayas en s'enquérant sans circonspection de ce qui les regarde, il faudra faire tout cela avec beaucoup de prudence.

Si, par exemple, un rassemblement de Rayas venait à avoir lieu, il ne faudrait pas employer contr'eux les armes tout-à-coup; il faudra d'abord leur donner des conseils énergiques pour les engager à rentrer dans l'obéissance. Dans le cas qu'ils ne se soumissent pas et qu'ils voulussent grossir leur rassemblement, comme d'après les nouveaux ordres que le Seraskier a envoyés, il y a quelque temps, les commandants des troupes doivent envoyer une force militaire partout où il est nécessaire, il faut s'entendre avec eux pour cerner les séditieux et tâcher d'empêcher par là avec prudence et modération que la révolte ne fasse des progrès. Il faut aussi nous informer, sans aucun délai, de ce qui se sera passé; tout cela est de la dernière importance.

Voilà les ordres qu'il a plu à Sa Majesté le Sultan de donner. Une conduite contraire à ces ordres serait incontestablement très-préjudiciable et à la Sublime Porte et à vous-mêmes; et c'est pour vous en prévenir que cette lettre a été écrite et expédiée exprès.

No. 384.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 10.*)

(No. 65.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, May 26, 1853.*

I ADD a few lines to some despatches which could not be prepared in time for the French packet yesterday, and which are now forwarded by the Vienna post, to inclose some further advices received by way of Galatz from the Principalities. Your Lordship will observe that in some respects they are rather at variance with each other.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 384.

Extract of a Private Letter, dated May 26.

AN English shipmaster, arrived to-day from the Danube, says he saw on Thursday last twelve Russian schooners of war towing up the river by steamers.

Another Letter.

By the Galatz steamer it is stated that three Russian steamers, with about 1000 soldiers, had entered the Danube and landed the troops on the Russian territory. From Bucharest it is written, that everybody was quite easy since the previous day, when advices had been received from St. Petersburgh by the Prince, that he need be under no apprehension, as there was no intention of the Russian troops entering the Principalities.

Inclosure 2 in No. 384.

Consul Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 25, 1853.

My Lord,

PASSENGERS arrived by this steamer this morning from the Danube, report that the exportation of grain from Ismail had been prohibited in consequence of the large body of troops which was expected to arrive there. Very

considerable activity by all accounts prevails in respect to the movements of the Russian army stationed all along that frontier.

In this district, and indeed throughout this province, great fear and anxiety prevails in the uncertainty as to the issue of the questions pending between Russia and the Porte.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWARD ST. JOHN NEALE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 384.

Consul Gardiner to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Jassy, May 19, 1853.*

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that the public mind at Jassy is kept in constant alarm from the expected return of the Russian forces to occupy this and the neighbouring Principality; for Vice-Consul Cunningham writes also from Galatz that there had been much perturbation and inquietude caused to the mercantile body, from the political news of their correspondents at Constantinople. The presence of your Excellency is of itself sufficient to dispel all doubts. I have the honour to report the circumstances, for they have certainly produced a general impression of doubt and dismay.

The Hospodar had mentioned to me two or three days ago that several Russian Engineer officers had visited Sculeni, and had examined very particularly the state and solidity of the bridge thrown over the Pruth at that place, which is the chief passage to and from Russia and the Principality. The chief merchandize from Russia comes also by this same bridge, which consequently requires to be kept in good repair. The Prince added, that the Russians had been collecting at Reni, a Russian port near Galatz, a quantity of materials as in 1848, but having waited on the Prince to-day, he said that he had received no intelligence whatever to indicate any intention of the Russian forces to cross the Pruth, and I hope that the alarm is altogether unfounded.

I have, &c.

(Signed) SAMUEL GARDINER.

No. 385.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 72.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatches to No. 65 of the 26th of May, inclusive.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of the letter which you addressed to Sir Hamilton Seymour on the 23rd of May, and of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch No. 63, of the 25th, explaining the progress of the discussions at Constantinople which terminated in Prince Menchikoff's departure.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 386.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 73.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency in reply to your despatch No. 64, of the 25th of May, that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having advised the Porte to issue to the provincial authorities, with reference to the present crisis, the instruction of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 387.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 74.)

Foreign Office, June 10, 1853.

My Lord,

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of the instructions given by the French Government to M. de la Cour on the 22nd of March last, which are referred to in the despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys to Count Walewski of the 5th instant.

I also inclose copies of the instructions sent to the French Admiral on the 20th of March and 4th of June, and to the French Ambassador at Constantinople on the latter date, which have likewise been communicated to me by Count Walewski.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 387.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to M. de la Cour.

Paris, le 22 Mars, 1853.

Monsieur,

LE choix que Sa Majesté Impériale a fait de vous pour représenter sa personne et défendre les intérêts politiques de la France à Constantinople dans les circonstances difficiles où se trouve l'Orient, indique assez la confiance qu'elle met dans votre caractère et votre expérience, et je ne doute pas que vous ne sachiez complètement les justifier.

Je reviendrai plus tard sur les différents points que vous aurez à traiter pendant le cours de votre mission; je ne me propose aujourd'hui que de vous tracer des instructions pour régler votre attitude et votre langage dans la crise que traverse l'Empire Ottoman.

Alliée fidèle de la Turquie, engagée par ses traditions non moins que par ses intérêts à la soutenir et à la préserver d'une catastrophe, la France veut loyalement lui venir en aide. C'est dans ce but, Monsieur, que l'Empereur a donné à notre escadre d'évolution l'ordre de se rendre dans les mers de Grèce. J'espère encore que cette détermination n'aura que le caractère d'une mesure de précaution et de surveillance; mais il était essentiel que nos forces navales se rapprochassent du théâtre des événements, afin que personne ne peut douter de notre sollicitude pour les destinées de l'Empire Ottoman.

Il me faut, toutefois, prévoir le cas où la gravité et l'imminence des conjonctures qui peuvent surgir à Constantinople détermineraient la Porte à invoquer notre appui. M. l'Amiral de la Susse devrait alors obtempérer à vos réquisitions, et je ne puis trop vous recommander d'aviser de concert avec lui aux moyens de faciliter vos communications avec l'escadre.

Tant que le Divan ne sera en lutte qu'à une pression morale, vous vous bornerez à soutenir son courage, tout en le maintenant, autant que possible, dans les voies de la prudence et en l'éclairant de vos conseils. Si M. le Prince Menchikoff, au contraire, rompait les négociations entamées ou recourait à des moyens coércitifs pour les rendre plus efficaces, vous auriez d'autres devoirs à remplir.

Trois hypothèses sont admissibles; je vais les passer en revue tour-à-tour, et vous indiquer la conduite que vous auriez à tenir en face de chacune d'elles.

1. Il se peut que la Russie commence par occuper les Principautés de Moldavie et de Valachie. Si grave que fût cette atteinte à l'intégrité de l'Empire Ottoman, elle ne serait malheureusement pas nouvelle. Vous attendriez donc que la Porte, considérant la Russie comme en état de guerre avec elle, vous adressât d'elle-même et sans excitation de votre part, une demande d'intervention, et vous seriez alors autorisé à faire entrer l'escadre dans le Détroit des Dardanelles. Mais quand même une telle demande ne viendrait pas à se produire, la situation n'en exigerait pas moins une surveillance plus active, et vous devriez inviter M. l'Amiral de la Susse à venir mouiller soit aux Iles

d'Ourlac, soit dans la Golfe d'Enos. Cette dernière position est d'une grande importance stratégique, et son occupation par nos forces navales détournerait peut-être la Russie de l'idée de faire une démonstration contre Varna ou Bourgas.

Si, cependant, la flotte de Sevastopol se mettait en mouvement, et si en même temps que l'armée Russe entrerait dans les provinces du Danube, elle se rapprochait du littoral Ottoman de la Mer Noire, ou faisait seule acte d'hostilité, il n'y aurait plus de doute à conserver; la guerre serait commencée et le Sultan dégagé *ipso facto* du Traité du 13 Juillet, 1841. Le moment serait venu pour notre escadre de franchir les Dardanelles, et vous n'hésiteriez plus à l'appeler au-delà des châteaux, si la Porte adhérait à cette combinaison. Il faudrait toutefois qu'elle vous fit, à cet égard, une demande formelle en écrit; et si Rifaat Pasha, ce que je ne suppose pas, ne prenait pas l'initiative, vous ne manqueriez pas de l'engager à adresser une demande semblable à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique. Vous auriez soin en tout cas d'informer de votre résolution soit M. le Colonel Rose, soit Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, et de leur dire que la France, uniquement mue par l'intérêt générale qui s'attache au maintien de l'Empire Ottoman, et ne poursuivant aucun but particulier, regretterait vivement que l'Angleterre ne s'associât point à ses efforts. Si la Porte voulait nous faire participer à la garde même des châteaux, c'est à dire autoriser un débarquement, vous expliqueriez bien à M. le Amiral de la Susse qu'il devrait, dans le cas où l'Amiral Dundas se présenterait aussi aux Dardanelles, s'entendre avec lui pour que cette occupation, destinée à cesser aussitôt que les circonstances ne le rendraient plus nécessaire, fût faite en commun par les forces Françaises et Anglaises. La combinaison la plus simple serait celle qui attribuerait à chaque escadre la défense de l'une des côtes.

3. Les événements enfin peuvent prendre une tournure plus décisive; la flotte Russe, en un mot, peut vouloir menacer et forcer le Bosphore. Si les choses en arrivaient à cette extrémité, vous devriez, sur une nouvelle et pressante demande de la Porte, engager M. l'Amiral de la Susse, lorsqu'il aurait garni les châteaux des Dardanelles de forces suffisantes pour assurer son retour, à se rapprocher de Constantinople et à prêter aux Turcs, outre l'appui matériel de son escadre, celui de son expérience militaire. Il entrerait alors dans la plénitude de son action, et vous n'auriez plus à intervenir dans ses opérations que pour fixer le moment où il vous semblerait nécessaire qu'il quittât le Bosphore. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire, Monsieur, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale repousse de toutes ses forces l'idée que la mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff puisse se dénouer d'un façon aussi fatale; mais je devais vous mettre en mesure de n'être pris au dépourvu par aucun événement. Il me paraîtrait, en surplus, impossible que, dans une pareille hypothèse où il s'agirait de l'existence ou de la chûte de l'Empire Ottoman, la marine Anglaise ne fût pas appelée à faire son devoir à côté de la marine Française, et vous auriez soin si la situation prenait un aspect aussi menaçant, de ne pas cacher à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté Britannique les pouvoirs entiers qui vous sont confiés.

Ces graves résolutions, Monsieur, n'ont été inspirées au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale que par l'intérêt général de l'Europe à empêcher une dissolution violente de l'Empire Ottoman. Mes instructions s'appliquent donc à toutes les circonstances qui vous paraîtraient assez caractérisées pour mettre en danger l'existence de la Turquie.

Agréez, &c.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 387.

The Minister of Marine to Admiral de la Susse.

Paris, le 20 Mars, 1853.

M. le Vice-Amiral,

JE vous ai transmis l'ordre de faire appareiller l'escadre sans délai pour se rendre dans la rade de Salamine.

J'ordonne à M. le Contre-Amiral Desfosses de se ranger sous votre commandement avec les bâtiments de sa division. Le Gouvernement, préoccupé de

l'attitude de la Russie vis-à-vis de la Porte Ottomane, croit devoir vous diriger dans les mers voisines du théâtre des négociations. Je ne vous donne aucunes instructions personnelles. Vous tiendrez les forces placées sous vos ordres à la disposition de M. de la Cour, notre Ambassadeur à Constantinople, qui se rend immédiatement à son poste; et je suis convaincu que, dirigées par vous, elles seconderont efficacement la politique de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Receivez, &c.

(Signé) DUCOS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 387.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys to the Prefet at Toulon.

Paris, le 4 Juin, 1853.

DES la réception de cette dépêche et sans perdre un instant, remettez au Commandant du "Chaptal," les deux dépêches télégraphiques suivantes:

1.—A M. le Vice-Amiral de la Susse, commandant l'escadre Française à Salamine.

Rendez-vous immédiatement avec l'escadre à Basica, près Ténédos. L'escadre Britannique s'y rend de son coté, pour agir de concert avec vous. Entendez-vous avec l'Amiral Anglais. Continuez à suivre les directions que vous recevrez de l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople.

(Signé) DUCOS.

2.—Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères à l'Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople.

Le Gouvernement Anglais envoie sa flotte à Basica et la met à la disposition de Lord Stratford. Notre escadre reçoit l'ordre de se rendre dans les mêmes eaux. Je confirme vos instructions du 22 Mars: des instructions analogues sont envoyés à Lord Stratford. Entendez-vous avec lui.

(Signé) DROUYN DE LHUYS.

No. 388.

Reshid Pasha to M. Musurus.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by M. Musurus, June 10.)

18 *Shaban*, 1269. (*Mai* 26, 1853.)

(Traduction.)

PAR ma dépêche du 12 Shaban, je vous informais que le Prince Menchikoff avait interrompu les relations diplomatiques, qu'il était sur le point de partir, que la Sublime Porte était dans l'impossibilité de modifier sa décision contenue dans la note officielle qu'elle avait préparée, qu'enfin les choses étaient à ce point.

Peu après que le Prince Menchikoff eut déclaré qu'il partirait, le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche vint me voir, et me dit que si j'envoyais chez le Prince Menchikoff un de mes fils pour lui faire entendre quelques paroles obligeantes, il était probable que cet Ambassadeur modifierait en quelque sorte sa résolution de partir. Il a ajouté qu'il l'avait vu lui-même que la personne qui lui serait envoyée serait bien reçue, et que les Représentants d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse avaient jugé convenable une semblable démarche.

Je dus donc envoyer ce jour-là même chez le Prince Menchikoff mon fils Salih Bey, qui, après avoir exprimé au Prince des regrets sur sa résolution violente, lui a montré une copie de la note officielle qu'il n'avait pas encore reçue. Le Prince garda cette copie, disant qu'il croyait faire preuve de modération en consentant que les demandes qu'il avait dès le commencement formulées fussent réunies par une note dont il avait lui-même préparé le projet, et à laquelle ajouta-t-il, une seule lettre ne saurait être changée; et là-dessus il dit adieu à Salih Bey en lui déclarant qu'il partirait le lendemain, Samedi, dans l'après-midi, mais qu'il s'arrêterait s'il recevait quelque temps avant son départ une communication comme quoi le principe de ses demandes était admis.

Or, le projet de note susmentionné, quoique portant quant à la forme une autre dénomination, ne diffère nullement quant à ses dispositions de la Convention demandée dès le commencement par le Prince Menchikoff; et dès lors il était impossible d'y revenir. Ainsi comme la décision de la Porte à cet égard était invariable, et que vu le court délai fixé par le Prince, il était matériellement impossible de soumettre cette dernière proposition du Prince au Conseil des Ministres et de lui donner une réponse, le Prince Menchikoff s'embarqua pour la Mer Noire à l'heure indiquée.

Je juge inutile de vous dire que le Gouvernement Impérial, loin d'être animé d'aucun sentiment hostile à l'égard de la Russie, n'a au contraire en vue que de resserrer les liens d'amitié entre les deux Empires. Nous espérons que la Russie ne voudra pas faire la guerre sans aucun motif et contrairement aux assurances positives qu'elle a données aux Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Cependant comme le Prince a interrompu les relations diplomatiques et qu'il a quitté le pays où il était accrédité, la Sublime Porte, considérant que, dans des circonstances aussi graves, il ne lui a été donné aucune assurance qu'il n'y aura pas de la guerre, tandis que des armements considérables, par terre et par mer, se font par la Russie dans le voisinage de l'Empire Ottoman, se voit dans la nécessité impérieuse de prendre des mesures de précaution pour prémunir ses états et ses sujets contre toute attente pouvant être la conséquence probable des armements susmentionnés.

Bien que les Représentants des quatre Puissances aient exprimé à la Sublime Porte l'avis que ces mesures de précaution soient prises sans éclat, toutefois comme il est impossible de faire un mystère de mesures aussi étendues, et que des préparatifs faits sans déclaration préalable pourraient, au contraire, justifier les soupçons qu'on désire prévenir, la Sublime Porte a communiqué aux Représentants des quatre Grandes Puissances une note sous la date d'aujourd'hui pour leur déclarer que, tout en étant dans la nécessité de prendre des mesures de précaution, elle n'a nullement l'intention ni le désir de faire la guerre à moins qu'elle ne soit attaquée.

Je vous envoie ci-joint copie de cette note officielle, ainsi que celle du projet de note donné par le Prince Menchikoff. Voilà où en sont maintenant les choses.

Vous voudrez bien communiquer les faits qui précèdent au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, et nous faire parvenir au plutôt la réponse que vous en aurez reçue.

Veuillez, &c.

Inclosure in No. 388.

Note addressed by Reshid Pasha to the Representatives of England, France, Austria, and Prussia.

18 *Shaban*, 1269. (26 *Mai*, 1853.)

LA question des Lieux Saints, qui formait un des objets de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de Russie, a été résolue à la satisfaction des deux Parties.

Quant aux propositions d'une portée extraordinaire, faites par le Prince au sujet des privilèges de la religion et du clergé Grecs, il est de l'honneur du Gouvernement Impérial de préserver de toute atteinte tant à présent qu'à l'avenir les privilèges religieux et les droits et immunités accordés aux sujets Grecs de l'Empire Ottoman, à leur clergé, à leurs églises, à leurs monastères, par les illustres ancêtres de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, et confirmés par Sa Majesté elle-même; et de même qu'il n'existe aucune intention ni aucune pensée de porter atteinte à ces privilèges, de même il n'y a aucun doute sur les intentions amicales et sincères de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie envers l'Empire Ottomane.

Toutefois, comme il est évident que si un Gouvernement prenait vis-à-vis d'un Gouvernement étranger, soit par Séned sous forme de Convention, soit par note ou déclaration, un engagement qui aurait pour objet les droits, immunités, et privilèges accordés à une communauté religieuse constituant une partie considérable de ses sujets, lors même que ces privilèges seraient considérés sous le

point de vue purement religieux et clérical, un tel engagement porterait atteinte au droit d'indépendance et à l'autorité du Gouvernement qui le subirait; et comme de plus il est facile de démontrer qu'il n'y a aucune analogie entre une question de cette nature et quelques concessions stipulées dans les temps anciens, la Sublime Porte, en exposant d'une part au Prince Menchikoff le véritable état de choses dans un langage plein de sincérité et de loyauté, a témoigné, d'autre part, les meilleures dispositions pour donner des assurances propres à dissiper les doutes élevés au sujet des privilèges de la religion professée par Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie. Malheureusement aucune entente n'a pu s'établir entre les deux Parties à cet égard; et le Gouvernement Impérial regrette infiniment que le Prince Menchikoff en soit venu au point de rompre les relations diplomatiques et de quitter le pays.

Loin d'être animé d'un sentiment hostile envers le Cabinet du Russie, le Gouvernement Impérial ne désire, au contraire, rien si ardemment que de voir reprises les relations diplomatiques, et consolidés, et raffermis plus que jamais les rapports d'amitié au maintien desquels il attache le plus haut prix; et il aime à se flatter que l'Empereur de Russie, conformément à ses sentiments de justice et de loyauté, ne voudra pas sans motif ouvrir les portes de la guerre, et qu'il n'agira pas en opposition avec la politique invariablement suivie par la Cour de Russie, et reconnue de tout le monde, ni avec les assurances positives qu'il a données aux Cabinets des Grandes Puissances de l'Europe.

Cependant comme l'interruption des relations diplomatiques et le départ de l'Ambassadeur se sont accomplis sans que dans de semblables circonstances le Gouvernement Impérial ait reçu des assurances que la guerre ne s'en suivra pas, tandis que des armements considérables se font, par terre et par mer, dans le voisinage de l'Empire Ottoman, le Gouvernement Impérial, quoique éloigné de toute idée hostile, se voit dans la nécessité d'ordonner certains armements comme moyens de précaution et de conservation. Aussi a-t-il décidé de prendre des mesures pour mettre à partir de ce jour son armée sur le pied de guerre et ses forteresses en état de défense.

Dans la conviction que les Grandes Puissances signataires du Traité de 1841 rendront justice dans les circonstances actuelles au Gouvernement Impérial, le Soussigné, chargé par ordre de Sa Majesté Impérial le Sultan de vous communiquer par la présente ce qui précède, saisit, &c.

No. 389.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 8.)

(No. 228.)

Vienna, June 4, 1853.

My Lord,

AS Count Dimitri Nesselrode in passing through Vienna on his route from Constantinople to London had represented very generally and particularly to Count Buol, that the consent of the Turkish Government to the mitigated demands of Prince Menchikoff had been prevented by the interference of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I thought it advisable, towards counteracting any impression which might be produced, to place in the hands of Count Buol for his perusal, the despatch of Lord Stratford addressed to Sir H. Seymour, and dated the 23rd ultimo, in which His Lordship's conduct is so clearly and so ably described.

Count Buol stated his concurrence with the sentiments expressed in this despatch, and that he considered the proceedings of Lord Stratford as he had described them, and as M. de Ktezl had also represented them, as entirely satisfactory.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 390.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 10.)

(No. 416. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 9, 1853.

THE Prussian Minister has informed me confidentially that he has communicated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys a despatch from his Government, dated the 3rd instant, explanatory of the attitude which Prussia will take in regard to the Eastern question. As a similar despatch will no doubt have been communicated to your Lordship by M. von Bunsen, and as Lord Bloomfield has written amply to your Lordship upon the same subject, I should not think it necessary to allude to it, were it not that M. Drouyn de Lhuys, in expressing the general satisfaction at the tone of the despatch, takes exception to the expression "free from all engagement," of which the Prussian despatch makes use when speaking of the expectant attitude which the Prussian Cabinet has assumed.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed to Count Hatzfeldt, that he could not admit that any of the Great Powers who signed the Treaty of 1840 is free from all engagement, or at liberty to act on the present occasion as she may think that her own interests dictate. At the same time he does not wish to press for any immediate expression of opinion, so long as there is any chance of an amicable arrangement of the differences which exist between Russia and Turkey. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has addressed a despatch in the same sense, but in still stronger terms, to M. de Bourqueney at Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 391.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 11.)

(No. 417.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 10, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I have placed in M. Drouyn de Lhuys' hands, as desired by your despatch No. 211, a copy of that despatch, as also copies of your Lordship's despatch No. 55 of the 31st of May to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and of your letter to the Lords of the Admiralty dated June 2nd, 1853.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 392.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 12.)

(No. 265. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 4, 1853.

THE French Envoy has been good enough to read to me a despatch and some private letters which he has addressed to his Government. The sum of the opinions expressed by General Castelbajac upon the important crisis which has taken place in the affairs of Turkey is as follows:

That the Russian Cabinet (and this is indeed palpable) have acted with great duplicity in the affair, and that their proceedings have been as injudicious as they have been insincere, the great moral position hitherto occupied by the Emperor being irretrievably compromised by conduct at variance at once with the forbearance which ought to be exercised towards an independent Sovereign, and with the good faith to be observed with allies and friends.

That the Turkish Government were right in rejecting the Treaty or Sened, but that it is to be regretted that they did not settle the business by an acceptance of the note proposed by Prince Menchikoff, such a conclusion being, in General Castelbajac's opinion, an impotent one for Russia to obtain after such

a demonstration of force, and after so much diplomatic bargaining with the Porte. That the Emperor being in point of fact the protector of the Greek religion, little advantage would accrue to His Majesty by an official recognition of his right to act in that capacity; that right, too, being acquired under threats of violence and admitted by a simple note.

That the Emperor and his Government are aware that the position which they have made for themselves is disadvantageous, and that they are desirous that the interposition of some foreign country, probably that of England, should afford them the means of extrication. That the Emperor would be reluctant to push matters to the last extremity, but still that if he did so, a better position as regards the Russians and the Greeks would be made than that which Russia would possess by a settlement of the question by an acceptance, however tardy, of Prince Menchikoff's note. In the employment of violent measures against Turkey, General Castelbajac expresses his belief that the Emperor would carry with him the sympathy of the great mass of his people.

I collect from General Castelbajac's correspondence and conversation that he considers the pending question as one more interesting to England than to France; and he observes with truth that more bad faith has been exhibited towards the other Powers than to France, as with regard to her there have been fewer professions of acting with perfect openness.

The French Minister remarked to me upon the little attentions (les petites cajoleries) already shown him by some of the Emperor's attendants, and expressed his contempt for the small artifices of a Court which thus endeavoured to recommend itself to different Foreign Missions.

The Austrian Legation appears to have been as much taken by surprise by the pretentions of Prince Menchikoff as have been General Castelbajac and myself.

Baron Lebzeltern acquaints me that, in consequence of apprehensions which had been felt at the Austrian Mission at Constantinople, he had been instructed to wait upon the Chancellor and to request some information as to the demands which were about to be made upon the Porte. In reply to his inquiries the Chancellor acquainted Baron Lebzeltern, a fortnight or three weeks ago, that the Russian demands were of a very simple nature. That they went only to the point of obtaining a solemn confirmation of the rights already in the possession of Russia.

It would appear that, however at variance with previous declarations, and however unfounded in justice the objects now averred by Russia may be, there exists a full intention of supporting them with energy. I know upon certain grounds that the greatest activity is observed at the Etat Major, and that the heads of the departments are engaged day and night at their offices.

It is with pain I add that the late conduct of the Emperor's Government has taught me not only that no confidence is to be placed in Russian assurances, but that words are to be taken in a sense the very opposite of that which use assigns to them.

When then I am told that in the event of a rupture with Turkey the Emperor's first military operation will be to occupy the Principalities, it may possibly be that this announcement covers the purpose of making a sudden descent upon the very heart of the Sultan's dominions; upon the bad faith which begets this mistrust, I will not enlarge.

I will only remark that if 1848 exhibited the excesses of democratic movements, the present year has already afforded some remarkable instances of the waywardness and want of honesty of autocratic proceedings.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since my despatch was written I learn from Count Henckel that like myself he had been informed by the Chancellor that Russia sought nothing from the Porte but confirmation of old rights. Like me he is still assured by his Excellency that this purpose has never varied, and that Prince Menchikoff's note demands nothing but the sanction of rights possessed by Russia in virtue of the Treaty of Kainardji

G. H. S.

No. 393.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 266. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 4, 1853.*

IN the course of a conversation which I held yesterday with Count Nesselrode, I remarked to him that I found myself in the painful position of having given to Her Majesty's Government very incorrect information as to the object of the Russian Embassy to Constantinople.

The Chancellor hoped that I would not deny that the demands made by Prince Menchikoff, and modified as they had been at last, were extremely moderate. That, I observed, was a point upon which I was not called upon to express an opinion. I would only keep in sight the fact of the object being perfectly different from that which had been stated to me to be sought by the Emperor's Cabinet.

In a later part of the conversation, after dwelling upon the most unacceptable part which had been assigned to myself in the late transaction, I observed to Count Nesselrode that whatever objections were entertained by Her Majesty's Government to the concessions which it was attempted to extort from the Porte, it could not be doubted that they were much increased by the concealment which had been practised; that many difficulties would have been avoided by a little more frankness as to intentions.

It is indeed remarkable that whereas the Russian Government professed constantly to have the double intention of not asking for any extension of rights, but of placing old ones under the sanction of an international Act of at least the same value as that possessed by the Capitulations with France, both points are now seen to be lost sight of; privileges of which very slight mention is made in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople are to be secured to the Crown of Russia, and (which is a new feature in diplomacy) the privileges supposed to be derived from existing Treaties are to receive the sanction of an official note.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 394.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 267.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 4, 1853.*

COUNT NESSELRODE when I waited upon him yesterday invited me to read the letter which he addressed on the $\frac{19}{31}$ ultimo to Reshid Pasha recommending him to reconsider the rejection of Prince Menchikoff's note, together with the important despatch addressed to Baron Brunnow giving an explanation of the Emperor's views and intentions with regard to Turkey.

As these documents will be both communicated to your Lordship it is not necessary that I should trouble you with any particulars concerning them. The most important point which I observe in the despatch is the specific announcement of the Emperor's intention, not indeed of making war upon Turkey, but of occupying and holding the Principalities, should the Porte fail of accepting the Russian "projet de note."

As regards the justification of the course lately pursued by the Imperial Government, it is attempted by confounding two questions which were perfectly distinct—the confirmation by an international Act of the settlement of the Greek and Latin disputes at Jerusalem, and the extension of the rights thus sanctioned to such a degree as to secure to the Emperor a right of protectorate.

I learned from Count Nesselrode that his letter to Reshid Pasha will be delivered by M. Balabine, the First Secretary of the Russian Legation, who, as well as M. Pisani, the head of the Commercial Chancellerie, has been left at Pera. I was further acquainted by his Excellency that whether the Russian terms are

finally accepted or rejected by the Porte, equally Prince Menchikoff will not return to Constantinople.

It had been my intention to address to Count Nesselrode the note of inquiry of which I have the honour to inclose a copy. I have, however, kept it back on reading in the despatch to Baron Brunnow the information afforded as to the Treaties by which, according to the Russian Government, the Emperor is already invested with the right of protecting the Greeks.

The Treaties to which (as appears to me most incorrectly) appeal is made are those of Kainardji and Adrianople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 394.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

St. Petersburgh, June 3, 1853.

M. le Comte,

THE apparent discordance between the assurances and explanations with regard to the objects of Prince Menchikoff's mission which it has been my duty to transmit to Her Majesty's Government, and the demands which have actually been made by the Prince upon the Porte, induces me to request that your Excellency will be pleased to afford me the means of clearing up the doubts which present themselves to my mind.

Your Excellency was good enough to inform me, upon various occasions, that the object sought by negotiation at Constantinople was a confirmation of the rights possessed by His Majesty the Emperor, and that no extension of these rights would be required of the Sultan.

I have subsequently learned from your Excellency that this purpose has been adhered to and not exceeded; in other words, that the "projet de note" presented for the acceptance of the Porte by Prince Menchikoff, although requiring what is, in point of fact, a right of protectorate of the Greek subjects of the Sultan in matters of religion in favour of the Crown of Russia, demands only a fresh recognition of a right already possessed by His Imperial Majesty in virtue of Treaty.

Being then unable to reconcile these statements with the imperfect knowledge which I possess of the international engagements which at present exist between the Imperial Government and the Ottoman Porte, I venture to request your Excellency to resolve the doubts to which I have referred, by acquainting me what is the Convention, and what the Articles of such Convention, the confirmation of which has been required of the Sultan's Government by the "projet de note" lately presented by the Imperial Ambassador Extraordinary.

I have the less hesitation in making the foregoing inquiry of your Excellency, my desire of doing so for the information of Her Majesty's Government having, as your Excellency has been made aware, received the highest sanction.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 395.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, May 27, 1853.

THE sudden departure of a Turkish messenger for Vienna enables me to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, the copy of a translated note addressed to me by Reshid Pasha, in explanation of the present state of affairs between Russia and the Porte.

Your Lordship will observe how earnestly the Turkish Government deprecates war, and also what friendly and respectful sentiments it expresses, though in no unbecoming language, towards the Court of St. Petersburgh. It announces, at the same time, the necessity in which it is placed, by the military demonstrations in its neighbourhood, of preparing to resist any act of aggression to which, by possibility, the Emperor of Russia may resort.

A similar note is addressed to the Representatives of Austria, France, and Prussia.

Reshid Pasha sent to inform me yesterday that he intended to instruct the Sultan's Ambassadors at those Courts to express a hope that they would give the Porte their moral, and if necessary, their material assistance at the present alarming juncture. He wished to know whether I saw any objection to his making such a communication, and I replied that it was for the Porte to consider the necessities of its own position, and that I should not feel myself justified in discouraging a precautionary appeal suggested by its sense of them.

I inclose the latest intelligence which has reached me from the Black Sea.

One of my colleagues has just apprised me of an order given to the Russian Chancery to prepare for following the Legation. It is added that some of the principal Russian merchants are included in the notice.

M. Pisani, who saw Reshid Pasha this morning, assures me that he never saw His Highness exhibit such unvarying firmness. I mention this circumstance because it affords a striking proof of the Porte's conviction that the demands of Russia left no alternative but that of refusal with all its risks.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 395.

Reshid Pasha to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Traduction.) 18 *Shaban*, 1269. (26 *Mai*, 1853.)

LA question des Lieux Saints qui faisait partie des affaires dont son Excellence le Prince Menchikoff, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de la Cour de Russie, était chargé, a reçu une solution propre à satisfaire toutes les parties.

Mais les propositions mises en avant par le Prince relativement aux privilèges de la religion Grecque et des prêtres Grecs, ne sont pas à comparer à d'autres questions. La Sublime Porte maintient à présent, et elle maintiendra à l'avenir aussi, car il y va de son honneur, les privilèges religieux, les droits, et les immunités qui ont été donnés sous les règnes des augustes ancêtres de Sa Majesté le Sultan, aux prêtres de la nation Grecque qui sont des sujets de la Sublime Porte, à leurs églises, et à leurs couvents: droits et immunités que Sa Hautesse a confirmés. La Sublime Porte n'a pas la moindre intention qui soit en opposition avec ces droits et ces privilèges tels qu'ils existent; et de l'autre côté aussi, elle ne révoque, en aucune manière, en doute les intentions amicales et loyales de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie envers l'Empire Ottoman.

Le Gouvernement qui consacrerait par un Sénéd en forme de Traité avec une autre Puissance, ou par une note ou publication ayant la même force, les droits, les privilèges, et les immunités d'une nombreuse congrégation de prêtres, ses propres sujets, fût-il seulement en ce qui concerne la religion et les églises, et qui se trouverait ainsi avoir contracté un engagement, porterait atteinte à ses droits comme Gouvernement indépendant, et aux bases de son autorité. Et comme il est bien facile de prouver qu'une pareille mesure ne souffre aucun parallèle avec quelques concessions faites dans les anciens temps par des Traités, la Sublime Porte a représenté au Prince Menchikoff toutes ces vérités dans un langage plein de loyauté et de sincérité, et elle a montré en même temps la plus grande disposition à donner des assurances suffisantes pour dissiper les doutes qui se sont élevés et qui ont été mis en avant relativement aux privilèges de toutes sortes de la religion que Sa Majesté l'Empereur professe.

Mais à quoi bon; les deux parties n'ont pas pu parvenir à s'entendre, et le Prince est allé jusqu'à rompre les relations diplomatiques et à mettre fin à son Ambassade, aux grands regrets de la Sublime Porte.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Hautesse n'a aucune mauvaise intention contre l'illustre Gouvernement de Russie; loin de là, il ne désire rien tant que de voir les liens de l'amitié à laquelle il attache le plus grand prix, acquérir plus de force encore par la reprise des relations diplomatiques, et il espère, en même temps, que Sa Majesté l'Empereur, doué comme il est d'un caractère noble et

plein d'équité, ne voudra pas entrer en guerre sans motif, ni agir d'une manière qui ne serait pas en harmonie avec les assurances positives qu'ils a données aux grandes Puissances de l'Europe, ni avec les principes que tout le monde lui connait.

Cependant comme le Prince Menchikoff a rompu les relations diplomatiques et a mis fin à l'Ambassade; que sur ces entrefaites on ne donne à la Sublime Porte aucune espèce d'assurance qu'il n'y aura point de guerre; et que de grands preparatifs de guerre par mer et par terre se font de la part de la Russie dans des endroits si près des Etats Ottomans, la Sublime Porte de son côté aussi, sans avoir la moindre intention hostile, mais uniquement par mesure de précaution, et purement pour se tenir sur la défensive, se voit dans la nécessité de faire quelques préparatifs. En conséquence il a été décidé que dès aujourd'hui elle commencera à prendre des dispositions pour les troupes et pour la fortification du pays, et elle espère que les Hautes Puissances qui ont signé le Traité conclu l'année de l'ère Chrétienne 1841, lui donneront raison en cela; et c'est ce que j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence par ordre de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Je saisis, &c.
(L.S.) MUSTAPHA RESHID.

Inclosure 2 in No. 395.

Private Letter addressed to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(Extract.) *Constantinople, May* 27, 1851.

A SHIPMASTER just arrived to-day, tells me that he saw twenty floating batteries, mounting ten guns each, towed into the Danube by Russian steamers, on Friday last.

No. 396.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 67.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, May* 27, 1853.

I THINK it my duty to record that the note verbale presented to the Porte by Prince Menchikoff on the $\frac{1}{13}$th of March, and inclosed with Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the $\frac{9}{21}$ ultimo, was never communicated to this Embassy. I have questioned M. Pisani on the subject, and he assures me that Rifaat Pasha would never be brought to admit its existence. That Minister, who is not remarkable for firmness, was probably restrained from disclosing it by the Russian Ambassador's intimidating language.

Your Lordship has too much discernment not to have noticed the deceptive manner in which the intended demand of a guarantee is vaguely associated with the Greeks at large, while limited in appearance to the Sanctuaries in Palestine. Jacob's voice and Esau's hand were never more skilfully combined.

The Turkish Ministers are more apprehensive of a *coup de main* than of general hostilities. They are consequently increasing their preparations for the the defence of the Bosphorus, and I believe it is their intention to make, if possible, a vigorous resistance. In whatever manner the present alarm may terminate, they have much to endure, and the expense of preparation alone will prove a serious burthen, to say nothing of the hands which will be withdrawn from the early harvest of this country, and the danger of insurrection among the Greek inhabitants of Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 397.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 220.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June* 8, 1853.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 215 and 217, of the 3rd and 5th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith, copies of a circular which has been sent to the Prussian Missions, transmitting for their information and guidance an instruction which had been addressed to M. de Wildenbruch at Constantinople.

These documents shew the independent attitude which the Prussian Government desires to take upon the subject of complications which may arise in the East.

It may be right that I should observe to your Lordship that, in addition to this circular, a despatch has been also addressed to Count Henckel in the sense which I have already reported, and that it is further intended to forward a somewhat stronger instruction this week to the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 1 in No. 397.

Circular addressed to the Prussian Missions.

Monsieur, *Berlin, ce 4 Juin*, 1853.

PAR le départ du Prince Menchikoff de Constantinople, les affaires d'Orient viennent d'entrer, on ne saurait se le dissimuler, dans une phase nouvelle et plus sérieuse. Nous ne la considérons toutefois pas comme devant conduire à des complications guerrières. La dépêche ci-jointe en copie que j'ai adressée hier à l'Envoyé du Roi près la Sublime Porte, vous informera, Monsieur, de l'attitude que, d'ordre de Sa Majesté, son Cabinet compte prendre dans cette question, et qui nous conserve une entière liberté d'action en face du développement ultérieur des événements.

Recevez, &c.

Inclosure 2 in No. 397.

Baron Manteuffel to M. de Wildenbruch.

Monsieur, *Berlin, le* 3 *Juin*, 1853.

VOS rapports au Roi, y compris celui du 22 Mai, nous sont exactement parvenus. Tout ce que vous nous avez mandé sur les négociations entre la Sublime Porte et le Prince Menchikoff, a, comme vous le pensez bien, fixé au plus haut dégré l'intérêt de notre Auguste Maître et de son Cabinet. Sa Majesté rend une pleine justice au zèle consciencieux avec lequel vous nous avez transmis l'historique de toutes les phases par lesquelles ces importantes négociations ont passé. Nous ne nous sommes pas dissimulé la gravité de la situation. Mais confiant dans les assurances réitérées du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, d'après lesquelles il nous était impossible de voir dans la mission du Prince Menchikoff des germes de rupture, nous avons conservé jusqu'au dernier moment l'espoir qu'elle amènerait un resultat satisfaisant. Cet espoir nous paraissait d'autant plus fondé que nous ne pouvions pas douter des sincères efforts de la Porte d'aller aussi loin que possible au-devant des demandes que l'Ambassadeur de Russie croyait devoir formuler. Le départ de celui-ci est donc un fait doublement grave et doublement regrettable. Mais quelque vif qu'eût été notre désir de voir s'établir une entente entre le Prince Menchikoff et Reshid Pasha, nous ne pouvons que pleinement approuver l'attitude que, comme MM. vos collègues d'Autriche, de France, et d'Angleterre, vous avez prise à l'égard de la dernière

démarché du Ministère Ottoman. La Sublime Porte connait l'intérêt sincère et soutenu que le Roi notre Auguste Maître voue aux destinées de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle sait que nous restons fidèles à la conviction que ces destinées sont inséparables du système politique de l'Europe, tel que les Traités l'ont consacré. Nous persistons à croire que cette conviction continue à être celle de toutes les Puissances Européenes. Et nous avons particulièrement trop de confiance dans la sagesse et la modération de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour considérer l'interruption formelle des relations diplomatiques entre les deux Empires comme devant conduire à des complications plus graves. Nous attendons donc l'œil ouvert, mais calmes, et libres de tout engagement, le développement ultérieur des événements, pour en faire dépendre l'attitude qu'ils nous assigneront dans l'intérêt de la sainteté des Traités et du repos de l'Europe.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 398.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 223. Most Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853.*

AT an interview which I have just had with Baron Manteuffel, he allowed me to bring home for my perusal the last communications which have been made to him by the Russian Minister upon Eastern affairs. He did not, however, authorize me to take a copy of the despatch of the $\frac{23 \text{ May}}{4 \text{ June}}$, addressed by Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg, and considered that it ought not to be known to Her Majesty's Government on account of the unjustifiable allusions to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's conduct at Constantinople which it contains; but I have nevertheless thought it advisable to do so, and inclose one herewith for your Lordship's confidential information.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure in No. 398.

Count Nesselrode to Baron Budberg.

M. le Baron, *St. Pétersbourg, le 23 Mai, 1853.*

LE départ du Prince Menchikoff de Constantinople, la rupture officielle de nos relations officielles avec la Porte, et les circonstances qui l'ont accompagnée, seront parvenus sans doute à la connaissance du Cabinet de Berlin. Ce déplorable dénouement de plus de trois mois de négociations, dû moins encore à l'aveuglement de la Porte elle-même qu'à l'influence pernicieuse des conseils méfians et passionnés de l'Ambassadeur Britannique, vient de mettre l'Empereur dans la nécessité d'adopter enfin des mesures qu'il depend toutefois du Gouvernement Turc de prévenir s'il se décide à signer dans le délai de huit jours, que notre Auguste Maître lui accorde, le projet de note qu'à son départ notre Ambassadeur a laissé entre ses mains. Pressé par le temps, et désirant transmettre sur ce grave objet au Gouvernement Prussien des renseignements aussi complets que possible, je ne puis mieux faire, M. le Baron, que de porter par votre entremise à sa connaissance les deux dépêches que je viens d'adresser tant à Londres qu'à Paris avec les annexes qu'elles contiennent. Parmi les dernières figure le projet de note obligatoire dont l'adoption par la Porte Ottomane forme désormais à elle seule le nœud Gordien de la question. Nous aimons à croire que le Cabinet Prussien en voumt aux termes et à la forme de cette pièce un examen consciencieux et impartial, reconnaîtra qu'il était difficile après tant d'attente et de concessions infructueuses de pousser plus loin que ne le fait l'Empereur la condescendance et la modération, et que cette note que Lord Redcliffe a déclaré d'avance inacceptable, ne renferme absolument rien qui soit contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, rien dont on puisse inférer avec la moindre apparence de raison, qu'elle sera pour nous le prétexte d'une intervention continuelle dans les

affaires intérieures du Gouvernement Ottoman. L'Empereur se flatte que telle sera l'opinion qu'en emettra le Roi tant en France qu'en Angleterre, et que Sa Majesté Prussienne voudra bien y employer son influence pour prévenir de la part des deux Puissances maritimes toute résolution hâtive qui, en nous plaçant dans une situation où notre honneur nous défendrait de reculer, amènerait pour la Turquie, dont nous voulons maintenir l'existence, pour l'Europe que nous voulons sauver de la guerre et de l'anarchie, de conséquences dont il est impossible dès à présent de mesurer toute l'étendue.

(Signé) NESSELRODE.

No. 399.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon. -(Received June 12.)

(No. 224.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853.*

WITH reference to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch No. 67, of the 27th ultimo, which has reached me under flying seal from Vienna, in which Her Majesty's Ambassador states that Prince Menchikoff's note verbale of the $\frac{7\text{th}}{19\text{th}}$ March to Rifaat Pasha had never been communicated to him by the Porte, and that he was ignorant of the existence of this document until a copy was forwarded to him by your Lordship, I have the honour to state that I have heard to-day, from what I believe to be a good source, that this note is unknown to the Prussian Government. It has neither been communicated to them from St. Petersburgh nor from Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 400.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 225. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853*

AFTER a rapid perusal of the various despatches on Eastern affairs which I received from your Lordship to-day, I called on Baron Manteuffel, and I am happy in being able to report that I found his Excellency's opinions the same as I have already had the honour to describe them; and instead of their having been unfavourably influenced by communications made to him a few days ago by the Russian Minister, his Excellency is, I should rather say, confirmed in his original impressions as to the late proceedings of the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

He told me that the Russian Government had sent, for his information, copies of despatches which had been addressed to Baron Brunnow on the $\frac{29 \text{ May}}{11 \text{ June}}$, and to M. de Kisseleff on the $\frac{23 \text{ May}}{4 \text{ June}}$, together with copies of various communications which had passed between Prince Menchikoff and the Turkish Government, and had invited him to lay these documents before the King, and move His Prussian Majesty to employ his influence in England and France, to prevent those countries from taking any hasty steps which, by placing Russia in a position from which her honour would not allow her to retire, must entail the most disastrous consequences not only on Turkey but on Europe.

Baron Manteuffel told me that his first impression was to reply to this communication, that as the Russian Government had, on the 31st of May, sent an ultimatum to the Porte, and allowed eight days for its acceptance or rejection, and had declared its intention of occupying the Principalities if this peremptory demand were refused, it was a mere delusion to write in the sense requested to London and Paris; but that the King disapproved of this course, saying that he considered his position in the matter to be that of peacemaker, and therefore he had decided that a communication should be addressed to Chevalier Bunsen and Count Hatzfeldt in this sense.

His Excellency read me the draft of this paper, which will be submitted to the King to-morrow. It is certainly conceived in a spirit of conciliation, the chief object being to preserve for Prussia her entire independence of action now and hereafter in this question. There is no attempt at recrimination, no endeavour to array a number of arguments to prove that Russia is in the wrong, but the tone of this document is nevertheless calculated to convey dissatisfaction with her late proceedings.

Baron Manteuffel said that he should send this paper to St. Petersburgh, as an answer to the communication from that Government.

I then asked his Excellency what he intended saying upon the unjustifiable accusation brought by the Russian Government against Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. He replied that he should state that no mention whatever of these proceedings had been reported by M. de Wildenbruch, and that consequently he was unable to believe the exactness of the report which had reached St. Petersburgh as to that Ambassador having urged the Porte to reject the last note prepared by Prince Menchikoff, and he added that he had already said as much to Baron Budberg.

Baron Manteuffel expects to be able to send off his communication to Chevalier Bunsen to-morrow night.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 401.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 226.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853.*

I ASKED Baron Manteuffel to-day if he had received any answer to his late inquiries as to the policy which the Austrian Government were about to pursue in the present crisis of Eastern affairs.

His Excellency replied that they were as yet unwilling to pronounce any opinion, and were waiting for further news from St. Petersburgh; but he had been assured that Count Buol had distinctly declared that he would not be a party to any conference of the Four Powers to the exclusion of Russia.

Baron Manteuffel told me that the health of Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, is so bad, that he is obliged to ask for leave of absence.

Count Arnim is to be temporarily replaced by Baron Canitz, as Chargé d'Affaires.

I have, &c
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 402.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 227.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, his Excellency said that his apprehensions increased hourly as to the probability of a Russian occupation of the Danubian Principalities; and he read to me some portions of a despatch which he had received from Bucharest stating that different bridges for the passage of the Pruth were nearly ready. He added that everything in those countries announced the approach of the Russian army; that no preparations whatever for defence appear to have been taken by the Turkish Government, and that the greatest excitement prevailed amongst the population of the Principalities and in Bulgaria in favour of Russia.

On the other hand, his Excellency said that he had received reports from St. Petersburgh of the opinions of the military authorities there, and that they

were all united in deprecating the commencement of a war at this season, because it would be impossible for troops to exist in Turkey during the hot months without greater preparations than had been made for them.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 403.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 228.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 10, 1853.*

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 96, of the 7th instant, I have expressed to Baron Manteuffel the sincere satisfaction which had been felt by Her Majesty's Government on learning his Excellency's views of the conduct of Russia in Eastern affairs; and I read to his Excellency the latter part of your Lordship's abovementioned despatch, and endeavoured to impress most strongly on him that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is a pacific policy, and that they earnestly hope that the question may still be settled by negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 404.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 13.)

(No. 423. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, June 12, 1853.*

M. DE KISSELEFF had an interview with M. Drouyn de Lhuys the day before yesterday, and communicated to him various papers sent for that purpose from St. Petersburgh, relating to the negotiations of Prince Menchikoff at Constantinople, and to his departure from thence; among others a memorandum which seems, from the description of it given to me, to be a summary of the arguments contained in a despatch addressed by Count Nesselrode to M. de Brunnow on the 1st instant, and communicated by the latter to your Lordship.

In giving me this information, confidentially as he said, M. Drouyn de Lhuys did not add, what he appears to have stated to some of my colleagues, that the Russian Government asked for the support of the French Ambassador at Constantinople to obtain of the Porte the satisfaction which Prince Menchikoff had in vain demanded. He rather gave me to understand that he had inquired of M. de Kisseleff his object in making this communication; but be this as it may, M. Drouyn de Lhuys seems not to have varied much in the account which he has given to me and to my colleagues, of the language which he held to M. de Kisseleff on this occasion, or, to use his own expression, of the ground on which he has placed himself.

The communication, M. Drouyn de Lhuys observed, had been made either as a mere matter of form, or else with the view of asking the opinion and enlisting the sympathies of the French Government on the side of Russia. If made as a matter of form, it required no expression of opinion on the part of the French Government. If, on the contrary, it was made with an object in view, it proved that the independence or integrity of the Turkish dominions was, in the opinion of one or other of the two parties, in question, for on this ground alone could the interference of France be called for: but this was a matter which France was not competent to decide alone; it must be referred to all the Powers interested in the preservation of the independent existence of the Ottoman Empire.

The above is the substance of what M. Drouyn de Lhuys stated to me as the summary of his conversation with M. de Kisseleff, but I learn from other sources that the result of the conversation, although it commenced somewhat bitterly, is considered satisfactory by both parties:—that M. de Kisseleff has acquired the conviction that the French Government had no wish to push matters to extremities, and that M. Drouyn de Lhuys is under the impression that the

Russian Government is still anxious to find, and ready to avail itself of, any loophole that may be devised for a safe and honourable retreat of the Emperor of Russia from the false position in which he has placed himself.

I have not failed, on my part, in all my conversations with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and with those of his colleagues who have oftener access to the Emperor, to inculcate the duty which devolves upon the Great Powers of smoothing the way to a reconciliation between Russia and Turkey by all the honourable means at their disposal, a course which I feel no doubt your Lordship will approve. I have found the French Ministers in general ready to admit the necessity of so doing, though some among them, and especially M. Drouyn de Lhuys, appear to entertain the conviction that to arrange the present quarrel is but to put off the evil day, and that we shall, ere a very long period elapses, have to encounter Russia on the same ground, and probably under less favourable auspices, when she herself shall have chosen the moment and devised the cause of a fatal rupture with Turkey.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 405.

Circular Addressed to Her Majesty's Ministers abroad.

Foreign Office, June 13, 1853.

Sir,

THE rupture of the diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte has been the cause of great regret to Her Majesty's Government.

The repeated assurances of the Russian Government, given both to the Government of Her Majesty and to the French Government, that Prince Menchikoff's mission to Constantinople had reference solely to the Holy Places, had led Her Majesty's Government confidently to hope that the satisfactory arrangement of that long-pending question would have removed all grounds of difference between Russia and the Porte.

But, under the plea of confirming ancient Treaties, further demands were put forward by the Russian Ambassador, involving a protectorate of the Greek Church in Turkey, not only as regards the spiritual, but also the civil rights and immunities of its members.

Every concession which could be made was offered by the Turkish Government, who, throughout these trying negotiations, displayed a most moderate and conciliatory spirit; but it would have been impossible for them to have complied with these last demands without derogating from the sovereign rights of the Sultan, and virtually surrendering the independence of the Ottoman Empire; and Her Majesty's Government have, therefore, entirely approved the advice given by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Porte.

In these views and opinions there is a complete agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the French Government; and the English and French fleets, which have been ordered to approach the Dardanelles, will act in concert under the orders of the respective Ambassadors of the two countries.

In taking this step Her Majesty's Government are actuated solely by the desire to uphold the independence of the Turkish Empire—an independence which the Great Powers are deeply interested in upholding, and which has been acknowledged by them as necessary to the balance of power in Europe. And although Her Majesty's Government cannot conceal from themselves the grave character of these occurrences, yet the moderation which has hitherto distinguished the policy of the Emperor of Russia; the repeated declarations which His Imperial Majesty has made of his desire to respect and maintain the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire; and the interest which all Europe possesses in preventing the disturbance of peace; induce them still to hope that an amicable solution of these difficulties may be found.

You will take every proper opportunity of urging the Government to which you are accredited to use all the influence they possess in favour of moderate and pacific counsels.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 406.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 427. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June* 13, 1853.

M. DE LHUYS has read to me a confidential despatch addressed by him to Count Walewski, and intended for communication to your Lordship, giving a summary of the conversation which he held two days ago with M. de Kisseleff, and to which reference is made in my despatch No. 423 of yesterday's date. I observe that in this despatch M. de Lhuys states that the request for French assistance at Constantinople, in favour of the demands of Russia, came from M. Kisseleff, and not, as I informed your Lordship yesterday I had been led to believe, from St. Petersburgh.

In the course of the conversation which I had with M. de Lhuys, and which was in general a mere repetition of former conversations on the same subject, he said that France was quite willing to assist the Emperor of Russia to extricate himself with honour from the false position in which he had placed himself, and that he had stated as much to M. Kisseleff, adding that, in his opinion, nothing could be easier than to find means for so doing. One plan he indicated was that of consigning all the demands made by the Emperor in favour of Russian subjects to a Convention, and affirming all the rights of the Greek subjects of the Porte by a Firman, which might be rendered more solemn by a reference in it to previous Conventions which treat of the subjects between Russia and the Porte.

M. de Lhuys was much more moderate in his tone to-day than I have yet heard him when speaking on this subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 407.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 150.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 14, 1853.

ON the 12th instant I learnt from Count Colloredo, whom I had requested to call upon me, that he had heard nothing from his Government since the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople, and knew nothing of their opinions upon the present state of the Eastern question.

I expressed my regret at this, as the discussion which I desired to have with him upon the subject would be more useful if he had received instructions from Count Buol, but that I should nevertheless endeavour to put him in possession of the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government, with the object of their being transmitted by him to his Government.

In making this communication, I said that it was unnecessary to refer to the past, or to dwell upon the assurances we had received and the non-fulfilment of our expectations; but that we wished frankly to confer with Austria upon the present alarming state of things in the East, and the imminent danger to which the peace of Europe now appears to be exposed.

I added that the policy of England was essentially pacific, and that Her Majesty's Government, so far from entertaining any hostile feeling towards Russia, made every allowance for the difficulty in which the Emperor found himself placed, as the attention of Europe had been called to the vast military armaments that for the last four months have been in progress, to the protracted negotiations of Prince Menchikoff, to the demands which he had been instructed to make, and to the rejection of those demands by the Porte.

The position of the Emperor was therefore one of singular embarrassment, from which it would be difficult for him to recede with honour, or to advance without endangering the general peace which, in common with every other Sovereign of Europe, it was his duty and his interest to maintain; but that it

now behoved the allies of His Imperial Majesty, in the same spirit and with the same motives that led to the Treaties of 1840 and 1841, to use their best efforts and to exert all the influence they can command, to bring this question to a satisfactory solution.

The moderation of our proceedings, the confidence reposed by us in Russia, and the grounds upon which the British fleet remained stationary at Malta when the French fleet sailed from Toulon, were, I said, well known to the Austrian Government, and had been acknowledged by Count Buol, who would readily therefore believe that it was with extreme regret, and only upon learning the departure of Prince Menchikoff from Constantinople and the menacing circumstances which attended it, that authority was given to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, under certain contingencies, to send for the British fleet, and that Admiral Dundas was instructed to proceed towards the Dardanelles, where it would be joined by the French fleet. Her Majesty's Government hope, however, that nothing may occur to impose upon the English and French Ambassadors the necessity of using the power now confided to them, and that no act on the part of Russia may justify the Porte in suspending the Treaty of 1841. On the contrary, it is the earnest desire of Her Majesty's Government that, in the event of the Porte again refusing to comply with the demands of Russia, and of the Principalities being occupied by a Russian force, negotiation should again be resorted to, and the friendly intervention of other Powers should be accepted.

For this important object I assured Count Colloredo that Her Majesty's Government, and indeed every other Government, was disposed to rely upon the assistance of Austria. The personal friendship that existed between the two Emperors, the relations, political and geographical, that connect the two countries together, and the common danger in which both would be involved by war, gave to Austria a power of mediation not possessed by any other country, and, I must add, a greater interest also in that mediation being successful—for if the Russian army proceeded beyond the Principalities, and other provinces of Turkey were invaded, a general rising of the Christian population would probably ensue, not in favour of Russia, nor in support of the Sultan, but for their own independence; and it would be needless to add that such a revolt would not be long in extending itself to the Danubian Provinces of Austria; but it would be for the Austrian Government to judge of the effect it might produce in Hungary and in Italy, and the encouragement it must give to the promoters of disorder throughout Europe whom Austria has reason to fear, and who even now would appear to think the moment is at hand for the realization of their projects.

It was these considerations, I said, that rendered Her Majesty's Government most anxious to unite with Austria for an object so essential to the best interests of society, and to endeavour with her to discover some mode by which the just claims of Russia may be reconciled with the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Her Majesty's Government, I added, desire to know the views of, and will gladly receive any proposal from, the Austrian Government, and it was also their wish that Count Colloredo might receive instructions to take part in any conference that it may be considered useful to hold here, having for its object a solution of the existing difficulties in a manner both safe and honourable for Russia and for Turkey.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 408.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 106.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 14, 1853.*

I HAVE expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen, who called upon me yesterday at my request, the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at learning by your Lordship's despatches that their views upon the Eastern question were still in perfect harmony with those of the Prussian Government.

In answer to an inquiry from me, the Chevalier Bunsen said that he had received no instructions from Baron Manteuffel beyond those by which he was directed to communicate to me a few days ago certain despatches from the Prussian Minister at Constantinople.

I requested the Chevalier Bunsen to convey the thanks of Her Majesty's Government to Baron Manteuffel for this friendly communication, and to state that they saw with pleasure that Baron Wildenbruch shared the opinions and justified the conduct of Lord Stratford, who has been charged by Prince Menchikoff with having, through motives of hostility to Russia, induced, or rather compelled, the Turkish Government to reject the proposals of Russia, to which, but for the intervention of Lord Stratford, they would have been prepared to accede.

I then held to the Chevalier Bunsen precisely the same language as I used in a conversation, on the preceding day, with Count Colloredo, and which you will find recorded in my despatch No. 150 to Lord Westmorland, herewith inclosed. I impressed upon him that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was essentially pacific; that they desired that an honourable issue should be found for Russia from the embarrassing position in which she was now placed, and which was so full of danger to Europe; and that they did not think such an issue should be despaired of, if good faith and good will were manifested by Russia, and that she would really be contented with the *status quo* in Turkey, and the fulfilment of existing Treaties, without seeking to acquire more extended influence over the subjects of the Porte.

In furtherance of this object, I said that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to learn the opinions of the Prussian Government, and to cooperate with them in any course of proceeding that may be considered practicable. I also expressed to the Chevalier Bunsen the wish of Her Majesty's Government that he might have permission to attend any conference that may hereafter be held here, with a view of bringing the question again within the pale of negotiation, and solving it in a manner that should be satisfactory to the Emperor of Russia, without infringing on the sovereign rights of the Sultan.

Your Lordship is instructed to read this despatch and the inclosure to Baron Manteuffel.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 409.

Baron Manteuffel to the Chevalier Bunsen.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Chevalier Bunsen, June 14.)

Monsieur, *Berlin, ce 10 Juin, 1853.*

LE Cabinet de Londres a été directement informé, comme nous le sommes nous-mêmes, de l'attitude que la Cour de St. Pétersbourg croit devoir prendre vis-à-vis de la Turquie à la suite du départ du Prince Menchikoff de Constantinople. Dans une lettre que le Chancelier de l'Empire a écrite à Reshid Pasha, il invite la Porte à signer, dans huit jours, le dernier projet de note que l'Ambassadeur Russe lui avait présenté. Ce terme écoulé les troupes Russes recevront ordre d'occuper temporairement les Principautés. D'ordre du Roi, Monsieur, je m'abstiens de soumettre à un examen rétrospectif les différentes phases que la mission du Prince Menchikoff a parcourues, et qui ont abouti à une rupture profondément regrettable. Notre Auguste Maître est d'avis, et certes c'est une nouvelle preuve de la haute sagesse de Sa Majesté, que le moment est bien trop sérieux et la situation trop pressante pour établir une controverse ou pour se livrer à des récriminations. Mais les graves conjonctures en face desquelles se trouve placée l'Europe, imposent au Roi le devoir d'élever encore une fois cette voix à laquelle personne ne contestera l'impartialité et le désintéressement.

Nous ignorons quelle sera la réponse de Reshid Pasha à la lettre du Comte de Nesselrode. En considérant toutefois que l'objection principale de la Porte contre les demandes antérieures du Prince Menchikoff était leur forme bilatérale, nous admettons même que le Ministre Ottoman se décide à signer la note qui lui est actuellement soumise. Dans le cas contraire nous nous attendons à voir entrer les troupes Russes dans les Principautés Danubiennes. Est-ce à dire qu'alors

la guerre—une guerre générale, avec tous ses malheurs et toutes ses incalculables conséquences—éclatera ? Notre Auguste Maître ne peut pas se décider à le penser. La profondeur même de l'abîme dans lequel les désastres de la guerre jetteraient l'Europe, est pour Sa Majesté une garantie que la sagesse des Souverains et la modération des Cabinets reculeront devant l'immense responsabilité de l'y précipiter. La position exceptionelle que les Traités ont faite aux Principautés pourra contribuer à ôter à leur occupation temporaire un caractère incompatible avec la conservation de la paix, vers laquelle, certes, les efforts de tous les Cabinets sont dirigés. Mais l'on ne saurait se dissimuler, et nous sommes bien éloignés de le faire que, une fois entrés dans la voie des démonstrations militaires, les Cabinets ont besoin d'un redoublement de réserve et de circonspection, d'un surcroît de modération et de calme, pour ne pas provoquer, malgré eux souvent, les conséquences les plus désastreuses. Un ordre précipité, exécuté peut-être avec plus de précipitation encore, ne peut que trop facilement entraîner celui qui l'a donné à des conflits qu'il aurait voulu éviter, et qui sont hors de toute proportion avec le but qu'il s'était proposé d'atteindre.

Heureusement la portée de ces observations, dictée par la gravité du moment, n'a pu échapper à l'appréciation éclairée du Gouvernement Anglais, qui bien certainement partage le désir, je dirai même le besoin général, de la paix. Aussi notre Auguste Maître aime-t-il à espérer que même, si, comme nos nouvelles nous le font supposer, une flotte Anglaise se trouve, à l'heure qu'il est, très rapprochée de Constantinople, celui qui la commande répondra aux intentions de son Gouvernement, en conservant à ses mouvements le caractère de mesures non pas hostiles et provocatrices, mais destinées à seconder la phase ultérieure des négociations, et à hâter un arrangement qui mît fin, le plus tôt possible, à la déplorable tension qui préoccupe l'Europe.

J'invite votre Excellence à porter la présente dépêche à la connaissance du Gouvernement Britannique, qui, nous en avons la confiance, ne méconnaîtra pas les motifs de conciliation et de paix qui ont présidé à sa rédaction.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 410.

Count Buol to Count Colloredo.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Colloredo, June 14.)

Vienne, le 31 Mai, 1853.

M. le Comte,

LE Cabinet de Paris nous a, par l'organe de M. de Bourqueney, fait exprimer l'opinion qu'il serait opportun d'aviser dès à présent aux moyens d'établir entre les Grandes Puissances un centre d'entente pour prendre en considération la situation de l'Empire Ottoman et les "complications que pourrait engendrer la fâcheuse tournure qu'avait prise la négociation du Prince Menchikoff." M. l'Envoyé de France est allé jusqu'à émettre l'avis personnel qu'il serait utile de commencer par nous réunir ici en conférence avec les Représentants de Prusse, d'Angleterre, et de France, sauf à rallier ensuite la Russie aux délibérations dans lesquelles nous serions entrés sur la question en instance.

Votre Excellence a vu par ma dépêche du 24 du mois courant qu'en réponse à une ouverture du Gouvernement Français, nous nous étions déclaré disposés à prêter notre concours pour amener une entente entre les cinq Puissances dans le cas où la négociation du Prince Menchikoff aurait malheureusement, et contre toute attente, abouti à une complication grave menaçante pour l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman.

Cette éventualité cependant ne se présente pas à nos yeux comme si imminente. Aussi n'ai-je pas hésité à dire à M. de Bourqueney qu'une conférence à cinq et aucune autre n'était entrée dans nos prévisions, nous semblait prématurée dans la phase actuelle de l'affaire, et qu'en tout état de choses nous ne pourrions qu'abandonner au Gouvernement Français l'initiative des propositions à faire à cet égard au Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg.

Voici où en étaient les choses à Constantinople d'après les rapports qui nous sont parvenus de cette capitale jusqu'inclusivement le 22 du mois courant.

La Porte avait décliné de souscrire au Sénad proposé par le Prince Menchikoff, et dont votre Excellence trouvera ci-près le texte. Là-dessus l'Ambassadeur de Russie, après avoir rompu les relations diplomatiques avec la Porte, avait quitté la capitale de l'Empire Ottoman, où il avait laissé les employés de l'Ambassade avec ordre de le suivre dans deux jours.

Les deux rapports ci-joint en copie de M. de Klezl, rendent compte des circonstances qui ont accompagné le départ du Prince Menchikoff et des efforts que notre Chargé d'Affaires, de concert avec les Représentants d'Angleterre, de France, et de Prusse avait faits, malheureusement sans succès, pour empêcher la rupture.

Il nous semble qu'il faudra maintenant attendre l'effet que produiront ces nouvelles sur l'esprit de l'Empereur Nicolas; notre confiance dans la loyauté et dans les assurances pacifiques de ce Souverain n'est point ébranlée. La divergence d'opinion entre le Divan et l'Ambassadeur de Russie portait beaucoup plus sur la forme que sur le fond de la question. Nous ne sommes pas éloignés de penser que quant à la forme dans laquelle seraient données les garanties demandées à la Porte, le Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg offrira des facilités que le Prince Menchikoff ne s'est pas cru autorisé à accorder. Nous allons faire sans délai à la Cour de Russie des représentations tendantes à ce but. Nous ne renonçons pas à l'espoir qu'elles trouveront à St. Pétersbourg un accueil favorable, et que la crise actuelle aboutira à un dénouement satisfaisant, pourvu que la Porte continue à suivre une ligne de conduite prudente et modérée en s'abstenant de tout ce qui pourrait offrir à la Russie de justes motifs de plaintes et soulever sa susceptibilité.

C'est dans ce sens que je prie votre Excellence de s'énoncer envers Lord Clarendon en lui donnant confidentiellement lecture de cette dépêche.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) BUOL.

No. 411.

M. de Wildenbruch to the King of Prussia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 15.)

Sire, *Constantinople, 19 Mai*, 1853.

LES prévisions auxquelles j'ai osé donner expression à la fin du rapport que j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser à votre Majesté en date du 16 Mai (No. 42), prévisions qui étaient corroborées et justifiées par la teneur de la note Russe du 11 Mai, qui forme l'annexe de mon très humble rapport du 17 Mai (No. 43), ont été remplies.

La note par laquelle l'Ambassadeur de Russie annonce la rupture des négociations et son départ ainsi que celui de la mission, note que j'ai l'honneur d'annexer au présent rapport, en fait foi.

Cette note me semble apporter une nouvelle preuve à une conviction que j'ai osé prononcer, il y a longtemps, vis-à-vis du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de votre Majesté. J'émettais l'opinion que l'Ambassadeur de Russie n'avait pas été heureux dans le choix de mesures pour atteindre le but des négociations dont il était chargé.

Si, à son arrivée ici, arrivée qui frappait de terreur le Gouvernement Ottoman, l'Ambassadeur avait demandé bien plus qu'il ne demande actuellement et l'avait demandé péremptoirement et en fixant un court délai, s'il avait même demandé l'Eglise de Sainte Sophie pour les Grecs, comme le supposent certains journaux, quitte à rabattre de ses prétentions, si le Prince Menchikoff ne s'était dès le principe rendu impossible toute négociation, s'il ne s'était pas fermé toute porte de retraite qui cependant devait rester ouverte dans le cas que le Gouvernement Russe n'agissait pas avec le parti pris de rompre avec la Porte, supposition que les délais successifs, accordés par l'Ambassadeur de Russie, suffisent seuls à écarter; il est à présumer que la Turquie, effrayée, ébranlée de la chûte récente de Fuad Effendi, aurait accordé ce qu'elle refuse à l'heure qu'il est. L'on ne saurait nier, à ce que je pense, que le Gouvernement Ottoman n'ait fait preuve, dans le cours de cette négociation, de bonne volonté. Je crois pouvoir assurer votre Majesté que les conseils qui lui ont été donnés de toute part n'ont pas été de nature à la pousser à une résistance inconsidérée, que la Porte n'a pas reculé devant les sacrifices que la Russie lui demandait tant que

par ces sacrifices elle n'abdiquait pas des droits essentiels, inhérens à tout Gouvernement. La Porte n'a résisté que quand elle s'est vue poussée à bout, et elle a resisté quoique dans le moment l'Europe l'eut laissée seule—l'Europe qui d'ailleurs n'était et ne pouvait être informée du vrai état de la question puisqu'elle avait été induite en erreur par le silence de la Porte même, silence funeste qu'elle s'était laissé imposer par les menées de la Russie.

Le moment actuel apporte la preuve que le Gouvernement Russe n'a pas eu le parti pris de rompre avec la Porte, qu'il a été mal informé en supposant qu'il suffirait à l'apparition du Prince Menchikoff pour emporter la question. Mais ceux qui ont mal informé leurs Gouvernements (MM. Ozeroff et Balabine) n'ont peut-être pas tort de rejeter, comme je sais qu'ils le font, sur la lenteur et la mollesse de l'Ambassadeur la faute de la non-réussite.

Le fait est que l'Ambassadeur se trouve encore à Buyukdéré, qu'il ne part que demain, que la Légation tarde de vingt-quatre heures encore, et que l'Ambassadeur est au désespoir d'être dans la nécessité de partir.

Je viens dans ce moment de chez l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, que j'ai trouvé prêt à tout démarche qui pourrait rétablir une entente. J'avouerai très-humblement à votre Majesté que je crois peu à la possibilité d'un tel revirement quoique j'aie dit à Lord Redcliffe que, sans être muni d'aucune instruction par rapport à la position que le Gouvernement de votre Majesté compte garder vis-à-vis des complications qui ont surgi en Orient, je n'hésiterais point à me joindre à une démarche quelconque qui aurait pour but le rétablissement de rélations dont la rupture pourrait amener les résultats les plus graves. Ce résultat ne pourrait être atteint que par une modification des prétensions de l'Ambassade Russe. Cette modification lui a été proposée par la Porte; elle l'a été par la diplomatie Européenne; l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre s'accuse même d'être allé trop loin peut-être dans ses essais infructueux de la faire accepter par le Prince Menchikoff.

Est-il possible qu'après avoir écrit la note du $^{9}/_{5}$ Mai, une pareille modification ait lieu? J'ose en douter, Sire, car elle équivaudrait à un échec signalé, et le Gouvernement Russe aimera mieux sans doute désavouer son Ambassadeur après son retour, que de supporter cet échec complet à l'heure qu'il est.

L'historique de la dernière phase des négociations est dit en peu de mots. Le Sultan, pénétré de la gravité des circonstances, a appelé dans la journée du 17, les Ministres et tous les mouchirs présents à Constantinople pour entendre leur conseil.

L'avis presqu'unanime (30 voix sur 42) de l'assemblée à laquelle assistaient Riza, Moussa Savreti, le vieux Chosrew Pasha, Fuad Effendi, &c., a été pour la résistance, puisqu'une fin glorieuse était préférable à une substitution d'autorité qui en minant et sappant lentement le trône du Sultan devait mener sous peu à la fin pas honorable de l'Empire Ottoman et du peuple Turc.

Reshid Pasha, à la sortie de ce Conseil, s'est rendu chez l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre, qui, depuis que j'avais eu l'occasion de le voir, a acquis une position bien plus assurée et plus ferme, et qui se prononce hautement et fortement sur l'impossibilité d'accorder à la Russie un protectorat qui serait le partage de l'Empire Ottoman.

Après cette visite faite au doyen du corps diplomatique, Reshid Pasha est allé voir le Prince Menchikoff à Buyukdéré.

D'après les renseignements qui me sont parvenus, Reshid Pasha n'aurait réussi qu'à tirer des réponses évasives et générales aux assurances répétées qu'il a faites au Prince Menchikoff concernant les garanties que la Porte avait résolu de donner à la Russie, conjointement avec l'Europe entière il est vrai, par rapport au maintien des libertés et privilèges des églises Chrétiennes en général et à l'extension des droits des sujets non-Musulmans du Sultan.

Immédiatement après cette visite la note qui forme annexe de ce très humble rapport a été remise à la Porte. Le Sultan, auquel on s'est empressé de la soumettre, a réuni de nouveau dans la journée d'hier le grand Conseil, qui n'a pas changé de manière de voir, et n'a pas cru possible de se resigner à signer avec la Russie seule et uniquement en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque l'engagement que le Gouvernement Ottoman est prêt à prendre vis-à-vis de l'Europe entière. Le Sultan, après avoir pris connaissance de l'opinion du Conseil dans la journée du 18 Mai, a appelé ses Ministres et leur a déclaré qu'il saurait remplir, si Dieu voulait que la paix dont jouissait l'Empire Ottoman fût troublée, les devoirs d'un souverain; que sa conscience lui disait que ce n'était pas lui qui avait rendu

impossible une entente dont il connaissait tout le prix; et que, s'il fallait, il mourrait à la tête de son armée.

Je suis loin, Sire, de croire à une solution guerrière, immédiate de ce différend. J'y crois d'autant moins que de ce côté-ci tout ce qui pourrait ressembler à une provocation sera soigneusement évité. Il n'y aura donc, j'en ai reçu l'assurance, ni appel fait aux escadres Anglo-Françaises, ni même une sortie de l'escadre Turque dans la Mer Noire, mesure de laquelle il a été question dans la crainte d'un coup-de-main sur Varna. Mais je ne saurais me cacher, Sire, ni la gravité des circonstances ni la portée qu'elles pourraient avoir, et je crois superflu d'y attirer l'attention de votre Majesté, qui aura été à même de peser leur gravité conjointement avec son Illustre Allié pendant le séjour qu'elle vient de faire à Vienne.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.
(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

No. 412.

M. de Wildenbruch to the King of Prussia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 15.)

Sire, *Constantinople, le* 19 *Mai*, 1853, 5½ *heures de soir.*

J'AI assisté à une conférence que l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a réunie au Palais de France, dans le but d'aviser aux moyens d'éviter, s'il est encore possible, une rupture qui certes ne paraît pas être recherchée par l'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui, malgré sa note tranchante du $^{1}/_{5}$ Mai, a remis son départ annoncé pour demain (Vendredi) jusqu'à Samedi, et qui a déclaré que la Mission de Russie ne partirait que quelques jours plus tard.

Avant d'aller au Palais de France je m'étais abouché avec le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche, et nous avions resolu, étant également privés d'instructions, de maintenir une attitude identique, dont le but serait avant tout d'éviter toute démarche officielle qui aurait pu assumer le caractère d'une quadruple alliance contre la Russie.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a longuement exposé le contenu de la pièce que la Porte avait résolu de communiquer à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, dont Reshid Pasha lui avait dit verbalement la teneur, et que celui-ci malheureusement n'a pas cru devoir attendre, mais à la communication de laquelle il a coupé court par la note du $^{9}/_{5}$ Mai.

Cette pièce, connue par M. de la Cour, qui a pleinement constaté ce qu'en disait son collègue, et qui plus tard devait être communiquée ainsi que j'ai eu l'honneur de le dire, aux Représentants de Prusse, d'Angleterre, d'Autriche, et de France, accorde tout ce la Russie demande hors la forme.

La Porte avait même résolu de concéder cette forme (la forme de Convention, Traité, Sened) pour tout ce qui a directement rapport aux établissements religieux Russes à Jerusalem, et l'Ambassadeur de France avait consenti à cette rédaction, en excluant toutefois de ce Traité la question des sanctuaires.

Les libertés et garanties données et renouvelées en faveur de l'Eglise Grecque n'étaient cependant communiquées à l'Ambassadeur Russe qu'avec une note "pour faire part" du firman Impérial adressé au Patriarche, à l'instar de ce qui sera pratiqué pour les autres Missions.

L'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a proposé de nous charger à quatre de donner connaissance au Prince Menchikoff du contenu exacte de cette communication—communication que la Porte ne peut plus faire à un Ambassadeur qui vient de déclarer la cessation de ces fonctions, en lui exprimant en même temps tous les regrets que nos Cours éprouveraient de la voir rejettée.

Je n'ai pas cru, ainsi que M. de Klezl, devoir prendre sur moi de servir d'intermédiaire à des communications de cette nature. L'Ambassadeur de France s'est rangé de notre avis.

On a donc abandonné cette idée pour y substituer une autre sur laquelle je m'étais d'avance mis d'accord avec le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche.

J'ai l'honneur de la soumettre très respectueusement à votre Majesté.

Le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche va demain matin voir le Prince Menchikoff.

Il lui exprimera les regrets des Représentants des quatres Puissances sur la rupture des négociations, et lui posera la question si une communication des pièces qui devaient être remises à l'Ambassade Russe, faite d'une manière non officielle par la Porte, l'engagerait à prendre en sérieuse considération le contenu.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe s'est engagé à ce que la Porte ne se refuse point à faire encore ce dernier pas pour arriver à une entente.

J'avouerai à votre Majesté très respectueusement qu'après la note du $\frac{9}{21}$ Mai, j'ai peu d'espoir qu'une telle démarche puisse avoir une résultat.

J'en attendrais bien plus d'une autre démarche qui semble être projetée par le Cabinet Ottoman; et le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche est de même avis.

Le signataire de la note du $\frac{9}{21}$ Mai, une fois parti, la Porte s'adresserait confidentiellement à M. d'Ozeroff que l'on sait désespéré de la rupture, et craignant les accusations que le Prince Menchikoff ne manquerait pas de faire peser sur lui. Elle le sommerait d'annoncer à Sa Majesté l'Empereur le départ d'un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire chargé par la Porte, qui a pleine confiance dans la magnanimité de l'Empereur, de soumettre à ce Souverain les garanties qu'elle est prête à donner au culte Chrétien en général et au culte Grec en particulier—garanties dont son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire n'aurait pas cru devoir attendre seulement l'élaboration ou plutôt la mise sur papier.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

No. 413.

M. de Wildenbruch to the King of Prussia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 15.)

Constantinople, ce 22 Mai, 1853.

Sire,

LE départ d'un courier expédié par le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche me fournit l'occasion d'informer préalablement et très respectueusement votre Majesté du dénouement du drame, dont la fin était d'autant plus facile à prévoir, qu'il ne s'agissait point de la part de l'Ambassade de Russie de négocier, mais d'imposer une volonté à laquelle le Cabinet Ottoman, malgré sa faiblesse et son isolation, avait résolu d'opposer une résistance mâle et courageuse.

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à mon très humble rapport, No. 45 (19 Mai, 5½ du soir), et de le continuer.

Le Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche s'étant rendu auprès du Prince Menchikoff, et lui ayant fait part de l'objet de sa visite, cet Ambassadeur s'empressa de l'informer que, comme dernier essai d'accommodement avec la Porte, il avait transmis sous main à Reshid Pasha un projet de note devant avoir la valeur d'un Acte obligatoire, en lui faisant déclarer que si le Gouvernement Ottoman ne consentait pas à la lui adresser jusqu'à ce soir, il quitterait définitivement Constantinople. Le Prince donna rapidement lecture à M. de Klezl de cette note, qui reproduit les bases du Sened ou de la Convention primitivement proposée par le Cabinet de Russie, et ne varie que sous le rapport de la forme.

Après avoir pris congé de l'Ambassadeur de Russie, M. de Klezl alla directement chez le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, qui lui annonça de son côté, que quelqu'un lui avait donné connaissance d'un projet de note que le Prince Menchikoff serait disposé d'accepter dans le cas que la Porte la lui adressât dans la journée même, en ajoutant qu'il n'était pas autorisé à la lui laisser entre les mains.

Comme cependant le Prince Menchikoff a postérieurement donné copie de ce projet de note à Reshid Pasha, j'ai l'honneur de le soumettre à l'appréciation de votre Majesté dans l'Annexe No. 1.

Reshid Pasha fit observer à la personne qui s'était fait l'organe de cette proposition, qu'il fallait à la Porte au moins vingt-quatre heures de temps pour y répondre, puisque l'on devait prendre l'avis du Conseil et celui des Représentants des autres Puissances et obtenir ensuite le consentement du Sultan.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, à l'issue de son entretien avec M. de Klezl, informa ce dernier qu'il allait envoyer le jour même son fils Salih Bey auprès du Prince Menchikoff pour lui donner connaissance de la note que la

Porte avait résolu de lui adresser dans le Conseil tenu Mercredi dernier 18 Mai, et lui proposer de lui en remettre une identique à celle-là.

Le Prince Menchikoff ayant reçu cette note des mains de Salih Bey, et en ayant pris connaissance, le but de la visite du Chargé d'Affaires d'Autriche s'est dans le fond trouvé rempli.

J'ai l'honneur d'annexer ce projet sous le No. 2.

Le projet de note que le Prince Menchikoff avait communiqué à Reshid Pasha comme un *ne plus ultra*, n'est que la réproduction presque littérale du projet de convention et aurait acquis pour la Russie la même valeur par une contre-note de l'Ambassadeur. C'est le document qui à ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de dire en citant les paroles de M. d'Ozeroff, devait lier la Turquie en face de l'Empereur, et qui mettait l'une des Puissances signataires du Traité de Londres dans une position toute exceptionnelle, et en-dessus des autres Puissances co-signataires, pour ce qui concerne ses rapports avec l'Empire Ottoman. Reshid Pasha communiqua cette pièce aux Representants d'Autriche, de France, de Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, dans la journée du 21 Mai, en leur disant qu'il la jugeait inadmissible, mais que si ces Représentants en exprimaient le désir, il la soumettrait néanmoins au Conseil et au Sultan, sans toutefois pouvoir prendre aucun engagement par rapport à son acceptation.

Le but de Reshid Pasha était facile à entrevoir: il n'était autre que de rejeter sur les quatre Représentants la responsabilité que lui seul n'avait pas envie de porter. Aussi le résultat d'une conférence tenue au Palais d'Angleterre dans la matinée du 21 a été l'instruction identique adressée par les quatre Représentants aux premiers interprètes des Ambassades et Missions.

J'ose espérer que cette instruction sera considérée par votre Majesté comme convenable à la position de son Représentant, qui n'a d'autres instructions à cet égard que celles qui ressortent des Traités de Londres. Je la soumets très-respectueusement à votre Majesté dans l'Annexe No. 3.

Si l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre a cru pouvoir se borner à une réponse aussi évasive que l'est cette instruction, c'est qu'il avait en vue deux choses:

1. D'empêcher son collègue de France de faire des démarches isolées qui auraient eu pour but un rapprochement à la Russie, crainte que Lord Redcliffe ne m'a pas cachée et que je crois fondée;

2. Le manque total d'instructions *ad hoc* des deux Ambassades, dont les rapports qui accompagnent le Projet du Sened n'avaient point jusqu'à la journée d'hier pu recevoir de réponse.

Dans un long entretien que j'ai eu avec l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre avant la conférence, dans laquelle il s'est montré très pliant et où il a facilement abandonné toute idée d'une pièce collective—idée à laquelle, conjointement avec M. de Klezl, qui du reste a tenu un langage beaucoup plus décidé qu'il ne l'aurait fait à ce que je pense s'il n'avait eu des ordres à cet effet, j'ai cru devoir m'opposer—c'est dans cet entretien, dirai-je, Sire, que j'ai eu occasion de me convaincre de la fermeté de ses opinions et de l'énergie qu'il saura déployer pour les faire prévaloir, une fois qu'il s'y verra suffisamment autorisé par les ordres de son Gouvernement.

L'Annexe No. 4 à ce très-humble rapport annonce enfin le départ de l'Ambassadeur de Russie, qui tout en posant des demandes qu'il savait être inacceptables, a prolongé son séjour dans le but de donner une preuve apparente de sa longanimité, peut-être aussi dans le but d'arriver par des moyens détournés à amener un revirement que le changement de Ministère avait fait espérer en vain.

Je puis affirmer très respectueusement à votre Majesté que l'arrivée de Réshid Pasha au pouvoir avait été considéré comme un gage certain d'une attitude plus pliante du Cabinet Ottoman. J'affirme, Sire, que c'est le Prince Menchikoff même qui, trompé par les assurances du Logothète Aristarchi et du premier drogman Argyropulo, lequel a été suspendu de ses fonctions, a demandé du Sultan la nomination de Reshid au Ministère.

L'Ambassadeur de Russie a quitté Buyukdéré dans la soirée du 21.

Dans ce moment on met bas les armes de Russie au Palais à Péra.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

Inclosure in No. 413.

M. de Wildenbruch to M. Bosgiaviéz.

Pera, ce 21 Mai, 1853.

Monsieur,

VOUS vous rendrez chez son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et lui direz qu'en réponse au désir exprimé par son Excellence Reshid Pasha de connaître mon opinion sur un projet de note communiqué par le Prince Menchikoff par voie particulière, je suis d'avis que sur une question qui touche de si près à la liberté d'action et à la souveraineté de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Excellence Reshid Pasha est le meilleur juge du parti qu'il convient de prendre, et que je ne me considère pas dans la circonstance actuelle autorisé à émettre une opinion à cet égard.

Vous êtes autorisé, Monsieur, à laisser à son Excellence Reshid Pasha copie de la présente instruction s'il le désire.

(Signé) L. DE WILDENBRUCH.

No. 414.

Baron Manteuffel to the Chevalier Bunsen.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 15.)

Berlin, ce 3 Juin, 1853.

Monsieur,

PAR le départ du Prince Menchikoff de Constantinople, les affaires d'Orient viennent d'entrer, on ne saurait se le dissimuler, dans une phase nouvelle et plus sérieuse. Nous persistons toutefois à ne pas la considérer comme devant conduire à des complications guerrières. J'ai adressé aujourd'hui la dépêche ci-jointe en copie à l'Envoyé du Roi près la Sublime Porte. Elle vous indiquera le point de vue duquel nous envisageons la situation et l'attitude que nous comptons prendre en conséquence. Veuillez, Monsieur, donner confidentiellement lecture de l'annexe à Lord Clarendon, qui, de cette manière, acquerra la conviction que tout en suivant le développement ultérieur des événements avec l'attention qu'ils méritent, nous nous réservons une entière liberté d'action. L'attitude des Cabinets de l'Europe, par rapport à cette question, est du plus grand intérêt pour nous, et nous attachons par conséquence beaucoup de prix à connaître celle du Cabinet de Londres. Les communications qui nous parviendront à ce sujet, seront donc toujours accueillies avec une attention marquée, dictée par le désir de prévenir par l'accord des Puissances des complications dont les suites seraient incalculables.

Je prie, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

Inclosure in No. 414.

Baron Manteuffel to M. de Wildenbruch.

Berlin, ce 3 Juin, 1853.

Monsieur,

VOS rapports au Roi, y compris celui du 22 Mai, nous sont exactement parvenus. Tout ce que vous nous avez mandé sur les négociations entre la Sublime Porte et le Prince Menchikoff, comme vous le pensez bien, fixe au plus haut degré l'intérêt de notre Auguste Maître et de son Cabinet.

Sa Majesté rend une pleine justice au zèle consciencieux avec lequel vous nous avez transmis l'historique de toutes les phases par lesquelles ces importantes négociations ont passés. Nous ne nous sommes point dissimulé la gravité de la situation. Mais confiants dans les assurances réitérées du Cabinet de St. Pétersbourg, d'après lesquelles il nous était impossible de voir dans la mission du Prince Menchikoff des germes de rupture, nous avons conservé jusqu'au dernier moment l'espoir qu'elle amènerait un résultat satisfaisant. Cet espoir nous paraissait d'autant plus fondé que nous ne pouvions pas douter des sincères efforts de la Porte d'aller aussi loin que possible au devant des demandes que l'Ambassadeur de Russie croyait devoir formuler. Le départ de celui-ci est donc

un fait doublement grave et doublement regrettable. Mais, quelque vif qu'eût été notre désir de voir s'établir une entente entre le Prince Menchikoff et Reshid Pasha, nous ne pouvons que pleinement approuver l'attitude que, comme messieurs vos collègues d'Autriche, de France, et d'Angleterre, vous avez prise à l'égard de la dernière démarche du Ministère Ottoman. La Sublime Porte connait l'intérêt sincère soutenu que le Roi notre Auguste Maître voue aux destinées de l'Empire Ottoman. Elle sait que nous restons fidèles à la conviction que ces destinées sont inséparables du système politique de l'Europe tel que les Traités l'ont consacré. Nous persistons à croire que cette conviction continue à être celle de toutes les Puissances Européennes, et nous avons particulièrement trop de confiance dans la sagesse et la modération de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie pour considérer l'interruption formelle des relations diplomatiques entre les deux Empires comme devant conduire à des complications plus graves. Nous attendrons donc, l'œil ouvert, mais calmes et libres de toute engagement, le développement ultérieur des événements, pour en faire dépendre l'attitude qu'ils nous assigneront dans l'intérêt de la sainteté des Traités et du repos de l'Europe.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) MANTEUFFEL.

No. 415.

Memorandum.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 15.)

LE premier axiome pour le traitement politique de la question Orientale doit être celui-ci: La Turquie est une nécessité Européenne. Mais pour qu'elle continue d'exister, ce qui est indispensable, il faut que les cinq Grandes Puissances s'unissent solidairement et fermement à cet effet. Ce n'est qu'une pareille union qui puisse rendre possible et garantir cette existence. Cependant la simple promesse, le simple désir de cette union, ne suffisent pas à la réaliser, et encore moins à la rendre efficace. Il s'agit plûtot de donner force et autorité à une telle entente. Et cela ne peut se faire qu'en organisant des éléments antagonistiques pour une action commune, et en créant des formes qui donnent une garantie pour la durée de l'union. L'Empire Turc n'est ni un État Chrétien ni un État social: sous ces deux points de vue il n'a aucun titre à la sollicitude des Etats Chrétiens civilisés. Il doit son importance ainsi que l'ombre de force vitale qui lui est resté, uniquement à la politique et à l'intérêt général de l'équilibre Européen. De nos jours il n'est qu'un zéro politique artificiel dans le grand calcul Européen, lequel, par conséquent, ne peut être soutenu que politiquement et artificiellement, savoir par le moyen d'une union spéciale de toutes les cinq Grandes Puissances. Une pareille union doit avoir comme première base et comme base immuable, la conservation de la Turquie dans son actuel état territorial. Mais ne nous trompons pas! Cette conservation est impossible à moins que, dès à présent, l'entière indépendance de la Porte dans ses relations extérieures et son autonomie complète à l'intérieur ne lui soient garanties vis-à-vis de chacune des Grandes Puissances. Si l'on ne veut pas accélérer la chûte de la Porte, et l'accélérer d'une manière violente, il est nécessaire que les violences et les empiétements que certaines Puissances ont exercées individuellement contre elle, cessent désormais. A l'avenir il ne devrait être porté par aucune Puissance le moindre préjudice aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan. Si cependant ces droits et cette autonomie devaient être amoindris, il faudrait que cela se ne fît qu'au profit du culte Chrétien et de la civilisation Chrétienne en général, et dans l'intérêt de toutes les Puissances Chrétiennes. C'est ce principe qui devra former la seconde base de l'union mentionnée et qui lui donnera le cachet de la solidarité durable et de son utilité Européenne. Il est vrai que les circonstances imposent aux Gouvernements Chrétiens le devoir de ménager et de soutenir un Etat non-Chrétien et corrompu: mais ils sont tenus à ne lui porter secours parceque l'Europe ne peut pas permettre que cet Empire cesse d'exister intempestivement et au profit d'une seule ou de plusieurs des Grandes Puissances. De plus les Gouvernements Chrétiens, en aidant la Turquie, doivent reconnaître l'obligation de protéger de toute manière les éléments d'une civilisation Chrétienne qui s'y trouvent, en les plaçant sous la sauvegarde

politique de l'Europe entière. Que la population Grecque se sente attachée à la Russie à cause de son unité dogmatique, soit: mais, politiquement parlant, il est nécessaire qu'à l'avenir elle s'apperçoive et reconnaise à chaque occasion qu'elle doit les libertés de son église et son développement religieux non au Cabinet Russe seul, mais bien à la protection et à la coopération de toutes les Puissances. Ce n'est que par cette voie que nous serons capables de diminuer un peu en notre faveur moralement la disproportion numérique qui existe parmi différentes confessions de la population Chrétienne en Turquie.

Une autre question très importante et connexe du traitement d'adopter vis-à-vis de la Turquie, et à la conservation de cet Empire, est celle qui regarde les réformes de son Gouvernement et de son état intérieur. Les Turcs, comme tels, ne sont pas accessibles à la civilisation dans le sens Européen; ce n'est que la population Chrétienne de la Turquie qui soit susceptible de progrès dans ce sens. En poussant le Gouvernement Turc, par principe, à introduire des réformes qui ne seront jamais comprises et qui seront toujours détestées par la masse des Turcs, on ne fait qu'affaiblir l'autorité de ce Gouvernement aux yeux de ses propres sujets, et par conséquent on accélère sa chûte qu'on veut pourtant empêcher.

Mais aussi pour ce qui regarde les populations Chrétiennes, il importera beaucoup de choisir la juste espèce et de trouver la mesure convenable des idées et libertés politiques qu'on désire qu'elles leur soient. Leur perfectionnement chrétien et social est le principal but qu'on aura à atteindre. En les élevant à des corporations indépendantes et en les accoutumant à soigner la vie de famille et les relations de commune, on les préparera bien autrement à recueillir des faibles mains de leurs maîtres actuels l'héritage que la Providence leur a destiné, qu'en voulant leur parler un jargon de constitutionalisme moderne dont elles ne comprennent rien.

Préparer en silence et sans des perturbations intérieures et intempestives ce grand événement, de sorte qu'au moment où il aura lieu l'équilibre et la position des différentes Grandes Puissances en soient touchés le moins possible—voilà ce qui aujourd'hui doit être le but des efforts communs et sincères des cinq Puissances. Pour obtenir ce résultat il sera indispensible qu'elles déclarent d'abord, par un acte solennel et collectif, que désormais elles veulent vouer leur sollicitude commune à l'Empire Ottoman, en s'engageant expressément, non seulement de maintenir son intégrité territoriale, mais encore de respecter et de garantir son autonomie et sa souveraineté.

Il en découle un second devoir pour chacune des Puissances: c'est de renoncer à jamais au droit de se faire justice à elles-mêmes dans des griefs qu'elles auraient contre la Porte, sans que préalablement toutes les cinq Puissances n'en aient fait l'objet de conférences et de discussions amicales dans le sens d'un arrangement paisible.

C'est sur ces principes et ces bases que l'union dont on parle devrait être fondée. Elle trouverait sa meilleure forme et son expression la plus sûre et simple dans une Conférence permanente des cinq Puissances siégeant à Londres.

L'intérêt général de la paix exige la réalisation d'une pareille union; et la situation géographique de l'Angleterre, ses propres intérêts, et sa position politique, paraissent être des raisons pour que le Cabinet Anglais prenne l'initiative à cet égard vis-à-vis des autres Puissances

---

No. 416.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

No. 107.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 15, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 220, of the 8th instant, transmitting a copy of the circular instruction addressed to the Prussian Ministers on Eastern affairs, I have to inform your Lordship that Her Majesty's Government hope that Prussia will turn to account the independent position she has assumed in this question, and not hesitate to give to Russia her opinion upon the inadmissibility of Prince Menchikoff's demands, and the injustice therefore

of chastising Turkey for their rejection. Her Majesty's Government likewise hope that the Prussian opinions will be freely communicated to Austria, and more particularly as regards the calamities of war in which Russia appears ready to involve Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 417.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 108.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 15, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 223, forwarding a copy of Count Nesselrode's despatch to Baron Budberg of the $\frac{27 \text{ May}}{8 \text{ June}}$, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve of your having done so. Your Lordship knows by my various despatches the opinion entertained by Her Majesty's Government of the conduct of Lord Stratford, and you will take every fitting opportunity to rebut the charges brought against him by the Russian Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 418.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 109.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 15, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 225 of the 10th instant, reporting what passed between you and Baron Manteuffel on that day, I have to instruct your Lordship to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the language which he held to the Russian Minister. England and France have taken no rash step, and have done nothing beyond what was imposed upon them by the policy of Russia towards Turkey, and in order to uphold the Turkish Empire, which is recognized as an European necessity in the memorandum of Baron Manteuffel which has been communicated to me this day by Chevalier Bunsen.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 419.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 110.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 15, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 226, of the 10th instant, reporting what passed between you and Baron Manteuffel as to the policy of Austria in the present crisis of Eastern affairs, I have to instruct your Lordship to assure Baron Manteuffel, that in the possible event of any conference here being deemed expedient, there would be no desire to exclude Russia, and that Baron Brunnow would be informed of it, and would be at liberty to attend.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 420.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 105.)

Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you in reply to your despatch No. 266 of the 4th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve of the observations which, as stated in that despatch, you addressed to Count Nesselrode respecting the concealment which had been practised by the Russian Government in regard to the demands to be made by Prince Menchikoff on the Porte.

I am, &c

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 421.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 108.)

Foreign Office, June 15, 1853.

Sir,

THE Russian Government have constantly professed that they sought no increase of influence or power over the subjects of the Porte professing the Greek religion, and that the fulfilment of existing Treaties, and the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, were the sole objects of the demands made by Prince Menchikoff.

But it appears from the despatch of Count Nesselrode to Baron Brunnow of $\frac{\text{20 May}}{\text{1 June}}$ which has been communicated to me, that in the event of these demands being again rejected by the Porte, a Russian force will immediately occupy the Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia; and as this will be not alone a violation of the Turkish territory, but may also lead to a general revolt among the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to events of a character far more deplorable, the subject assumes an European importance, upon which, before a decided opinion is pronounced by Her Majesty's Government, it is essential that no misunderstanding should exist.

It must be quite unnecessary for me to observe that Her Majesty's Government pretend not to interfere with any just claim of Russia upon the Porte, nor to dispute her right rigidly to enforce the fulfilment of Treaties; but they desire that the independence of Turkey should be maintained, and that a right unduly to interfere in her internal affairs should not be conveyed by the Sultan to any other Power.

The Treaties relied upon by Russia, in justification of Prince Menchikoff's demands, are those of Kainardji and Adrianople; and it is with respect to them, and for the purpose of doing no injustice to the Russian Government, that Her Majesty's Government will feel themselves indebted to Count Nesselrode for such explanations as he may be disposed to afford to you.

By the Treaty of Kainardji the Christian religion and churches are protected, and some privileges and immunities are granted; but I look in vain for any sanction afforded by that Treaty to the demand of Prince Menchikoff that the orthodox churches and clergy throughout the Sultan's dominions are to be secured in the possession of all the rights, privileges, and immunities which they have enjoyed *ab antiquo*.

The term *ab antiquo* must of course refer to a period far antecedent to that of 1774, the date of the Treaty of Kainardji; but under this vague form of expression, Russia would acquire an unquestionable right to claim privileges granted in the earliest periods of the Mahometan rule—privileges which, conferring vast secular as well as spiritual power upon the Greek clergy, have, by the process of time and administrative changes, long since become obsolete, but which, being revived by Russia, with the right to enforce them, would enable her to exercise supreme control over fourteen millions of subjects of the Porte, and to render the Sultan a mere vassal of the Emperor.

Nor let it be supposed that this is a forced or unfounded construction of

Prince Menchikoff's demand, for he himself, in his note, dated the 21st of May, which has caused a profound impression throughout Europe, has proclaimed that religious objects alone have not been aimed at by him; and can the refusal of the Sultan to part with his sovereign rights, be imputed to him as an offence? Can it be held to justify the forcible occupation of his territory? Can it be possible that for such a cause Europe should now stand exposed to the horrors of war by the Emperor of Russia, who throughout his whole reign, has laboured so gloriously for the maintenance of peace?

But I repeat what I have on a former occasion written to you. Her Majesty's Government rely too firmly upon the justice and moderation of the Emperor, to believe in the possibility of war; and they are convinced, that if such should be the will of His Imperial Majesty, a solution of this embarrassing question might be found perfectly consistent with the dignity of the Emperor and the security of the Greek church, without infringing upon the rights of the Sultan, whose very weakness should be his protection, even if the maintenance of the Turkish Empire were not a fundamental principle of European policy.

I cannot conclude this despatch without expressing the regret with which Her Majesty's Government have learnt that to the different Courts of Europe, the Russian Government has addressed unmeasured complaints of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, and have attributed to him alone the failure of Prince Menchikoff's mission; but you will ask Count Nesselrode calmly to consider whether if the views taken by His Majesty's Government of Prince Menchikoff's demands be correct, it required the intervention or advice of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to secure their rejection; and if, on the other hand, these demands were as insignificant in themselves, and as acceptable to the Porte, as they are said to be, whether the British Ambassador would have influence enough, even if there had been any conceivable object in his so doing, to control the Sultan, the Divan, and the Ministers, and induce them, against their own opinions, to brave the menaces of Prince Menchikoff, and to bring down upon themselves the consequences of an act which they must have considered to be uncalled for and impolitic.

You are instructed to read this despatch to Count Nesselrode.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 422.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 73.)

Constantinople, May 30, 1853.

My Lord,

MY latest intelligence from the neighbourhood of the Danube is contained in a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Neale at Varna, dated the 28th instant. I inclose an extract of it herewith.

A private letter of the 24th from Odessa tends to establish that no hostilities will take place without fresh and special orders from the Emperor of Russia.

On the other hand, a despatch from Her Majesty's Consul at the Dardanelles announces that the Russian Vice-Consul there had received directions from Constantinople to advise the Russian merchants not to embark in any fresh commercial transactions, and to wind up their outstanding affairs.

The Porte, meanwhile, continues to prepare for the worst. The squadron, which was anchored before the Sultan's Palace, has gone to take up a new position towards the entrance of Bosphorus. Omar Pasha has been ordered to Shoumla, and his army will follow him. A flying camp is likely to be formed between the capital and Kilia, near which a Russian force might succeed in effecting a disembarkation. The danger of an attack from the side of Batoum and Trebizond has also attracted the attention of Reshid Pasha.

I am informed on good authority that the Porte will be able to collect a force of about 80,000 men for the defence of its dominions in European Turkey. A part of this force will have to be composed of Redif, or Militia. I hope to obtain an authentic statement of the whole available force, whether naval or military, and I shall take the earliest opportunity of transmitting it to your Lordship.

The Turkish Ministers have applied to the managers of the new Bank for an advance of about 450,000*l.* to be repaid within six months. It may be doubted whether the application will succeed in the present uncertain and dangerous posture of affairs in the Levant.

Some few of the Turkish Ministers show signs of alarm; but Reshid Pasha told me yesterday that he felt himself quite at ease, though wearied with excessive application to business. His impression seemed to be, that the great and long-dreaded Eastern question had all but commenced; that he had taken a line which he was prepared to follow out; and that in some way or other the doubts and anxieties which had so long prevailed would be brought to a conclusive issue. The Sultan, I am told, continues to maintain a calm and steady attitude.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

P.S.—I have drawn Reshid Pasha's attention to the dismantled state of Varna, and he assures me that orders are issued for effecting the necessary repairs in that fortress.

S. DE R.

Inclosure in No. 422.

Colonel Neale to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Varna, May 28, 1853.

(Extract.)

THE twenty-four Russian gun-boats which had arrived at Sulina, and which had gone from thence to Ismail, it was understood would be used as pontoons; and the bridges across the Danube, it was said, would be put up above Ismail to cross the Kilia branch, and the main branch at Toultcha.

All the most efficient men among the Russian sailors were to have left Sulina yesterday for Ismail; and 14 men in the guard-ship, and 25 Cossacks, were all that would then remain in the whole Island of Sulina. The quarantine in Bessarabia had been reduced to twenty-four hours for all persons in the employ of the Russian Government.

Immediately after the arrival of Prince Menchikoff at Odessa, an express steamer had been dispatched, which passed up the Danube on the 26th; and Russian steamers were passing up and down the river opposite Sulina daily.

In Varna, and throughout this district, the greatest anxiety and alarm prevail in consequence of the intelligence brought by each steamer. On the other hand, I have to state, that up to this hour, no preparation approaching even to the most common precaution, has been adopted with respect to this fortress. The guns in all the batteries are dismantled; and the only troops here are in the shape of the local guards or Topjees, who do not amount to 200.

No. 423.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 74.)

Constantinople, May 30, 1853.

My Lord,

INCLOSED herewith, in translation, is a draft of the Sultan's solemn renewal and confirmation of the privileges accorded by himself and his ancestors to the Greek church and clergy in his dominions. It is not likely to undergo any further alteration, and will probably be promulgated in three or four days.

Similar firmans will be addressed to the heads of the Armenian, Catholic, Protestant, and Israelite communities.

These documents are to be communicated to the Representatives of friendly Powers; and the several privileges and immunities, which are recorded more at length in ancient patents or commissions, will be repeated in connection with the firmans.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 423.

Firman addressed to the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople.

A TOI, Prélat Yermanos, Patriarche Grec actuel de Constantinople et dépendances—puisse ta dignité être permanente!—j'ordonne:

En m'élevant par sa grâce Divine et par sa sainte volonté à l'Empire et à la glorieuse dignité du Califat, l'Être Suprême m'a confié, comme un dépôt tout particulier de sa part, un grand nombre de pays et de contrées, et des sujets composés de plusieurs nations et de plusieurs races.

C'est pourquoi j'ai depuis mon avénement au Trone Impérial, d'après mon devoir comme Souverain et comme Calife, et ainsi que l'honneur de l'Empire l'exige, constamment exercé, avec l'assistance et la faveur Divines, une surveillance active à l'effet de faire jouir, car telles sont réellement mes vues bienveillantes et ma volonté souveraine, chaque classe de mes sujets, d'une protection qui ne laisse rien à désirer et surtout d'une sécurité parfaite et sans exception, comme cela a toujours été, par rapport à l'exercice de son culte et dans les affaires qui concernent sa religion. Aussi mes efforts à ces égards ont-ils produit les plus heureux effets et des avantages qui ont toujours été remarqués, non-obstant quelques abus que le temps et la négligence ont pu introduire, et qu'il est l'objet spécial de mes soins de faire disparaître entièrement pour ne plus être renouvelés. Comme c'est ma volonté souveraine, comme je tiens à ce que les privilèges particuliers concernant le spirituel que mes augustes ancêtres ont octroyé aux prêtres, mes fidèles sujets, de la religion Grecque; que les immunités et les privilèges accordés aux églises et aux couvents qui existent dans mes Etats, avec les terres et les propriétés foncières qui en dépendent; à d'autres lieux consacrés à la religion et autres sortes d'oratoires; et que les immunités et les droits qui appartiennent en propre aux prêtres Grecs, et qu'en un mot, les privilèges et les concessions de cette sorte qui sont insérés dans les Berats qui renferment les conditions des patriarches et des archévêques, soient toujours maintenus; j'ai donné des ordres très-positifs à tous ces égards, pour publier de nouveau et confirmer mes vues souveraines ci-dessus énoncées; et afin qu'il ne soit porté aucune atteinte aux privilèges ni aux immunités et concessions susmentionnées, et que l'on sache que ceux qui les auraient enfreints se ressentiraient des effets de ma colère souveraine.

On a fait savoir aux autorités compétentes ce dont il s'agit, afin qu'elles ne puissent justifier la moindre négligence dont elles se rendraient coupables à quelqu'un de ces égards; et c'est pour publier et pour faire donner plus de force à ces ordres, dont l'exécution, selon ma volonté Impériale doit être réelle et constante, que mon présent firman Impérial est émané de mon Divan Impérial.

Toi donc, Patriarche susmentionné, lorsque tu auras eu connaissance de ce dont il s'agit, tu auras soin d'agir toujours d'une manière conforme au présent firman Impérial, et tu te garderas bien d'y contrevenir; ayez-le pour entendu, et prêtes foi au noble chiffre dont est décoré le présent commandement Impérial, écrit le .

No. 424.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 15.)

(No. 75.)

Constantinople, May 30, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Porte has directed the Pasha of Egypt's agent here to apply to His Highness for assistance in troops and ships, to be employed in defence of the Sultan's dominions against any act of aggression which may be committed by Russia in pursuance of the present unfortunate rupture.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 425.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(Private.)

My dear Lord Clarendon, *Constantinople, May 30, 1853.*

THE accompanying copy of a private letter which I received this morning from our Consul at Odessa will give you the latest news from that quarter.

Prince Menchikoff's "bitterness" against me would be amusing on a less serious occasion. He has much more reason to be angry with himself, or with his master.

Believe me, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 425.

Consul Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Odessa, May 24, 1853*

I HAD the honour of writing to your Excellency on the 11th ultimo.

The steamer "Gromonosetz," with Prince Menchikoff and his suite on board, arrived at this port yesterday morning at 9 o'clock, and though no public communication was made, it soon transpired that the negotiations had terminated unsatisfactorily. Great consternation has in consequence spread through all classes in this city. At 11 o'clock the Prince had a conference in quarantine with General Lüders, the Commander of the 5th Corps d'Armée, the Acting Governor-General, and the Governor of the town. The great intimacy between our families enabled me to have a conversation with the General on his way back from the quarantine, and he informed me that all diplomatic relations with the Porte had ceased, and that the steamer "Bessarabia" was to leave the Bosphorus three days after the "Gromonosetz" with M. Ozéroff and the rest of the Russian Mission; he said that concession to the ultimatum had been refused, and that the resistance is "avec amertume" attributed to your Excellency's influence. I asked if it was war; that, it was replied, depends upon the will of the Emperor. No such alternative, therefore, has been predetermined.

I can again state, and with assurance, that a war with Turkey is far from being desired in the army, further than that it may suit the needy, when by the occupation of the two Danubian Principalities, they will be entitled to double pay.

All the troops, if not now countermanded, are to go into camp on the 27th instant. The artillery has not been yet brought forward, as I have erroneously stated. The 4th Corps d'Armée, according to previous orders, was put into motion on the 6th instant for concentration on the Dniester. The reserves are still far in the rear.

I observe this morning that the "Gromonosetz" is in free communication with the shore; and the Prince, therefore, is probably in the town. I have not heard anything said of his future motions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) JAMES YEAMES.

No. 426.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 15.)

(No. 237.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 11, 1853.*

THE communications from St. Petersburgh which Baron Meyendorff expected, have arrived, and have been brought before Count Buol, who still feels that he cannot approve the line taken by the Russian Cabinet in the affairs of Turkey. He much regrets that the Emperor Nicholas should have claimed the adoption by the Sultan, without any modification, of the last proposition of Prince Menchikoff, and that the Russian Government should have accompanied the demand with the threat of the immediate occupation of the Principalities by a Russian force, in case of refusal. In the hope of averting the calamities which must arise from such a measure, Count Buol has written to Petersburgh to represent in the strongest manner the hostile feelings which such a step would occasion, and to urge at least delay till the other Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1841, should have an opportunity of using their good offices with the Porte to obtain some arrangement which might be satisfactory to the Emperor, and avoid the dangers to which all Europe would be exposed by war. Count Buol has also written to Constantinople, pointing out to the Turkish Government how desirable it would be that they should seek by every means consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan to meet the requisitions of the Emperor; and he expresses a hope that the last note which was proposed to Prince Menchikoff, and refused by him, may, by trifling alterations, be adapted to the exigency of the moment. Count Buol also recommends the Turkish Government to accept, for the moment, the Emperor's declaration, that he does not consider the occupation of the Principalities as the commencement of war, and that he will take no further measures of hostility, but await in that attitude the mediation of the friendly Powers. Count Buol strongly recommends that if the Russian troops cross the Pruth, the Turkish Government should not attack them: he advises this conduct, not upon any principle of right, but to avert a calamity; for not only does he dread the misfortunes which must be entailed by the commencement of hostilities, but he is persuaded the Turkish army is not in a state to cope with the Russian forces in the Principalities. He likewise believes that if general hostilities took place, the Christian population in many of the provinces would rise. The intelligence he has from Greece, as well as from other parts where the Greek population is numerous, leads him to this impression.

Count Buol earnestly hopes that, notwithstanding the present threatening aspect of affairs, a peaceable solution will be obtained; but if war was to be the consequence of what may take place, the policy of Austria would be to acknowledge the right of each of the Four Powers to act according to its own convictions; the Austrian Government will take no engagement either with Turkey to support her, or with Russia not to oppose her; it will remain free to act according to its own judgment.

Count Buol has not concealed from Baron Meyendorff the unfavourable impression which the Emperor's conduct has made upon all His Majesty's friends; and he hopes the Baron may, by representing it, assist in bringing about a more favourable decision. Count Buol has received despatches from Count Colloredo of the 7th instant, giving an account of his conversation, with your Lordship and Lord Aberdeen upon the affairs of Turkey, and he is very much pleased with the moderation and desire of conciliation which were evinced in those conversations. He is particularly pleased with an assurance that the fleet would not for the present, in approaching the Dardanelles, violate any treaty. An expression, also, that it was possible the Principalities might be occupied, and yet no state of war be declared by Turkey, was remarked upon by him as being satisfactory; for he thinks this essential, and will strongly recommend to England and the other Powers, that if Turkey does not declare the occupation of the Principalities an act of war, the other Powers should equally refrain from doing so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 427.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 430. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 15, 1853.*

COUNT HATZFELDT has received from his Government a despatch dated the 10th instant, which is identical with that addressed on the same day to M. Bunsen, and communicated by the latter to your Lordship.

Count Hatzfeldt saw M. de Lhuys yesterday, and read to him the despatch in question. The following have been confidentially reported to me as the remarks made by the French Minister on the occasion:

"The present despatch is not so satisfactory as that communicated to me from the same quarter some days ago. M. de Manteuffel appears to have changed his point of view. He now seems to look for peace only, and to set the preservation of the Ottoman Empire on one side. If that is the case, England and France cannot agree in the policy of Prussia, for they prize the preservation of the Ottoman Empire even beyond the preservation of peace. If, however, the Prussian Government means and will declare that the two can go hand in hand, and that their object is to ensure the continued existence of the Turkish Empire by pacific means, England and France can and will unite their advice with that of Prussia and of Austria (if she is willing) to obtain the desired result."

So much for the general question. Upon certain points of the despatch M. de Lhuys observed to the Prussian Government: 1st, That he could not admit, as M. de Manteuffel appeared to argue, that the acceptation by the Porte of Prince Menchikoff's last propositions would deprive them of that bilateral, and consequently that obligatory form which a Treaty or Convention would give to them, because Prince Menchikoff had taken care to insert in the note which he proposed the Porte should sign, words signifying that it had an obligatory power.

2nd. The French Minister remarked that he could not allow that the exceptional position of the Principalities established by Treaty gave the Russians any right to enter them on the present occasion. Such an entry would, in his opinion, be an act of aggression, although the Turks might not necessarily consider it an act of war. But it would make France more anxious than ever that the Porte should persist in its refusal to accept Prince Menchikoff's propositions, because if Russia claimed the right of occupying the Principalities under Treaty now, what would she do when her powers of interference with the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire should be so greatly augmented?

3rd. M. de Lhuys pointed out to the Prussian Minister that although there was no intention to irritate or provoke in sending the fleets to the Dardanelles, and that there was still every disposition to negotiate, yet the two Governments of England and France had not adopted this measure solely as a means of supporting their diplomatic representations, but were quite prepared to give the Porte the material assistance which those fleets could afford, should the Sultan call upon them to do so for the preservation of his dominions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I have seen M. de Lhuys, who corroborates what I have stated as being the substance of his conversation with Chevalier Hatzfeldt on the especial points of the value to be given to a note, and the right of the Russians to occupy the Principalities. He did not touch with me on the general question, except to remark that the Prussian Cabinet appeared to have altered its tone, nor did he mention what he had said to Chevalier Hatzfeldt about the fleets; but he said that he was occupied in answering M. de Manteuffel's despatch through the French Minister at Berlin, and that he should make it clearly understood that France would not rest satisfied without a positive declaration from Austria and Prussia of the policy they intended to pursue in regard to the Eastern question.

C.

No. 428.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 17.*)

(No. 439.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 16, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has been good enough to read me a despatch which he received this morning from the French Minister at Munich, who gives an account of a conversation which he had had with M. Van den Pfördten, on

the present aspect of affairs. This despatch will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Walewski, but it is of sufficient importance to induce me to give you in a few words the summary of it.

M. Van den Pfordten is informed by the French Minister of the reasons which have induced the English and French Governments to send their fleets to the Dardanelles, and of the intimate union which exists between the two Cabinets in their policy on the Oriental question. In his answer he not only admits the legitimacy of the cause which the two Governments defend, but he declares his satisfaction at seeing them united to curb the ambition of Russia. He expresses the hope that the other great Governments of Europe will join England and France, and that every State will adopt means for letting the Emperor of Russia know their opinion of his present conduct. M. Van den Pfordten represents Germany as having been too long under the thraldom of Russia, and he accuses the Emperor of being the cause of many of the evils under which Germany still labours; and he says that it is but a just retribution that he who so long has dictated to others should now be dictated to himself.

Whatever may be the paramount cause of this language, it is of importance at this present moment; for the opinions of the smaller Courts of Germany must have some influence on those of the greater.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 429.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 17.*)

(No. 440.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 16, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has read to me two very important despatches which he has addressed to the French Ministers at Berlin and St. Petersburgh in answer to the communications which my previous despatches will have informed your Lordship have been made to him on the parts of the Cabinets of Prussia and Russia relative to the Oriental question.

The first of these is very much in substance what I had the honour to report to your Lordship yesterday had been M. Drouyn de Lhuys' language to the Prussian Minister; but the opportunity is taken to make the Prussian Government clearly understand the identity of feeling which unites the English and French Cabinets on this question; and while it declares in the strongest terms that whatever may be the policy pursued at Berlin and Vienna, England and France will remain true to the cause of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire it expresses the sincere wish of the French Government to see the other parties to the Treaty of July 1841 join with them in defence of Treaty engagements, and the desire for a pacific solution of existing differences. At the same time France claims the right of being informed how far in all eventualities she can count on the support of Prussia.

The despatch to General Castelbajac contains an explanation of the reasons which have induced the Governments of Great Britain and France to send their fleets to the Dardanelles. It is stated to be a measure of precaution rendered necessary by existing circumstances. France counts upon the Emperor's previous conduct and character not to push his quarrel with the Porte to extremities, assures the Russian Cabinet of her desire to cooperate for the just settlement of any fair claims Russia may have upon the Porte, points out the danger to which Europe would be exposed by war, and repels the insinuation which Count Nesselrode appears to have made, that the responsibility of war would rest with those who encouraged the Porte in her resistance to the demands of Russia.

As copies of those despatches will be communicated to your Lordship by Count Walewski, I need not add more. They do honour to the policy of the Government which sanctioned and to the pen which wrote them, and I feel sure that your Lordship will be satisfied with them.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys informed me further that he should in the course of the day address an appeal to the Austrian Government in the same sense as that addressed to Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 430.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 239.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 17, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 430, marked Confidential, of the 15th instant, reporting the language used by M. Drouyn de Lhuys upon the communication to him by Baron Hatzfeldt of a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, I have to inform you that although I fully agree in opinion with M. Drouyn de Lhuys that that despatch indicates less decision on the Eastern question than we had been led to expect by previous communications from the Prussian Government, yet when a copy of it was given to me by the Chevalier Bunsen, I did not express myself to him in terms quite as strong as M. Drouyn de Lhuys appears to have used to Baron Hatzfeldt.

My reason for this was that Prussia, not having the same interest in the Eastern question as England and France, cannot be expected to regard it in the same point of view. She is, moreover, habitually under the influence of Russia, which England and France are not; and she has much, while they have little to fear from Russia. Family ties must also not be excluded from our estimate of the allowance to be made for the position of Prussia.

The same considerations apply with equal, if not with greater force to Austria, who, although more interested than Prussia in the affairs of Turkey, is far more dependent than her upon Russia, and the most intimate relations subsist between the two Emperors, which, together with the services rendered by Russia to Austria in Hungary, and the mission of Prince Leiningen to Constantinople, scarcely less hostile in its character than that of Prince Menchikoff, must render the remonstrances of the Austrian Government feeble, however much they may disapprove and feel alarm at the proceedings of Russia, and will certainly indispose them to take any active part against their powerful neighbour.

To Count Colloredo therefore, as well as to the Chevalier Bunsen, I have spoken in moderate terms, and by inducing them to agree with us upon the unjustifiable nature of Russian pretensions upon the Porte, I have endeavoured to secure that the moral influence of their respective Governments should be used to check the present proceedings and the ulterior projects of the Emperor of Russia.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government most desirable not to scare away Prussia and Austria from acting with England and France as far as they will go with us, by seeking to bind them to a course of action which we know beforehand they will not venture to adopt; but, on the contrary, that France and England, while taking their own measures for the protection of Turkey, should neglect no means of keeping Austria and Prussia connected with them upon this question, and acting in concert with them to bring it to a peaceful solution.

In short, it is useless to expect from these Governments active opposition against the designs of Russia; but they will exert their moral influence, and that we should endeavour to turn to the best account.

I inclose the copy of a memorandum upon Turkish affairs which has been given to me by Chevalier Bunsen by the direction of Baron Manteuffel, and of which the practical usefulness or application at the present moment are not very apparent.

No. 431.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)

(By Telegraph.)

My Lord, *Constantinople, June 10, 1853.*

RESHID PASHA received yesterday a letter, dated 19th May, v.s., from Count Nesselrode, offering him another opportunity to accept the last ultimatum of Prince Menchikoff, the project of a note included in my message No. 55 to your Lordship.

The Porte is begged to send its simple acceptation in a delay of eight days, and in case it would not do so, the Russian army to cross the frontier within a few weeks, in order to obtain by force, and without a war, what the Porte would not give up spontaneously.

Reshid Pasha, my three colleagues, and myself, hold the same opinion respecting this letter. There is every appearance the Porte will not cede.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 432.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 270. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 7, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's confidential despatch marked No. 83, I am anxious to observe to your Lordship that amongst the many new features which distinguish the policy at present pursued by Russia towards the Porte, and that which is announced, is that of an anomaly which, although being unlike peace, is still maintained by the Emperor not to be regarded as war.

His Imperial Majesty, whilst announcing his intention of occupying the Principalities, if at the end of the week given for fresh consideration Prince Menchikoff's note be not accepted by the Porte, states that he shall not make war upon Turkey: that he is desirous of being able to refrain from the use of violence; and that he is anxious as before to respect the independence of the Sultan and his dominions.

It is wholly out of my power to reconcile the first of these intentions with the professions by which it is accompanied, and I imagine that the explanation would be sought in vain in any Treatise upon the Law of Nations. I feel it my duty, however, to notice the discrepancy, because it occurs to me that should the occupation of the Danubian Provinces take place, and should it be followed by the entry of Her Majesty's fleet into the waters of Constantinople, the Emperor, under the strange view which he is seen to take of public rights, will be apt to consider himself as the party having a right to complain of aggression.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 433.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 281.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 10, 1853.*

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF, the officer who a few months since was despatched by the Emperor to London, has left St. Petersburgh, after passing forty-eight hours here, for the purpose, as I hear confidentially stated, of taking the command of the forces which appear destined to occupy the Danubian Provinces.

Both the French Minister and myself have received intimation of the activity which prevails at Cronstadt, and of the probability which exists of the third division of the Baltic fleet being prepared for sea.

From all I can collect, it appears that the crews of these ships will consist in great part of men who have never been at sea in their lives.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 434.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 283. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, June 11, 1853.

My Lord,

ACCOUNTS of warlike indications reach me from every quarter. Two of the Consuls stationed at Cronstadt report that preparations are making for fitting out the three divisions of the Baltic fleet, comprising, exclusive of frigates and smaller vessels, 27 sail of the line.

From Archangel, Mr. Consul Whitehead writes me word, that a screw frigate of 44 guns, the "Pulkan" has just been launched, and that she will be ready in six weeks to proceed to Cronstadt, there to take on board her engines.

I understand that orders have been given here that no officers are to absent themselves on leave, and I am further informed that considerable quantities of medical stores have been despatched hence to the army in the south.

A traveller who is just arrived here from Odessa states that everything which he has observed on his journey denotes the greatest military activity: he believes (though the numbers appear to me exaggerated) that if necessary 500,000 men could, in a short time, be poured into Turkey, and what he collected inclines him to believe that in the event of war, Asiatic Turkey, as well as the Sultan's European Provinces, would be invaded.

With reference to the reports from Cronstadt, unqualified as I am to form an opinion upon naval matters, I do not hesitate to express to your Lordship my disbelief in the ability of the Government to man the whole of the Baltic fleet in a manner which would render it safe for this large number of ships to put to sea.

It appears to me that the answer returned by every Russian to whom an observation is addressed respecting the amount of military and naval preparations, is the same: "Certainement il faut se mettre en mesure."

The misfortune is, that in this country any hostile measure against Turkey is apt to be considered in the light of a war of religion.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 435.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 81.)

Foreign Office, June 18, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE received by the telegraph from Vienna your Excellency's despatch dated the 10th instant, stating that on the previous day a note from Count Nesselrode had been received by Reshid Pasha, requiring that the Porte should accept the last proposal of Prince Menchikoff within the space of eight days, and that in the event of its being rejected, the Russian army would cross the frontier within a few weeks in order to obtain by force and without a war, what the Porte would not give up spontaneously. Your Excellency further adds that this communication is viewed in the same light by Reshid Pasha, your three colleagues, and yourself, and that there is no appearance of a disposition to yield on the part of the Porte.

Her Majesty's Government see no reason to expect that the fact of the same demand having been made by Count Nesselrode instead of by Prince Menchikoff would produce any change in the decision taken by the Porte three weeks before; and they learn with much satisfaction that between your Excellency and the Representatives of France, Austria, and Prussia, there continues to exist a complete identity of opinion.

Russia has no more right to occupy the Principalities than she has any other portion of the Turkish territory: the pretext under which this aggression will be committed only renders such an abuse of power more flagrant; and Turkey

would be quite justified in regarding it as an act of war, notwithstanding the announcement of the Emperor of Russia that war is not intended.

Her Majesty's Government are however of opinion that the Sultan should be strongly advised to refrain from acting upon his undoubted right, and declaring war against Russia; not alone because Turkey is unprepared for war, and that her naval and military and financial resources are feeble as compared with those of Russia, but because it is of the utmost importance to prove to the world that where such vast social interests are concerned, no step has been taken in haste; that every measure which a conciliatory spirit can devise has been exhausted; and that upon Russia alone will devolve the fearful responsibility of involving Turkey, and possibly Europe, in a war which no man will be found to justify, and the duration and disastrous consequences of which it is impossible to calculate.

In the event, then, of no other steps being taken than the occupation of the Principalities, Her Majesty's Government would recommend that a solemn protest be addressed to the Russian Government against such an invasion of the Turkish territory, which is rendered more unjustifiable by the reasons assigned in its defence by Count Nesselrode in his note to Reshid Pasha.

The Porte should then, in language more definite and intelligible than has hitherto been used, explain the real character and practical operation of the Russian demands, the extent to which a compliance with them would confer upon the Emperor of Russia new influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte, and the consequent impossibility that the Sultan should consent to such an infringement of his sovereign rights—the Sultan being at a loss to conceive how this should cause the resentment of Russia, or be made matter of complaint against the Porte, because the justice and moderation of the Emperor's character forbid the idea that he would knowingly advance a claim unsupported by reason or right, and because both to the Sultan himself and to the different Powers of Europe, the Emperor has recently given assurances of his desire to respect the dignity of the Sultan, and to maintain the independence of the Turkish Empire.

It might moreover be stated that the Sultan has given proofs of his earnest desire to meet every just claim on the part of Russia, and to redress any just grievance under which his Greek subjects may labour; that reparation has been made with respect to the holy places, and the question settled to the entire satisfaction of Russia; and that the Porte is now prepared to give more explicit assurances in order to confirm that settlement.

The Russian Government should further be informed that the Porte has issued a firman which confers upon its Greek subjects the most complete tôleration, and secures to them the fullest enjoyment of their religious rights, immunities, and privileges; and in connection with this firman it appears to Her Majesty's Government that an explanatory Act might be offered by the Porte in the words of the Treaty of Kainardji, or with such change of that form of words as the Turkish Government may consider safe and consistent with the dignity of the Sultan.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 436.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 444. Confidential.)

Paris, June 19, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DE HUBNER has received despatches from Vienna relative to the Eastern question, which he has been desired to communicate to the French Government. Up to this afternoon he had not made the communication, but I learn from a confidential source that the Austrian Government is at bottom very much displeased with the conduct of Russia, although they are resolved in attempting to obtain satisfaction for her from the Porte.

M. de Bourqueney reports, under date of the 15th instant, that he had just had a categorical explanation with Count Buol, and that the latter appears to

enter much more into the views of the French Cabinet than he had done. A French messenger was to leave Vienna on the 16th, with the details of this explanation.

Despatches from the French Minister at Berlin, of the same date, are also more satisfactory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 437.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 82.)
Constantinople, June 3, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE been asked by Reshid Pasha, in the name of his Government, whether I advise that resistance should be offered to a Russian army crossing the Danube and invading Turkey. I have replied, that in my opinion it is desirable to avoid collision as long as possible, that the line which cannot be passed by an enemy without danger to the capital, is the one where forbearance must necessarily cease, and that a professional opinion can alone with propriety decide that question, which must partly be solved with reference to the available means of resistance.

I am informed by M. Pisani that the Porte adopts the principle thus offered to its consideration, and intends, by addressing suitable instructions to Omar Pasha, to leave its application, in the supposed case, to his discretion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 438.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 230. Confidential.)
Berlin, June 13, 1853.

My Lord,

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 98, of the 7th instant, I communicated this morning to Baron Manteuffel the copy of your Lordship's despatch to Sir Hamilton Seymour No. 81, of the 31st ultimo, asking for explanations from the Government of Russia.

I read to his Excellency the principal points of this despatch, and left the document with him, stating that it was meant only for his confidential information.

We had afterwards some general conversation on the Turkish question, and on my telling him that I had observed in one of Sir Hamilton Seymour's late despatches that Baron Meyendorff, the Russian Minister at Vienna, appeared, previously to his departure from St. Petersburgh, to have acted in a way infinitely to his credit with reference to the crisis in the East, his Excellency said that he knew but little of the proceedings of that Minister since his arrival at the Austrian Court, but that that little, according to the reports which had reached him, was not as satisfactory as he could have wished it to be.

Baron Manteuffel finally said that he was preparing the draft of a Convention which it was proposed should be entered into by the Five Powers, having for its object the welfare of Turkey, and that it was intended to forward this draft, when approved of, to Chevalier Bunsen, for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government.

This project may possibly lead to nothing; but it proves at all events that the King of Prussia and his Government take a lively interest in the maintenance of Turkey as an independent State, and are desirous to unite with the other Powers for so desirable an object.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 439.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 231. Confidential.)
Berlin, June 13, 1853.

My Lord,

IT having been lately stated to me by persons usually well informed, that they believed in the existence of an understanding between the Emperors of Austria and Russia as to the affairs of Turkey, and nominally that some verbal engagement had been entered into by the Emperor Francis Joseph, at Warsaw, during His Imperial Majesty's visit there after the Hungarian war, I alluded to the subject this morning in the course of conversation with Baron Manteuffel. His Excellency could not, however, confirm the impression which I had received, and observed that if any such engagement exists, the Prussian Government at all events was quite ignorant of it. The Baron then said in answer to an observation which I made on the supineness of Austria in the present crisis of Eastern affairs, that the King of Prussia had received an autograph letter two days ago from the Emperor of Austria, which was nearly filled up with allusions to the pleasure which had been given to the Imperial Court by His Majesty's late visit, and to various occurrences which took place during his stay there; but that at the close of this letter there was a short sentence relating to the difficulties in the East, which bore an important signification.

It was to the following effect: "That His Imperial Majesty placed entire confidence in the assurances which he had received from St. Petersburgh on this subject, and had no fears as to the intentions of the Emperor Nicholas.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 440.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 233.)
Berlin, June 17, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 230 of the 13th instant, Baron Manteuffel read to me yesterday the draft of Convention which it is the earnest desire of His Prussian Majesty should be taken into consideration by Her Majesty's Government. This project, having in view the interests of Turkey and the maintenance of its independence by binding the Five Powers from acting singly to the disadvantage of that country, will be sent immediately to Chevalier Bunsen.

I told Baron Manteuffel that I thought Her Majesty's Government would probably not consider the present moment favourable for bringing the question forward, as Russia would certainly not listen to any such project. He replied this certainly might be so, but that the King was very anxious on the subject, and that he had received his final orders to forward it.

It appears to me that Baron Manteuffel is desirous that the communication should be made as a record of the wishes and intentions of the Prussian Government, and in order to serve as a basis for future negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 441.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 234. Confidential.)
Berlin, June 17, 1853.

My Lord,

BARON MANTEUFFEL told me yesterday that Chevalier Bunsen has reported that a Conference of the Representatives of the Five Powers might be convened in London shortly on the complications in the East, and that the

Prussian Minister should of course attend the summons that your Lordship might address to him, for his Government would rejoice to see a Conference established for so laudable a purpose; but that news from St. Petersburgh and Vienna, which had lately arrived here, was very discouraging, and led him to expect that there could be no question of the Russian and Austrian Ministers appearing on this occasion. Consequently, added his Excellency, it would not be advisable for Chevalier Bunsen to attend any further meetings of the Representatives.

Baron Manteuffel naturally feels that the interests of Prussia are not to separate altogether from the general policy of her Northern Allies, though she differs materially from Russian and Austrian views on the Eastern question; but the dread of France is always uppermost with her, and will have its influence on the decision of the Prussian Cabinet; and if the two Imperial Governments threaten to abandon her to the dangers that may arise in the West, she will, I apprehend, have much difficulty in following up the good wishes and just intentions which dictated her original views on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 442.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 20.*)

(No. 235. Confidential.)

Berlin, June 17, 1853.

My Lord,

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Baron Manteuffel, I found his Excellency much dejected at the news which he had received from St. Petersburgh and Vienna: he said that nothing could be worse than it was from both places; that Count Münster, the Prussian Military Agent at St. Petersburgh, had stated that there was no making any impression whatever on the Emperor, for that His Imperial Majesty appeared resolved not to depart an iota from his lately-declared intentions with regard to Turkey; that Count Nesselrode's conciliatory advice was not listened to; that the Russian Government heaped the greatest abuse on the late conduct of M. de Klezl at Constantinople, and that Prince Menchikoff was positively in disgrace.

Baron Manteuffel said that he was fully prepared to hear of the Russians entering the Principalities; but that, at the same time, the most deplorable accounts had reached him as to the Imperial finances, and that certainly arrangements for an extended war had not been made.

His Excellency informed me that he learnt from the same confidential source, that Count Buol had written to Count Nesselrode, rather approving of than finding fault with the proceedings of the Russian Government; that the Austrian Government have no secrets from that of Russia, and that every communication sent from other places to Vienna has been made known at St. Petersburgh; and that Austria appears to desire that the Porte should yield everything rather than that there should be a risk of war.

Baron Manteuffel told me further, in great confidence, that nothing could be more detrimental to the interests of Turkey than the conduct of the Austrian Government, which seemed rather to increase than to lower the demands of Russia; and that he could not give me a better proof of the understanding which existed between Austria and Russia at the present moment, than by telling me that the Emperor Nicholas had lately written to the Emperor Francis Joseph, stating that he had learnt with extreme satisfaction the views taken by his Government of Eastern affairs, and that he always considers their objects to be identical. This apparent establishment of such complete confidence between the two Imperial Courts naturally causes alarm to Prussia, and she feels that, on the part of Austria, such a policy is an abandonment of German interests, and amounts almost to a dereliction of duty. The conduct of Austria, too, is doubly distasteful to Prussia, because the latter has, at all events, taken an independent course, and desires to persevere in it, and she feels that these two countries ought not to differ in the important question which now fixes the attention of Europe.

Baron Manteuffel seems resolved to follow up, as far as he is able, the line he has thus far adopted; and I was glad to learn from him—in answer to an inquiry which I made, as to whether the King's opinions were fluctuating, or had been influenced by all this intelligence—that they were unchanged. He said, "Je puis compter sur le Roi dans cette question,"—repeating almost the same words which he made use of to me the other day,—"il ne veut pas être à la remorque de la Russie." I asked Baron Manteuffel what he expected from Baron Bruch's arrival at Constantinople? He replied that Count Arnim, the Prussian Minister at Vienna, had not been able to discover much as to the instructions of the Austrian Internuncio, but that nominally he will be charged to mediate, and in reality will yield everything to Russia.

We spoke on the subject of proposals said to have been made at Vienna by Baron Meyendorff, which were that a note should be written by Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode, raising objections to certain passages in the draft projected by Prince Menchikoff, and that Count Nesselrode should reply that no political objects were sought by Russia—that religious motives alone had been in view.

Baron Manteuffel seemed to attach no value to this scheme, and seemed to think that it was put forward merely to amuse and occupy the Austrian Cabinet, and would have no practical effect.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 443.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 20.*)

(No. 236. Secret and Confidential.)

Berlin, June 17, 1853.

My Lord,

HAVING pressed Baron Manteuffel to-day to give me any further information he might possess as to the policy of Austria with respect to the affairs of Turkey, he said that he would tell me, in great confidence, the substance of a communication which had been made to him last night by the Austrian Minister.

Count Thun read to him two despatches from Count Buol—one inclosing a copy of the instructions to Baron Bruch, which were to the following effect: that he should use his best endeavours to obtain a peaceable solution of the difficult question which had arisen at Constantinople; that he was to urge the Porte to yield to the demands of Russia; and that if the Porte persisted in its refusal, he was to exert all his influence to prevent the Porte from opposing armed resistance to the occupation of the Danubian Principalities by Russian troops.

The other despatch was a confidential one—"reservée," as Baron Manteuffel called it. It related to the eventuality of a war between Russia and Turkey, and to the policy which Austria would follow in such case, which, it is declared, would be one of neutrality; that she would not interfere between the belligerents, but would strengthen her frontier garrisons and her armies in the Eastern provinces—less with the view to watch the military proceedings of the two parties, than of the various refugees and free corps that would doubtless form a considerable portion of the Turkish army.

Baron Manteuffel told me that he had certainly been prepared for Austria avoiding, as much as possible, to mix herself up in this matter; but he did not expect to see her take this line, and that he was grieved and disappointed at the policy which she now declared it was her intention to follow. He seemed to think it unworthy of that great country. He was unwilling to admit that the course she proposed to adopt was even partly the result of her own internal difficulties, but considered it to be an act of subserviency to the Emperor of Russia, which she would some day deplore.

I asked Baron Manteuffel what effect this communication would have on the Prussian Cabinet? He said that he had already spoken to the King on the subject, and that, far from inducing His Majesty to go back from his declaration, he could assure me that Prussia would be disposed to go further than she had

originally intended; adding, she would be now disposed to unite herself more closely with the policy of England as to the affairs of the East, and would be found ready to receive a proposition to this effect from Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 444.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 238.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 17, 1853.*

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch, No. 110 of the 15th instant, I have this day assured Baron Manteuffel that, in the possible event of any conference being deemed expedient, there would be no desire to exclude Russia, and that Baron Brunnow would be informed of it and would be at liberty to attend.

After I had made this communication his Excellency observed that Baron Budberg had just been to see him, and had said that he had heard (Baron Manteuffel believed from Baron Brunnow) that there was a question of a conference of the Four Powers being opened in London, and that he could assure him, if this were the case, it would be the most certain way of fixing the Emperor in his resolutions instead of producing a modification of them.

His Excellency further remarked that Baron Budberg had held a long tirade on the anti-Russian feeling which dictated the present policy of the Cabinet of Berlin, saying that Count Nesselrode had been greatly disappointed at it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 445.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 240.)
My Lord, *Berlin, June 17, 1853.*

IN conformity with the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch, No. 109, of the 15th instant, I have expressed to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the language which his Excellency lately held to the Russian Minister; and observed to him that England and France had taken no rash step and had done nothing that was inconsistent with a frank declaration of their intention to uphold the Turkish Empire.

I may add that his Excellency seems entirely to approve of the policy which has been pursued by Her Majesty's Government in the present crisis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 446.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 268.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 5, 1853.*

I UNDERSTAND upon good authority that the Emperor, upon being informed of the conversations which have taken place in Parliament respecting Prince Menchikoff's demands upon the Porte, remarked upon the "éternelle méfiance" exhibited upon these occasions in the intentions of Russia towards the Sultan!

His Majesty, in allusion to the declaration stated to have been made by Government as to their intention, in conjunction with France, of upholding the upholding the independence of the Turkish Empire, further observed that in this respect the purpose of the two Governments agreed entirely with his own.

On the same day this observation was made to me, as coming from himself, by the Chancellor.

The unity of purpose upon a given point, however, evidently does not interfere with the Emperor's intention of being prepared for any differences which may arise with regard to others; I understand that extensive orders have been given for collecting the supplies of food which would be required for a large army upon entering a foreign country, and, as I am positively assured, a fresh park of artillery stationed at Moscow has been despatched to the South.

The Russian funds, which are perhaps less subject to fluctuation than any others, have fallen ½*d.* in the silver rouble at Odessa, and ¼*d.* at St. Petersburgh, in consequence of the intelligence from Constantinople, and of the still more and evidently unfounded reports which are in circulation; whilst the general anxiety and want of confidence which prevail here have had the effect of paralyzing commerce at the very moment when it ought to be putting forth its greatest activity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 447.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 269. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 6, 1853.*

THE French Minister has read to me the minutes of a conversation which he had the honour of holding with the Emperor on the 4th instant.

His Majesty received General Castelbajac in the most gracious manner, and after expressing his regret at seeing him so seldom and desiring him to ask for an audience whenever he pleased, proceeded to speak of the affairs of the East.

His Majesty began by recapitulating the various circumstances connected with the disputes of the Greeks and Latins at Jerusalem, and observed (which had not before appeared) that his wish to have the question settled at Constantinople had proceeded from his desire of keeping clear of any altercation with the French Government.

In speaking of the late diplomatic rupture and its possible consequences, the Emperor appears to have been more explicit with General Castelbajac than he was with me; partly, I presume, because the subject is now more familiar to him than it was when I was last at the Palace, partly because His Majesty's feelings could be better expressed to any diplomatic agent than to a servant of the English Government.

His Majesty laid the chief blame of the rejection of Prince Menchikoff's note upon Her Majesty's Embassy, and as usual spoke in strong terms of disapprobation of all those who called in question the moderation of which the Russian Government had given proof upon this occasion.

This, indeed, is an old practice of the Emperor's, who is apt to consider and to speak of all those persons who have the misfortune of disagreeing with his

views as his personal enemies and as being infected with revolutionary principles.

With regard to his intentions, the Emperor declared most distinctly to General Castelbajac that he could not recede from his demands upon the Porte—that their continued rejection would be immediately followed by his occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia—but that he should not use actual force unless resistance were made to his army; that he should hold these Provinces as a "moyen de négociation" until he should obtain satisfaction; but that he should not consider himself at war with Turkey, should be as desirous as he had ever been, and as any other Government could be, to maintain the independence of the Ottoman Empire; and that, as a consequence of his resolution, he was quite ready to give the most positive assurances of his intention of not seeking any territorial aggrandizement at the expense of the Sultan's dominions.

The Emperor proceeded to express his hope that the demands which he had again offered to the Sultan might be considered as moderate by the Governments of France and England, as they were judged, he was happy to say, by the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets.

I here remarked to General Castelbajac that with regard to this point I recommended a very limited portion of confidence; that the fact might be as had been stated, but that it was at least singular that the feeling spoken of was not known either to the Austrian or Prussian Mission, while the policy of accrediting such a belief was obvious.

Going back to his memoranda, the French Envoy then stated that the Emperor had in a very remarkable way betrayed his want of confidence in his naval power; His Majesty had said that he was aware his Black Sea fleet would soon be destroyed were they to come into collision with those of England and France; "for that reason," added His Majesty, "I shall keep them out of your reach should war break out: even so, it is possible that my ships might be destroyed in the harbour of Sevastopol, although, supposing them to be so, their loss would have little effect upon the operations in Turkey."

After going through and commenting upon these notes, General Castelbajac read me a despatch which he had addressed to his Government, in which his view of the present state of affairs is very plainly stated.

General Castelbajac believes the advanced period of the season and the imperfect state of the Commissariat to be insuperable obstacles to any attempt at crossing the Balkan and marching upon Constantinople.

He believes that not more than one of the three divisions of the Baltic fleet could be adequately manned; that France alone would not oppose an adequate resistance to any serious design formed by Russia against Turkey; that a joint resistance on the part of England and France might be sufficient for the purpose, but that such an attempt would be likely to give rise to a general war, one of the effects of which would be to set loose all the revolutionary spirits in Europe; that a joint remonstrance of the Four Powers against the intentions of the Emperor would keep him in check, but that such community of purpose is not to be expected.

Finally, that as the Emperor has made a bad position for himself by exchanging the confidence with which he has been regarded by foreign Cabinets, for the substitution of a recognized protectorate for one just as real, without its recognition—the exchange effected too after great exertions and a considerable abatement of original terms—it is more prudent to leave His Majesty in that bad position, than by endeavouring to induce him to accept a moral defeat, to which he could not submit, and to drive him into a war which would be pleasing to his own subjects, and which must end disastrously for Turkey.

At the same time, General Castelbajac (without offering any suggestion as to its nature) expresses an opinion as to the possibility of some modification being obtained from the Emperor of the conditions which it has been endeavoured to force upon the acceptance of the Sultan's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 448.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 20.*)

(No. 272.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 9, 1853.*

THE Chancellor has had the kindness to send me, this morning, Baron Brunnow's memorandum of the $\frac{1}{13}$th ultimo.

I regret not being able to copy this document, which I am requested to take back to his Excellency in two hours' time, as it is one which requires attentive consideration.

It appears to me that Baron Brunnow's arguments in favour of the justness of the demands made by Russia upon the Porte are conclusive or inconclusive, according to the starting point of the discussion.

If the Russian Cabinet require only that the settlement of the Greek and Latin dispute at Jerusalem should be made permanent and binding, by means of an Act of as stringent a nature as the Capitulations between France and the Porte, I am bound in honesty to state that the demand corresponds closely with the intentions which had been repeatedly made known to me.

If, on the contrary, the whole relations of the Greek Church in Turkey towards the Sultan are to be changed, I can only say that the idea is not only new to me, but that it is opposed to the repeated explanations and assurances which I have received from the Chancellor.

But, remarks Baron Brunnow, if England had undertaken to procure the acceptance of the Russian demands, she would have had a right to ask for the detail of propositions.

She did not; and she remained "libre de ses conseils, comme la Russie, à son tour, est restée libre de son action."

This passage suggests two observations. It may be that Russia (supposing her at least not to be bound by Treaty to respect the independence of the Sultan) would have been at liberty to follow her own free action towards Turkey, and to withhold a knowledge of her intentions from Her Majesty's Government; but she did not use that right. Explanations very full—assurances very tranquillizing, were voluntarily given; and the question now is, does the course of action pursued by the Russian Cabinet correspond with those, in fact, engagements?

Again, Baron Brunnow speaks of "propositions;" but did the communications made by Prince Menchikoff to the Sultan's Government, contain propositions, or were they demands under menace in case of refusal?

In a subsequent passage of his memorandum, Baron Brunnow quotes the following passage of a despatch of Prince Menchikoff's, as explanatory of the Russian views:

"Nous ne demandons pas le droit de protéger des Chrétiens du rit orthodoxe, sujets de la Porte, mais le maintien du *statu quo* religieux de ce rit."

If this is so, assuredly there can be no incompatibility between that which the Emperor has a claim to ask, and that which the Sultan would do well to grant—the demand for a confirmation of old rights, not the grant of new ones.

Further on, and speaking in the name of His Imperial Majesty, Baron Brunnow says: "Il a tenu uniquement en vue de sauvegarder l'Eglise Orthodoxe en Turquie contre les empiètements et les lésions dont elle venait d'éprouver l'injuste et flagrante atteinte."

With this view, continues M. de Brunnow, His Majesty insists upon obtaining from the Porte "un Acte formel, un Acte explicatif." "Cet Acte dans la pensée de Sa Majesté ne doit servir qu'à confirmer l'Eglise Orthodoxe dans la possession des droits dont elle jouit en Orient; l'Empereur ne demande ni plus ni moins."

"Un Acte formel, un Acte explicatif," appears, however, to have been that which it would have been in Prince Menchikoff's power to obtain at Constantinople, but that which he did not consider worthy of acceptance.

At the close of his memorandum, Baron Brunnow lays down what is the greatest proof of respect for an independent Sovereign. "It is," he says, "that of not preventing him from fulfilling his engagements towards a friendly and

neighbouring Power." The duty is certainly very imperative, and it is one in which Her Majesty's Government are little likely to be found wanting; but in point of order of succession, it appears more proper to establish that the greatest proof of respect which can be shown to an independent Sovereign is, to refrain from encroaching upon his independence.

This, however, is mere verbal criticism. That which is of more importance, and which is deducible from Baron Brunnow's memorandum, is, that there is nothing in the demands which can fairly be made by Russia on the Porte which, under temperate negotiation or impartial arbitration, could not be obtained with honour to the Emperor, and without danger either to the independence of Turkey or to the peace of Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 449.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 273. Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 9, 1853.*

IF there were no other reason for holding fast to truth, there would be this very adequate one, that a single departure from it constantly involves many others.

This remark is suggested by the flagrant contradiction which is to be observed between the declarations made to your Lordship and to myself, as to the Russian intentions with regard to Turkey, and the course of threats and probable violence which has been commenced under the auspices of Prince Menchikoff.

That a gross deception has been practised upon Her Majesty's Government, of which, to my eternal regret, I have been made a principal instrument, is not to be denied; the only question appears to me to be, to what extent that deceit was premeditated, and at what period it commenced.

It is very possible that it may have been so from the outset, and that the Emperor discovered in the dispute which arose respecting the holy places, an opportunity which might be turned to the purpose of carrying through a scheme of ambition; but it is likewise not improbable that the deception may be of a more recent date, and that it originated in the perception of a quiet confirmation of the Emperor's rights at Jerusalem, being a conclusion which by no means responded to the expectations raised among Greeks and Russians by the Emperor's armed diplomacy and the extent of his military preparations.

As regards Baron Brunnow, the part assigned to him has been, if I do not err, similar to that which I have been called to play in the transaction.

Having had several opportunities of reading his private letters, as well as his public despatches, I conjecture him to have been the better qualified to mislead Her Majesty's Government from having been himself misled and deceived as to the Emperor's real objects.

However this may be, the system of disregarding truth being once established, there appears to be little hesitation as to its adoption.

The Emperor, as I have had the honour of stating to your Excellency, acquainted General Castelbajac on the 4th instant, that the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets approved of the proceedings of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, and, as I have since ascertained, declarations to the same effect had been made by the Chancellor to the Grecian and Swedish Envoys.

As I am compelled to speak in terms which are painful to apply to a Sovereign whom I have every wish to be able to respect, it may be but justice to offer perhaps the only excuse which is to be made for a portion of his late conduct.

Supposing, as it may appear there is good reason for believing, that His Majesty imagines himself to be possessed of much more extensive rights, as the defender of the Greek religion, than any Treaty ever assigned to him, and if it

be admitted that this error exists, it may be much more readily believed that none of those who approach His Majesty have had the frankness and courage to point it out to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 450.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 279.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 10, 1853.*

THE Chancellor has read me a short memorandum respecting the French protectorate in Turkey.

The object is to prove that the right has been long exercised by the Sovereigns of France with regard to Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan, as well as with respect to Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Italians.

In proof of the statement, the Protocol No. 3 of the 3rd February 1830 is adduced; the dispositions of which assign to the King of Greece the protecting rights possessed up to that period by the Kings of France as regards the Catholics belonging to the provinces transferred from Turkey to Greece.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 451.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 280. Secret and Confidential.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE held a second conversation with General Castelbajac, at which he observed that he was now able to give me more ample particulars of what passed between the Emperor and him on the 4th instant.

The two points which I think it right to notice to your Lordship, are the following:

His Imperial Majesty having observed that he was convinced that the good faith for which the Emperor Napoleon was so remarkable, would lead him to take a very favourable view of the demands upon the Porte by Prince Menchikoff; to this the Marquis de Castelbajac represents himself to have replied, that certainly the rectitude of his Imperial Master had been manifested upon three remarkable occasions. It had been shown in the manner in which he had accepted the mode of recognition by some of the great Powers—it had been shown by his eagerness to see good relations re-established between Austria and Prussia—it had again been shown by his willingness to accept the settlement of the Holy Places Question upon terms which, although not quite agreeable to his feelings, were such as he had thought it right to accede to, out of regard to the general interests of Europe.

The other point is of much greater importance. Having requested General Castelbajac, now that he had time to make his report, to inform me precisely what the Emperor had said respecting his intentions, he stated, that His Majesty's declaration was as follows:

Que si les Turcs ne se décidaient point à accepter la note qui leur avait été remise par le Prince Menchikoff, il se verrait dans l'obligation d'occuper la Valachie et la Moldavie. Que dans ce cas il espérait que la France et l'Angleterre ne donneront point à leurs flottes les ordres de franchir les Dardanelles, que si celles-ci devaient y arriver ce ne serait par sur lui que pesérait la responsabilité de ce qui pourrait s'en suivre: Qu'il se garderait bien (?) [or some similar expression which General Castelbajac could not call to mind, but

which signified a recognition of the inability of the Russian fleet to cope with those of England and France], d'envoyer ses vaisseaux à leur rencontre, mais que quand même l'on voudrait brûler sa flotte dans le port de Sevastopol, rien ne l'empêchait d'envahir la Turquie.

Your Lordship will, I am sure, excuse my having reverted to this subject; but I have been desirous of learning, as nearly as possible, what were the exact words employed by the Emperor upon a matter of the highest interest.

The impression which they left upon the mind of General Castelbajac is, that the Emperor conceives himself authorized to occupy the Danubian provinces, if he thinks proper; but that he would consider the consequent entry of the Dardanelles by an English or French fleet as a breach of Treaty engagements.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—It may be proper to state to your Lordship, that in alluding to the conversation between the Emperor and his Chef, the French Secretary of Legation is known to have said that a part of it was a great secret, and known only to himself and General Castlebajac.

I should likewise state, that after his audience the French Minister addressed a short letter to the Emperor himself; and that I understand that he is to have a fresh audience of His Imperial Majesty.

G. H. S.

No. 452.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 282.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 10, 1853.*

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Lordship's despatch No. 81, upon which I am desirous of offering some observations before stating that the orders which it contains have been acted upon.

It has been, I can assure your Lordship, a great relief to me to learn that if my reports have been the means of misleading Her Majesty's Government with regard to the intentions of the Imperial Cabinet towards Turkey, the fault —if it is one—is not to be ascribed to the incorrectness of my statements. I might indeed have misapprehended Count Nesselrode's explanations and assurances if only once given, but it can hardly be imagined that I can have misunderstood their meaning when repeated over and over again; and the hypothesis of misapprehension becomes wholly inadmissible when it is seen that the successive statements of the Russian Cabinet to the English Envoy have been re-echoed seriatim to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the Emperor's Minister in London. I am, however, desirous of acknowledging to your Lordship, that such blame as may attach to a complete belief in solemn assurances, very justly belongs to me, and that it has been my misfortune, as I thought it my duty, to express to Her Majesty's Government the confidence with which those assurances inspired me. As matters of fact, I have often been called upon, it is true, to notice to your Lordship circumstances which appeared to be in contradiction with the moderate and conciliatory intentions professed by the Imperial Cabinet; but I could not prevail upon myself to allow appearances, however suspicious, to outweigh distinct explanations and assurances equally explicit.

I may now be permitted to state to your Lordship that the explanations which I have been ordered to seek of the Russian Government have been in some measure forestalled by the communications made to Her Majesty's Government, through the Russian Mission in London, and by my own despatches.

Before this despatch can leave St. Petersburgh, your Lordship will have learned that, instead of explaining former declarations, the Russian Cabinet is only intent on making known its resolutions with regard to those events which are in preparation. It was, however, not the less my duty to endeavour to obtain from Count Nesselrode the explanations which are required by your

Lordship's despatch, and with this view I waited upon his Excellency yesterday, having, on the preceding evening, placed the paper itself in his Excellency's hands.

The conversation which ensued was as little satisfactory as possible, and the Chancellor himself appeared in low spirits, and perhaps more distant than usual in manner.

Her Majesty's Government, he said, had expressed a desire to receive explanations from the Emperor's Cabinet. By this time they must be received: they would be found in the account of my audience of the Emperor, and in the long "travail" which had been addressed to Baron Brunnow.

Some discussion ensued as to the striking difference observable between the explanations given to your Lordship and to myself by Baron Brunnow and Count Nesselrode; when it was soon to be seen that it would be impossible to come to an understanding as to facts.

I begged leave to pass to a more practical part of the question—to suggest that it would be most desirable that time should be given for reflection and deliberation, and that resolutions which might lead to the most serious consequences, should not be acted upon hastily.

The Chancellor said the period for deliberation was known to me; that if at the end of eight days Prince Menchikoff's note should not be accepted by the Porte, orders would be given for the immediate occupation of the Principalities.

When I remarked that another eight days would intervene before the news of a refusal could reach St. Petersburgh, Count Nesselrode stated that this was not to be counted upon; that on the intelligence he referred to arriving at Odessa, orders for the advance of the troops would be given by the General in command there.

A fresh discussion then arose, in which I stated that although I could not give my word of honour that such was the case, a distinct impression had been upon my mind of twenty-four days being the probable term assigned—eight for the messenger's journey to Constantinople, eight days for his return, and an intermediate eight days for deliberation. That I had made this statement to Baron Meyendorff, who was just setting off for Vienna, some minutes after leaving the Emperor's presence. The Chancellor thought that His Imperial Majesty would hardly be brought to accord this delay.

I then spoke of some middle course which it would not be difficult to suggest for an adjustment of differences. The Chancellor had thought upon the point, but could not see any could be devised. "You have known me," he said, "two years; you have seen that I am not disposed to violent measures (à casser les vitres). Well, I declare to you that I could not advise the Emperor to recede: his dignity would be lowered, his position would be compromised—it would be a triumph for the Turks and a humiliation for Russia. The inevitable result would be a war with Turkey. The insolence of the Turks would become such, that friendly relations with them would become impossible."

I replied that assuredly nothing could be further from my wish than to lower the Emperor's position, but that I desired that all parties concerned should be spared humiliation, and that if according to his notion, Governments friendly to Turkey, and bound by Treaty to respect her independence, were to counsel her to accede to a demand which was held to involve the sacrifice of that independence, his Excellency must see that they would be called upon to act a part unworthy of their dignity.

The Chancellor would not admit that there was any compromise of independence in the assent to be given by Turkey to the demands made upon her. At least, I said, it may be taken to be the opinion of all impartial men who have given their attention to the subject.

Count Nesselrode then, with a warmth of manner which appeared to me to be assumed for the occasion, remarked upon the unfair and prejudicial manner in which the claims and the grievances of Russia were always received by Foreign Cabinets; on these occasions the eternal jealousy of Russia came to light. France had intended to bombard Tripoli,—not a word of blame was to be heard; Russia sought temperately for redress of a serious grievance, and exceptions were instantly raised—instantly Russia was charged with a wish to destroy the independence of Turkey.

I observed that I thought, as probably every one else would, that the reparation sought by Russia was wholly disproportioned to the offence given her by

the Turkish Government, which had offended, not from unfriendly feelings, but from weakness; but that as regarded Her Majesty's Government, I could accept of no reproach; that every disposition had existed on their part that every just complaint of Russia should be attended to, and its repetition guarded against; and that in reply to an insinuation thrown out by his Excellency, I must state that a large mass of correspondence, of which I was in possession, established the fact of these friendly feelings having been worthily acted upon by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who had throughout been intent on adopting a course which, if only not dangerous to Turkey, might be acceptable to His Imperial Majesty.

In reply to my observations as to the extreme confidence shown by Her Majesty's Government in the intentions of the Emperor, as proved by a fleet not having been sent to the Levant, Count Nesselrode replied, "And if you had sent a fleet there, how would that have altered the position of affairs? Would that deprive us of the means of marching our armies into Turkey?"

M. le Comte, I replied, I take, I assure you, the most dispassionate view of Turkish affairs; I believe the Emperor to have the power of overrunning Turkey when he pleases, but it is clear that such a step would involve very serious consequences, and I can hardly believe that the feelings by which the Emperor is known to be animated, would allow him hastily to take a measure which might throw the whole of Europe into a state of war.

Count Nesselrode repeated his former declaration, that if at the close of the prescribed term, the Turks should not accede to the Emperor's conditions, His Majesty would be compelled, by a sense of his dignity, to occupy the Principalities; but that no violence would be employed, and that for the present His Majesty would content himself with this preparatory measure. There will, Count Nesselrode said, be no further advance into Turkey.

I must once more state to your Lordship, that in endeavouring to report as faithfully as I am able the declarations of the Russian Minister, I am compelled, after the painful experience which I have acquired, to confine myself to reporting. The despatch to which I am replying, shows what value is to be attached to the explanations and declarations of the Russian Cabinet.

I am, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 453.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 20.)

(No. 284. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, June 11, 1853.

My Lord,

YOUR Lordship will no doubt have received a copy of a despatch dated the 23rd, which reached me yesterday evening from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe. It appeared to me desirable that this document should be communicated as soon as possible to Count Nesselrode, and I accordingly sent it immediately to his Excellency inclosed in a private letter of which I beg to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 453.

Sir G. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private.)

June 10, 1853.

My dear Count Nesselrode,

I HAD the honour of observing to you yesterday that some despatches of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's, of which copies had been sent me, were sufficient to establish the extraordinary injustice of the statements which had been made respecting the unconciliatory conduct which his Lordship had been represented to have held in the late negotiations at Constantinople. As the whole of these

transactions will surely come to light, full justice will, I am convinced, be awarded to a diplomatist whose exertions to reconcile conflicting interests have been on the contrary most honourable; but as the hour of explanations and publicity has not yet arrived, I beg to inclose you a despatch which I have just received from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe himself.

Perhaps your Excellency will be good enough to return the despatch at your leisure, as I must send a copy of it to Lord Clarendon.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 454.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 21.)

(No. 285.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburgh, June 12, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the "Journal de St. Pétersbourg" of this date, containing the "Projet de Note" submitted as an ultimatum, by Prince Menchikoff, to the acceptance of the Porte, as well as an instruction from Count Nesselrode to the Russian Legations covering the same, and embodying an apology for the policy of the Russian Government in the preceding negotiation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 454.

Extract from the "Journal de Saint Pétersbourg."

Circulaire.

Monsieur,

St. Pétersbourg, le 30 *Mai*, 1853.

LA mission de M. le Prince Menchikoff en Turquie ayant déjà donné lieu aux rumeurs les plus exagérées, rumeurs auxquelles son départ et l'interruption de rapports qui s'en est suivie ne feront sans doute qu'ajouter encore, je crois devoir vous transmettre à ce sujet quelques renseignements généraux pour vous servir à rectifier les fausses données qui pourraient s'être répandues dans le pays où vous résidez.

Je crois superflu de vous dire qu'il n'y a pas un mot de vrai dans la prétention que les journaux nous ont prêtée de réclamer, soit un nouvel agrandissement de territoire, soit un règlement plus avantageux de notre frontière Asiatique, soit le droit de nomination ou de révocation des Patriarches de Constantinople, soit enfin tout autre protectorat religieux tendant à dépasser celui que nous exerçons traditionnellement de fait et de droit en Turquie, en vertu de nos Traités antérieurs. Vous connaissez assez la politique de l'Empereur pour savoir que Sa Majesté ne veut pas la ruine et la destruction de l'Empire Ottoman, sauvé par elle-même à deux reprises; qu'au contraire elle a toujours regardé et regarde encore le *statu quo* actuel, comme la meilleure combinaison possible à interposer entre tous les intérêts Européens qui ne manqueraient pas de se heurter de front en Orient, si le vide venait à s'y faire;—et que, quant à la protection du culte Gréco-Russe en Turquie, nous n'avons pas besoin, pour en surveiller les intérêts, d'autres droits que ceux que nous assurent nos Traités, notre position, l'influence résultant de la sympathie religieuse qui existe entre 50 millions de Russes du rit Grec et la grande majorité des sujets Chrétiens du Sultan; influence séculaire; influence inévitable, parcequ'elle est dans les faits et non dans les mots, influence que l'Empereur a trouvée toute faite en montant sur le trône, et à laquelle, il ne saurait, par déférence pour les injustes soupçons qu'elle éveille, renoncer sans abandonner le glorieux héritage de ses augustes prédécesseurs.

C'est vous dire combien ont peu de fondement tous les bruits semés au sujet de la mission du Prince Menchikoff, laquelle n'a jamais eu d'autre objet que l'arrangement de l'affaire des lieux saints.

Il serait, Monsieur, trop long de vous retracer en détail l'historique de toutes

les phases par lesquelles elle a passé depuis l'année 1850. Cette question, nous avons la conscience de ne l'avoir point soulevée les premiers. Nous savions trop combien elle était grosse de conséquences pour la paix de l'Orient, peut-être même pour la paix du monde. Nous n'avons cessé, dès son origine, d'appeler l'attention sérieuse des grands Cabinets sur la position qu'elle nous ferait, sur les graves éventualités qui en devaient naître ; et le développement successif qu'elle a pris, en amenant enfin la crise actuelle, n'a que trop justifié nos tristes prévisions. Il suffira pour le moment de vous rappeler qu'à la suite des premières concessions obtenues par la France en faveur des Latins à Jérusalem, au détriment des privilèges séculaires accordés aux Grecs, l'Empereur, voyant chaque jour la partialité évidente de la Porte pour les Latins l'entraîner à des concessions de plus en plus graves pour les droits et intérêts du culte Oriental, se trouva dans l'obligation d'adresser sur ce sujet une lettre amicale mais sérieuse au Sultan. Les résultats de cette démarche furent, d'abord l'appel d'une Commission exclusivement composée d'Oulémas Turcs, qui s'occupa d'un arrangement propre à concilier les prétentions réciproques ; puis, après de longs pourparlers, une lettre responsive du Sultan à l'Empereur, annonçant la solution définitive de la question et renfermant les promesses les plus solennelles sur le maintien des anciens droits octroyés par la Porte aux communautés Grecques. Un firman qui renfermait les détails de cet arrangement nous fut en même temps communiqué. En tête de ce firman, un hatti-shérif autographe du Sultan reconnaissait et consacrait de la manière la plus formelle les Actes antérieurs accordés aux Grecs à différentes époques, renouvelés par le Sultan Mahmoud, et confirmés par le Souverain actuel.

Bien que cette lettre et ce firman fussent conçus dans un esprit et dans des termes qui s'écartaient quelque peu du strict *statu quo* que nous nous étions toujours attachés à maintenir, cependant ces pièces ayant paru à l'Empereur satisfaire jusqu'à un certain point à sa juste sollicitude pour les intérêts et les immunités du culte Gréco-Russe à Jérusalem, un désir de conciliation porta Sa Majesté à les accepter. Elle en prit acte, de manière à leur donner la valeur d'une transaction solennelle et définitive.

En présence de ces documents catégoriques, officiellement communiqués à la suite d'une longue et pénible négociation, le Gouvernement Impérial était certes fondé à considérer comme à jamais clos un débat dont sa modération avait réussi à écarter les dangers, et qui laissait les Latins en possession de nouveaux avantages. Vous savez que malheureusement il n'en a point été ainsi.

Je serais entraîné trop loin, si je relatais ici tous les actes de faiblesse, de tergiversation, et de duplicité qui ont signalé la conduite des autorités Ottomanes, lorsqu'il s'est agi d'accomplir les engagements pris à notre égard, et de procéder à Jérusalem, suivant les formes d'usage, à la promulgation, à l'enregistrement et à l'exécution du firman. Envoyé à cet effet dans la Ville Sainte, selon l'assurance explicite qu'en avait reçue notre mission à Constantinople, le Commissaire Turc, une fois sur les lieux, osa déclarer à notre Consul, qui insistait sur la lecture et l'enregistrement du firman, qu'il n'avait point connaissance de cet Acte, et qu'il n'en était fait aucune mention dans ses instructions. Bien que plus tard, sur nos réclamations, le firman ait fini par être lu et enregistré à Jérusalem, il ne l'a été qu'avec des restrictions blessantes pour le culte Oriental. Mais pour ce qui est de l'Acte même, si l'on en excepte l'accomplissement de ces simples formalités, les dispositions principales en ont été ouvertement transgressées. L'infraction la plus flagrante en a été la remise aux mains du Patriarche Latin de la clef de la porte principale de l'Eglise de Bethléem. Cette remise était contraire aux termes précis du firman. Elle heurtait profondément le clergé et toute la population du rite Gréco-Russe, parceque, suivant les idées accréditées en Palestine, la possession de la clef semble impliquer à elle seule celle du temple tout entier. Le Gouvernement Turc constatait ainsi aux yeux de tous, contre son propre intérêt même, la suprématie qu'il accorde à un autre rite que celui auquel est soumise la majorité de ses sujets.

Un pareil oubli des promesses les plus positives consignées dans la lettre du Sultan à l'Empereur ; un manque de foi aussi patent, aggravé encore par les procédés et par le langage dérisoire des Conseillers de Son Hautesse ; étaient certes de nature à autoriser notre Auguste Maître, blessé dans sa dignité, dans sa confiance amicale, dans son culte, et dans les sentiments religieux qui lui sont communs avec ses peuples, à demander sur-le-champ une satisfaction éclatante. Sa Majesté l'aurait pu faire, si, comme l'on accuse sans cesse une opinion

faussée dans ses sources, elle ne cherchait que des prétextes pour renverser l'Empire Ottoman. Mais elle ne l'a point voulu. Elle a préféré obtenir cette satisfaction par les voies d'une négociation pacifique. Elle s'est efforcée encore une fois d'éclairer le Souverain de la Turquie sur ses torts envers nous, comme envers ses propres intérêts, d'en appeler à sa sagesse des fautes de son Ministère ; et c'est dans ce but qu'elle a envoyé Prince Menchikoff à Constantinople.

Sa mission avait deux objets, toujours relatifs à l'affaire des Lieux Saints :

1. Négocier, à la place du firman que l'on avait mis à néant, un nouvel arrangement qui, sans enlever aux Latins ce qu'ils venaient d'obtenir en dernier lieu (car nous voulions éviter de placer, en exigeant ce retrait, la Porte Ottomane vis-à-vis de la France précisément dans la fausse position où elle était placée vis-à-vis de nous), expliquât au moins ces concessions de manière à leur ôter l'apparence d'une victoire remportée sur le culte Gréco-Russe, et rétablît, moyennant quelques compensations légitimes, l'equilibre rompu aux depens de ce dernier.

2. Corroborer cet arrangement par un Acte authentique, qui pût nous servir à la fois de réparation pour le passé, de garantie pour l'avenir.

Cette première partie de la mission de notre Ambassadeur Extraordinaire, fort difficile et fort épineuse en elle-même, en ce qu'il s'agissait de mettre d'accord les droits et les intérêts réciproques mais contradictoires de la Russie et de la France, nous croyons y avoir apporté un extrême esprit de conciliation, dispositions auxquelles, nous aimons à le dire, le Gouvernement Français a répondu de son côté. Après de longues discussions, elle venait enfin de porter fruit, et le résultat en a été la rédaction de deux nouveaux firmans, obtenus sans opposition de la part de l'Ambassadeur de France.

Mais, comme je l'ai dit plus haut, la question à négocier présentait encore une autre face. Obtenir un arrangement n'était pas tout. Sans un Acte qui le validât, qui nous offrît la garantie que les nouveaux firmans seraient à l'avenir exécutés et religieusement observés dans leur principe et leurs conséquences, il est évident que ces documents, après la flagrante violation de celui qui les avait précédés, ne pouvaient avoir à nos yeux plus de valeur réelle que celui-ci. Cette garantie, l'Empereur y attachait d'autant plus d'importance, qu'elle constituait au fond la seule et unique réparation qu'il demandait après l'outrage fait à sa dignité par le manque de foi de la Porte Ottomane, après surtout les circonstances qui l'avaient rendu encore plus patent.

Le Prince Menchikoff fut chargé de chercher à l'obtenir, moyennant une Convention qu'il signerait avec le Gouvernement Turc. De traité proprement dit, il n'en a jamais été question.

On s'est récrié hautement contre la forme de cette Convention, comme portant atteinte en principe aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan ; comme nous conférant de fait, au nom de la religion, un droit d'ingérence perpétuelle dans les affaires intérieures de la Turquie. Nous croyons qu'on se crée là un fantôme, qu'on se préoccupe de craintes dont le fondement est plus spécieux que réel.

En principe, une Convention ou même un Traité pareil n'auraient rien d'insolite ; et nous ne comprenons pas en quoi ils seraient plus attentatoires aux droits d'autonomie souveraine du Sultan que les Capitulations ou autres Actes que possèdent déjà en Turquie la France et l'Autriche. Car, en principe seulement, c'est-à-dire, en ce qui concerne l'indépendance du Sultan, il importe peu qu'un Acte s'applique à tel ou tel nombre plus ou moins considérable de ses sujets en faveur desquels s'exercerait un droit de protection étrangère. La garantie par Traité assurée dans un autre Etat aux intérêts d'une communion étrangère a été usuelle de tout temps. A l'époque de la Réforme, par exemple, des Etats, même de grands Etats Catholiques, ont conclu avec d'autres des Traités, ou Conventions, par lesquels ils garantissaient chez eux à la Communion Protestante certains privilèges, franchises, et immunités, en sorte que, même aujourd'hui, la position civile de cette Communion y repose encore sur ces bases, sans que pour cela les Etats, qui ont donné pareille garantie, se soient crus lésés dans leurs droits souverains ou dans leur indépendance politique. A plus forte raison, en principe, de tels Actes peuvent-ils être conclus avec un Etat Musulman, dont les sujets Chrétiens ont souffert et souffrent encore tant de fois, non-seulement dans leurs immunités, mais dans leurs propriétés et dans leur existence.

Quant au fait, en ce qui nous concerne, la chose existe déjà, et la forme d'une Convention que nous avons proposée n'offrirait rien de nouveau en matière

de protection religieuse. Le Traité de Kainardji, par lequel la Porte s'engage à protéger constamment dans ses Etats la religion Chrétienne et ses églises, implique pour nous suffisamment un droit de surveillance et de remontrance. Ce droit se trouve établi derechef, et plus clairement encore spécifié dans le Traité d'Andrinople, qui a confirmé toutes nos transactions antérieures. Celle de Kainardji, date de l'année 1774. Voilà donc, de fait, près de 80 ans que nous possédons par écrit le droit même que l'on nous conteste, et dont on regarde la mention qui en serait faite aujourd'hui comme devant apporter une révolution toute nouvelle dans nos rapports avec la Porte Ottomane, en nous conférant la souveraineté effective de l'immense majorité de ses sujets. Certes, durant ce laps de temps, si nous avions été disposés à en abuser, comme d'incurables défiances le supposent, les occasions ne nous auraient pas manqué, dans les derniers temps surtout, où l'Europe livrée à l'anarchie, où les Gouvernements impuissants contre la discorde intérieure, étaient absorbés ou distraits par les révolutions de l'Occident et laissaient en Orient libre carrière aux vues ambitieuses qu'on nous prête. Si nous avions les intentions qu'on se plait à nous supposer, aurions-nous attendu pour les mettre à exécution que la paix fût rétablie en Europe? Aurions-nous disposé nos forces de manière à en offrir à nos voisins le secours moral ou matériel? Aurions-nous travaillé avec zèle, comme nous l'avons fait, à réconcilier nos alliés, à écarter tout ce qui pouvait nuire à l'union intime des Puissances? Au contraire, nous aurions cherché à perpétuer leur désaccord. Nous aurions laissé les Gouvernements Européens se débattre entre eux ou avec leurs peuples en révolte, et, profitant de leurs embarras, nous aurions volé sans obstacle au but de ce qu'on persiste à nommer notre politique envahissante. Aujourd'hui que l'ordre social s'est heureusement raffermi partout, et que les Etats, rassis sur leurs bases, peuvent disposer plus librement de leur action comme de leurs forces, le moment serait étrangement choisi pour suivre une pareille politique.

Encore une fois, en principe et en fait, une Convention avec la Porte dans l'intérêt de nos coreligionnaires n'a rien de nouveau. Elle ne nous offrirait nul avantage que nous ne possédions, depuis longtemps, et dont nous n'eussions pu faire abus si nos intentions étaient telles qu'on le suppose. Si nous sommes forts, nous n'en avons pas besoin. Si nous sommes faibles, un pareil acte ne nous rendrait pas plus à craindre. Cela est si vrai, que nous n'aurions jamais songé à en faire la proposition à propos de la question spéciale des lieux saints, si la Porte ne nous avait obligés, par l'oubli de ses promesses antérieures, à tâcher de la lier plus étroitement au maintien du *status quo* des sanctuaires de la Palestine; si, quand nous avons réclamé contre les concessions faites à notre détriment, elle ne nous avait donné pour excuse qu'en ce qui concerne les lieux saints la France avait un Traité, et que la Russie n'en avait pas.

Au reste, Monsieur, nous n'avons jamais fait d'une Convention proprement dite la condition *sine quâ non* de notre accommodement avec la Porte. Tout en remettant sous cette forme au Prince Menchikoff, lors de son envoi à Constantinople, la minute des stipulations qu'il aurait à négocier, il lui avait été laissé pleine et entière latitude non-seulement de les modifier dans leurs termes, mais aussi de les obtenir sous telle autre forme quelconque à laquelle répugneraient moins les susceptibilités de la Porte ou de la Diplomatie Etrangère. C'est d'après cette autorisation que notre négociateur, arrivé sur les lieux et ayant pu se convaincre des obstacles que rencontrait notre Projet de Convention, s'est borné à demander, sous le nom de Sened, un Acte plus en rapport avec les usages Orientaux et moins conforme aux idées solennelles qu'implique d'ordinaire le mot de Convention dans le droit public Européen. Deux clauses étendues de ce premier Projet de Sened par lesquelles nous demandions, non pas, comme on l'a prétendu, le droit de confirmer l'élection des Patriarche de Constantinople, mais simplement le maintien des immunités ecclésiastiques et des avantages temporels accordées *ab antiquo* par la Porte aux quatre Patriarches de Constantinople, d'Antioche, d'Alexandrie, et de Jérusalem, ainsi qu'aux métropolitains, évêques et autres chefs spirituels de l'Église Orientale, ayant soulevé de trop graves objections, le Prince Menchikoff n'a point refusé de supprimer entièrement ces deux clauses.

Il en est résulté un second Projet de Sened, sur l'acceptation duquel il a longtemps insisté. Enfin, au dernier moment, la Porte persistant à rejeter toute espèce d'engagement qui porterait une forme bilatérale et synallagmatique quelconque, notre Ambassadeur, dans l'esprit de ses instructions, avait été jusqu'à déclarer que si la Porte voulait accepter et signer immédiatement une note telle que celle dont vous trouverez ci-joint le Projet textuel, il consentirait lui-même à se contenter d'un pareil document, et à le considérer comme réparation et garantie suffisante.

Voilà donc quel était, au moment où le Prince Menchikoff a quitté Constantinople, le véritable ultimatum posé par le Cabinet Impérial; et c'est sur le retard qu'a mis la Porte à accepter la pièce en question que notre négociateur a enfin levé l'ancre pour Odessa et interrompu nos rapports diplomatiques avec le Gouvernement Ottoman.

Ce qu'il a cédé successivement sur la forme et le fond de nos propositions même, il l'a cédé également sur le terme originairement fixé pour leur admission. Il lui avait été prescrit, après une longue et stérile attente, de demander à la Porte une réponse définitive dans le terme de trois jours; et, quoique cette réponse conséquemment eut dû lui être donnée dès le 8 Mai N. S., ce n'est pourtant que le 21, qu'il a quitté Constantinople.

Après trois mois consécutifs de laborieuse négociation, ayant ainsi épuisé jusqu'aux dernières concessions possibles, l'Empereur se voit désormais forcé d'insister péremptoirement sur l'acceptation pure et simple du projet de note. Toujours mû neanmoins par les considérations de patience et de longanimité qui l'ont guidé jusqu'ici, il laisse à la Porte un nouveau sursis de huit jours pour se décider; après quoi quelque effort qu'il en coûte à ses dispositions conciliantes, il se verra bien forcé d'aviser aux moyens de se procurer, par une attitude plus prononcée, la satisfaction qu'il a vainement essayé d'obtenir jusqu'ici par des voies pacifiques.

Ce n'est pas sans un vif et profond regret qu'il adoptera cette attitude. Mais à force d'aveuglement et d'obstination on aura voulu le pousser dans une situation où la Russie acculée, pour ainsi dire, à l'extrême limite de la modération, ne pourrait plus céder d'un pas qu'au prix de sa considération politique.

Veuillez, Monsieur, communiquer ces faits au Gouvernement auprès duquel vous êtes accrédité, en portant à sa connaissance la pièce importante qui sert d'annexe à cette dépêche. Nous le prions d'y vouer sa plus sérieuse attention; car c'est elle qui forme en ce moment le nœud Gordien de la question; le nœud que nous ne demandons encore qu'à délier pacifiquement, mais qu'on semble avoir pris à tâche de vouloir nous forcer à rompre. En soumettant notre ultimatum au jugement impartial des Cabinets, nous leur laissons à décider si, après les torts si graves dont la Porte s'est rendue coupable envers nous, après qu'elle nous a donné tant de causes de ressentiment légitime, il était possible de se contenter d'une moindre satisfaction. L'examen consciencieux de notre projet de note prouvera que, dépouillé de toute forme de Traité ou même de contrat synallagmatique, il n'a rien qui soit contraire aux droits de souveraineté du Sultan, rien qui implique de notre part les prétentions exagérées que nous prête une défiance aussi injurieuse pour nous qu'elle est peu justifiée par nos actes antérieurs. Cet examen suffira, nous l'espérons, pour faire évanouir les faux bruits répandus sur nos exigences hautaines, et pour montrer que, si le rejet des derniers moyens d'accommodement que nous proposons pour résoudre les difficultés qui nous ont été suscitées dans l'affaire des Lieux Saints, amène des complications compromettantes pour la paix, ce n'est pas sur nous que la responsabilité en devra peser aux yeux du monde.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Annexe. Projet de Note.

La Sublime Porte, après l'examen le plus attentif et le plus sérieux des demandes qui forment l'objet de la mission extraordinaire confiée à l'Ambassadeur de Russie, Prince Menchikoff, et après avoir soumis le résultat de cet examen à Sa Majesté le Sultan, se fait un devoir empressé de notifier par la présente à son Altesse l'Ambassadeur la décision Impériale émanée à ce sujet par un iradé suprême en date du * * * * * (date Musulmane et Chrétienne).

Sa Majesté le Sultan, voulant donner à son Auguste Allié et Ami, l'Empereur de Russie, un nouveau témoignage de son amitié la plus sincère et de son

désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux Etats; plaçant en même temps une entière confiance dans les intentions constamment bienveillantes de Sa Majesté Impériale pour le maintien de l'intégrité et de l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman; a daigné apprécier et prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations franches et cordiales dont l'Ambassadeur de Russie s'est rendu l'organe en faveur du culte orthodoxe d'Orient professé par son Auguste Allié ainsi que par la majorité de leurs sujets respectifs.

Le Soussigné a reçu en conséquence l'ordre de donner par la présente note l'assurance la plus solennelle au Gouvernement Impérial de Russie que représente, auprès de Sa Majesté le Sultan, son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff, sur la sollicitude invariable et les sentiments généreux et tolérants qui animent Sa Majesté le Sultan pour la sécurité et la prospérité dans ses Etats du clergé, des églises, et des établissements religieux du culte Chrétien d'Orient.

Afin de rendre ces assurances plus explicites; préciser d'une manière formelle les objets principaux de cette haute sollicitude; corroborer par des éclaircissements supplémentaires, que nécessite la marche du temps, le sens des Articles qui, dans les Traités antérieurs, conclus entre les deux Puissances, ont trait aux questions religieuses, et prévenir enfin à jamais toute nuance de mésentendu et de désaccord à ce sujet entre les deux Gouvernements, le Soussigné est autorisé par Sa Majesté le Sultan à faire les déclarations suivantes:

1. Le culte orthodoxe d'Orient, son clergé, ses églises, et ses possessions, ainsi que ses établissements religieux, jouiront dans l'avenir sans aucune atteinte, sous l'égide de Sa Majesté le Sultan, des privilèges et immunités qui leur sont assurés *ab antiquo*, ou qui leur ont été accordés à différentes reprises par la faveur Impériale, et, dans un principe de haute équité, participeront aux avantages accordés aux autres rites Chrétiens ainsi qu'aux Légations Etrangères accréditées près la Sublime Porte par Convention ou disposition particulière.

2. Sa Majesté le Sultan, ayant jugé nécessaire et équitable de corroborer et d'expliquer son firman souverain revêtu du hatti-houmayoun, le 15 de la lune de Rébiul-Akhir 1268 (16 Février, 1852), par son firman souverain du * * * * * * * * * * * et d'ordonner en sus, par un autre firman en date * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * la réparation de la coupole du Temple du Saint Sépulcre, ces deux firmans seront textuellement exécutés et fidèlement observés, pour maintenir à jamais le *status quo* actuel des sanctuaires possédés par les Grecs exclusivement ou en commun avec d'autres cultes.

Il est entendu que cette promesse s'étend également au maintien de tous les droits et immunités dont jouissent *ab antiquo* l'Église Orthodoxe et son clergé, tant dans la ville de Jérusalem qu'en dehors, sans préjudice aucun pour les autres communautés Chrétiens.

3. Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait la demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à la célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigents ou malades, lesquelles fondations seront sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

4. On donnera les firmans et les ordres nécessaires à qui de droit et aux patriarches Grecs pour l'exécution de ces décisions souveraines, et on s'entendra ultérieurement sur la régularisation des points de détail, qui n'auront pas trouvé place tant dans les firmans concernant les saints lieux de Jérusalem, que dans la présente notification.

Le Soussigné, &c.

No. 455.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 286.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 14, 1853.*

I HAVE the satisfaction of acquainting your Lordship, upon the authority of the Chancellor, that the final resolution of the Imperial Cabinet as to the occupation of the Principalities, will be taken only upon the answer of the Porte to the last intimation being known at St. Petersburgh.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 456.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 87.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government approve of the answer which, as stated in your despatch No. 82 of the 3rd instant, you returned to Reshid Pasha's inquiry as to the course which the Porte should adopt in the event of a Russian army crossing the Danube and invading Turkey; and I have to instruct your Excellency to point out to the Porte, that the instructions to be given to Omar Pasha should be as specific as possible, for the Pasha cannot be well informed of the policy of his Government, and may do some act inconsistent with it.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 457.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 111.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.*

I HAVE to state to you that Her Majesty's Government agree in the remarks made by you in your despatch, No. 272 of the 9th instant, on Baron Brunnow's memorandum of the 25th of May, recapitulating his communications with Her Majesty's Government on Turkish affairs. Baron Brunnow has himself communicated to me a copy of that paper.

Her Majesty's Government were not made aware of any intentions of Russia towards Turkey unreasonable in themselves or infringing upon the independence of the Porte, or which, with more or less modification as to form, might not have been accepted by the Turkish Government; but, beyond the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, all the demands of Russia were expressly limited to the Holy Places, and all apprehension as to the settlement of them, had reference less to the Porte than to France.

To the best of our belief, Baron Brunnow acted throughout in a frank and straightforward manner, and as far as his limited information went concealed nothing from Her Majesty's Government; but, that his information was limited is proved by the fact that some of Prince Menchikoff's demands were made known to him by me, and were received with doubt by him.

It was in consequence of such information from me, and the inquiries he made upon it, that Baron Brunnow received for the first time from St. Petersburgh the Convention proposed by Prince Menchikoff, and which had already been altered at the suggestion of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe.

If Baron Brunnow's memorandum was a faithful record not only of his

communications with Her Majesty's Government, but of the demands really made by Russia, a complete and satisfactory arrangement might have been concluded without compromising the dignity of the Emperor, or menacing the independence of the Sultan.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 458.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 112.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to observe in reply to your despatch No. 273, of the 9th instant, that the statement which Count Nesselrode is said to have made to some of the Foreign Ministers at St. Petersburgh, that the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets approved of the proceedings of the Russian Embassy at Constantinople, cannot be consistent with the facts.

The Representatives of those Powers entirely agreed that the proposals of Prince Menchikoff could not be accepted by the Porte, and we have been made aware of the terms in which those Cabinets have written to St. Petersburgh upon the subject. The opinions of the Austrian Government were also particularly stated in Lord Westmorland's despatch No. 237, of the 15th instant, of which a copy was sent to you by the last messenger, in my despatch No. 110, of the 15th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 459.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 113.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to state you, in reply to your despatch No. 282 of the 10th instant, that no blame whatever attaches to you from the circumstance that the conduct of the Russian Government has proved to be at variance with the professions which you had informed Her Majesty's Government that you had received from them. You appear to have faithfully reported the assurances given to you, some of which were voluntarily offered.

Count Nesselrode does not seem to have questioned the accuracy of your reports, and there was no reason, but the contrary, for doubting assurances as to a course of action which was in harmony with the general principles laid down by the Emperor as to maintaining the independence of the Turkish Empire.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 460.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 131. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatches Nos. 235 and 236 giving an account of what passed between you and Baron Manteuffel as to the policy of Austria with respect to the affairs of Turkey, and I have to inform you in reply that Her Majesty's Government learn with great satisfaction that the opinions of His Majesty the King of Prussia and of the Prussian Government with reference to this affair, remain unchanged. If moral influence is to be used to any effect

as a check upon the proceedings and designs of Russia, it is most important that an agreement of opinion between the other Four Powers should be manifested; and that, at all events, no approval of Russian demands should encourage her to persist in them. Her Majesty's Government, however, fear that the view taken by Baron Manteuffel of the policy of Austria, rests on better grounds than those which Her Majesty's Government are inclined to entertain upon the information contained in the Earl of Westmorland's last despatches, and from a conversation held by me with Count Colloredo, but which, if the information now given you by Baron Manteuffel be correct, Her Majesty's Government must now suppose do not truly represent the policy of the Austrian Cabinet.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 461.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 132.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

THE Chevalier Bunsen, on the 4th instant, showed me a despatch from Baron Manteuffel, stating that he had learnt with sincere pleasure the moderate views entertained by Her Majesty's Government upon the Eastern question, and authorizing the Chevalier Bunsen to attend any conference here to which he might be invited, having for its object a peaceful solution of the matters in dispute between Russia and the Porte, with the understanding, however, that any distinct proposal should be received by the Chevalier Bunsen subject to the approval of his Government.

I requested the Chevalier Bunsen, as your Lordship is also instructed, to express to Baron Manteuffel the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this fresh proof of the confidence and identity of views that exist between the two Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 462.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 174.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

ON the 19th instant, Count Colloredo read to me a despatch from Count Buol stating that the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh had asked for the good offices of the Austrian Government with the Porte, and that the Internuncio had accordingly been instructed to point out to the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that as Prince Menchikoff, in his last project of note, had abandoned the bilateral form which was considered objectionable, there ought no longer to be the same difficulty in acceding to the proposals of Russia.

It was not expected, however, that this advice, even if it should arrive within the eight days allowed to the Porte for decision, would have any effect; and, in contemplation of its failure, the Internuncio was to request Reshid Pasha to consider what difference existed between Prince Menchikoff's last project and the note from the Porte which he declined to receive on the ground that official relations between the two countries had ceased; and that if this difference could be reconciled, and a new proposal were offered by the Porte, Count Buol engaged to make it known at St. Petersburgh.

Count Buol then asks for the cooperation of Her Majesty's Government with the Turkish Government, and the intimation of our confidence in the Emperor of Russia, whose assurances, that by the occupation of the Principalities he does not intend war nor territorial aggrandisement, but simply their retention until he obtains satisfaction from the Porte, should be received by

Europe as an unmistakeable pledge (gage non équivoque) of his peaceful sentiments.

Count Buol expresses an earnest hope that the Powers will abstain from all demonstrations that might unduly excite the hopes of the Porte, and still further embarrass the Emperor of Russia with reference to the national and religious feelings of his people.

But he adds that he should deplore that the Emperor gave immediate effect to his intention of occupying the Principalities; that the Austrian Government have frankly expressed themselves in that sense, and hope to obtain a delay if ["pour peu que"] the Sultan shows any spirit of conciliation; and, with that object, they have engaged the Porte not to give to the occupation of the Principalities a character of "flagrant hostility."

I told Count Colloredo that although I fully agreed with some portions of the despatch, yet I could not help saying that it would be more satisfactory if it were less one-sided, and if the concessions urged upon the Porte had likewise been recommended to Russia.

I told him, also, that confidence was not an act of volition, but depended on reason or experience, and, after all that had passed, we could feel no confidence that the violent and unjustifiable occupation of the Principalities would not be followed by a further invasion of the Turkish territory, in which event Her Majesty's Government reserved to itself an entire freedom of action, in conjunction with France, for the protection of Turkey.

Count Colloredo, I said, must be well aware from his previous communications with me, that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to cooperate with Austria in bringing this question to an amicable settlement; and I had the satisfaction to inform him that the instructions to the Internuncio did not materially differ from those sent to Lord Stratford, who, I was sure, would gladly favour any proposal acceptable to the Emperor of Russia that did not compromise the independence of the Sultan; but that, if any such proposal were made, Austria, whose good offices had been asked by Russia, would have a right to insist upon its being received in a peaceful and conciliatory spirit.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 463.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 21.*)

(No. 452. Confidential.)

Paris, June 20, 1853.

My Lord,

THE Austrian Minister made yesterday a communication to M. Drouyn de Lhuys on the subject of the Eastern question. I presume that Count Colloredo will have made a similar one to your Lordship, and I will therefore merely mention the heads of what M. de Hübner stated to M. Drouyn de Lhuys.

The Austrian Cabinet has submitted to the Ottoman Minister whether the difference between the note insisted on by Prince Menschikoff and that offered by Reshid Pacha is so great as to preclude the acceptance of the former; but Count Buol, aware, in fact, that his despatch must reach Constantinople after a final decision had been taken by the Porte, proceeds to examine the question as it will then stand. If the Porte has yielded, well and good; if not, the Russians will probably enter the Principalities, although he still hopes, from the strong representations which he had made to the Russian Government, that the occupation of the Principalities would be delayed. If so, Austria will employ all her energies to compass an immediate reconciliation between Russia and the Porte. If, on the other hand, a Russian army cross the Pruth, Count Buol is desirous that this hostile demonstration should not be considered as a *casus belli* either by the Porte or by her allies. M. de Hübner was therefore desired to express to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the hope that the French fleet might not pass the Dardanelles because the Russians entered the Principalities, and in general terms that the French Ambassador at Constantinople might be instructed in the sense of the Austrian views.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied to M. de Hübner that the question of

summoning the fleets to Constantinople rested entirely with the Ambassadors of England and France, and that he could not prejudge their conduct by giving any opinion as to what ought to be done. He had, however, no objection to add, that M. de la Cour's attention had been called in his instructions to the delicacy of the question regarding the occupation of the Principalities.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys expressed himself as thinking the Austrian communication on the whole "plutôt bonne que mauvaise."

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 464.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 22.*)

(No. 241.)

Vienna, June 17, 1853.

My Lord,

I WAITED this day upon Count Buol to communicate to him the telegraphic despatch that I had received late last night from Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, dated the 10th instant, and which I have forwarded to your Lordship. Count Buol was not surprised at learning that Reshid Pasha and the Representatives of the Four Powers took the same view of the note of Count Nesselrode, and that to all appearance its terms would not be accepted by the Porte. He said that he had recommended the greatest moderation compatible with the honour and independence of the Sultan, and deeply lamented that the terms of that note gave little hope of an amicable solution. He feared the most serious consequences should the reply of the Porte lead to the occupation of the Principalities by Russia. It would then remain with the Sultan to determine if that measure should be looked upon as an act of war, and Count Buol fully recognizes the right of that Sovereign to do so, and to call for the assistance of the British and French fleets; but he still hopes that this may not be the case, and that in conformity with the declarations of Russia no act of hostility will be committed after that occupation by the Russians, and that the Powers, parties to the Treaty of 1841, may be enabled to interfere and by mediation to bring about such an arrangement as may satisfy the expectations of the Emperor, and secure the evacuation of those Principalities, and the establishment of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; and to these objects the efforts of the Austrian Government would unceasingly be directed.

Count Buol declared that he had spared no efforts in his communications with the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh to induce them to abandon the policy they appeared to have adopted towards the Turkish Government; he had not concealed from them the unfavourable impression it had created upon the sincerest friends of the Emperor, and he had still hopes that these remonstrances might produce their effect.

In replying to these assurances, I communicated to Count Buol the despatch from your Lordship, No. 141, in which I am instructed to express to him the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at his views of the Russian proceedings, and at the course the Austrian Government intended to pursue as reported in my despatch No. 219; and with the view of bringing more explicitly before him your Lordship's sentiments, I read to him the last-mentioned despatch. Count Buol was much satisfied with your Lordship's expressions; he desired me to state that he considered himself as entirely united with your policy with respect to the Turkish Empire: he regards the maintenance of its independence and integrity as of the most essential importance to the best interests of Austria, and he would employ every means in his power to effect that object. He repeated his former declaration that he would take no engagements with Russia not to oppose her with arms, and he even added that should he be called upon to carry out an armed intervention on the frontiers, it would be in support of the authority and independence of the Sultan. This is certainly more than he has yet said, and corroborates Baron Bourqueney's statement to me, that in his last conversation with Count Buol he had remarked a decided progress in his expressions of disapproval of the policy of Russia. Baron Bourqueney had called upon Count Buol in order to communicate a despatch from M. Drouyn de

Lhuys, desiring him to obtain from the Austrian Government a more explicit declaration of the position they intended to assume in the complication which had arisen, and which appeared likely to become more serious, in the affairs of Turkey, and he detailed to me the conversation which had taken place on that occasion, when Count Buol had held the same language to the French Minister as he had done to me this day, to the great satisfaction of Baron Bourqueney, who expressed himself as much gratified by the warm manner in which Count Buol acknowledged the straightforward and dignified conduct of the French Government in these affairs.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 465.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 287. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 14, 1853.

THE explanatory circular published in the St. Petersburgh Journal of the 12th instant, and forwarded to your Lordship by post in my despatch, No. 285, is a paper well deserving of attention.

It is speciously written; it is calculated to produce a considerable effect upon those who have no knowledge of the subject; but its assertions are open, not only to so much observation, but to so much positive contradiction, that little more is proved than the great wish entertained by its compilers to mislead public opinion.

I request your Lordship's consideration of the following passages, which I indicate by their first words:

"Je crois superflu de vous dire qu'il n'y a pas un mot de vrai dans la prétention que les journaux nous ont prêtée de réclamer, &c.

"Soit toute autre protection religieuse tendant à dépasser celui que nous exerçons traditionellement de fait et de droit en Turquie en vertu de nos Traités antérieurs."

Prince Menchikoff is seen to have broken off diplomatic relations with the Porte, and Turkey to be menaced with a war, because the grant of a right of protectorate, which no Treaty ever gave to Russia, is demurred to by the Sultan.

"Vous connaissez assez la politique de l'Empereur," &c. What is here stated respecting His Imperial Majesty's views is, it is to be hoped, correct: but if so, the policy followed towards Turkey is singularly at variance with its professed object; Turkey, like every other feeble State, being of course unable to resist a course of constant interference and encroachment.

"Nous n'avons pas besoin pour en surveiller d'autres droits que ceux que nous assurent nos Traités," &c.

It follows that the demands upon the Porte have been made unnecessarily.

"La mission du Prince Menchikoff n'a jamais eu d'autre objet que l'arrangement de l'affaire des Lieux Saints."

Such, indeed, was the statement constantly made to me: its incorrectness is proved by the fact of the arrangement respecting the Holy Places being the mere prelude to requisitions affecting the whole religious, and therefore political relations of the Greek subjects of the Porte towards their legitimate master.

The object of Prince Menchikoff's mission is subsequently stated to have been in part to "corroborer cet arrangement [respecting the Holy Places] par un Acte authentique."

Again I would remark that this was the repeatedly avowed intention of the Russian Cabinet. It is, however, doubtful whether, in the opinion of any impartial person, an authentic Act relating to the state of rights at Jerusalem can be held as having shadowed out, or as now corresponding with, a Russian protectorate throughout the Sultan's dominions.

"Cette garantie [that of a Convention confirming the new arrangements] l'Empereur y attachait d'autant plus d'importance qu'elle constituait au fond la seule et unique réparation qu'il demandait."

The Chancellor appears to have forgotten that, directly or indirectly, the

dismissal of Fuad Effendi, who was considered the Minister by whom offence had been given to Russia, was required by Prince Menchikoff. His Excellency has likewise lost sight of the fact of his having declared to me that Fuad's withdrawal was actually regarded by the Emperor's Government in the light of a reparatory act.

With regard to Prince Menchikoff's diplomatic proceedings, it is stated, "De Traité proprement dit il n'en a jamais été question."

In this passage it is seen that the Chancellor's memory has again served him ill.

Upon the withdrawal of the Embassy from Constantinople, Count Nesselrode stated to me that the conciliatory conduct of Prince Menchikoff had been fully evinced by his having demanded, first, a Treaty, then a "Sened," and having finally professed his readiness to accept a note.

"En principe une Convention, ou même un Traité pareil, n'auraient rien d'insolite, et nous ne comprenons pas en quoi ils seraient plus attentatoires aux droit d'autonomie souveraine de Sultan que les Capitulations ou autres Actes que possèdent déjà en Turquie la France et l'Autriche."

As regards France, it is at least questionable whether her protecting rights are claimed on behalf of any Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan; but the object of this and other passages of the circular is to prove that the question of principle involves one of numbers; that it follows as a matter of course, that if the Emperor of Austria can be permitted to protect a few thousands of Catholics, there is no ground for refusing to the Emperor of Russia a right of protectorate over twelve or fourteen millions of Greeks.

But this is one of the many cases in which principle is less to be considered than its application.

That the Kings of France, for instance, were of opinion that there was nothing derogatory in the employment of foreign troops, is proved by the existence of a Scotch, and later of a Swiss body-guard; a principle, therefore, was admitted: but these Sovereigns would probably have thought their independence a little compromised, and their security somewhat endangered, if the foreign soldiers in their pay had been four times more numerous than the national army.

I will not occupy your Lordship's time by offering, as I might do, the refutation of several others of the statements to be found in the Russian Circular. There are few parts of it indeed with which I agree, except with that which gives it to be understood that no arrangement which could be made would much affect the overpowering influence which the Emperor exercises *de facto* in Turkey. The influence, however, being real, and even avowed, it might have been hoped that the respect so constantly proclaimed by His Imperial Majesty for the rights of independent Sovereigns, would have led him to have been unwilling to have inflicted a particular humiliation upon the Sultan by the demands now brought forward. There remain two reflections which I am desirous of submitting to your Lordship. The right possessed by Russia to make what is termed, in M. de Brunnow's late memorandum, a proposition to the Porte cannot be contested; but it may well be doubted whether, in the opinion of any of those Cabinets to whose verdict Russia now appeals, the courteous refusal of the Sultan to comply with what he considers an unsafe proposition, can be considered as justifying the breaking off of diplomatic relations, and a recourse to measures of coercion. The precedent thus established is a dangerous one. Further I would observe, and this in some measure apologetically, that the difficulty of learning the nature even of the declared intentions of the Russian Cabinet may be judged of from that of reconciling their account of actual events with the existence of known facts, and with the simple evidence of the senses.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 466.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 22.*)

(No. 289. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 14, 1853.*

I RECEIVED on the 11th instant from Lord Bloomfield the cyphered despatch of which I have the honour of inclosing a copy.

Upon proceeding to the Foreign Office I found that both Count Nesselrode and M. de Seniavine were in attendance upon the Emperor in the country.

It was of importance that the Chancellor should learn without delay the intelligence which had reached me, and that if possible it should be communicated to him before he left the Emperor's château, as he had the intention of doing after dinner; and I accordingly addressed him the very hurried private note of which I beg to inclose a copy, which was forwarded by a yacht-steamer that was just setting off for Peterhoff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 466.

Lord Bloomfield to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Sir, *Berlin, June 6, 1853.*

I AM ordered to inform you in answer to your despatch of the 30th ultimo, that the form of Treaty is alone open to objection.

Russia may obtain in other cases all that she has a right to demand.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 466.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Private.)

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, June 11, 1853.*

A MESSAGE which I have received from Lord Bloomfield gives me to understand that the opinions of Her Majesty's Government respecting the demands upon the Porte are changed, in consequence of the form of note being substituted for that of Treaty. I only entreat of you, as I would venture to do of the Emperor, to give time for the expression of these views at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 467.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 22.*)

(No. 290. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 15, 1853.*

I HAD the honour of receiving yesterday evening, by the messenger Ball, your Lordship's despatches down to No. 98 inclusive.

By my despatch No. 286 of the 14th instant, I had the honour of acquainting your Lordship that the final decision of the Imperial Cabinet with

regard to the occupation of the Principalities, would be taken only upon the receipt at St. Petersburgh of the last proposition to the Porte.

The information was conveyed to me on the 13th instant in a private note from the Chancellor, of which I beg to inclose a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 467.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

Lundi, ⅓ Juin, 1853.

J'AI l'honneur, cher Sir Hamilton, de vous restituer ci-joint les deux lettres de Lord Redcliffe, en vous demandant la permission de m'abstenir de tout jugement sur leur contenu.

J'attends avec une vive impatience le bâteau de demain qui nous apportera, j'espère, la confirmation de la bonne nouvelle que vous m'avez donnée Samedi.

La détermination finale, quant à l'occupation des Principautés, ne sera prise que lorsque nous recevons *ici* [underlined], la réponse de la Porte.

Mille hommages, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

N.B.—There is a mistake here. I communicated to Count Nesselrode only Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's despatch to me, dated May 23.

G. H. S.

No. 468.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 23.*)

(No. 458.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 22, 1853.*

ALTHOUGH your Lordship is probably already in possession of the circular despatch addressed by the Russian Government to its diplomatic agents at the different courts of Europe, I do myself the honour of transmitting a copy as published in the French papers.

The French Government is evidently annoyed at this publication, because the original fault of what is passing at Constantinople is laid on France. M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed also with me in thinking it a further difficulty in the way of any future arrangement, because it contains a public declaration of the Emperor of Russia that he will be satisfied with nothing else but the acceptation of Prince Menchikoff's last note. We remarked further on the want of candour on the part of Russia in not alluding to the declaration of Prince Menchikoff on quitting Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 469.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 23.*)

(No. 460. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 22, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has just read to me confidentially the latest reports from Vienna and Berlin.

The former are dated the 14th and 16th instant, and are those alluded to as expected from Vienna in my despatch No. 444. They are not without importance. M. de Bourqueney had pressed the Austrian Cabinet to explain the attitude which they proposed assuming on the Eastern question, and elicited

something like a categorical answer from Count Buol. The purport of it is this; that Austria disapproves and laments the proceedings of Russia in the Eastern question; that she is not surprised that England and France should have taken alarm, and sent their fleets to the Dardanelles, and she is glad that they have done so. Nevertheless she hopes it will not be thought necessary to summon the fleets to Constantinople should Russia enter the Principalities, which Count Buol evidently thinks inevitable, though he has done what depends on him to prevent it. He admits, however, that the occupation of the Principalities is an aggression on Turkey, and that the latter would be justified in considering it as a war, and in opening the Dardanelles. Should war unfortunately be the result of this crisis, Austria would guard a strict neutrality, and would certainly give no assistance to Russia.

In sum, M. de Bourqueney believes Austria's sympathies to be with Turkey, and that this will be declared more positively should matters assume a warlike turn. Still the Emperor, partly from his friendly feelings for the Emperor of Russia, and partly from apprehensions of what may occur nearer home, will abstain from any active interference as long as practicable, and will devote his energies to obtain a pacific solution both now and, should hostilities occur, hereafter.

The advices from Berlin are of the 19th instant, and relate to a conversation which the French Minister had had with M. de Manteuffel, during which he had shown to the Prussian Minister the despatch addressed to him in consequence of Count Hatzfeldt's late communications to the French Government. Your Lordship will recollect that M. Drouyn de Lhuys had not been satisfied with them. M. Manteuffel assured the French Minister that no change had taken place in the feelings or opinions of the King, or of the Prussian Cabinet, in regard to the Eastern question; but that the despatch to which M. Drouyn de Lhuys had taken objection, had been written at the solicitation of the Russian Government, who wished to prevent the occupation of the Principalities being considered "un cas de guerre." Pressed by the French Minister as to what would be the attitude of the Prussian Cabinet should the Porte persist in its refusal to accept the Emperor of Russia's last demand, M. Manteuffel replied that he should advise assembling a conference. When asked whether he would not invoke the Treaty of 1841 against the aggressive acts of Russia, he replied, that as yet no acts of aggression had taken place; but he finally promised, after taking the King's orders, to write to St. Petersburgh, to call the attention of the Russian Cabinet to the existence of the Treaty of 1841, and to the necessity of respecting it. This promise, however, was given in very vague terms.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys showed me further despatches from Stutgardt and Carlsruhe, from which it would appear that the Wirtemberg and Baden Governments disapprove the proceedings of Russia, and were highly laudatory of those of France. That from Stutgardt mentions that a Russian messenger had arrived with letters to prevent the Duchess of Leuchtenberg prosecuting her intended journey in England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 470.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 91.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 7, 1853.

THE Imperial firmans renewing and confirming the rights and privileges of the churches and clergy of the several Christian communities in Turkey, have received the Sultan's formal sanction, and are to be delivered to the respective heads of each in the course of the day.

I have the honour to inclose herewith M. Pisani's official report on this subject. The memorandum of which he makes mention, together with translated copies of the firmans, will be forwarded to your Lordship with this despatch.

It is gratifying to observe that the Jewish community is included in the benefits of so solemn an act; and I have taken care that on this decisive occasion the Protestants should also be placed on terms of equality with the more ancient establishments.

The Sultan, by thus pledging himself before the world to maintain and enforce the privileges of the Christian churches and their respective clergy throughout his dominions, and by communicating his solemn declaration to the Five Great Powers of Christendom, appears to throw a strong additional light on the proceedings of that Power which has suspended its diplomatic relations with Turkey and thrown all Europe into anxiety and alarm, for the purpose of appropriating to itself and to its own exclusive policy a system of tolerance and protection which is now made to rest on foundations of real solidity, without prejudice to the independence of that Sovereignty from which it emanates.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 470.

M. E. Pisani to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Pera, June* 6, 1853.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that the firmans, decorated with the Sultan's khatti-sheriff, have been returned to-day to the Porte, and Reshid Pasha is authorized to deliver them to the heads of each community. For that purpose His Highness sent an invitation to the three Patriarchs, to the Vakeel of the Protestants, and to the Chief Rabbin, requesting them to go to-morrow to his country-house between 11 and 12.

Copies of these firmans will be forwarded to the Representatives of the Four Powers, accompanied with a memorandum from the Porte.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. PISANI.

No. 471.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 23.)

(No. 93.)
My Lord, *Constantinople, June* 7, 1853.

THE Ottoman Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent yesterday to consult me as to the expediency of writing in the name of the Porte to direct the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia to retire from their respective Governments in the event of the Principalities being occupied by a Russian force.

I replied in the following words:

If the Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia were to leave their respective Governments in consequence of a Russian occupation, their retirement would afford to Russia a pretext for appointing other Princes from among its own creatures, and perhaps even making some new institutional arrangement favourable to its views against Turkey.

I think it would be better for the Princes to retain the reins of Government as long as their communications with the Porte are free, and they are allowed to administer the affairs of the Principalities according to the existing institutions.

Should they be restrained in those respects, the Porte might then recall them with the advantage of throwing the odium of that measure on the Russians, and contrasting the Porte's forbearance with their illegality and violence.

It is to be hoped that the supposed contingency will not occur; but as the Porte appears to have adopted my advice, I should be glad to learn that it meets with your Lordship's approbation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 472.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 94.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1853.

I RECEIVED yesterday, through Vienna, your Excellency's despatches from No. 88 to No. 95, both inclusive—the last of the 9th of June.

I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have received, with great satisfaction, the account given in your despatch No. 91, of the 7th instant, of the comprehensive nature of the firmans at that time about to be promulgated by the Sultan for the confirmation of the privileges of the non-Mussulman subjects of the Porte; and Her Majesty's Government highly approve the precaution taken by your Excellency to insure the extension of those privileges to the Protestant, as well as other Christian religious communities in Turkey.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 473.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 95.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1853.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the advice which you have given to the Turkish Government, as reported in your despatch No. 93, of the 7th instant, with regard to the course which the Hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia should be instructed to pursue in the event of the entrance of the Russian forces into the Principalities.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 474.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 98.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1853.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency with reference to my despatch No. 87 of the 21st instant, that it appears possible that the Russian troops may cross the Danube into Bulgaria, with the sole object of passing through a portion of that province on their way to Wallachia.

Now the mere passage of the Danube by the Russian troops and their subsequent march through a portion of Bulgaria, not leaving any post nor keeping up a line of communication in Bulgaria, would be one thing; while the passage of the Danube, followed by the retention of posts and the establishment of a line of communication in Bulgaria, would be another; and Her Majesty's Government consider that the Porte would do well to reserve to itself, instead of leaving to Omar Pasha, to decide upon the important distinction between the two cases.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 475.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

(No. 100.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June* 24, 1853.

HER Majesty's Government consider that every fair advantage should be taken of the present position of the Turkish Empire to press upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance of removing all civil distinctions between the Christian and Mahomedan subjects of the Sultan, and of giving the former an equal degree of assurance with the latter as to the impartial administration of justice by the Turkish tribunals.

Your Excellency has long and zealously laboured to obtain for the Christians in Turkey that their evidence should be received in the courts of justice with the same consideration and respect as that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects, and that the barbarous distinction which fanaticism has long interposed between Turks and Rayahs in this respect should no longer be allowed to prevail.

The firman which in 1850 your Excellency obtained from the Porte for regulating the mixed jurisdiction in Egypt, gave a limited sanction to the principle for which Her Majesty's Government have so earnestly contended, that the oath of a Christian witness should be regarded in the same light as that of a Mahomedan witness; and that a Mussulman should no longer enjoy impunity for crime on the ground that Christian testimony, frequently the only one that could be adduced, was inadmissible against a Mussulman.

Your Excellency is instructed to state to the Porte that it is the deliberate opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the only real security for the continued existence of Turkey as an independent Power, is to be sought by enlisting the feelings of its Christian subjects in its preservation; that, although Turkey may get over her present difficulties by the aid of her allies, she must not reckon upon external assistance as a permanent resource; but that she must create for herself a surer defence in the affections of the most intelligent, active, and enterprising class of her subjects; and that it is impossible to suppose that any true sympathy for their rulers will be felt by the Christians, so long as they are made to experience in all their daily transactions, the inferiority of their position as compared with that of their Mussulman fellow-subjects; so long as they are aware that they will seek in vain for justice for wrongs done either to their persons or their properties, because they are deemed a degraded race unworthy to be put into comparison with the followers of Mahomet.

Your Excellency will plainly and authoritatively state to the Porte that this state of things cannot be longer tolerated by Christian Powers. The Porte must decide between the maintenance of an erroneous religious principle, and the loss of the sympathy and support of its allies. You will point out to the Porte the immense importance of the election which it has to make; and Her Majesty's Government conceive that very little reflection will suffice to satisfy the Turkish Ministers that the Porte can no longer reckon upon its Mussulman subjects alone as a safeguard against external danger, and that without the hearty assistance of its Christian dependents, and the powerful sympathy and support of its Christian allies, the Turkish Empire must soon cease to exist.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 476.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Therapia, June* 18, 1853.

THE answer of the Porte to Count Nesselrode was sent yesterday to Odessa, as well as the records of the Russian Legation. News were received yesterday of the arrival of the army within two hours' march from Jassy. The

English and French squadrons are at anchor near the entrance of the Dardanelles. The despatches which accompany this telegraphic message are forwarded to Vienna by estafette. Mr. Webster, the messenger, will return to London by Trieste and Vienna, after to-morrow.

No. 477.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 243. Confidential.)

Berlin, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 236 of the 17th instant, in which I reported the communication which had been made to Baron Manteuffel by the Austrian Minister at this Court of the instruction addressed to the Internuncio, I have the honour inform you that I reverted to the subject to-day in conversation with his Excellency.

He told me that he had again examined Baron Bruck's instructions, and that he was confirmed in the original impression which he had received as to the object of these being to concede all to Russia rather than expose Europe to the danger of war; but that he nevertheless hoped that Austria would preserve for herself a certain degree of independence of action if a rupture between Russia and Turkey became inevitable. He added that he had no written documents upon which he could base this opinion, but that since he last saw me, Count Thun had assured him that his Government had spoken with firmness at St. Petersburgh, and that the Austrian Minister had said it in a tone which made him hope that the Cabinet of Vienna was earnestly disposed to render better service in this affair than he had thought was their intention last week.

I told his Excellency that the whole world was interested in the maintenance of peace, and that it would be impossible but that some impression should be made on the Russian Government if the great Courts united in making prudent representations at Petersburgh; that the moral effect that must be produced by the general expression of disapprobation at Russia's late conduct must be attended with beneficial results, unless she were completely blinded and infatuated, and resolved to carry out her scheme at any price.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 478.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 244.)

Berlin, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

THE French Minister called on me a few days ago, to ask my advice as to a communication which he had been directed by his Government to make to Baron de Manteuffel on Eastern affairs.

He said, that he had never before been employed in diplomacy, and that, knowing scarcely anybody in Berlin, he felt that, under the circumstance of the confidential relations existing between our Courts, I would not withhold my opinion from him on the present occasion.

I replied, that I was glad to have an early opportunity of speaking to him on official matters, and that I thought it would advance the interests of our Governments, that we should see as much as possible of each other.

The Marquis de Moustier then said, that he had been directed by M. Drouyn de Lhuys to urge ("pousser") Baron Manteuffel to declare himself more positively than he had done hitherto, and to state what would be the policy of Prussia in the event of serious complication growing out of the affairs of the East, and especially as regarded the Treaty of July 1841. He asked me how I thought Baron Manteuffel would take such a communication.

I replied, that in the numerous conversations which I had held with the Prussian Minister, I had found him well disposed to enter into the views of Her

Majesty's Government, and that certainly neither the King nor his Ministers had done anything which had the appearance of approving the policy lately pursued by the Russian Cabinet at Constantinople, and had taken an independent line; but that although they desired to go certain lengths with us, I feared if we attempted to press them for a positive declaration of their future intentions, that we should gain nothing by so doing, but rather indispose them, and that we should obtain more by quietly arguing the case with Baron Manteuffel than by taking a course which would alarm the Prussian Government, which owing to her geographical position, was obliged to have certain "ménagements" with Austria as well as with Russia. I find from Baron Manteuffel that the French Minister has spoken to him in a tone which has rather pleased the Prussian Minister for Foreign Affairs. I asked him if M. de Moustier had alluded to the Treaty of 1841. He said that he had done so; and on my inquiring whether we could not make use of it in case of need, he said, that the preamble of it certainly proved the interest which the Powers take in the existence of the Porte, but that the Contracting Parties do not engage with each other to act together for its support, and that its provisions are not clearly applicable to the present case. He, however, by no means puts in question the spirit which dictated this Treaty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 479.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 247.)

My Lord,

Berlin, June 21, 1853.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 230 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that Baron Manteuffel has returned to me the copy of your despatch of the 31st ultimo to Sir G. H. Seymour, which I had communicated to him in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, and has told me that he has read it with great interest, and had heard with satisfaction from St. Petersburgh that some of the arguments contained in this paper had been productive of much good.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 480.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 248.)

My Lord,

Berlin, June 21, 1853.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 110, of the 15th instant, and to my No. 234 of the 17th instant, respecting the question of a conference of the Representatives of the Great Powers being held in London on Eastern affairs, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, having expressed this morning to Baron Manteuffel my anxiety as to whether he still thought there would be a difficulty about the attendance of Chevalier Bunsen at these proposed conferences, his Excellency said, that he had been thinking over the matter since our conversation last week; and that he intended to write to-day to Chevalier Bunsen, and direct him not to absent himself from these conferences, but to consider himself authorized to attend them until further orders.

I told the Baron I was glad to hear that the Prussian Government had come to this resolution—a prudent and right one under the circumstances in which Europe might shortly be placed.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 481.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 250.)

Berlin, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

I CALLED on Baron Manteuffel this morning, and read to his Excellency, according to your Lordship's instructions, your despatch No. 106, of the 14th instant, and its inclosure, No. 180, to Lord Westmorland.

Baron Manteuffel appeared gratified at the tone of this communication, and particularly at the assurances which it contained of the pacific policy Her Majesty's Government wishes to pursue, and the desire which is expressed, that an honourable issue should be found for Russia from the embarrassing position in which she was placed.

His Excellency afterwards listened with the greatest attention whilst I read your Lordship's despatch No. 150, to Lord Westmorland; and was so struck with the arguments which it contained in favour of the maintenance of the *status quo* in Turkey, and the allusion to the dangers to which Austria would be exposed in the event of a war, that he requested me to leave it with him for communication to the King.

Thinking that there would be no inconvenience in my doing so, I left the despatch with his Excellency, and trust your Lordship will not disapprove of what I have done.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 482.

The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Westmorland.

(No. 168. Confidential.)

Foreign Office, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

I HEREWITH transmit to your Lordship, for your confidential information only, copies of two despatches which I have received from Her Majesty's Minister at Berlin reporting a conversation with Baron Manteuffel as to the policy of Austria in the affairs of Turkey; and I have to instruct your Lordship to endeavour to ascertain whether the views expressed in your despatch No. 237, and other recent despatches, or those of Baron Manteuffel as to Austria subserving to Russia, are the more correct.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 483.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 291. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, June 15, 1853.

My Lord,

ALTHOUGH I thought it right to soften the expressions made use of by Count Nesselrode, and more particularly by the Emperor, in speaking of the course which led to Prince Menchikoff's departure from Constantinople, your Lordship will have observed the very direct purpose entertained here of attributing the Prince's failure to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

It may have been that it suited Prince Menchikoff's purpose to lay upon another the blame which belonged to himself; it may likewise be that it was proposed here that Her Majesty's Ambassador should be made responsible for the consequences which it had been intended should arise out of the late diplomatic rupture at Constantinople.

However this may be, it is certain that according to Prince Menchikoff's reports, the Turks are made to appear desirous of closing with the final proposal

of the Russian Embassy, while Lord Stratford de Redcliffe is represented as having by his activity prevented their doing so.

I dwelt upon this subject in my reports as lightly as possible; firstly, because I am always eager to lay the least possible stress upon irritating circumstances, and, secondly, because I could not believe that accusations and reproaches so confidently made, should be (as they have proved to be) utterly devoid of foundation.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's correspondence having satisfied me that his Excellency had been most unjustly accused, I was glad to have an opportunity of addressing to the Chancellor the letter of which a copy was submitted to your Lordship by my despatch No. 284 of the 11th instant.

In writing that letter I had another object. I had learned by experience that promises and assurances are not considered very binding by the Russian Government. I saw from the amount of naval and military preparations going forward, that there was considerable appearance of a pursuit, which began in duplicity, being carried on by violence, and I reflected that the only remaining hold upon the Emperor's mind, might be that love of personal reputation which he has always been supposed to cherish.

Independently, therefore, of my wish that tardy justice should be done to the able and important exertions of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe towards reconciling conflicting interests, I was not sorry to direct the attention of the Chancellor to an approaching publicity as to late diplomatic proceedings from which Her Majesty's Government has certainly nothing to fear, but which may be extremely fatal to that high character which has been enjoyed hitherto by the Emperor Nicholas.

In further justification (however little required) of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, I have thought right to place in the Chancellor's hands and to give some diplomatic publicity here to the paper signed by the Ambassador of France, the Minister of Prussia, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires as well as by Her Majesty's Ambassador, and which was transmitted to your Lordship in Lord Stratford's No. 55, of the 22nd ultimo.

It has been my painful duty to make various references which seem to point at a fixed purpose on the part of the Russian Cabinet to mislead Her Majesty's Government. There is one circumstance of another character which I think it right to recall to your Lordship's recollection.

I allude to the fact of the Emperor having discouraged my idea of proceeding on leave of absence to England.

To Her Majesty's service it may be unimportant whether or no I am at my post, but it is difficult to reconcile the Emperor's wish to detain me here with a purpose of acting in a manner contrary to the intentions expressed to myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 484.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 292. Confidential.)

St. Petersburgh, June 16, 1853.

My Lord,

IN consequence of a summons which (as if in anticipation of my wishes) I received from the Chancellor, I waited yesterday upon his Excellency at his villa.

It was, however, with some anxiety that I looked forward to the meeting, feeling not only that it would be difficult that the views of Her Majesty's Government upon Turkish affairs should be brought into accordance with those of the Emperor's Cabinet, after the publication of the Circular of the Russian Chancellerie, but that that publication might have been made with the intention on the part of the Russians of precluding any modification as to the form or substance of their ultimatum.

I began by expressing my regret at having misrepresented the feelings of Her Majesty's Government, which I accounted for by stating, that in a few

hurried lines I had endeavoured to express the sense of a telegraphic message communicated to me in a cyphered despatch from Berlin.

The Chancellor had become aware of the mistake by his correspondence from London.

Well, M. le Comte, I said, I fear we are getting into deep water, to use an English phrase, but, as I have always told you, with patience all will come right—nothing can be more peaceably disposed than our Government—all their desire is to reconcile the friendly relations which it was ever wished to maintain with Russia, with the independence and safety of Turkey.

His Excellency's answer showed me at once, that some progress had been made towards reconciliation.

He hoped the waters were less deep than I imagined; the fact is, he continued after a pause, that the Emperor is extremely sensitive upon any point concerning his honour; he is conscious of having acted with the greatest sincerity; but the idea of his words having been misunderstood by the English Government is extremely painful to him.

An impression had then been made, and your Lordship will believe that I said all that I could to make it deeper and durable.

Count Nesselrode read me some passages of Baron Brunnow's last letters; was I aware, he asked, that there was question of sending a special Mission here from London? What was my opinion of the measure?

I said I had not heard of the plan, but that I thought it a very good one; that there could be no question of personal interests; whatever was for the good of the Queen's service, whatever tended to promote peace, was the measure to be adopted.

The great point was, I continued, that the late resolutions of Russia should be brought into more accordance with general policy; how could this best be effected? Looking to the forward position taken by the Emperor, I would ask, not of the Chancellor, but of Count Nesselrode, which course would be the most agreeable to his Majesty's feelings? Would it be the despatch of a special mission from England? or a mediation undertaken by Austria? or a mission from the Porte? I should be glad to learn His Majesty's feelings.

The only thing, Count Nesselrode said, which would be agreeable to the Emperor, would be that the Porte should be advised by the allies to accept Prince Menchikoff's note.

That, I said, was impossible; and I explained why. I did not think Her Majesty's Government could take such a course; I did not think that any English Government could;—feeling in England was too strong upon the point: this was shown by the newspapers, of whatever shade of political opinions. The fact is, I said, I know that a warlike feeling, and even an anti-Russian feeling, are to be easily raised in England at this crisis: who would take upon themselves to encounter them?

Again we had a discussion upon the Treaty-rights of Russia: I observed, that it was clear, from your Lordship's despatches, that I had incurred blame for not having obtained more precise information as to the rights assured to Russia by the Treaty of Kainardji. I would then revive the former inquiry.

Count Nesselrode said, that he could only repeat that the fullest explanations upon this point had been given in the "travail" sent to Baron Brunnow a fortnight ago, for communication to your Lordship. Your Lordship will, I trust, appreciate the motive which again induced me not to humiliate a Minister whom it is my wish to conciliate by pushing him upon this point.

No Article in the Treaty of Kainardji, or in any other, can be shown by which the demands of Russia can be supported, and this because none such exists. I really doubt, however, whether this fact had been pointed out to the Emperor until I myself noticed it to His Majesty.

It is true that, *de facto*, the Emperor exercises a religious protectorate in Turkey. It is not true that His Majesty is entitled to do so in virtue of any Treaty-stipulation.

Count Nesselrode then spoke of Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe and Prince Menchikoff, the latter of whom had been very unfairly attacked.

I had not been, I said, one of the Prince's assailants further than was necessary to defend Lord Stratford de Redcliffe against most unjust accusations. His Lordship's conduct had been most unfairly attacked; and in proof of his opinions as to the ultimatum being precisely the same as those which were

entertained by the Representatives of France, Austria, and Prussia, that fact was recorded by the paper sent me by his Excellency, which contained their joint answer to the appeal made to them by Reshid Pasha.

Then, Count Nesselrode observed, Reshid Pasha must have told a lie (menti), for he it was who assured Prince Menchikoff that it was only the disapprobation expressed by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe which prevented the Porte from accepting the Prince's note.

It was, I replied, very possible that Reshid Pasha might have lied—any one else might have lied; but not for a moment could the correctness of Lord Stratford's reports be called in question by any one to whom his Lordship's character was known.

The Russian circular came next under discussion, and I expressed my regret at its publication, which only increased present difficulties, and gave food for controversy (polemique).

Count Nesselrode could not agree in this opinion. The paper was written in moderate terms, and had produced an excellent effect here; it had become absolutely necessary to break silence after the Russian Government had been for three or four months exposed to every sort of attack (des horreurs) on the part of the French and English press.

Passing to the relations between England and France, Count Nesselrode observed that the *entente* appeared to have arrived at greater maturity than he had expected.

I begged to remind his Excellency that there could be no grounds for surprise; that I had often stated what must be the result of any violence on the part of Russia in Turkish affairs.

Could I inform him, Count Nesselrode inquired, whether the English and French fleets had sailed for the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles?

I begged not to answer positively, but that I believed both fleets to have sailed; I believed both would be found in the course of a few days at anchor in Besika Bay.

Count Nesselrode considered this demonstration very unfortunate; he did not see how the Emperor could have the appearance of making any concession under menace.

I replied that I thought the best course which could be followed would be that the two fleets should withdraw from the coast, upon a clear understanding that there should be no attempt made at occupying the Principalities.

Count Nesselrode made use of some expression signifying the impossibility of the Emperor's renouncing his intentions, but the declaration was made in fainter terms than have been lately employed by the Russian Government.

The state of the case, I said, M. le Comte, is plainly this. The English and French fleets have joined for a common purpose; the great object should be to prevent their junction being marked by common action; to prevent this, prudence suggests that the Principalities should not be entered, and that time should be given for the settlement of all difficulties by negotiation.

Count Nesselrode then indulged in a good deal of abuse of the French Cabinet and their late attempt to draw Austria into a "levée de boucliers" against Russia; all this was personal feeling, all this was mere pique occasioned in great measure by the approaching marriage of the Duc de Brabant with an Austrian Arch-Duchess.

When one is engaged against four (the Chancellor said), the one is sure to hear a good deal of the proceedings of the four. I did not point out to Count Nesselrode what an unfortunate policy that must be which suddenly places the Four Powers in opposition of various degrees to Russia; and contented myself with observing that, as regards Her Majesty's Government, there was no wish to raise a crusade against Russia; that, as I had said before, all that was desired was, whilst making allowance for the position taken up by the Emperor, to provide for the security and independence (de sauvegarder) of Turkey.

The upshot of a very long conversation, of which the most interesting portions only have been submitted to your Lordship, is that for the moment no very decided course appears to be fixed upon by the Imperial Cabinet. I suspect, however, that the perception has been forced upon them of close allies having become feeble allies; that less intimate friends are now all but open opponents; that the opinion of all Europe is against them, and that in prudence they would do well to settle, by the less striking means of diplomatic discussion, questions

which they had hoped to carry by a "coup de main," prepared with great art and still greater duplicity.

From various slight points of evidence which I have collected, I am inclined to believe that the difficulties in which the Emperor finds himself have been of his own preparing. If I do not mistake, he chose to take the rudder into his own hands at the commencement of this Turkish negotiation, and if the vessel of State has for a moment run upon a bank, it is only owing to the cautions of an experienced pilot having been disregarded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 485.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 298.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 17, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 279, of the 10th instant, I beg to inclose to your Lordship a copy of the Russian memorandum, drawn up with a view to establishing that the French Protectorate in Turkey applies as well to the Roman Catholic subjects of the Sultan as to Spaniards, Italians, and other strangers of the Roman Catholic religion resident in His Highness's dominions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 485.

Russian Memorandum on the French Protectorate of Latins.

LA presse Française et Anglaise, à propos de la Mission du Prince Menchikoff, cherche à prouver que le Protectorat exercé par la France sur les Catholiques en Orient ne saurait être invoqué aujourd'hui par la Russie comme un exemple et un précédent, parceque ce Protectorat ne s'applique qu'à des Catholiques étrangers domiciliés en Turquie, et non à des Catholiques soumis à la domination de la Porte.

Tous ceux qui suivent les mouvements de la politique Française en Orient, surtout à l'égard des Syriens et des Maronites, peuvent facilement citer des faits à l'appui du contraire. D'ailleurs la pensée qui sous ce rapport a guidé de tout temps le Gouvernement Français, se trouve exprimée d'une manière non douteuse dans un Acte public, nommément dans un Protocole sur les affaires de la Grèce du 5 Février, 1830, No. 3. Ce Protocole, signé pour la France par son Plénipotentiaire le Comte de Montmorency-Laval, renferme le passage suivant que nous nous permettrons de citer textuellement:

"Le Plénipotentiaire Français a réclamé l'attention de la Conférence sur la situation particulière dans laquelle son Gouvernement se trouve relativement à une partie de la population Grecque.

"Il a représenté que depuis plusieurs siècles la France est en possession d'exercer en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan, une patronage spécial que Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne croit devoir déposer aujourd'hui entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état; mais en se dessaisissant de cette prérogative, Sa Majesté Très Chrétienne, se doit à elle-même et elle doit à une population qui a vécu si longtems sous la protection de ses ancêtres, de demander que les Catholiques de terre ferme et des îles trouvent dans l'organisation qui va être donnée à la Grèce, des garanties capables de suppléer à l'action que la France a exercée jusqu'à ce jour en leur faveur.

"Les Plénipotentiaires de la Grande Bretagne et de la Russie ont apprécié la justice de cette demande, et il a été arrêté que la religion Catholique jouira dans le nouvel état, du libre et public exercice de son culte; que ses évêques seront maintenus dans l'intégrité des fonctions, droits, et privilèges dont ils ont

joui sous le patronage du Roi de France; et qu'enfin, d'après le même principe, les propriétés appartenant aux anciennes Missions Françaises seront reconnues et respectées."

Ainsi d'une côté nous voyons que la France n'hésite nullement à déclarer dans un Acte diplomatique formel qu'elle exerce un patronage spécial en faveur des Catholiques soumis au Sultan, et que ce patronage elle croit devoir le déposer entre les mains du futur Souverain de la Grèce quant à ce qui concerne les provinces qui doivent composer le nouvel état; de l'autre, que le Plénipotentiaire de la Grande Bretagne n'a également aucun scrupule d'y apposer sa signature, probablement parceque son Gouvernement ne voyait pas dans la mention explicite du Protectorat Français une atteinte à l'indépendance de la Turquie et à la souveraineté du Sultan.

Pourquoi donc cette manière d'envisager la question a-t-elle varié depuis qu'il s'agit d'en faire l'application à la Russie?

No. 486.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 299. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 17, 1853.*

THE conversation which I held with the Chancellor this morning, leaves me, I must confess, rather less sanguine than I was two days ago.

After some unprofitable controversy as to the Russian demands being or not in accordance with the expectations which Her Majesty's Government had a right to form, I observed that I was so desirous that there should be no further misapprehensions that, with a view to showing that my language was the expression of the feelings and views of Her Majesty's Government, I would read to his Excellency (although I was perhaps not authorized in doing so), your Lordship's two despatches No. 93 and No. 96.

The Chancellor immediately took note of the words, "and to obtain such guarantees as should effectually guard against all future differences on the question," which are to be found in the first of these papers; and said, that in the construction to be placed upon this sentence lay the whole question pending between the two Governments.

The remark gave rise to a fresh argument, with which it is not necessary to trouble your Lordship.

At its conclusion the Chancellor observed, that the protectorate exercised in Turkey by the Emperor of Russia being a matter of fact and notoriety, it appeared to him incredible that the Governments interested in the existence of the Ottoman Empire should hesitate in advising her to subscribe to terms which evidently in no way changed the condition of things.

I begged to remark that this assumption was not borne out by fact; that, as it had been seen, not one of the Representatives of the Four Powers at Constantinople would take upon himself to counsel the adoption of conditions which were considered dangerous to Turkey; and M. le Comte, I continued, permit me to remark, you alone are of your opinion; Russia, accustomed to majorities —Russia, in the habit of guiding other Governments, now finds that the opinions of the Four Great Powers are opposed to hers; surely this gives matter for reflection.

The Chancellor said, this might or might not be so; that he was grieved that any difference of opinion should prevailed among Allied Powers; and at a later period of the conversation, acquainted me that pressing instructions had been sent from Vienna, urging the Turks to accept the note. But, the Chancellor said, the point of view from which the question is to be regarded, is this: you are interested in the continued existence of the Turkish Empire, and certainly you are not more so than we are ourselves; no Power is interested in this object in the same degree as Russia; but you must see that the force of Turkey is wasting away, and that one fillip (chiquenaude) from Russia causes it to fall altogether. Surely then, in common prudence, you should offer advice

which, without producing any change in the real state of affairs, removes all danger from the Sultan's dominions.

Allow me, I returned, M. le Comte, to put the question differently. Interested as you ought to be, and as now, having lived some time in Russia, I believe you to be, in the preservation of Turkey, ought you not to refrain from placing her in the dilemma either of accepting a measure which the majority of friends consider destructive of her independence, or, by a refusal, of incurring a war which implies her destruction?

The Chancellor could not allow the question to be so put: for Russia it was a matter of necessity that her influence should be very great (very great or paramount, for I cannot state which), and this influence is destroyed, if the Turks are not driven to accept the terms which have been proposed to them.

Count Nesselrode then enlarged upon the horrors of war, the unbounded injury which it would entail upon his own country and upon England, and commented upon the disproportion of the object as stated, with the sacrifices which would be made for its attainment. He thought war in such a cause could hardly be undertaken by the Government of a country professing such peaceable intentions, and so manifestly interested in the cultivation of peace, as England.

I observed that no Government and no people could be more disinclined to go to war than those of England; but that nothing could better prove the force of feeling in England, than that war should be coolly considered, when interests dear to all English feelings were considered in danger.

After some hesitation, Count Nesselrode begged to know whether I had any proposition to make to him. I replied, M. le Comte, the only thing I have to suggest is, that you should be good enough to take into consideration the words of Lord Clarendon's despatch to which you just now pointed, and that you should endeavour to strike out some course by which you may "obtain such guarantees as shall effectually guard against all future differences on the question (of the Holy Places), without seeking the guarantee in a measure of which the Allies in general, as you are aware, think very unfavourably."

The Chancellor having with some reluctance undertaken to speak to the Emperor upon the subject, and having expressed a wish of being allowed to read to His Majesty your Lordship's two despatches Nos. 93 and 96, I made up my mind to leaving them in his Excellency's hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—The answer of the Porte is expected here on or about the 24th instant.

G. H. S.

No. 487.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 300.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 17, 1853.*

THE Prussian Chargé d'Affaires had an interview to-day with the Chancellor, at which he read to him the despatch which he had received expressing the opinion of his Government as to the late events at Constantinople.

Some days have elapsed since I have seen Count Henckel, and I have not read his instructions; I am informed, however, that Count Nesselrode spoke to him of the great disapprobation felt by the Emperor at the conduct of the Prussian Minister at the Porte; and when Count Henckel remarked that the line taken by the Prussian Mission was precisely the same as that of the Legation of Austria, he was met with the observation, "Yes, but the Austrians have made atonement for their conduct, and are now pressing the Turks to accept the ultimatum, even if the eight days assigned for their final resolution should have expired."

In a word, it appears that the Russian Cabinet, having been accustomed to

the cooperation of allied Governments when prudent counsel prevailed here, considers itself equally entitled to see its policy shared by them when all moderation is cast aside.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 488.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 24.)

(Secret.)
My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 17, 1853.*

THE Chancellor has called my attention to a quotation from the Emperor's memorandum of the 31st of March last, which is to be read in your Lordship's despatch No. 81.

The passage in question begins with these words: "Le meilleur moyen de soutenir la durée du Gouvernement Turc."

His Excellency requested me to represent to your Lordship that the whole passage had not been quoted, as, if referred to at all, it ought to have been; but to represent still more forcibly the impropriety of any use being made of a communication addressed in fact by one Sovereign to another in a paper to which publicity might be given.

I undertook readily to submit Count Nesselrode's observation to your Lordship, but begged to remind him that I had at the time been sensible of the possible inconvenience of a mode of international communication which was foreign to the practice of Constitutional Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 489.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 256. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 25, 1853.*

I INCLOSE to your Excellency the draft of a despatch to Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, conveying a recommendation to the Porte, which Her Majesty's Government hope may afford a solution of its difficulties with Russia.

The recommendation is to unite together in one Act the stipulations in favour of Christians and of the Christian religion that are to be found in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, as well as other matters contained therein which more especially concern Russia, and to send this proposed Convention by an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh, who should have power to sign it, but not to assent to alterations without reference to the Porte.

Before taking any step in the matter, however, Her Majesty's Government are anxious to have the concurrence of the French Government; and your Excellency is therefore instructed to communicate to M. Drouyn de Lhuys the despatch, together with the form of Convention that we think might be adopted by the Porte.

Your Excellency will lose no time in informing me of the opinion entertained by M. Drouyn de Lhuys; and if, as Her Majesty's Government hope, it should be favourable, the despatch and Project of Convention shall immediately be sent to Constantinople, and copies to Berlin and Vienna for the purpose of securing, if possible, the support of the Prussian and Austrian Governments, both at Constantinople and at St. Petersburgh, of a project which has been sanctioned by the Governments of France and England.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this may be a mode of uniting the Four Powers together for a practical purpose, and of bringing the whole weight of their moral influence to bear upon the Cabinet of St. Petersburgh.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 489.

Draft of a Note to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Foreign Office, June , 1853.

My Lord,

HER Majesty's Government expect shortly to learn from your Excellency that the ultimatum of Count Nesselrode, addressed to Reshid Pasha, has been rejected by the Porte; and they see no reason to doubt that the Emperor of Russia will, in consequence, execute his threat of occupying the Principalities.

Against this act Her Majesty's Government have, by my despatch No. 81 of the 18th instant to your Excellency, recommended the Porte to protest in strong terms.

It is an act of violence and injustice; it rests upon no right, and can be defended on no principle; it is dangerous as a precedent, and as an abuse of power that every civilized community is interested in denouncing. If a powerful State is tacitly permitted to make inadmissible demands upon a weak one, and, on their rejection, to invade and to hold a portion of its territory, professing that it is not an act of war, but avowedly for the purpose of coercing it into a surrender of its rights and independence, international law ceases to exist, and the mutual obligations upon which society depends are grossly violated.

After mature deliberation, however, Her Majesty's Government saw reason to advise the Sultan not to exercise his unquestionable right of declaring war against Russia upon the occupation of the Principalities; but if Russian aggression were to be carried further, and if any other portion of Turkish territory were to be invaded, active operations on the part of Turkey would seem to be inevitable, and eventually the English and French fleets might be called upon to protect Constantinople.

England and France might thus find themselves opposed to Russia; and if war should ensue, Europe might be convulsed from one end to the other; for we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that this would become a war of no ordinary character, and soon cease to be within the control of those by whom it was originally undertaken. It would be a war of opinion, and the struggle of nations against their rulers; the discontented everywhere would seize the opportunity to avenge their real or imaginary wrongs, and revolution would shake the social fabric of Europe to its foundation.

It is the duty of Her Majesty's Government to guard against such a contingency, and its disastrous results, by every means at their command. The policy of France upon the Eastern question is happily identified with that of England; and her cordial cooperation towards the maintenance of peace is with confidence relied upon by Her Majesty's Government. Both Powers are bound by the same obligations towards Turkey, and by both they will faithfully be fulfilled; but upon a question involving such momentous interests, no false step must be made; freedom of action must not be unnecessarily fettered; and it is essential therefore, that upon the precise nature of these obligations no misconception should be permitted to exist. First, then, as to the Treaty of 1841, which was signed by the Five Powers, in the persuasion "that their union and agreement offer to Europe the most certain pledge for the preservation of general peace—the constant object of their solicitude; and their said Majesties, desiring to attest this agreement by giving to His Highness the Sultan a manifest proof of the respect they entertain for the inviolability of his sovereign rights, as well as of their sincere desire to see consolidated the repose of his Empire," &c.

To the principles thus laid down, Her Majesty's Government entirely adhere; the same spirit which dictated this preamble animates them now; but it is the Articles of the Treaty alone that have a binding force, and to which the Five Powers are compelled to adhere; and Her Majesty's Government consider, therefore, that Turkey could not rely upon this Treaty in demanding aid from her allies, nor could they, on their part, be under any obligation to come to her assistance.

The evident intentions, however, that are recorded in the preamble, the frequent declarations of policy respecting Turkey made by Great Britain, our commercial interests and the balance of power in Europe furnish abundant motives for desiring the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and for resisting the

encroachments upon it of any other Power, whatever be the form that those encroachments may assume.

But I repeat again, that before the time for adopting a policy of resistance shall arrive, it is alike our duty and our interest to exert our utmost efforts, in conjunction with Her Majesty's allies, to preserve peace on terms that shall be safe and honourable to the Sultan, and entirely satisfy every claim that Russia can with justice put forward.

The Emperor of Russia, throughout these painful negotiations, has declared, and he has recently renewed the declaration, that he seeks no increase of power or influence over the Greek subjects of the Porte, and desires only the maintenance of the *status quo* in religious matters, and the fulfilment of existing Treaties. Her Majesty's Government would therefore recommend the Turkish Government to take this declaration as the basis of a new agreement, and to embody in one separate Convention every stipulation in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople by which Turkey is now bound to Russia.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that, from Articles VII, VIII, XIV, XVI, XVII, and XXIII, of the Treaty of Kainardji, and Article V of the Treaty of Adrianople, a Convention new in its form, but in its substance containing no extension of rights, might be framed, which the Sultan, without loss of power, might propose, and the Emperor might, without loss of dignity, accept.

Her Majesty's Government would further recommend that this Convention should be sent to St. Petersburgh by a special Ambassador, who should have power to sign, but not to alter it without reference to the Porte. He should lay before the Emperor the recent firman in favour of the Greek Church, by itself, as evidence of the good faith with which, even by anticipation, the terms of the Convention will be carried out by the Sultan.

He should also lay before the Emperor the firmans respecting the holy places, and be empowered to give a written assurance as to their fulfilment, taking care, however, that such assurance in no way infringes upon the rights acquired by the Latin Church, or militates against a similar guarantee being given to the French Government and to other Powers; and lastly, the Ambassador should, by Convention or note, assign to the Russians at Jerusalem a hospital, and such other buildings as may be required.

If the Porte should think proper to act upon this advice, and if a proposal so fair and complete be rejected, Her Majesty's Government will consider that it will be manifest to the world that the claim of religious rights covers ulterior designs on the part of Russia, hostile to the independence of Turkey; and the Sultan may then justly claim the sympathy and support of every Government in Europe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

Inclosure 2 in No. 489.

Draft of a Convention between Russia and the Porte confirmatory of the Articles touching the Christian Religion in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople.

HIS Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having expressed to His Highness the Sultan his desire that at this particular juncture the privileges enjoyed in the Ottoman dominions by the members of the orthodox Eastern Church should be solemnly recognized by the Sublime Porte, so that no doubt or uncertainty should exist as to the right of the members of that Church fully to participate in the privileges, immunities, and other advantages which by the Treaty between Russia and the Porte concluded at Koutchouk Kainardji on the $\frac{16}{27}$ July, 1774, and by the further Treaty between the same Powers concluded at Adrianople on the $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1829, were conferred generally on the Christian religion in the said dominions; and his Highness the Sultan being anxious to comply with this desire of His Imperial Majesty, and at the same time to afford to all the Christian subjects of the Sublime Porte the fullest assurance of His Highness's unalterable determination to continue to extend to them his gracious protection, more particularly in regard to matters appertaining to their religion; it has seemed good to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, and to His Highness the Sultan, that the several stipulations

relating to the Christian religion contained in the aforesaid Treaties of Koutchouk Kainardji and Adrianople should be embodied in one special and separate Act, which shall serve hereafter as a perpetual memorial of the deep interest taken by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias in the well-being of the members of that particular branch of the Church of Christ which is dominant in His Imperial Majesty's dominions, and of the benevolent feelings and intentions of His Highness the Sultan towards all classes of his Christian subjects.

For this purpose His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Highness the Sultan have named as their Plenipotentiaries,

who having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

The Sublime Porte promises constantly to protect the Christian religion in all its churches within the Ottoman dominions; to offer no obstacle to the free exercise of their religious rites by christians of every denomination; to secure from insult and injury on account of their religion, the ecclesiastics belonging to the various Christian churches and the members of their respective flocks; to allow new Churches to be built and ancient churches to be repaired wherever and whenever the same may be required to enable the Christian subjects of the Porte to exercise their religious worship according to their respective creeds; to secure Christian conventual or other religious establishments from oppression, exaction, and confiscation on account of the purposes to which they are devoted; to recognize and respect according to their rank and station, the dignitaries and other ecclesiastics of the several branches of the Christian Church; and generally to extend as regards their religious worship his gracious countenance and favour to all classes of his Christian subjects.

ARTICLE II.

His Highness the Sultan, moreover, engages scrupulously to observe the stipulations of the VIIth Article of the Treaty of Koutchouk Kainardji relating to the church at that time to be built at Constantinople, and to the persons to be employed in that church; the stipulation of the VIIIth Article of the aforesaid Treaty relating to Russian pilgrims and travellers, whether ecclesiastics or laymen, proceeding to Jerusalem or other places of interest; and the stipulation of the XIVth Article of the aforesaid Treaty in favour of the Russo-Greek church at that time to be built at Galata: which Articles shall be deemed and taken to be inserted word for word in the present Treaty.

The Plenipotentiaries aforesaid have accordingly set their hands and seals to these Articles, agreeing further that the same shall be duly accepted and ratified by their respective Sovereigns within the space of

Done at

No. 490.

Project of Convention for the future Regulation of the Religious Privileges of the Christian Subjects of the Porte, proposed by the Prussian Government.—(Communicated by the Chevalier Bunsen, June 25.)

LES Hautes Puissances Contractantes, convaincues que l'entente existante entre elles et Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie offre les garanties les plus solides au maintien de la paix Européenne, et voulant constater cette entente par un Acte formel, en donnant en même temps à Sa Majesté l'Empereur et Padishah des Ottomans une preuve non équivoque du respect qu'elles ont pour l'inviolabilité de ses droits en parfait accord avec la nécessité de sauvegarder les droits et immunités garantis aux sujets Chrétiens de Sa Hautesse par des Traités antérieurs, sont convenues de ce qui suit:

ARTICLE I.

Il ne sera apporté aucun changement aux droits, privilèges, et immunités dont ont joui ou jouissent *ab antiquo* les églises, les institutions pieuses, et les clergés des différentes communautés Chrétiennes, nommément, de l'Eglise Catholique Grecque, de l'Eglise Catholique Romaine, et de la confession Protestante, dans les Etats de la Sublime Porte Ottomane, qui se plait à les leur assurer à tout jamais sur la base du *status quo* strict existant aujourd'hui.

ARTICLE II.

Les droits et avantages que le Gouvernement Ottoman a concédés à l'une des communautés Chrétiennes susnommées, ou qu'il leur concédera à l'avenir par Traités, Conventions, ou dispositions particulières, seront considérés comme appartenant également aux autres cultes.

ARTICLE III.

Les dispositions de l'Article II, relative à l'égalité des droits de tous les cultes Chrétiens ne sont point applicable aux privilèges et immunités garantis à l'Eglise Grecque ou à un autre culte Chrétien, tant dans la ville de Jérusalem que dans les autres lieux saints, par Traités, Capitulations, ou autres Conventions spéciales.

ARTICLE IV.

Si les droits et immunités des communautés Chrétiennes, ou de l'une d'elle, étaient méconnus et lésés par le Gouvernement Ottoman, les Puissances Contractantes s'engagent à appuyer, après s'être concertées préalablement, les démarches que la partie intéressée devra faire pour sauvegarder ses droits.

ARTICLE V.

Si des délibérations communes deviennent nécessaires par suite d'une réclamation ou d'une divergence d'opinion existante entre la Sublime Porte et les Puissances Contractantes, ou l'une d'entre elles, au sujet de cette Convention ou de toute autre question relative au même objet, les Gouvernements, sur la proposition de l'un d'eux, ouvriront immédiatement une conférence diplomatique à Londres.

ARTICLE VI.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies reconnait et convient, de même que les autres Hautes Parties Contractantes, qu'elles ont un égal intérêt à concourir au maintien de la paix religieuse de l'Empire Ottoman, et que toutes les confessions des Eglises Chrétiennes sans exception seront désormais placées sous la protection égale et commune des Puissances Signataires de ce Traité. En conséquence, chacune des dites Puissances s'engage, pour sa part, formellement par la présente stipulation, de ne rien entreprendre, innover, ou exiger de la Sublime Porte en fait de matière religieuse qu'en vertu d'une entente ou décision faite ou prise préalablement et en commun avec les autres.

ARTICLE VII.

Le présent Traité ne déroge à aucune des stipulations et conventions ultérieures existantes entre l'Empire Ottoman et les Puissances Contractantes ou l'une d'entre elles, et qui conservent tout leur force et valeur.

No. 491.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 117.)

Foreign Office, June 25, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your despatches to No. 301 of the 18th instant inclusive, and one marked Secret of the 17th instant.

I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the language held by you to Count Nesselrode on the Turkish Question in the conversation of which a report is contained in your despatch No. 292 of the 16th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 492.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 119.)

Foreign Office, June 25, 1853.

Sir,

I HAVE to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to Count Nesselrode in the further conversation on the Turkish Question, of which a report is contained in your despatch No. 299 of the 17th instant; and they also approve of your having left in Count Nesselrode's hands my despatches Nos. 93 and 96, of the 7th and 8th instant.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 493.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 25.)

(No. 467.)

Paris, June 24, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS received this morning despatches from St. Petersburgh (he could not tell me the exact date, but they have not been above six or even days on the road) in which General Castelbajac states that in a conversation which he had had with Count Nesselrode, the latter had said that if the answers from London and Paris to the communication lately made from St. Petersburgh on the Eastern question were satisfactory it was still possible that the Russian troops might not cross the Pruth.

I asked if any explanation was given of the meaning attached by Count Nesselrode to the word "satisfactory." It might mean that Russia would be contented with the pacific assurances of the two Cabinets, and of their desire to see an arrangement honourable to both Parties concluded between Russia and the Porte; or it might mean that Russia expected that England and France were to bow to her arguments, and disown their Ambassadors at Constantinople. General Castelbajac does not seem to have given any indication of the sense in which Count Nesselrode's words were uttered.

I have, &c.

(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 494.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 96.)

Constantinople, June 10, 1853.

My Lord,

A LETTER from Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pasha, dated St. Petersburgh, May 19, I presume old style, was received yesterday by a Russian war-steamer under merchant colours, and delivered to the Pasha by M. Argyropulo, the Russian interpreter. Its purport is, that the Emperor entirely approves of Prince Menchikoff's conduct, and that, without actually making war, his army will in a few weeks cross the frontier to obtain a "material" guarantee from the Porte, until the "moral" one demanded by his Ambassador shall be obtained. Count Nesselrode ends by advising Reshid Pasha to sign the project of a note delivered to him by Prince Menchikoff before his departure from Constantinople, and to send it without the slightest alteration—"sans variation"—to that Ambassador at Odessa within eight days at latest. The rest of the letter is a mixture, as usual, of reproach, friendly assurances, and menace, conveyed in no flattering form.

Reshid Pasha lost no time in sending me a copy of the letter. He gave M. Pisani to understand that the Porte would not accept the overture, which is, in fact, the same identical proposal which has been already rejected.

Since writing what precedes, I have seen Reshid Pasha, the French Ambassador, the Prussian Envoy, and the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, to whom copies of Count Nesselrode's letter had been sent. They all hold the same language with respect to that communication. It offers, in truth, no alternative but a simple acceptance of the terms before refused as inadmissible, or an armed invasion of the Turkish territory, with the view of obtaining by force what the Porte will not spontaneously accord. The Sultan has taken cognizance of the letter, which will also be submitted to the Council.

The present occasion does not admit of my saying more. My impression is, that the Porte will persist in its refusal of the Russian demands.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 495.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon,—(Received June 27.)

(No. 251.)

Berlin, June 24, 1853.

My Lord,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 244 of the 21st instant I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the late communication of the French Minister at this Court to Baron Manteuffel has produced a further instruction to Count Hatzfeldt, which announces the policy of Prussia to be still more in harmony with that of England and France, on the Turkish Question, than it appeared to be some time ago.

The attitude of Prussia is one of pacific remonstrance, in which she will endeavour to exert a beneficial influence at St. Petersburgh.

Mention is made in this despatch of the Treaty of July 1841, the importance of which Baron Manteuffel fully recognizes, stating that he has not yet thought it advisable to appeal to it in his official communications, but he admits its full force, and announces his readiness to invoke its provisions, if circumstances should hereafter occur which may render this course advantageous.

Baron Manteuffel read this despatch to me hastily, yesterday, and it is useless for me to allude further to the subject, as his Excellency will send a copy of it to Chevalier Bunsen for communication to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 496.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 254. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 24, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 131 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to state that I had some conversation this evening with Baron Manteuffel as to the policy of Austria with respect to the affairs of Turkey, and told his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government hoped he would exert all his influence at Vienna to engage the Austrian Government to enter as cordially as possible into our views; for it was of the greatest importance that an agreement of opinion between the Four Powers should be manifested, and that no approval of Russian demands should take place.

I said that I felt called upon to make this statement to him in consequence of the different impressions which the policy of Austria had made here and in London; that I had already reported to your Lordship, in my despatch No. 243, of the 21st instant, that a more favourable account had been received at Berlin than that which I had forwarded last week, and that I was desirous to learn from him whether the opinions he then stated had undergone any change.

His Excellency replied that he had heard from Chevalier Bunsen that Her Majesty's Government was in possession of reports from Vienna which differed certainly from those which had reached him, and that he was willing to believe that he might have been unfavourably impressed as to the intentions of Austria; that he grounded his opinions on the only communications which he had as yet received from the Imperial Government, which were instructions to Baron Bruck, and that none other had been made.

He added that he had to-day received a despatch from Baron Canitz, the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna, which was more satisfactory; and that he should certainly do all in his power to encourage the Austrian Government to maintain their independence in treating the Eastern Question with the Russian Government; and he assured me, further, that no exertions should be wanting on his part to carry out the policy which Prussia desired to follow, and which it would give him the most sincere pleasure to see adopted by Austria.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 497.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 256.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 24, 1853.*

THE impression made on Baron Manteuffel by the last despatches which have reached him from St. Petersburgh, is as unfavourable as ever, and he does not understand that there is the least disposition on the part of the Russian Government to modify their demands on the Porte.

His Excellency mentioned to me in confirmation of this opinion, that he had directed the Prussian Chargé d'Affaires to represent to Count Nesselrode the advantage in the interests of peace, of the Emperor receiving a Turkish Ambassador with new proposals for an arrangement of the points in discussion between the two Governments, and that the Chancellor had replied that the question could not be entertained until the note was signed.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 498.

Lord Bloomfield to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 257.)

My Lord, *Berlin, June 24, 1853.*

WHEN I was with Baron Manteuffel this evening, I read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch No. 132, of the 20th instant, in which you mention the communication by Chevalier Bunsen of a despatch authorizing that Minister to attend any conference to which he might be invited, having for its object a peaceful solution of the matters in dispute between Russia and Turkey, and his Excellency was gratified to learn the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this fresh proof of the confidence and identity of views that exist between the two Governments.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 499.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 247.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June 21, 1853.*

I READ to Count Buol your Lordship's despatch No. 161, in which you state that Her Majesty's Government have learnt the opinion of that Minister on the present aspect of Turkish affairs, as reported in my despatch No. 237, with great satisfaction.

Count Buol was gratified by this statement of the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government; and as I afterwards read to him your Lordship's despatch No. 150, in which your conversation with Count Colloredo is detailed, he begged me to assure you that he entirely coincided with the policy of Her Majesty's Government therein described, and that it was the greatest satisfaction to him to observe that, upon the important questions now pending in the East of Europe, there was no difference in the sentiments entertained in regard to them by either of the two Governments of England and of Austria.

Count Buol said that he had already received from Count Colloredo a report of the conversation now described by your Lordship, with which he had been highly satisfied, but it had not entered into so many details as those given by your Lordship, which had rendered the expression of your sentiments still more valuable to him.

There was one point alone which was mentioned by your Lordship upon which he wished to make a remark, and which referred to the desire you expressed that Count Colloredo might be instructed to take part in any conference that it might be considered useful to hold in London, having for its object a solution of the existing difficulties in a manner both safe and honourable for Russia and for Turkey. Upon this proposal Count Buol desired to state that, however willing he should be to allow Count Colloredo to take part in bringing about the objects so described, yet he thought that, for the moment, while the decisions both of the Governments of Russia and of the Porte had not yet been declared, it would be premature to form a conference which might have the appearance of arranging itself in opposition to Russia, and of imposing terms upon her Government. Moved by this sentiment alone he recommended that, for the present, no measure should be taken towards the assembly or preparation of this conference, although he fully admitted the force of all the stipulations of the Treaty of 1841, and the obligations they imposed upon the Five Powers parties to it; and in case of the complications arising between Russia and Turkey, which at present there was too much reason to dread, he looked upon the stipulations of that Treaty as the groundwork upon which the peace of Europe could best be re-established, and to which the Austrian Government would lend its most cordial assistance.

Count Buol stated that he had received a communication as to a conference

of the Five Powers from the French Government (of which I had already been informed by M. de Bourqueney) which was of a similar character to the one made by your Lordship. The despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, which treated of this subject, and which had been read to him, was dated the 12th instant, and referred to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1841, by which the Five Powers were "garans de l'intégrité de la Turquie," and therefore the French Government called upon the Five Powers to meet in conference, to take into consideration the questions at present in dispute with the Porte before they should be resolved by one of those Five Powers by the force of arms.

Count Buol stated that the despatch of M. Drouyn de Lhuys was extremely well written (an opinion with which I was able to coincide, as it had been read to me by M. de Bourqueney), but that he had replied to it in the same manner in which he had answered the proposal from your Lordship. He had, however, taken the opportunity of stating distinctly that he recognized all the obligations of the Treaty of 1841, and he looked to them, in case of more serious complications, as the hope and security for the future maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 500.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 473.)

Paris, June 26, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS read to me this afternoon a despatch from M. de Bourqueney dated the 22nd instant, in which that Minister gives an account of a short conversation which he had just had with Count Buol on Eastern affairs. Count Buol had asked, in a tone of disquietude, what was to be done if Russia persisted in her aggressive intrusions. "You have nothing for it," replied M. de Bourqueney, "but to establish a Conference. A Conference will be the only remaining chance of safety for Turkey." "That will be the second phase of the question," rejoined M. de Buol, without contesting the truth of M. de Bourqueney's assertion; "it will then become European. But, from the indications I have, it is not probable that Russia will consent."

M. de Bourqueney adds that Count Buol avoids all discussion of the Eastern Question with Baron Meyendorff.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 501.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 475.)

Paris, June 26, 1853.

My Lord,

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS has addressed a circular of some length to the different French Missions, commenting on the Russian circular published in the public press of Europe.

The greater part of this paper contains refutations already used and repented *usque ad nauseam* of the Russian arguments, but it comprises further a positive denial that the French Capitulations of 1740 give to France any right of protection over the Latin subjects of the Porte, and it contrasts the conduct of the French Government with that of Russia during the negotiation of the Question arising out of the disagreement respecting the Sacred Places. "France," M. Drouyn de Lhuys observes, "has quite as much reason to complain of, and has quite as much right to require satisfaction for the tergiversations of the Porte as Russia; but she had felt that those tergiversations were the natural consequence of a weak Power endeavouring to humour the antagonistic exigencies of two powerful States, and that the Porte was not to blame for them. France, on the other hand, had never obtained all that had been promised to her, while she had ceded to the Greeks certain advantages which had previously been in her exclusive and undisputed possession."

I asked M. Drouyn de Lhuys, with reference to his denial of any right of protectorate over the Latin subjects of the Sultan, whether he was aware of the declaration made by the Duc de Laval in the third Protocol on Greek affairs signed on the 5th of February, 1830. He replied that he knew to what I alluded, but that his explanation was quite ready. "The Greeks," he said, "in the islands, who professed the Roman Catholic faith, had always been denominated Franks, to which race the French Capitulations applied, and France had, in fact, up to the moment of the negotiation of the independence of Greece, always exercised the privilege of recommending or nominating the Greek or Frank Roman Catholic Bishops." "But what greater proof," exclaimed M. Drouyn de Lhuys, "could France give of her own value of the extent of her rights than both in this question and that of the Maronites in Syria? Instead of putting forward a claim to exclusive protection and therefore to exclusive jurisdiction, she stated her wishes to her allies, and submitted her demands for their examination." "Let Russia," he said, "do as much on the present occasion, before placing her conduct in contrast with that of France."

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 502.

Draft of Note proposed by the French Government to be addressed by the Porte to Russia.—(Communicated to the Earl of Clarendon by Count Walewski, June 27.)

LE départ de M. le Prince Menchikoff dans des circonstances qui auraient pu jeter des doutes, heureusement mal fondés, sur le caractère amical et confiant des relations que Sa Majesté le Sultan a à cœur d'entretenir et de resserrer avec son auguste allié et voisin Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, a profondément peiné la Sublime Porte. Elle s'est donc occupé soigneusement de rechercher les moyens d'effacer les traces d'un si regrettable malentendu, et un iradé suprême, en date de lui ayant fait connaitre la décision Impériale, elle se félicite de pouvoir la communiquer à son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Russie (ou à son Excellence M. le Comte de Nesselrode.)

Si à toute époque les Empereurs de Russie ont témoigné leur active sollicitude pour le maintien des immunités et privilèges de l'Église Orthodoxe Grecque dans l'Empire Ottoman, les Sultans ne se sont jamais refusés à les consacrer de nouveau par des actes solennels qui attestaient leur ancienne et constante bienveillance à l'égard de leurs sujets Chrétiens. Sa Majesté le Sultan Abdul Medjid, aujourd'hui régnant, animé des mêmes dispositions et voulant donner à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un témoignage personnel de son amitié la plus sincère et de son désir intime de consolider les anciennes relations de bon voisinage et de parfaite entente qui existent entre les deux États, n'a écouté que sa confiance infinie dans les qualités éminentes de son auguste amie et allié, et a daigné prendre en sérieuse considération les représentations dont son Excellence M. le Prince Menchikoff s'est rendu l'organe auprès d'elle.

Le Soussigné a reçu, en conséquence, l'ordre de déclarer par la présente que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Sultan regarde qu'il est de son honneur de faire observer à tout jamais, et de préserver de toute atteinte, soit présentement, soit dans l'avenir, la jouissance des privilèges spirituels qui ont été accordés par les augustes aïeux de Sa Majesté, à l'Église Orthodoxe d'Orient, et qui sont maintenus et confirmés par elle: et en outre à faire participer, dans un esprit de haute équité, le rit Grec aux avantages concédés aux autres rits Chrétiens, par Convention ou disposition particulière.

Au reste comme le firman Impérial qui vient d'être donné au Patriarche et au clergé Grecs, et qui contient la confirmation de leurs privilèges spirituels, devra être regardé comme une nouvelle preuve de ces nobles sentiments, et comme, en outre, la proclamation de ce firman qui donne toute sécurité devra faire disparaître à jamais toute crainte à l'égard du rit qui est la religion de Sa

Majesté l'Empereur, je suis heureux d'être chargé du devoir de faire la présente notification.

Quant à la garantie qu'à l'avenir il ne sera rien changé aux lieux de visitation de Jérusalem, elle résulte du firman revêtu du hatti-humayoun de 15 de la lune de Rebiul-akhir 1268 (Février 1852), expliqué et corroboré par les firmans des , et l'intention formelle de Sa Majesté le Sultan est de faire exécuter sans aucune altération ses décisions souveraines.

La Sublime Porte, en outre, promet officiellement qu'il ne sera apporté aucune modification à l'état des choses, sans que les Gouvernements de France et de Russie en soient préalablement informés. La même notification sera faite à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français.

Pour le cas où la Cour Impériale de Russie en ferait demande, il sera assigné une localité convenable dans la ville de Jérusalem ou dans les environs, pour la construction d'une église consacrée à célébration du service divin par des ecclésiastiques Russes, et d'un hospice pour les pélerins indigens ou malades de la même nation.

La Sublime Porte s'engage dès à présent à souscrire à cet égard un acte solennel qui placerait ces fondations pieuses sous la surveillance spéciale du Consulat-Général de Russie en Syrie et en Palestine.

Le Soussigné, &c.

No. 503.

The Earl of Clarendon to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(No. 123. Secret.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, June 28, 1853.*

I HAVE received your despatch marked "Secret," of the 17th instant, reporting that you had been requested by Count Nesselrode to represent to me that the passage of the Emperor's memorandum on the Turkish Question of the 7th April, transmitted to this office in your despatch No. 190 of the 21st of April, to which reference is made in my despatch No. 81 of the 31st of May, should, if alluded to at all, have been quoted at length; and that his Excellency had further represented the impropriety of mentioning in a paper to which publicity might be given, a communication addressed in fact, as he said, by one Sovereign to another.

I have to state to you in reply, that although Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to consider that a communication made by a Foreign Sovereign to a British Minister abroad can be looked upon in the peculiar light in which Count Nesselrode suggested that the paper in question should be viewed, yet they would very reluctantly do anything which would be distasteful to His Imperial Majesty.

Her Majesty's Government considered the paper from which the passage in question was taken to form a portion of those unreserved explanations of the Emperor's policy with respect to Turkey, which they conceived it was His Imperial Majesty's intention to communicate to them through Her Majesty's Minister, and to which it was very agreeable to Her Majesty's Government to feel that implicit confidence might be attached.

But as Count Nesselrode appears to object to the publication of any portion of the document in question, you may assure his Excellency that if it should unfortunately become necessary for the justification of the conduct of Her Majesty's servants in regard to what has passed in Turkey, to lay before the British Parliament my despatch No. 81 of the 31st of July, the reference in that despatch to the Emperor's memorandum of the 7th of April, to which Count Nesselrode has called your attention, shall certainly be omitted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 504.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 138.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 28, 1853.*

WITH reference to your Lordship's confidential despatch No. 243 reporting what passed between Baron Manteuffel and yourself on the attitude assumed by the Austrian Government on Turkish affairs, I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you on that occasion, and I have to instruct you to state to Baron Manteuffel that the great object at this moment is to bring the utmost weight of moral influence to bear upon Russia, particularly on the part of all the German Powers, who would be the first to suffer from the war for which the Emperor of Russia appears to be prepared.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 505.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Bloomfield.

(No. 145.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 28, 1853.*

THE Chevalier Bunsen has communicated to me the project of a Convention, a copy of which is inclosed herewith, to be signed by the Five Powers, for the future regulation of the religious rights and immunities enjoyed by the Christian subjects of the Porte, and stipulating that in the event of any measures becoming necessary with reference to the above objects against the Porte on the part of one of the Contracting Powers, such measures shall only be taken in concert between all the Powers, and after due deliberation at a conference to be held at London.

Your Lordship is instructed to convey to Baron Manteuffel the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication, and to state that they concur in its spirit, and will be happy to cooperate with the Prussian Government towards the objects sought to be attained by the Convention whenever the time for bringing the question forward shall arrive; but Her Majesty's Government apprehend that it would be premature to do so at present.

I am, &c.

(Signed) CLARENDON.

No. 506.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 180. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 28, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship's confidential despatch No. 256 inclosing to me the Draft of a Convention which Her Majesty's Government think might be adopted by the Porte for the settlement of its differences with Russia, and desiring me to communicate it to M. Drouyn de Lhuys with a view of obtaining the concurrence of the French Government in recommending it to the consideration of the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets, reached me on the morning of the 26th. I saw M. de Lhuys in the afternoon of the same day, and read to

him, as desired, the proposed instructions to Lord Stratford, and the proposed Draft of Convention; and I expressed the anxious hope of Her Majesty's Government that their opinions might be shared by the Government of the Emperor.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys declared at once his approval of the pacific tenor of the instructions drawn up for Lord Stratford, but he hesitated at giving any decided opinion as to the Draft of Convention, until he had time to examine it more attentively, and to take the Emperor's orders. He promised, however, to see the Emperor the following morning; and I left the drafts with him, in order that His Majesty might see them. An answer was at the same time promised me after M. Drouyn de Lhuys' interview with the Emperor.

The French Minister, however, told me during this interview, he should prefer to see the misunderstanding between Russia and the Porte arranged without the signature of a Treaty or Convention, and that, upon a cursory view of it, the Draft proposed by your Lordship seemed to him to give to Russia a latitude of protection over all the Christian subjects of the Porte, not over the Greeks alone, which was objectionable. I replied, that if he would compare the Draft which he had in his hands with the Treaties already existing between Russia and the Porte, he would find that no fresh concessions were thereby made to Russia,—that all that had been done was to take the religious Articles out of existing Treaties, and to consign them together to a fresh Convention,—that the object which your Lordship had in view, was to find some proposal which would have the approbation of the Four Powers, and ensure their united action in offering it to the acceptance of Russia; that if even the signature of the proposed Convention was a small triumph to Russia, it was a triumph cheaply conceded, if the peace of Europe was to be preserved by it; and that, finally, should Russia refuse a settlement which confirmed to her everything to which under Treaty she could pretend, she put herself still more decidedly in the wrong than she was already, and would be the object of still greater blame on the part of all Europe.

Upon the whole, on leaving M. de Lhuys, I hoped that I had disposed him favourably to the adoption of your Lordship's views; and I was therefore much disappointed, on visiting him yesterday, to find greater reluctance than I had anticipated to entertain the proposals of Her Majesty's Government.

M. de Lhuys said that he had taken the Emperor's orders since he had seen me, and had found His Majesty's views and observations to be so correct, that he could not but adopt them. The Emperor, he went on to say, would have no objection to see the words of the proposed Convention embodied in a firman, and promulgated by the Sultan's orders, or His Majesty would be ready to convert it into a general Covention; but he had a decided repugnance to give the Emperor of Russia fresh power of protection, not only over the members of the Oriental Church in Turkey, but over all denominations of the Sultan's Christian subjects. He must also observe, that although the proposed Draft contained nothing more than was to be found in former Treaties, there was this difference, that those Treaties were for the most part directed to particular parts or provinces of the Sultan's dominions, some of them no longer belonging to the Porte, while the present proposal embraced the whole Turkish Empire.

A repetition of the arguments which I employed to combat M. de Lhuys' objections, would be useless. In fact, they could be of no avail, since M. de Lhuys entrenched himself behind the Emperor's decision. Determined, however, to know how far these objections were the true ones, I remarked to M. de Lhuys, that the Emperor's scruples might be respected, and the object proposed by Her Majesty's Government might perhaps be attained by an alteration in the wording of the Draft; and while with him I sketched out such modifications as I thought might meet the exigencies of the case, inquiring whether, supposing Her Majesty's Government to be satisfied with the Draft so altered, he would be prepared to sanction and act upon it.

He replied, that having taken the Emperor's orders, he could say nothing positive without a further reference to His Majesty; but that if I would send him a copy of the proposed modifications, he would submit them immediately for His Majesty's consideration. He added, that although the alterations I had suggested made the Draft less objectionable, he must confess he should regret the necessity for any Convention at all; that Russia having declared she would be satisfied with a note, he did not see why we were to revert to a Treaty.

I rejoined, that it was just the form of a Treaty which would possibly render the proposal acceptable to Russia—the object we all had in view; and that I considered in general a Treaty or Convention less dangerous than a note, because the substance of it was settled by both parties beforehand, whereas Russia might, in a written answer, put what construction she pleased on any assurances contained in a note, and the Porte must either acquiesce in them by silence, or re-open the whole question by disputing the interpretation given by Russia.

I have the honour to inclose herewith the Draft in its modified form, a copy of which I transmitted to M. de Lhuys yesterday evening. Of course, I gave him to understand that I had no power to make the alterations, and that their acceptance or rejection rested entirely with His Majesty's Government. I may perhaps be permitted to add, that the object which I had in view was to make it appear that whatever assurances were now given to the members of the Greek Church, were derived from promises already made to the whole Christian population of Turkey, and at the same time so to word the Articles of the Treaty that whatever in them bound the Porte to Russia, regarded the Greek Church alone.

In the conversations with M. de Lhuys to which I have referred above, he alluded to a counter-proposition on his part, which must have crossed your Lordship's despatches on the road. He had imagined, he said, a note taken partly from that proposed by Prince Menchikoff, and partly from Reshid Pasha's unaccepted answer, which he had put together, and sent to Count Walewski, for communication to your Lordship. He did not, however, he added, hold in any way to its being adopted.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

Inclosure in No. 506.

Draft of a Convention between Russia and the Porte confirmatory of the Articles touching the Orthodox Eastern Religion in the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople.

HIS Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having expressed to His Highness the Sultan his desire that at this particular juncture the privileges enjoyed in the Ottoman dominions by the members of the Orthodox Eastern Church should be solemnly recognized by the Sublime Porte, so that no doubt or uncertainty should exist as to the right of the members of that Church fully to participate in the privileges, immunities, and other advantages which by the Treaty between Russia and the Porte concluded at Koutchouk Kainardji on the $\frac{16}{28}$ July, 1774, and by the further Treaty between the same Powers concluded at Adrianople on the $\frac{14}{26}$ September, 1829, were stated generally to belong to the Christian religion in the said dominions; and His Highness the Sultan being anxious to comply with the desire of His Imperial Majesty; it has seemed good to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and to His Highness the Sultan that the several stipulations relating to the Orthodox Eastern religion contained in the aforesaid Treaties of Koutchouk Kainardji and Adrianople should be embodied in one special and separate Act, which shall serve hereafter as a perpetual memorial of the deep interest taken by His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias in the well-being of the members of that particular Church of Christ which is dominant in His Imperial Majesty's dominions.

For this purpose His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and His Highness the Sultan have named as their Plenipotentiaries, &c.

Who having communicated to each other their respective full-powers, found in due and proper form, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles:

ARTICLE I.

The Sublime Porte having constantly promised to protect the Christian

religion in all its churches within the Ottoman dominions, and to offer no obstacle to the free exercise of their religious rights by Christians of every denomination, and to secure from insult and injury on account of their religion the ecclesiastics belonging to the various Christian Churches and the members of their respective flocks, renews and confirms those promises in favour of the ecclesiastics and members of the Orthodox Eastern Church.

ARTICLE II.

The Sublime Porte engages further, in order to enable the Christian subjects of the Sultan professing the Eastern Orthodox faith, to exercise their religious worship according to the tenets of their creed, to allow new churches to be built and ancient churches to be repaired, whenever and wherever the same may be necessary, to secure these churches and other religious establishments belonging to the said creed from oppression, exaction, and confiscation, and to recognize according to their rank and station, the dignitaries and other ecclesiastics of the Orthodox Christian Church.

ARTICLE III.

His Highness the Sultan, moreover, engages scrupulously to observe the stipulations of Article VII of the Treaty of Kontchouk Kainardji, relating to the church at that time to be built at Constantinople, and to the persons to be employed in that church; the stipulation of Article VIII of the aforesaid Treaty relating to Russian pilgrims and travellers, whether ecclesiastics or laymen, proceeding to Jerusalem or other places of interest; and the stipulations of Article XIV of the aforesaid Treaty in favour of the Russo-Greek church at that time to be built at Galata; which Articles shall be deemed and taken to be inserted word for word in the present Treaty.

The Plenipotentiaries aforesaid have accordingly set their hands and seals to these Articles, agreeing further that the same shall be duly accepted and ratified by their respective Sovereigns within the space of

Done at

No. 507.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 29.*)

(No. 481.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 28, 1853.*

M. DROUYN DE LHUYS appears much preoccupied with the analogy which exists between the acts and language of Russia with respect to the Oriental question in the present day, and the acts and language of the same Power when applied to Poland nearly a century ago. He made me read yesterday various extracts from documents and Treaties showing the interference of Russia in Poland seemingly in favour of the Greek Church, and its gradual conversion into language such as is now used towards the Porte. The resemblance is not a little curious.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 508.

Lord Cowley to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 29.*)

(No. 484. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, June 28 (6 P.M.), 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 480 of this day's date, I regret to state that M. Drouyn de Lhuys informs me that he has seen the Emperor again this morning, and that His Majesty's scruples against recommending a Treaty between Russia and the Porte, even in the modified form which I had ventured to suggest, remain unaltered. His Majesty can see no difference between what is now proposed and what Prince Menchikoff insisted upon. I drew M. Drouyn de Lhuys' attention to the conciseness of the points detailed in the one, and to the vagueness of the assurances required by the other, but although I am far from saying that the French Government, if pressed, will not yield the point, it will be done with great reluctance.

So long as the proposed Treaty contained general assurances to Russia alone in regard to the Christian subjects of the Porte, I was not surprised, knowing the sensitive jealousy of France on all points connected with the protection of the Roman Catholic religion in Turkey, that objections should be raised and even persevered in; but I can only account for the present persistance of M. Drouyn de Lhuys—since I put it much more to him than to the Emperor—under the supposition that he is more enamoured of his own projected note than he had previously given me to understand, and that he may have already communicated that note elsewhere than in London. I could obtain no more of him this evening than the expression of a wish that the two projects should be weighed together by Her Majesty's Government before any further decision was taken.

I have, &c.
(Signed) COWLEY.

No. 509.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June 29.*)

(No. 302. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 19, 1853.*

YOUR Lordship will not, as I am willing to hope, under the circumstances of the case disapprove of the letter addressed to Count Nesselrode, but in fact intended for the Emperor, of which I have the honour to inclose a copy.

The moment is a critical one, and my conscience will only be at rest when I have taken every precaution which my limited intelligence can suggest for preventing the differences which have shown themselves between Her Majesty's Government and that of Russia from assuming a more formidable proportion.

My previous correspondence will have shown that there appeared to be a certain hold upon the Emperor's feelings, and it is of that of which I have sought to avail myself in a letter to which I will request of your Lordship that publicity be never given.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure in No. 509.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

(Most Private.)

St. Petersburgh, June 18, 1853.

M. le Comte,

MANY of the communications which have passed between your Excellency and myself may be destined to publicity, but not so the appeal which I am desirous of making through you to your Imperial Master. This, on the contrary, must be kept profoundly secret. It is the appeal, not of a diplomatic agent, but of an humble individual; it is not addressed to the mighty Sovereign, but to the man so eminently distinguished by his regard for the dictates of honour.

The situation in which our two Governments are placed towards each other is but too evident; a hasty resolution, if acted upon, may have the effect of compromising relations which for long years have been of a most friendly nature.

I will, then, make bold to say that before any resolution be finally taken, it should be well considered whether the difference between the Governments may not arise from misapprehension.

There can, I will affirm, be no doubt that such is the case.

There can be no doubt that during the whole course of the late diplomatic proceedings at Constantinople, Her Majesty's Government were possessed with the belief of the Imperial Cabinet having but two objects in view—first, the issue of such orders by the Porte as might redress the grievances with regard to the Greek Church at Jerusalem, of which the Emperor had just cause to complain; second, the confirmation of such orders by means of an international arrangement which should guard against any recurrence of similar infringements.

Beyond these limits, as was believed by Her Majesty's Government, there was no intention on the part of the Imperial Cabinet of proceeding.

I do not endeavour at present to establish by references to verbal and written communication whether the conviction which existed on the minds of the Queen's servants was correct or not; my object is to show what it really was; what it was shown to be on the part of Ministers by their declarations in Parliament; on my own, by my having come forward to give a positive contradiction to official intelligence (since proved to have been correct) as to the object of the Russian negotiation at Constantinople.

The intelligence, I said, from whatever source it may have been derived, must be false; my contradiction of it is founded upon assurances given by the Emperor and his Ministers, and these cannot have misled me.

In the grounds of that confidence which I thus expressed, M. le Comte, I still repose my trust; not only is the Emperor incapable of allowing performance to fall short of undertaking, but his noble feelings would, I am convinced, prevent him from withholding their execution from engagements which had been, from whatever cause, misapprehended.

There might indeed be cases in which hesitation might be conceivable; it might be so if His Majesty were dealing with a State of commensurate force: it cannot be when all the force is on the side of Russia, and all the weakness on the part of the country with which diplomatic differences have unfortunately arisen.

The sum, then, of the humble hope which I am desirous of conveying to the Emperor is this: that His Majesty will show himself as great in justice and magnanimity as he is in power of every kind, and that in consideration of the belief which was at least permitted to subsist on the part of the Queen's Government, he will be pleased to cause such modifications to be made in the terms of composition with the Porte as, while providing for the Imperial Crown the fullest security against any fresh infringement of the rights of the Greek Church, shall not exceed those limits which it was understood His Majesty had assigned to himself in his demands upon the Sultan.

I will request of your Excellency to lay this letter before your gracious Master, begging His Majesty at the same time to pardon the boldness of the writer. The step upon which I have ventured is, I am aware, a very unusual one, but I dare to hope that it may find its excuse in the momentous nature of the present crisis; in the necessity which exists for all decisions affecting the most important interests of nations being taken upon the surest and most unquestionable grounds; and in that confidence in his just and equitable disposition which every one must feel who has enjoyed the privilege of being admitted to personal communication with His Majesty.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 510.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 303.)

St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

THE instruction received by the Austrian Mission is, as far as I am able to judge by an abridgment of it which has been shown to me, very much what I had the honour of reporting it to your Lordship as being.

Count Buol states the intention of the Emperor of Austria of not separating his policy from that of his Imperial friend and ally. He expresses his willingness to counsel the Porte to accept the very moderate terms which have been proposed by Prince Menchikoff to accept, even should the term of eight days given for deliberation be expired; and finally he engages himself to employ his good offices towards bringing the views of the English and French Government into harmony with those of the Emperor.

The despatch concludes by an expression with regard to the vast military resources of Russia, the real meaning of which appears to be that Russia is so powerful that no demonstration of force can be requisite for establishing that influence which is the necessary accompaniment of great strength.

There is a striking difference between these expressions of deference for the resolutions of the Emperor of Russia, and those manifestations of painful surprise with which the first accounts of Prince Menchikoff's proceedings were received at Vienna.

I have, &c.

(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 511.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 304.)

St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1853.

My Lord,

I LEARN from the French Minister that upon being questioned by the Chancellor whether the occupation of the Principalities would be responded to by the entry of the French fleet into the Dardanelles, he replied affirmatively. I am, however, disposed to think that his answer was not made in a very positive manner. However that may be, General Castelbajac acquaints me that he has suggested to his Government that it may be advisable that the occupation of the Principalities should not be immediately followed by the appearance of the fleet within the Dardanelles.

I remarked to General Castelbajac that no one could be more influenced by peaceable feelings than myself, but that it must not be forgotten that if once the Russian troops enter the Danubian Principalities a fresh difficulty will be created, as it may be held certain that they will not leave them again without a demand being made for the expenses of occupation.

The French Minister tells me that he has given the most positive contradiction to a rumour which has been artfully propagated here, according to which the Emperor has received a letter from the Emperor Napoleon expressive of his acquiescence in the justice of the Russian demands upon the Porte. I may take this opportunity of noticing to your Lordship a fresh indication of the serious

intentions of the Russian Government, which has been afforded by a purchase lately made by them at Paris for a supply of sulphate of quinine to the amount of 350,000 francs.

This shows that the Russians have not forgotten the lesson which was taught them in the campaign of 1829—a campaign which had it continued longer would have had consequences the most fatal to the aggressive army, reduced as it already was by ague and fever.

I will not occupy your Lordship's time by dwelling upon the reflections which are suggested by the conduct of the Russian Cabinet in thus compromising the peace of the world in their pursuit of a selfish and inadequate object. I will only observe that the effect of His Imperial Majesty's late diplomacy has been already to place him in contradiction with those principles which for the last quarter of a century it has been his boast to uphold; to reunite the two Governments which it was his wish to keep asunder; to procure a pre-eminent place at the Council Board of Sovereigns for the illegitimate possessor of a throne he so much desired to keep in the back ground; and to commit to revolutionary France that defence of Conservative principles, and that upholding of international engagements, which he suddenly abandons.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

P.S.—Since writing my despatch I learn that an additional supply of quinine of the value of 10,000*l.* sterling has been bought by the Russian Government of the English house of Moberly and Co.

G. H. S.

No. 512.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 305. Confidential.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1853.*

ACCORDING to information received by the Imperial Government the state of Turkey is deplorable: several of the provinces are so overrun by brigands, that not only villages but towns are attacked by them; the dissensions between Turks and their fellow Greek subjects are so great that at any moment scenes of violence may be expected; the Councils of the Sultan are torn by uncertainty and apprehension, and the military resources of the Empire are so inadequate that Omar Pasha has only been able to collect 12,000 men with which he was hastening to occupy Shumla.

I am very far from asserting that these statements are correct, but I think it right to state to your Lordship what information is sent in by the Russian agents, as by this the decisions of the Government are likely to be influenced.

The reports which have reached me as to the state of the Russian army in the South is, I must remark, as little flattering as those which are made to the Imperial Cabinet with regard to Turkey.

A large number of men are upon the sick list; the officers of the different corps give a very indifferent account of the mens' clothing and accoutrements, and the want of boots and shoes is severely felt even before any invasion of an enemy's, or as I should more properly say a friendly country has been undertaken.

No one here appears to consider it possible that with an army so ill-provided as that now assembled, a campaign in Turkey can be attempted at this advanced period of the season, but a very general belief prevails that 50,000 men will be marched into the Principalities.

Some uneasiness is felt by the British merchants here at the critical aspect of affairs; but as far as I have an opportunity of judging, the best possible spirit prevails amongst them.

They desire that every reasonable effort should be made to avoid war, they have no wish that peace should be prolonged by means of dishonourable concessions, and they feel as they have every right to do that in a war between

England and Russia, the great balance of loss must be borne by the latter Power.

On some future occasion, I shall have the honour of addressing your Lordship in more detail upon this subject; in the mean time I will only remark that the Russians, who for years have been only in the habit of measuring their strength against Persians, Turks, Tartars, and other uncivilized nations and tribes, are prone to form an incorrect estimate of their resources. Unless I much err, a war between Russia and the west of Europe could not be carried on for two years without producing such a crisis as would render the condition of this country as precarious as that of Turkey is represented as being.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 513.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 306. Secret.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 21, 1853.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 302, I have the honour of inclosing to your Lordship the copy of the answer which has been returned by the Chancellor to my letter of the 18th instant.

In my rejoinder, a copy of which I have likewise the honour to transmit, I have taken note of the objects professed to be sought at Constantinople by the Russian Chancellerie, and which, if words bore the same sense in this country which is affixed to them in all others, might I think be obtained for the Emperor without danger to the Sultan's authority. I have further attempted to reconcile the Russian Minister to the idea of the differences with the Porte being submitted to negotiation.

As regards the insinuations thrown out in Count Nesselrode's letter against a most valuable servant of the Crown, it is really unworthy of the man by whom it is made, and the Sovereign whose prejudices he is seen to adopt. Your Lordship will, I trust, not disapprove of the manner in which I have met an indirect accusation.

The explanation of this maliciousness is very simple. Prince Menchikoff has compromised such reputation as he possessed at Constantinople, where he proved himself an awkward diplomatist, and when after failing to make an advantageous Treaty, he failed again in his endeavour to get up an intelligible quarrel.

It became necessary to account for failure, and the ready method was before him—he had only to charge his English colleague with having intrigued against him.

That Prince Menchikoff should have acted this part is no matter of surprise; that his calumnies should have been adopted by the Emperor and his ancient servant must, like many late passages in Russian history, be painful to those who take an interest in the character of public men.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

Inclosure 1 in No. 513.

Count Nesselrode to Sir G. H. Seymour.

(Très Confidentiel.)

Mon cher Sir Hamilton, *St. Pétersbourg, le* $\frac{8}{20}$ *Juin,* 1853.

J'AI reçu votre billet "most private," et je ne manquerai pas de le porter à la connaissance de l'Empereur. Je ne doute pas que Sa Majesté n'apprécie les bonnes intentions qui vous l'ont dicté et qui ont si constamment présidé à toutes vos actions depuis que vous représentez Sa Majesté la Reine auprés de son auguste ami et allié. En attendant, permettez-moi de vous offrir quelques

observations que le contenu de votre billet m'a suggérées. Il me paraît qu'en me l'adressant, vous avez eu principalement pour but d'éclaircir un malentendu qui d'après l'idée qu'on veut s'en faire en Angleterre impliquerait une contradiction entre les assurances données à votre Gouvernement et les demandes faites à la Porte par l'organe du Prince Menchikoff. Après avoir trouvé cette assertion dans plusieurs des pièces de votre Cabinet que vous m'avez successivement communiquées, je me suis vainement efforcé à rechercher sur quoi pouvait porter une pareille contradiction. Jamais nous ne vous avons laissé ignorer, qu'après avoir obtenu un arrangement équitable de la question des lieux saints, nous insisterions sur une garantie pour l'avenir qui nous servît en même temps de réparation pour le passé.

Or, la main sur la conscience pourrions nous en exiger une qui fût moins attentatoire à la dignité et à l'indépendance de la Porte que celle que nous assurait la note proposée à Reshid Pasha par le Prince Menchikoff peu avant son départ—note pleine de ménagement pour l'autorité souveraine et rédigée dans des termes où chaque ligne respire le respect dont l'Empereur désire que le Trône du Sultan soit constamment entouré.

Après avoir reçu votre billet, j'ai encore relu cette pièce avec la plus scrupuleuse attention, et je dois vous avouer franchement que je n'y trouve pas un mot à changer à moins d'en dénaturer le sens au point de nous priver de toute garantie pour l'avenir, afin de procurer à certains amours-propres personnelles la triste satisfaction d'avoir fait manquer à la Russie le but qu'elle s'est proposé en insistant sur cette demande.

Or ce but n'est autre que le maintien d'un état de choses qui existe; nous ne demandons aucun privilège de plus, aucune immunité nouvelle en faveur de nos coreligionnaires; nous voulons seulement qu'ils conservent ce qu'ils possèdent. Qu'une prétention aussi juste, aussi modérée, qui n'affecte les intérêts divers d'aucune Puissance Etrangère, puisse produire une complication sérieuse entre la Russie et l'Angleterre, et amener jusqu'à une rupture, jamais je ne le croirai. Il faudrait pour cela, mon cher Sir Hamilton, que le sens commun fût banni de la terre; et j'ai une trop haute opinion de vos hommes d'état pour craindre qu'ils se laissent emporter par un public passionné dont l'opinion a été si imprudemment faussé.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) NESSELRODE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 543.

Sir G. H. Seymour to Count Nesselrode.

My dear Count Nesselrode, *St. Petersburgh, June $\frac{9}{21}$, 1853.*

I SHOULD be very sorry to occupy your time by a correspondence which should lead to no good and practical results. You must allow me, however, after thanking you for the very flattering expressions regarding myself contained in your letter of yesterday's date, to make the following brief observations.

The object of my preceding letter was not to examine whether the terms proposed by Prince Menchikoff to the Porte are reasonable or not. I was desirous rather of establishing the fact of their being very unlike what they were expected to be by the Queen's Ministers and by myself, after the explanations and assurances which we had severally received.

Upon this point I can only affirm, as a man of honour, that I had always understood that Prince Menchikoff's mission related solely to the holy places, and to such a solemn confirmation of the firman to be issued by the Sultan, as would guard against a repetition of the causes of displeasure which had been given by the Porte to the Emperor's Government.

As to the judgment to be passed upon the conditions actually laid down by Prince Menchikoff, I would venture to remark that it would be best pronounced by some impartial party, that is, neither by the party to whom the demand is addressed, nor that by whom it is made.

To the opinion of any such impartial tribunal, I should rejoice in hearing that the decision of the question now pending were to be submitted; and I cannot doubt that the sentence would be received on all sides with satisfaction,

were it to be given in the sense of the following passage in your Excellency's letter now lying before me: "Or ce but (that of Russia), n'est autre que le maintien d'un état de choses qui existe; nous ne demandons aucun privilège de plus, aucune immunité nouvelle en faveur de nos coreligionaires; nous voulons seulement qu'ils conservent ce qu'ils possèdent."

That this object might be obtained with security as regards the Emperor's Government, and without loss of dignity upon that of the Sultan, appears to me not to admit of a question.

Before concluding, I shall venture upon one other observation.

It might be inferred, from a passage in your Excellency's letter, that persons in the service of the Queen, my gracious Sovereign, had bent their thoughts upon the satisfaction of thwarting a just and reasonable object of the Imperial Cabinet. To this I can only return the expression of my entire disbelief in the existence of any such feeling on the part of any servants or servant of the English Crown.

The feeling would be an unworthy one in itself, and would be doubly so as regards the servants of a Sovereign attached by the strong ties of personal friendship to the Emperor, and whose Ministers have certainly no more important object in view than that of giving every proof of their desire to cultivate the most amicable relations with the Government of His Imperial Majesty, which may be compatible at once with the dignity and advantage of the two Crowns, and with the rights of friendly and independent countries.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 544.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 99.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 14, 1853.*

SINCE I wrote to you announcing the arrival of a letter from Count Nesselrode to Reshid Pacha, and stating in substance its contents, I have had the honour to receive your Lordship's instructions by the "Caradoc" and also by messenger Webster.

I am highly gratified by the approval of Her Majesty's Government expressed with reference to such of my proceedings relative to the late negotiations between Prince Menchikoff and the Porte, as had then come to your Lordship's knowledge. The flattering confidence which Her Majesty's Government have also indulgently placed in my discretion and zeal for the public service deserves my deepest gratitude, though I cannot be insensible to the grave responsibility which accompanies it. I agree with your Lordship in hoping that Her Majesty's Mediterranean squadron, though ordered to the entrance of the Dardanelles and placed at my disposal, will not be wanted for any more active or perilous service. It will be my pride, as it is my duty, to take advantage of every passing circumstance calculated to improve the prospects of peace and to avert the dangers of an actual collision between Russia and the Porte.

I have communicated on this subject with the French Ambassador, and, judging from his language, have every reason to believe that he is animated by similar sentiments, and ready to cooperate heartily with me for the attainment of our common objects. He informs me that the French squadron at Salamis will probably reach the anchorage near Tenedos to-morrow, and I reckon upon the arrival of Admiral Dundas at the same well known station either to-night or in the morning.

I need not inform your Lordship that the Sultan and his Ministers are greatly encouraged by such demonstrations of sympathy and support. It is satisfactory at the same time to know that they did not wait for those demonstrations in order to take their stand against the inadmissible demands of Russia. Your Lordship will have learnt from the anterior parts of my correspondence how early they perceived the dangerous tendency of these demands, and with what perseverance and courage they have pursued a course of procedure at once both firm and conciliatory.

I have now the honour to inclose a copy of Count Nesselrode's letter, and I am greatly mistaken if it does not increase the feelings of surprise and regret with which you have traced the late inconsistencies of Russian diplomacy. In communicating with Reshid Pasha on the subject of this letter, I have studiously abstained from the use of exciting language, but it is impossible not to be struck with the contrast which it exhibits between professions and acts, or to repress every indignant emotion when told with the utmost complacency that the Russian armies are soon to cross the frontier, not to make war on the Sultan, but to seize a material in place of a moral guarantee.

The Turkish Minister's reply will, in substance, reject the requisition which was rejected before; but, if my advice be followed, an opening will still be left for further negotiation, if Russia be content to forego that pretension which the voice of Europe has so universally condemned.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 515.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 100.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 15, 1853.*

I HAVE seen Reshid Pasha this morning. No change appears to have taken place in the counsels of the Porte respecting Russia. His Highness's answer to Count Nesselrode's letter will be delivered to-morrow for transmission to St. Petersburgh. I have seen the draft of it, which will probably undergo some further amendment. Count Nesselrode is given to understand that his advice cannot be followed in the present instance, but a readiness is expressed on the part of the Sultan's Government to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh for the purpose of resuming the dropped negotiation, provided there be no further question of an engagement inconsistent with the Sovereign rights and independence of the Porte.

Judging from the language of the Russian Embassy when it was here, I cannot venture to augur any good result from this overture. But I have not hesitated to recommend its adoption to Reshid Pasha, now that the Porte has taken up a ground acknowledged as right and necessary by the general voice of Europe, and that the Emperor of Russia may possibly be thereby disposed to better counsels, notwithstanding the embarrassing position in which he has placed himself.

I am just informed, though not on official authority, that Admiral Dundas has brought up his fleet to Besika Bay. The French Admiral will probably reach the same station to-day or to-morrow.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE

No. 516.

The Earl of Clarendon to Lord Cowley.

(No. 263.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, June 30, 1853.*

HER Majesty's Government entirely approve your Excellency's proceedings with reference to my despatch No 256 and its inclosure, and I have now to inform you that under all the circumstances and after due deliberation, Her Majesty's Government have determined not to offer to the Porte the advice contained in my proposed draft of despatch to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

Your Excellency will make known this determination to M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and inform him at the same time that his proposition, which was communicated to me by Count Walewski, has been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government, who apprehend that it is hardly calculated to effect the

object in view. This document is drawn up with skill and ability, but it could not be acceptable to Russia, particularly as regards the Holy Places, and in that case such a proposal on the part of the Porte for settling the question might possibly be productive of more harm than good.

I am, &c.
(Signed) CLARENDON

No. 517.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 102.)
My Lord, *Therapia, June 16, 1853.*

I HASTEN to transmit herewith a copy of Reshid Pasha's answer to Count Nesselrode's letter, of which both the substance and a copy have been successively forwarded to your Lordship.

The Porte, as you will perceive, my Lord, has in no respect receded from the position which it occupied at the time of Prince Menchikoff's departure. Appropriate remarks have been made on all the salient points of Count Nesselrode's letter. The menace of sending the Russian forces across the frontiers, at the same time that the intention of making war against the Sultan is discarded, has been noticed in becoming, though moderate, terms. The last proof of an unpretending and conciliatory spirit is given by the expression of the Porte's readiness to send an Ambassador to St. Petersburgh, and there to resume the negotiations upon a distinct understanding that the Russian Government will no longer urge the pretension which at present forms the essential matter of difference between that Power and the Porte.

It may well be feared that the prospect of success in making this overture is extremely slender, but in the hope of averting so great a calamity as war, I feel that no chance should be neglected.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure in No. 517.

Reshid Pasha to Count Nesselrode.

Monsieur, *Constantinople, le 4/16 Juin, 1853.*

JE me suis empressé de mettre sous les yeux de Sa Majesté mon Auguste Maître la dépêche que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser le 14/26 Mai dernier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan a toujours montré en toute occasion les plus grands égards pour Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, qu'il considère comme son allié sincère et comme un voisin bien intentionné. La Sublime Porte, ne mettant nullement en doute les intentions généreuses de l'Empereur, a ressenti un profond chagrin de l'interruption des relations diplomatiques survenue malheureusement parce que l'on n'a pas bien compris peut-être l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouvait à propos de la question soulevée par le Prince Menchikoff de consigner dans un engagement diplomatique les privilèges religieux accordés au rite Grec. Toutefois, elle éprouve la consolation de voir que pour sa part elle n'a nullement contribué à amener un semblable état de choses. En effet, le Gouvernement Ottoman a montré, dès le principe, les meilleures dispositions et toutes les facilités relativement à toutes les questions que le Prince Menchikoff était chargé de régler d'après les ordres de l'Empereur. Et même dans une question si délicate que celle des privilèges religieux de l'Eglise Grecque, s'inspirant encore de ses sentiments pacifiques et ne refusant pas les assurances que pouvaient faire disparaître et réduire à néant tous les doutes qui auraient pû s'élever à cet égard, la Sublime Porte espérait surtout de la sagesse reconnue de Prince Menchikoff que cet Ambassadeur se montrerait satisfait du projet de

note qui lui avait été transmis en dernier lieu et qui contenait toutes les assurances demandées. Quoiqu'il en soit ce fait regrettable s'est produit.

Il est vrai que Son Altesse le Prince Menchikoff a la seconde fois abrégé la minute de Sened qu'il avait présenté d'abord, et en donnant à la fin un projet de note il a fait quelques changemens soit dans les termes, soit dans la rédaction et le titre de la pièce; mais le sens d'un engagement s'y trouvait toujours; et comme cet engagement diplomatique ne peut s'accorder ni avec l'indépendance du Gouvernement Ottoman, ni avec les droits de son autorité souveraine, on ne saurait donner aux motifs d'impossibilité réelle présentés sur ce point par la Porte, le nom de refus, et faire de cela une question d'honneur pour l'Empereur de Russie.

De plus, si l'on se plaint de cette impossibilité en l'attribuant à un sentiment de défiance, la Russie en ne tenant aucun compte de toutes les assurances offertes de la manière la plus solennelle par la Porte, et en déclarant qu'il était indispensable de les consigner dans un Acte ayant force d'engagement, ne donne-t-elle pas plutôt une preuve patente de son manque de confiance envers le Gouvernement Ottoman? Et celui-ci n'a-t-il pas à son tour le droit de s'en plaindre?

Il s'en remet pour répondre à ces deux points à la justice si connue de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie, ainsi qu'à la haute raison et aux sentiments éminemment pacifiques de votre Excellence que chacun d'ailleurs a pu reconnaître et apprécier.

Sa Majesté le Sultan par des firmans Impériaux révêtus de son Auguste khatti-sheriff, vient de confirmer de nouveau les privilèges, droits, et immunités dont les religieux et les églises du rite Grec jouissent *ab antiquo*.

La Sublime Porte n'hésitera jamais à maintenir et à donner les assurances contenues et promises dans le projet de note remis au Prince Menchikoff peu avant son depart. La dépêche reçue de la part de votre Excellence parle de l'intention de faire passer les frontières aux troupes Russes. Cette déclaration est incompatible avec les assurances de paix et de bon vouloir de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Elle est, en verité, si contraire à ce que l'on est en droit d'attendre de la part d'une Puissance amie, que la Sublime Porte ne saurait comment l'accepter.

Les préparatifs militaires et les travaux de défense ordonnés par la Porte, ainsi qu'elle l'a déclaré officiellement aux Puissances, ne sont donc nécessités que par les armemens considérables de la Russie; ils ne constituent qu'une mesure purement défensive. Le Gouvernement du Sultan n'ayant aucune intention hostile contre la Russie, exprime le désir que les anciennes relations que Sa Majesté regarde comme si précieuses, et dont les nombreux avantages sont manifestés pour les deux parties, soient établies dans leur état primitif.

J'espère que la Cour de Russie appréciera avec une sentiment de confiante conciliation les intentions sincères et loyales de la Sublime Porte et tiendra compte de l'impossibilité réelle où elle se trouve de déférer aux désirs qui lui ont été exprimés. Que cette impossibilité soit appréciée comme elle mérite de l'être, et la Sublime Porte, je puis l'assurer à votre Excellence, n'hésitera pas à charger un Ambassadeur Extraordinaire de se rendre à St. Pétersbourg pour y renouer les négociations et chercher de concert avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie un accommodement qui, tout en étant agréable à Sa Majesté, serait tel que la Porte pourrait accepter sans porter aucune atteinte soit aux bases de son indépendance soit à l'autorité souveraine de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

Votre Excellence peut tenir pour certain que pour ma part j'appelle ce résultat de tous mes vœux. J'aime à croire que de son côté il en est de même.

Je prie, &c.
(Signé) RESHID.

No. 518.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 103.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 16, 1853.

I HAD an audience of the Sultan this morning and presented Her Majesty's letter announcing the birth of a Prince. His Majesty received the communication with much interest, and desired me to assure the Queen that any incident calculated to augment Her Majesty's domestic happiness was a cause of real gratification to himself.

I took advantage of the opportunity to offer Her Majesty's condolence on the severe affliction which the Sultan had recently experienced by the loss of his mother, the late Validé Sultana.

I next referred to the arrival of Admiral Dundas with the squadron under his command in Besika Bay, and explained to His Imperial Majesty with what friendly sentiments and eventual intentions so powerful a force had been placed at my disposal. I gave him distinctly to understand that peace was the great object of British policy, as it was no doubt that of His Majesty's, and, consequently, that the services of the British squadron could only be called into more decided action for the purpose of averting an immediate and otherwise unavoidable danger from the Ottoman Empire, and the independence of His Majesty's authority when menaced by foreign aggression.

The Sultan acquiesced in this declaration of the views of Her Majesty's Government, and expressed a deep feeling of gratitude for the unequivocal marks of sympathy and cordial support afforded to him and his empire under the critical circumstances in which he is now placed.

He was, moreover, pleased to express his satisfaction with the counsels which I had occasionally given him during the late negotiations.

Before leaving His Majesty's presence I reminded him of what I had frequently stated before with respect to the importance, and indeed necessity, of no longer deferring those additional acts of benevolence towards his Christian subjects, and those comprehensive measures of administrative improvement, which are so imperiously required for this empire by the general voice of Europe and the necessities of the time. I expressed my unwillingness to trespass at any length upon his Majesty's indulgence during the period of religious seclusion now in progress, but I solicited his permission to enter more particularly upon the subject with one or more of his confidential servants, in order to prepare a distinct plan for His Majesty's consideration hereafter. The Sultan condescended to declare his approbation of this suggestion; and I hope that with the assistance of Reshid Pasha, and the employment of other means, I may be able finally to realise a portion at least of the hopes which I have made it my duty to cherish in spite of frequent disappointment.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 519.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June* 17, 1853.

THE Sultan's Minister for Foreign Affairs, on receiving Count Nesselrode's letter of the $\frac{1}{13}$ May, requested that I would draw up the reply to it. Although in the present state of things I conceived that it would be more prudent not to comply with his wish, I cheerfully undertook to suggest any amendments that might occur to me in his Highness's draft of the letter. Thus far I have taken part in the composition, and that passage in particular which takes notice of Count Nesselrode's declaration as to the Russian armies passing the frontier was introduced at my suggestion. I thought that the silence of Reshid Pasha on so offensive an intimation would be liable to misconstruction, but I took care to

word the animadversion in such manner as not to engage the Porte to more than a moral resistance.

The idea of an eventual Embassy to St. Petersburgh originated with my French colleague, or rather perhaps with M. de Klezl, who several weeks ago warmly recommended the adoption of that expedient to the Turkish Minister. I have thought from the first that the measure would in all likelihood prove as fruitless in the experiment as it was obvious in conception. It was not to be expected that the Emperor of Russia, who fancied that he had found no small amount of double dealing in the conduct of the last Turkish Ambassador accredited to his Court, and who complained that the Sultan's assurances, though addressed directly to himself, were never realized, would be satisfied or even otherwise than irritated by a fresh attempt to soften him with autograph letters and extraordinary Embassies. My impressions on this subject were confirmed shortly after the departure of Prince Menchikoff by a member of the Russian Embassy, who assured me that the Sultan's Ambassador, if an appointment of the kind were to take place, would not be received at St. Petersburgh, and that the case had been provided for in the instructions given to his chief.

I have nevertheless acquiesced in the present overture, for reasons which I hope will be found satisfactory by Her Majesty's Government. Before it can reach the Emperor of Russia, His Majesty will have learnt how completely the opinion of Europe has shown itself adverse to his pretensions, and with what difficulties he will have to contend in proceeding to give effect to an aggressive policy against Turkey. It is reasonable to hope that under such circumstances the Russian Government may be inclined to catch at anything which may offer a chance of relieving it with honour from the embarrassment of a false position. To these considerations may be added the hypothetical nature of the present overture which shelters the Sultan from the humiliation of having his Ambassador rejected, while it affords an additional evidence of the Porte's conciliatory and peaceable spirit within the limits prescribed by a due regard for its independence and sovereign authority. Such are the principal motives which have prevailed with me to acquiesce in M. de la Cour's experiment, and most sincerely do I hope that the result may be such as every friend of peace must desire. I have taken care that there should be no mistake as to the Porte's consistency on the main point of difference, and if the Emperor Nicholas were after all to accept the proposal, it is understood that Her Majesty's Embassy will have a voice in the selection of the Ambassador and a control over the draft of his instructions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 520.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 105.)

My Lord, *Therapia, June 17, 1853.*

THE Porte's reply to Count Nesselrode's letter was conveyed this morning to Odessa by the last remaining member of the Russian diplomacy here. It is worthy of note that M. Balabine, the individual in question, took away with him the archives and official correspondence of the Legation.

Advices from Odessa to the 10th instant state that the Divisions of the 4th Russian corps d'armée were marching rapidly towards the Pruth, and that those of the 3rd corps were moving to succeed them. Inclosed herewith are copies of Mr. Yeames' reports.

I have, &c.
(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 520.

Consul Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Odessa, June 9, 1853.*

I HAVE within this hour had authentic intelligence that on the 31st ultimo orders were received at Kremenetz, the head quarters of the 4th corps d'armée, to march immediately to the Pruth. The three Divisions have been in motion since that day, as also the corps of Cavalry stationed at Vouitza. The 10th and 11th Divisions of Infantry are directed to Seuleni, where the head-quarters of the corps will be removed; and the 12th Division to Leovo, there to join the 15th Division belonging to the 5th corps. On the 13th instant, three regiments of the 10th Division will already have been encamped at Seuleni.

This intelligence is to be depended upon.

The immediate occupation of Moldavia is anticipated in Kremenetz, and at all events the 4th corps will be in advance of the 5th corps, the troops of which, as I have already said, have orders not to leave their present positions.

I am obliged to write hastily to profit by an opportunity unexpectedly offered.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. YEAMES

Inclosure 2 in No. 520.

Consul Yeames to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.

My Lord, *Odessa, June 10, 1853.*

I BEG leave to number my letters commencing from the first written since your Excellency's late arrival in Constantinople. I have now to refer to those of the 6th, 8th, and 9th instant, forwarded by the "Hope," G. Potts, Master. Similar opportunities are becoming very rare, and I avail myself of the present one particularly to confirm the intelligence contained in my last.

I have this morning received from Kremenetz further advices down to the 6th instant. All the troops of the 4th corps are in rapid motion towards the Pruth; the remittances made from St. Petersburgh are all in gold, and every circumstance denotes the intention of an early occupation of the two Danubian Principalities.

Prince Gortchakoff, I am told, is already appointed as Commander-in-Chief.

The 3rd corps d'armée now in the Government of Kief is also in motion to take up the positions of the 4th corps, facing the frontier of Austria, or to support the future operations of the advanced corps.

The 5th corps continues motionless in the positions I have often described, nor is any stir perceptible in this place.

Prince Menchikoff is not here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JAS. YEAMES.

P.S.—My information respecting a bridge on floats at Ismail is very imperfect. I know, however, that there are no troops in that quarter.

Our Vice-Consul, Mr. W. Vincent Lloyd, at Ismail, has not written to me for months, and I know not what has become of him.

J. Y.

No. 521.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 108.) *Therapia, June* 17, 1853.

My Lord,

M. PISANI was with Reshid Pasha to-night on sundry matters of business, when his Highness received a message from Prince Vogorides, agent to the Prince of Moldavia, informing him that, according to advices which had just reached him from Jassy, the Russian troops were within two hours of that city, and that the Hospodar had ordered provisions and other necessaries to be prepared for the expected army.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 522.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 110.) *Therapia, June* 17, 1853.

My Lord,

IT may interest you to know that when Reshid Pasha communicated to his colleagues in the Sultan's Administration the arrival of the British and French squadrons in the neighbourhood of the Dardanelles, their Excellencies expressed apprehension of the vast expense entailed on them by the coincidence of their own preparations with the extraordinary means supplied by their friends.

When the Pasha assured them that, judging from past experience, the naval support afforded to the Sultan by England and France would be free of any charge upon His Majesty's Treasury, they could find no terms in which to express the fulness of their surprise, admiration, and gratitude.

I venture to draw a good augury from this manifestation of their feelings with respect to those acts of benevolence towards the Christian population in this Empire, of which I have so deeply at heart to obtain the adoption and enforcement

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 523.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 111.) *Therapia, June* 17, 1853.

My Lord,

I RECEIVED a visit from the Austrian Internuncio yesterday. His manner and language promise well for our future relations. He gave me to understand that his Government had been strangely surprised by the final demands of Prince Menchikoff, and that he expected to learn in a few days the result of what Count Buol had written to St. Petersburgh in order to obtain explanations and to promote pacific dispositions. He drew a favourable conclusion from the return of M. de Meyendorff to Vienna.

In the course of our conversation I sounded M. de Bruck upon the subject of counselling the Porte to place its Christian subjects on a more favourable footing, and he assured me of his inclination to cooperate with me for that purpose.

I am happy to add that I have a similar assurance from the Prussian Envoy.

I have, &c.

(Signed) STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

No. 524.

The Earl of Westmorland to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received June* 30.)

(No. 251. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Vienna, June* 27, 1853.

IN obedience to the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 168, I waited upon Count Buol for the purpose of ascertaining whether the views of Austria in the affairs of Turkey were such as I had expressed them in my despatch No. 237 and other recent despatches to your Lordship, or whether they were more accurately represented by the impressions which, from the documents transmitted to me by your Lordship, Baron Manteuffel appears to entertain with regard to Austrian subserviency to Russia. I am happy to be able to inform your Lordship that the correctness of my statements in the above-mentioned despatch, and subsequently, as to the line of policy adopted by Count Buol, is completely corroborated not only by his own verbal assertions, but also the correspondence with his own diplomatic agents in London and St. Petersburgh, as well as by his communications with Baron de Bourqueney. In the execution of your Lordship's directions I felt that the only mode of dealing fairly with Count Buol in my endeavour to obtain the information you wished for, was to state to him without reserve the representation which had been made condemnatory of his policy, and confidentially I read to him a précis of those representations. Count Buol immediately sent for his correspondence with London and St. Petersburgh, and he read to me his despatches to Count Colloredo of the 14th and 21st instant. He read also a private letter to Count Colloredo of the 14th instant, as well as the despatches to Baron Lebzeltern, the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburgh, and his replies; also the last despatch of the 18th which he had addressed to that gentleman.

The result of this recapitulation of Count Buol's correspondence proved that he had blamed the manner and form of Prince Menchikoff's negotiations; that he objected to the Convention and the Sened he had proposed; that he also objected to some of the terms of the last note presented by him; but with regard to this note [as he stated in his private letter to Count Colloredo of the 14th] he thought there might have been a possibility of connecting its expressions with those of the one which had been offered by Reshid Pasha, so as to satisfy the expectations of the Emperor; and in the anxious desire for the maintenance of peace, he had directed Baron Bruck to state that under such explanations there ought no longer to be the same difficulty in acceding to the proposals of Russia.

Upon this point I asked Count Buol whether I was right in representing his meaning by the words of my despatch No. 237, which were "that he had pointed out to the Turkish Government how desirable it would be that they should seek, by every means consistent with the honour and independence of the Sultan, to meet the requisitions of the Emperor, and had expressed a hope that the last note which was proposed to Prince Menchikoff and refused by him, may by trifling alterations be adapted to the exigencies of the moment."

Count Buol entirely agreed to the exactitude of this representation of his intentions, and of the communication he had made to me previous to my writing the despatch. Indeed, he could not do otherwise, for I had read it to him shortly after I had written it.

With respect to the "subserviency" to Russia which is said to have actuated the policy of Austria, and the approval of, rather than the finding fault with, the proceedings of that Government, Count Buol stated that he could appeal to your Lordship whether any such impression was to be derived from the despatches, particularly the one of the 21st instant, which by his direction had been submitted to you by Count Colloredo; and with regard to the interests of Germany, which he was represented as having abandoned, he felt satisfied that by using his best endeavours for the maintenance of peace with the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, he was serving her most essential interests.

Count Buol remarked that he was in hopes these explanations would no longer be necessary to your Lordship, for he had this day received from Count

Colloredo the report of a conversation which he had held with you, and which he looked upon with very great satisfaction, and he believed that when you were made acquainted with his later despatch of the 21st instant, you would be still more ready than you had hitherto been to cooperate with Austria in bringing the questions between Turkey and Russia to an amicable settlement.

Count Buol said he had been delighted to find that the instructions he had given to Baron Bruck did not materially differ from those sent by your Lordship to Lord Stratford; and he begged me to assure your Lordship that he would use his best exertions to induce the Emperor of Russia to receive with consideration and attention any proposal which may give a hope of any amicable arrangement, without compromising the independence of the Sultan.

In concluding this despatch, I think it right to state to your Lordship that I have consulted with M. de Bourqueney as to the character of the policy of Austria which we have reported to our respective Governments, and which reports we have confidentially communicated to each other; and he has corroborated the statements I have had the honour of submitting to your Lordship, as almost identical with his own, and with the declarations which had been made to him by Count Buol.

I have, &c.
(Signed) WESTMORLAND.

No. 525.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 309.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 24, 1853.*

THE French Envoy was kind enough to read me last night three or four despatches which he had received a few hours before from his Government, and than which nothing could be more satisfactory.

They speak of nothing but of the firm resolution of France of not allowing the independence of Turkey to be destroyed by what is termed the dictatorship of the Emperor of Russia; of the satisfaction of the Emperor Napoleon at finding that a perfect similarity of views enabled him to act hand in hand with Her Majesty's Government; and of the disposition felt of securing, if possible by peaceable means, the objects which France and England find themselves obliged by Treaty obligations, and by European interests, to keep in view.

Among other papers, General Castelbajac read me a very remarkable despatch from the French Envoy at Munich. Count de Segur represents M. Von der Pfordten as expressing the strongest indignation at the policy pursued by Russia towards the Porte, and as having stated that the conduct of the Emperor towards Germany had been for some years so overbearing, so in contradiction with the moderation which he was apt to recommend to other Governments, that now that His Imperial Majesty threw aside all appearance of moderation himself, it was to be hoped that he would receive a severe lesson from those other Great Powers which, like himself, were called upon to take part in the affairs of Turkey.

The expressions made use of by M. de Segur were even stronger than those which I employ in alluding to his despatch, and I do not doubt that the feeling which he so plainly announces, is that which prevails in Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 526.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 310.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 24, 1853.*

IN acknowledging the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant No. 107, I have the honour of informing you that I have placed in the hands of Count Nesselrode the draft of the firman which the Porte intended to publish for confirming the spiritual privileges of the Greek Church and its clergy. I called the attention of his Excellency to the unequivocal proof thus afforded by the Sultan of ameliorating the condition of his Christian subjects.

Count Nesselrode declined expressing any opinion upon the subject of this paper, but begged to be allowed to keep it for a time, that he might examine it at his leisure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 527.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 312.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 24, 1853.*

I UNDERSTAND that the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires received yesterday an instruction, which according to its date ought to have reached him some days ago, and which is much more in keeping with the opinions expressed by Count Buol to the Earl of Westmorland than the despatch to which I alluded in my late correspondence.

If I am rightly informed, Count Buol does not proceed to the length of expressing disapprobation of the intended measures of the Russian Government, but he does express the uneasiness which they occasion to the Austrian Cabinet, and while he announces his intention of making an appeal to the moderation of Great Britain, France, and Turkey, he equally gives it to be understood that the occupation of the Danubian Provinces would be, in the opinion of His Imperial Master, a measure liable to serious objections, and likely to be attended with considerable danger.

Similar instructions have been sent, as I understand, to the Austrian Mission at London and Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 528.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 313.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 24, 1853.*

THE arrival of the messenger Poignaud puts me in possession of your Lordship's despatches down to No. 118 inclusive, and in obedience to your Lordship's orders the despatch No. 108 has been communicated to the Chancellor.

Before stating to your Lordship, however, what passed between his Excellency and myself upon the occasion of my reading this paper to him, I am desirous of making the following observations.

Your Lordship will have perceived that from the moment of intelligence having reached St. Petersburgh of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and the Porte, my object has been to gain time for the purpose of allow-

ing the voice of moderation and reason to be heard, and of securing that the Russian Cabinet should be submitted to the impartial opinion of the Allied Governments as to the nature of the demands which have been made so imperatively upon the Sultan.

Most unfortunately, this desire on my part has been neutralized in considerable measure by the conviction which exists on the part of the Imperial Cabinet of their demands being of a nature the most moderate and reasonable —of such being, in fact the opinion of Foreign Governments; and of the opposition which they have encountered having no other origin than the desire entertained of interfering with Russia in the pursuit of a just and legitimate object necessary for the maintenance of her influence.

How a notion so totally unfounded can have arisen, I am at a loss to conceive; that it has existed and still prevails, is unfortunately not a matter of doubt.

Your Lordship will have observed that holding that neither the party who makes a demand, nor the party on whom it was made, are the proper judges of its character, I have been extremely anxious that the opinion of some impartial arbiter should be taken upon the question, and the wish can hardly be held to be unreasonable in a case in which the interests of all Europe are at stake. It has appeared, however, as if the Russian Cabinet were disposed to contest to its Allies the right of forming any judgment as to the nature of the conditions which it has endeavoured to impose upon a country the independence of which the other Great Powers are bound by Treaty engagements as well as by interest to support; and that having pronounced their own opinion upon these terms, they are to be regarded as beyond the reach of discussion and modification.

When I waited on the Chancellor, which I did on the 22nd instant, I was pleased however at hearing him state that the intelligence that he had received from London was pacific and satisfactory.

I observed that I might affirm in the most positive manner that the interests of peace were those upon which Her Majesty's Government were most intent, but that the objections entertained to Prince Menchikoff's demands in their present shape were insuperable; that there was no desire, however faint, of crossing the Emperor's just influence in the South, but that Her Majesty's Government, and no Government by which the present could be followed, could abandon a point of such importance as the independence of Turkey.

Count Nesselrode desired to read me Prince Menchikoff's note, which lay before him, and asked how it were possible that any paper should be more respectful in language, and that any demands could be less open to objection than those which it contained; great concessions had been made; the idea of a Convention had been given up; the demand regarding the "Patriarch" had been suppressed; how, he would ask, could concession be carried further?

After some exchange of words, I observed that the question was one which it was quite useless to discuss; that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government was made up; that it agreed with those of all the other Cabinets, although the particular position of Anstria might render it possible that her feelings were expressed less plainly than by other Cabinets; that I would beg therefore to suggest, before it was too late, that some different form of guarantee might be devised by the Imperial Cabinet or their friends.

I proceeded to read to Count Nesselrode your Lordship's despatch No. 108, which gave rise to a great deal of discussion, the details of which I suppress, as it was but the repetition of what has passed so often of late between his Excellency and myself.

At its conclusion I observed that as Her Majesty's Government were sincerely anxious to arrive at a true knowledge of the question before us, I thought he would do well to draw up a memorandum which should explain as well those rights enjoyed *ab antiquo* by the Greek subjects of the Porte, as those of which Russia was possessed by virtue of the Treaties of Kainardji and Adrianople, the former of which, as regarding its provisions and their application to the present demands of Russia, was but imperfectly understood by Her Majesty's Government or by myself.

Count Nesselrode undertook that this memorandum should be prepared for communication to your Lordship, and as I did not feel myself authorized to leave your Lordship's despatch in his hands, agreeably to his request, I undertook to send him such an extract of it as should fully explain what was the information which was sought by Her Majesty's Government.

I according sent his Excellency a memorandum formed of that portion of your Lordship's despatch which commences with the words "The Treaties relied on by Russia," and ending with these—"over fourteen millions of subjects of the Porte."

The conclusion of the conversation was more satisfactory than some preceding parts of it had been. The Chancellor said that in spite of all that was said and done, he still clung to the expectation of the present crisis being surmounted without an interruption of peace.

I must not, however, conceal from your Lordship my belief that the occupation of the Principalities is resolved upon; and that it is only at that stage of the proceedings that the Russian Cabinet looks to an amicable adjustment (however brought about) of the differences which now exist between the allied Cabinets.

According to my views, a Russian occupation will serve only to render composition more difficult; but, as I before stated, the impression which my various conversations with the Chancellor have left upon my mind is, that the measure is decided upon.

I ought, perhaps, to have stated that, in the course of my interview the Chancellor having remarked upon the unreasonableness of expecting that the Emperor should be called upon to recede from his position, and to modify terms already so modified, I begged leave to observe that nothing could have been more impartial and consistent than the conduct of Her Majesty's Government; that when France had unluckily disturbed a slumbering question, the language of Her Majesty's Government had been: "You have been the first to trouble the repose which prevailed; you are bound to take the first steps towards the settlement of the differences to which your conduct has given rise." Now, I went on to say, Her Majesty's Government does not even go so far. Their language is: "It is now Russia who, by her demands, puts the peace of Europe in danger. Let us settle the difficulty by negotiation, and let Russia meet us only half way."

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 529.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(Received July 1.)

(No. 314.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June 24, 1853.*

THERE are some particulars of the conversation which I held with the Chancellor on the 22nd which I reserve for a confidential despatch.

Upon my asking for explanation as to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, and the Greek rights enjoyed *ab antiquo*, the Chancellor replied that they could be best given by Baron Brunnow; that he himself knew little of the matter, while Baron Brunnow was well versed in Oriental questions.

I then suggested the idea of a memorandum, and I did so partly because I have learnt how important it is that explanations should be given in a recorded shape, and partly because the mystification which has been resorted to upon some late occasions is such, that I am persuaded that many of these explanations do but render an obscure and doubtful point still more obscure and involved.

A portion of the Chancellor's conversation, I would further remark, led me to believe that he has been grossly misled as to the feeling which prevails in England, and as the error might be dangerous, I cleared it up.

The Chancellor dwelt upon the horrors of war, and was certain, from what he learnt, that those who clamoured the most for violent measures, would be the first to recoil if there was the slightest appearance of a war with Russia; that no one in England desired it.

I intreated of his Excellency not to foster such illusions; were he more correctly informed he would find that as usual the Government were much more

pacific than the people; that the difficulty was not as to going to war, but as to keeping the country back from war; and that if my words were not credited, I would only request that the newspapers representing every shade of political opinion in England might be consulted. Upon this point, and upon one or two others, I found it necessary to speak more plainly to the Chancellor than I am in the habit of doing. His new practice of representing Lord Stratford de Redcliffe as a sort of incarnation of opposition to the Emperor's views, I thought extremely objectionable.

It was Lord Stratford alone who had taken so exaggerated a view of the Russian demands. He had alone prevented their acceptance. It was now asked that the Emperor should give way; but really, when it became a personal question between a Sovereign and an Ambassador, in his opinion it was for Lord Stratford, and not for the Emperor, to recede.

To this, and further reproach and inuendo of the same description, I simply answered that it was time to give up addressing to an individual reproaches which, if deserved at all, should be addressed to a Government; that Lord Stratford's conduct had been most proper and judicious, and as such had been entirely approved of; that his Lordship had given able and welcome support to Prince Menchikoff's demands as far as they had been explained to him and approved of by him; and that, if he had not followed the Prince in his sudden and more distant flight, it was simply because he thought that what was proposed was full of danger for Turkey—an opinion in which her Majesty's Government completely concurred.

The explanation which the Chancellor has given to various persons as to the present policy of the Western Governments is this: England has adopted it in deference to the prejudices of her Ambassador at Constantinople. France (who has not the remotest interest in Turkey) has likewise taken it up, with a view to forming an alliance with England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.

No. 530.

Sir G. H. Seymour to the Earl of Clarendon.—(*Received July* 1.)

(No. 317.)

My Lord, *St. Petersburgh, June* 25, 1853.

THE news of the arrival yesterday morning of the Russian messenger from Constantinople (which has been kept a profound secret) has just transpired, at the moment of the departure of the Stettin steamer.

According to information received from a General Officer attached to the Emperor's person, he is the bearer of the refusal of the Porte to accept Prince Menchikoff's note.

No order has been given, up to the present moment, for the Russian troops to enter the Principalities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. H. SEYMOUR.